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cçêÉïçêÇ=
Social protection systems have been set up successfully in Southeast and East Asia 
during the last decades and most countries have achieved considerable progress in 
providing security to their citizens. But at the same time, many social protection sys-
tems are characterized by lack of coverage, insufficient funds and ineffective institu-
tions. Especially the recent Asian crisis uncovered some limitations of the existing 
schemes. 
In order to promote social democracy and international understanding, the field of 
social policy has always played a central role in the work of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
In this context, social protection systems are crucial in protecting people against the 
contingencies of life. The project ‘Social protection in Southeast and East Asia’ was 
initiated by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Office for Regional Co-operation in South-
east Asia located in Singapore. Its aim is to promote dialogue on the existing social 
protection systems within the countries and to share experiences on a regional level. 
Based on a regional workshop, country studies have been developed including seven 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam) and South Korea. 
What is special about this project, considering the large number of studies available 
in this field? We aimed at achieving a comprehensive picture of social protection in 
the individual countries. Therefore the institutionalized system of social security, the 
informal sector and related labour market policies were included. Using such a broad 
perspective, not every detail about each scheme can be dealt with. However, the 
main achievements and challenges of the existing social protection systems become 
apparent and the need for coordination between different schemes is highlighted. 
These findings provide the basis for policy recommendations for each country. 
Obviously, these studies signify only one step in the whole project. They provide the 
basis for further discussion between trade unions, NGOs, academics, politicians and 
officials involved in designing social protection systems. Our networks in the indi-
vidual countries can be used to facilitate a regional exchange as well as coordinated 
efforts in improving existing schemes. 
We would like to thank all the authors who contributed to this publication, as well as 
the project leaders in the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung offices in the corresponding coun-
tries who helped to make this regional project possible. Special thanks go to Mrs. 
Belinda Wong and Michael Tröster for their help at various stages of the project. 
Erfried Adam, Michael von Hauff and Marei John 
The Editors 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=pçìíÜÉ~ëí=~åÇ=b~ëí=^ëá~=Ó=
qçï~êÇë=~=`çãéêÉÜÉåëáîÉ=máÅíìêÉN=
j~êÉá=gçÜå=
qÜÉ=mêçàÉÅí=Á=
‘An efficient and effective social protection system will support both social stability 
and social justice as well as economic development’2. In this context, the aim of the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung project on ‘Social protection in Southeast and East Asia’ is 
to promote dialogue on the existing social protection systems within the individual 
countries and to facilitate an exchange of experiences and best-practice examples on 
a regional level. The individual country studies serve the purpose of giving an over-
view on current social protection systems as well as policy recommendations for the 
further development of the systems of social protection. 
The following preliminary conclusions may serve as a basis for further discussion: 
1) While most countries have successfully developed comprehensive systems of 
social protection, difficulties in implementation remain enormous. 
2) Some social protection systems do not adequately reflect economic development 
or lack thereof. 
3) No solutions have been found so far in order to deal effectively with the infor-
mal sector. 
After explaining the background of the project as well as the structural framework of 
the studies, these statements will be examined in more detail. 
qÜÉ=_~ÅâÖêçìåÇ=Á=
As described in the article on ‘The Relevance of Social Security for Economic De-
velopment’ in this publication, access to social security is a basic right. How far is 
this right granted in Southeast and East Asian states? All examined countries have 
some form of social protection, but with differing ranges, degrees of intensity, and 
efficiency of the schemes. Existing social protection systems are usually described 
as achieving only very limited coverage, struggling with insufficient funds and inef-
fective institutions. The informal sector is growing in most countries, leaving large 
parts of the population unprotected. 
During the Asian crisis of 1997 / 98, it became particularly clear in some states that 
informal family and community-based social safety nets – supplemented by modest 
                             
1 This introduction is based on the original ‘terms of reference’ for the country studies. Special thanks 
go to Michael von Hauff for his contributions to this paper. 
2 See ‘The Relevance of Social Security for Economic Development’ by Michael von Hauff. 
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government programmes – are not adequate in the face of serious economic crises to 
prevent a significant growth of poverty and the associated risk of social tension and 
disturbances. Industrialization and urbanization plus social mobility have additionally 
resulted in the disintegration of traditional forms of social protection. 
In the years after the Asian crisis numerous short-term measures were introduced in 
order to smooth the social consequences of the financial and economic crisis and 
generally give support to the poor. However, the current project implemented by 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is supposed to look not only at the most vulnerable groups 
of the population, but to cover the whole population. Looking at the situation of only 
one specific group should be avoided because this always involves the risk of im-
proving the situation of one group at the expense of another. This is aggravated by 
the risk of implementing overlapping or conflicting measures, which are not coordi-
nated with each other. 
Social protection aims at overcoming risks and preventing risks, therefore three areas 
have been included to achieve a comprehensive picture: The institutionalized system 
of social security / social insurance, the informal sector, and related labour market 
policies. Social policy (education, housing etc.) is considered within the general 
framework. The project addresses government officials, ministries, employers’ or-
ganizations, and insurance providers in order to give support to policy makers to 
establish an integrated and coordinated national policy on social protection. At the 
same time, trade unions and civil society organizations shall be given relevant input 
to actively participate in the political discussion on social protection systems. 
aÉÑáåáíáçåëW=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=~åÇ=pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=
There is a wide range of definitions of social security and social protection. Generally, 
we agreed to use the broader term social protection, including: 
• Social insurance (social security) and savings schemes, such as industrial accident, 
health, old age and unemployment insurance. In other words, these are defined as 
contributory schemes for contingencies such as employment injury, occupational 
disease, sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age, death, or unemployment. 
• Social assistance and services, such as benefits and transfers. These are defined as 
social welfare, usually tax- or donor-financed and mostly means-tested. 
• Labour market policies. 
Thereby, we refer to the common ILO definitions (ILO, World Labour Report, 2000). 
Social security is defined as the protection that society provides for its members 
through a series of public measures. The term is used mostly in the context of insur-
ance-type schemes including mainly statutory social security schemes, but also other 
contributory (insurance-type) schemes such as employer-provided pension plans, 
community-based schemes, and private health insurance. Social protection is defined 
‘to include not only public social security schemes but also private and non-statutory 
schemes with similar objectives, formal or informal’. In other words, social protec-
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tion encompasses a broader range of public and private measures including all non-
contributory provisions such as tax- and donor-financed welfare programmes. 
Social security is most often used as an equivalent for social insurance or formal, 
institutionalized schemes set up by the government and / or by legislation in the so-
called formal sector. In the last two decades, however, there has been an intensive 
discussion on whether and how social security measures (e.g. health insurance) can 
be transferred to the informal sector (extension of coverage). The studies in this 
book provide different answers to this question. 
Ei~Åâ=çÑF=aÉÑáåáíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
Concerning the informal sector, there is still no generally accepted definition. In 1976, 
Sethuraman / ILO developed a catalogue of criteria which still provides a good guide-
line. According to this, economic activities belong to the informal sector when either 
• Family workers work in a business, 
• Less than 10 people are employed in a business, 
• There are no legal regulations or existing regulations are not observed, 
• There are no regular working times, 
• The workers have less than six years schooling, 
• The work is seasonal, 
• No electricity is available in the workplace or 
• There is no dependency on regular loans. 
A more up-to-date definition of the ILO was agreed during the 15th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993, which refers to an informal sector enter-
prise as ‘a private non-agricultural business which is household-operated and has a 
total of, at most, five paid employees’. 
An alternative sub-classification of the informal sector, which appears in connection 
with social security systems, is the following: 
• Persons with regular employment, but without an employment contract, who do 
not enjoy the protection of social legislation or social security systems 
• Persons who do not have a regular income due to the casual or seasonal nature of 
the work and who do not fall under the protection of social security systems (this 
also refers to migrant workers); self-employed workers 
• Unemployed persons. 
In connection with social security it makes sense to include the unemployed in the 
categorization of the informal sector, as they usually will have to look for jobs in the 
informal sector, provided they do not find work in the formal sector immediately and 
their family is not able to support them. Only in some cases they might benefit from 
a statutory scheme, e.g. unemployment insurance, or may have acquired pension 
rights by contributing previously to such a scheme. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
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qÜÉ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Each of the country studies in this publication comprises five main sections, 1) Insti-
tutional framework, 2) Review of the existing system, 3) Assessment of the effective-
ness and efficiency of the existing system, 4) Development of innovative programmes 
and alternative social protection schemes, and 5) Policy recommendations, in order 
to achieve a comprehensive picture. Using such a framework makes the studies com-
parable, which, in turn, is the basis for an intensive dialogue on a regional level. 
Please see the appendix for a complete overview of the structure of the studies. 
1) Institutional Framework: Social protection is significant to stabilize an economy. 
There is a positive relationship between social protection and economic develop-
ment, as long as the social protection system is effective and efficient. The justifica-
tion lies both in the economic framework theory and policy as well as in macroeco-
nomic justifications: A) Stabilization of the social and economic order, avoidance of 
social costs and safeguarding of labour potential; B) Stabilization of demand for 
consumer goods (built-in stabilizers); the purchasing power of the working class will 
be protected even in times of crisis. 
Based on these considerations and in order to provide the relevant country back-
ground, the first section gives an overview over the general political, social and eco-
nomic framework of the specific country. Furthermore, it includes information on 
quality and availability of data, the existing institutional framework, government sup-
port and the traditional and contemporary perception of the social protection system. 
2) Review of the Existing System: Due to the existing, deep rooted and decisive 
differences between the formal and informal sector concerning social protection 
systems, this chapter will examine the two sectors separately. The examination of 
existing measures includes information on financing (personal contributions / sav-
ings, taxes, the capital market), the providers of each scheme (state, private) as well 
as on beneficiaries. The demarcation of statutory and non-statutory social security 
systems requires a categorization of the formal (organized) and informal sector. 
It should be taken into account that in some Asian countries the formal sector only 
has a relatively small influence on economic growth and employment. In other cases, 
however, this may not be true as capital-intensive high productivity industries such 
as multinationals are part of the formal sector. Politically, more attention has always 
been paid to the formal sector. It generates tax revenue for the state and is generally 
considered to be progressive and productive. Section 2.1 deals with the formal sector 
and provides an introduction to social insurance and savings schemes (such as indus-
trial accident, health, old age / death and unemployment insurance) as well as addi-
tional social assistance offered by the state to formal sector workers. 
The informal sector in many countries, on the other hand, is playing an increasingly 
important role in this respect and therefore deserves greater attention. The main 
problems arise from the fact that informal sector workers are usually non-legal and 
outside the scope of official statistics and government regulation – therefore it is ex-
tremely difficult to give reliable assessments according to the specific size of the 
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sector and its necessities. Section 2.2 provides information on its problems and fea-
tures, on existing benefits and transfers available for this sector and, usually most 
importantly, on savings, small credit and micro-insurance schemes. 
As it is an important element of a comprehensive and sustainable social protection 
scheme, attention is also paid to supporting labour market policies. Employment is 
the most important form of social protection for workers. At this point, it is not in-
tended to deal with macroeconomic dimensions and measures in detail, but more with 
training and supportive programmes to improve people’s reintegration in the working 
process or prevent dropout and unemployment. Job creation programmes are usually 
more attractive, as the labour markets of most developing countries are characterized 
by a high degree of informal activity. In section 2.3, we distinguish between active 
labour market policies (creating job opportunities, human capital formation, matching 
job seekers) and passive labour market policies (educational system, retrenchment 
payments, minimum wage policy, occupational safety and health). 
For a long time, labour market policy in the formal sector was restricted primarily to 
the promotion of economic growth. Usually, ‘conventional’ labour market policy was 
not geared to the informal sector and thus only covered a fraction of the labour po-
tential. Labour market programmes for the informal sector are offered both by NGOs 
and to a certain extent by government bodies. The effectiveness hinges to a very large 
extent on the quality of labour market analyses, the legal structuring, the implemen-
tation of labour market legislation and the quality of the state’s labour market ad-
ministration. In all three areas, there are still significant deficits in many developing 
countries (e.g. in the regular statistical survey of labour market data). There is, how-
ever, no doubt that the formulation and implementation of instruments of labour mar-
ket policy depend largely on the methodological approach and accuracy of labour 
market analyses. 
3) Assessment of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Existing System: The 
idea is that new proposals should not be made without first looking at the effective-
ness and efficiency of the existing model. The evaluation of social security systems 
is a relatively new field of research, especially in the context of the long-term goal 
of ‘social protection for all’ and the study of new approaches as alternatives to the 
existing statutory schemes. One has to bear in mind who has set out the objectives, if 
they are sufficient to cover basic needs at least, if they are realistic and achievable 
within the set time frame and the existing means and if it was seriously intended to 
meet them at all. The following fields for analysis have been agreed on: Coverage, 
feasibility, financial sustainability, gender equity, costs of administration, targeting, 
accountability & transparency. 
4) Development of Innovative Programmes and Alternative Social Protection 
Schemes: This chapter is open to proposals, suggestions for improvement, and new 
innovative ideas. After having stated and analysed the positive features and defi-
ciencies of the existing system, the aim is to tackle the question where changes are 
deemed necessary and which best-practice examples can be identified. Usually it is 
neither possible nor desirable to completely substitute the existing model with an-
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
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other one. New ideas always have to be built into the existing system. Specific atten-
tion has been paid to the development of possible schemes to provide adequate cov-
erage to the informal sector. 
5) Policy Recommendations: After having presented suggestions for improving 
existing schemes, policy recommendations are made in order to answer the question 
of how these ideas can be implemented and by whom. Looking at general develop-
ment trends, the model of a system of social protection in which both the state and 
private and charitable bodies assume complementary functions will assert itself. The 
authors show possible solutions for their specific countries. 
pçãÉ=mêÉäáãáå~êó=`çåÅäìëáçåë=
Examining the systems of social protection, it is apparent that serious efforts have 
been made to provide sufficient coverage to the population against various contin-
gencies. However, more often than not, the existing system focuses on the formal 
sector only. The informal sector including the self-employed, daily and family work-
ers are outside the scope of the system, and social assistance is insignificant. The 
Asian financial crisis has altered perceptions somewhat, due to the sheer magnitude 
of adversity that workers and vulnerable groups faced. In recognition of this fact, 
efforts are increasingly apparent to reassess the existing systems. However, need for 
reform is not only obvious in the implementation of specific measures, but also in the 
general design of the social protection systems. On a large scale, the following pre-
liminary conclusions may be drawn: 
1. While most countries have successfully developed comprehensive systems of 
social protection, difficulties in implementation remain enormous. 
Common problems include lack of coverage, lack of financial sustainability and 
lack of coordination between different measures. This is aggravated by lack of 
reliable data and statistics, and ineffective administration. Often tax evasion, 
low income tax revenues and / or corruption lead to lack of financial resources. 
The studies give varying suggestions based on the specific context in order to 
tackle these problems. Generally, the government has to play a more pro-active 
role in terms of enforcement and in dealing with a low / not existing tax base. At 
the same time, in some cases the role of the private sector should be improved, 
always keeping in mind whether the state or the private sector can offer the best 
performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. 
2. Some social protection systems do not adequately reflect economic development 
or lack thereof. 
In some of the poorer countries, economic development does not support the 
complex (sometimes even generous) systems, which were developed. Some sys-
tems promise adequate benefits for the whole population. However, with low 
contribution rates, inadequate long-term planning and other difficulties, the main 
Towards a Comprehensive Picture 
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burden lies on the state. If economic development does not provide the neces-
sary resources, the state budget is insufficient to sustain the system in the long 
run. 
In some more developed nations the government opted for capital-based (de-
fined contribution) systems without pooling risks. Each individual pays into his 
or her own account for pension, health care etc. This system offers certain advan-
tages, e.g. in terms of financial sustainability, but there are also drawbacks. The 
responsibility lies almost exclusively with the individual and the family, with 
the state offering little support. The system works reasonably well in times of full 
employment. However, in economically difficult times with higher unemployment, 
social assistance can be inadequate. The necessity of at least partly pooling risks 
and providing transfer payments becomes apparent. It has to be kept in mind, as 
the authors of the Malaysia country study put it, that ‘development creates the 
need for formal social security provisions’. 
3. No solutions have been found so far in order to deal effectively with the infor-
mal sector. 
Usually, informal sector workers are neither covered by any social insurance or 
savings scheme, nor are social assistance schemes, such as benefits and trans-
fers, sufficiently developed and accessible to provide adequate protection for 
them. There are conflicting statements according to whether the informal sector 
should be integrated into the formal one. Obviously, simple registration of infor-
mal sector workers is insufficient. However, integration / inclusion seems to be-
come necessary once numbers grow in any successful voluntary scheme. At the 
same time, trust into formal institutions has to be gradually developed and in-
creased, so that savings and insurance schemes become a more valid option. 
Some positive experiences have been made with micro savings and small credit 
schemes. However, most countries are still in the experimenting stage. As a con-
sequence, much of the responsibility lies with civil-society organizations and 
their networks. The government has to acknowledge this fact by giving some fi-
nancial support to NGOs. Generally, more visibility is needed to change the im-
age of the informal sector. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
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All country studies are structured according to the following list of topics: 
Abstract 
1. Institutional Framework 
1.1 General Political, Social, and Economic Framework 
1.2 Availability and Quality of Data 
1.3 Existing Institutional Framework 
1.4 Government Support 
1.5 Traditional and Contemporary Perception of the Social Protection System 
2. Review of the Existing System 
2.1 Social Protection in the Formal (Organized) Sector 
2.1.1 Categorization of the Formal Sector 
2.1.2 Social Insurance and Savings Schemes 
2.1.3 Social Assistance and Services: Benefits and Transfers 
2.1.4 Others 
2.2 Social Protection in the Informal Sector 
2.2.1 Categorization of the Informal Sector 
2.2.2 Problems and Features of the Informal Sector 
2.2.3 Social Assistance and Services: Benefits and Transfers 
2.2.4 Voluntary Schemes: Savings, Credit and Micro-Insurance Schemes 
2.2.5 Others 
2.3 Labour Market Policy 
2.3.1 Active Labour Market Policy 
2.3.2 Passive Labour Market Policy 
3. Assessment of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Existing System 
3.1 Coverage 
3.2 Feasibility 
3.3 Financial Sustainability 
3.4 Gender Equity 
3.5 Costs of Administration 
3.6 Targeting 
3.7 Accountability & Transparency 
4. Development of Innovative Programmes and Alternative Social Protection 
Schemes 
5. Policy Recommendations 
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qÜÉ=oÉäÉî~åÅÉ=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=
Ñçê=bÅçåçãáÅ=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=
jáÅÜ~Éä=îçå=e~ìÑÑ=
NK= fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
The right to social security is a human right. According to Articles 22 and 25 of the 
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ enacted by the United Nations, access to 
social security is a basic right. The ‘Social Security (Minimum Standards) Conven-
tion 102’ adopted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1952 also pre-
scribes minimum standards for benefits in the important areas of social security. To 
date, most OECD countries have ratified the agreement, some countries in Latin 
America and Africa, but just one country in Asia. Furthermore, the World Summit 
for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 emphasized the establishment and 
expansion of a social security system as an essential component of widespread social 
development and the fight against poverty. The political declaration of the summit 
contains the undertaking ‘to develop and implement policies which ensure that all 
persons enjoy adequate economic and social protection in the event of unemploy-
ment, sickness, during motherhood and child-rearing, in the event of widowhood, 
disability and in old age.’ These are, of course, only a few stages in the efforts to 
strengthen or establish social security systems in developing countries. 
The range (degree of cover), degrees of intensity (what, for example, is covered by 
health insurance in the event of sickness?), and efficiency of social security systems 
in developing countries differ widely (Jäger et al. 2001). While, for instance, statu-
tory social security coverage in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia lies between 5% 
and 10% and in Latin America lies roughly between 10% and 80%, coverage in 
Southeast and East Asia varies between 10% and 100%. The goal cannot be to de-
velop a universal or uniform concept of social security. Rather, each country must 
develop its own system of social security aligned with the economic, social and 
cultural conditions of the country. 
Since the early 1980s, the topic of social security has been gaining in importance in 
discussions and collaboration in the field of development policy. Since the end of the 
1980s, national and international development organizations have also been increas-
ingly involved in the reform and further development of social security systems. There 
are many reasons for this trend. Particularly important are the economic and demo-
graphic structural changes which have led to changed conditions in many develop-
ing countries: e.g. increasing expectations of the working population in economically 
expanding sectors, a decline in poverty in the informal sector, changes in the age 
structure of the population as a result of longer life expectancy, the adjustment of 
social security systems in the process of transformation from a planned to a market 
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economy and improvement or expansion of existing social security systems that are 
often inconsistent or inefficient. 
In summary, different risk factors in a country may include financial / economic crises, 
structural adjustment processes, an ageing population, high unemployment, and the 
transition to market economies. An efficient and effective social protection system 
will support both social stability and social justice as well as economic development. 
These relationships will be looked at in more detail and explained in the following 
sections. 
OK= qÜÉ=cìåÅíáçåë=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=
Every person is faced with social problems and risks, whether he or she lives in a 
highly developed or an economically less developed country. The typical problems 
and risks are sickness, accident, unemployment, need for nursing care in old age, 
poverty and other forms of social plight. As a rule such problems require material 
and non-material help from society, and measures and expenditures for social secu-
rity are intended to mitigate or provide cover for these problems and risks. Such 
provisions thus have a lasting influence on the situation in life of the vast majority of 
the populations of industrial countries. 
While most developing countries claim to provide broad coverage of social risks, 
their social security systems are scarcely sufficient. This also applies to the ASEAN 
states. Social security systems are especially found in the formal sector, where they 
exist in the form of social welfare insurance, state payments into welfare schemes 
and labor market policies. In the informal sector and the subsistence economy, in 
contrast, there is generally no protection against social risks, whether as social wel-
fare insurance or state payments into welfare schemes. In the informal sector and the 
subsistence economy, traditional and other forms of social security frequently exist, 
providing existential security for many people. However, they are increasingly being 
pushed aside by advancing modern social and economic structures. The problem of 
providing existential security for the people concerned is thus one that is presenting 
itself with increasing frequency and urgency. 
The forms of social security that exist in the formal sectors of the various developing 
countries differ qualitatively and quantitatively. The following questions are therefore 
particularly relevant: 
– which risks are covered; 
– are the risks covered adequately, i.e. is the pension large enough to live on; 
– do the individual types of social security and schemes harmonize with each other; 
– what distribution or redistribution effects are triggered by social security schemes? 
One crucial issue when establishing and extending social security systems in develop-
ing countries is how the function of social security is defined. On this point, Leliveld 
arrives at the following definition: ”Social security is firstly the protection, by society, 
of individuals or social groups against a fall in their standards of living as a result of 
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temporary adversities, and secondly, the amelioration, by society, of those standards 
of living of individuals or social groups which are below an acceptable minimum 
level” (Leliveld 1991, p. 210). This definition underlines the significance of social 
security’s dual function. On the one hand, it is concerned with preventing a deterio-
ration in certain social groups’ living conditions and, on the other hand, with improv-
ing the living conditions of social groups if these do not satisfy the minimum basic 
criteria. In the end, this signifies that the functions of social security are extended to 
include those described below. 
crk`qflkp=lc=pl`f^i=pb`rofqv=fk=absbilmfkd=`lrkqofbp=
qÜÉ=ÑìåÅíáçå=çÑ=ëçÅá~ä=ëÉÅìêáíó= áë=íç=Öì~ê~åíÉÉ=éÉçéäÉ=áå=ÇÉîÉäçéáåÖ=ÅçìåJ
íêáÉë= ~å= ÉÑÑÉÅíáîÉ= ÅçåíêáÄìíáçå= íç= íÜÉ= ëìëí~áåÉÇ= ë~íáëÑ~Åíáçå= çÑ= íÜÉáê= Ä~ëáÅ=
åÉÉÇë=Äó=áãéêçîáåÖ=íÜÉáê=ëí~åÇ~êÇ=çÑ=äáîáåÖ=ïÜáÅÜ=ÇçÉë=åçí=ÅçåÑçêã=íç=~å=
~ÅÅÉéí~ÄäÉ= ãáåáãìã= äÉîÉäK= qÜáë= áë= íÜÉ= çåäó= ï~ó= íç= ã~âÉ= áí= éçëëáÄäÉ= Ñçê=
íÜçëÉ=~ÑÑÉÅíÉÇ=íç=ÄÉ=êÉäáÉîÉÇ=çÑ=íÜÉ=íÜêÉ~í=íç=íÜÉáê=ÉñáëíÉåÅÉK=
pçÅá~ä= ëÉÅìêáíó=~äëç=Ü~ë= íÜÉ= ÑìåÅíáçå=çÑ=Öì~ê~åíÉÉáåÖ=éêçíÉÅíáçå=~Ö~áåëí=~=
ïçêëÉåáåÖ=çÑ=íÜÉáê=äáîáåÖ=ÅçåÇáíáçåëI=ïÜáÅÜ=áë=ÄêçìÖÜí=çå=Äó=äáÑÉ=ÅçåíáåÖÉåJ
ÅáÉë= ~åÇ= ïÜáÅÜ= Å~ååçí= ÄÉ= çîÉêÅçãÉ= Äó= íÜÉ= áåÇáîáÇì~äë= íÜÉãëÉäîÉë= Eîçå=
e~ìÑÑ=~åÇ=ÇÉ=e~~åI=NVVTI=éK=SNFK=
 
In this section, I have shown that the critical task of establishing and designing a sys-
tem of social security is the responsibility of the state. This system has to protect the 
population against social risks and to ensure an adequate standard of living. However, 
it is often forgotten in this context that social security can also make a positive con-
tribution to the economic development of an industrialized or developing nation, as 
the following section shows. Social security should therefore always be a central 
component of economic development policy. 
PK= pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=
From the beginning of the 1980s, existing welfare states came in for even stronger 
criticism, especially in Europe. This criticism was in many instances aimed at the 
extension of social security systems, which was felt to be hampering the economic 
performance and competitiveness of developed economies. This frequently led to the 
conclusion that social security and economic performance / positive economic devel-
opment fundamentally contradicted each other, even though this contention with-
stood neither theoretical nor empirical examination (Lampert and Althammer, 2001, 
p. 435 ff. and Jaufmann, Mezger and Pfaff, 1995). 
In this context, a distinction has to be made between the reasons for its economic 
utility on the one hand and the effectiveness or efficiency of welfare states on the 
other. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness and efficiency of both welfare states and social 
security systems has to be proven. If welfare states or social security systems do not 
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satisfy effectiveness or efficiency criteria, reforms will be necessary (von Hauff and 
Sauer, 2001). The following comments are only concerned with the fundamental cri-
tique of the welfare state and social security systems outlined briefly above. 
Critics often forget that, in many advanced economies and developing countries in 
the past, government social security policy 
– made an important contribution to achieving ideals and goals such as social jus-
tice and individual freedom, and thus promoted social peace and social security; 
– prevented or compensated for the negative effects of privately-owned means of 
production (national economic utility of social security); and 
– via an active family and education policy to create human capital, created a pre-
condition for strengthening micro- and macro-economic productivity, thus con-
tributed to long-term economic performance (Kaufmann, 1997, p. 35 f). 
Many critics have thus misjudged or neglected the historically significant achieve-
ments of state-run social security in structuring and realizing a humane society, in 
which the level of social welfare is high (Lampert and Althammer, 2001, p. 436 ff.). 
Abramovitz makes these achievements more precise when he writes: ”The enlarge-
ment of the government’s economic role, including its support of income minima, 
health care, social insurance, and the other elements of the welfare state, was, up to a 
point, a part of the productivity process itself” (Abramovitz, 1981, p. 2). The follow-
ing comments will focus on substantiating the economic significance of government-
sponsored social security for the economic development of developing countries. 
Justification in economic framework theory and policy: the establishment and increas-
ing complexity of social security legislation and its implementation in truly useful 
material rights and opportunities is a crucial precondition for the creation of welfare 
states, based on individual freedom, whose aims are those already mentioned above: 
personal freedom, social justice and social security for a great majority of the popu-
lation. The principles on which it is based are generally ideal types, and to this ex-
tent reality always requires and is capable of improvement. Lampert and Althammer 
deduce the following positive economic effects from this (Lampert and Althammer, 
2001, p. 437 ff.): 
– Avoidance of social costs and safeguarding of labor potential: labor protection 
laws, health and pension insurance policy and education and training policy play 
a quite significant role in avoiding social costs and safeguarding efficient labor po-
tential. 
– Stabilization of social and economic order: Special emphasis must be given to the 
significance of institutionalizing the labor market and in-company and cross-com-
pany relationships between employers and employees. This plays an important 
role in social peace and thus in stabilizing the social and economic order. 
Macro-economic justification: Social security policy plays a role in stabilizing eco-
nomic development, because it stabilizes demand for consumer goods by making it 
constant (Vobruba, 1998, p. 37 ff.). In this connection, we speak of in-built stabiliz-
ers that function under certain conditions. Beveridge drew attention to this connec-
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tion as early as 1942, when he wrote: “If unemployment benefits are made as high as 
is at all compatible with the preservation of a fluid labor market and the incentive 
for the individual to find work rather than enjoy himself, then the purchasing power 
of the working classes will be protected when a crisis begins, and the violence of 
depression will be reduced” (Beveridge, 1943, p. 252). Pfaff has empirically con-
firmed this connection for certain European countries (Pfaff, 1989, p. 131 ff.). 
Finally, protection from and promotion of economic and social structural change 
should be mentioned. Here, legislation like the revised German Employment Promo-
tion Law can play a major role in cushioning and reducing imbalances in the labor 
market. This allows adjustment costs to be reduced, for example by retraining schemes 
for private households and companies. Social security benefits become socially ac-
ceptable in this way, and reduce resistance to structural change (Lampert and Alt-
hammer, 2001, p. 438). Whether and to what extent these economically positive ef-
fects of social security are felt will mainly depend on the way the schemes are struc-
tured. 
QK= `çåÅäìëáçåW=qÜÉ=fåÅêÉ~ëáåÖ=oÉäÉî~åÅÉ=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=
Ñçê=aÉîÉäçéáåÖ=`çìåíêáÉë=
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the topic of social security has increasingly been a 
subject of development policy debate. Guhan, one of the outstanding experts in 
social security in the context of developing countries, gives three reasons for this 
(Guhan, 1994, p. 35 ff): 
– The crass dichotomy between the social security systems of developing and de-
veloped countries has increasingly been regarded as unsatisfactory. In addition, 
there has been increasing awareness within developing countries of the difference 
in the way in which those employed in the formal sector and those who are self-
employed in the informal sector have access to social security. 
– It has increasingly been recognized that schemes to combat poverty cannot guar-
antee any adequate or prompt protection from various forms of impoverishment. 
– The most obvious reason was the increasingly critical appraisal of the role of so-
cial safety nets. The aim of social safety nets had been to cushion the negative ef-
fects of World Bank structural adjustment programs. However, these did not re-
sult in any sustained social security, particularly for those living in poverty. 
There is no doubt that the extreme heterogeneity of developing countries calls for a 
wide variety of concepts and schemes. This is particularly important for the ASEAN 
countries. Among other things, this heterogeneity is determined by 
– the level of economic development; 
– socio-culturally conditioned social structures; 
– the qualification and efficiency of government institutions; and by 
– the networks and power structure of lobby organizations and interest groups. 
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For the following discussion and assessment it is important to realize that most de-
veloping countries have only incomplete social security systems. They are to be found 
above all in the formal sector, in the form of social insurance, state social benefits 
and employment policies. In the informal sector and subsistence economy, in con-
trast, there is normally no state insurance against social risks (von Hauff and de 
Haan, 1996, p. 72 ff.). 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=fåÇçåÉëá~=
qìäìë=qK=eK=q~ãÄìå~å=~åÇ=_~ãÄ~åÖ=mìêïçâç=
^Äëíê~Åí=
During the ‘new order’ period1 up to mid-1997, the Indonesian economy had been 
performing very well. The annual growth rate of GDP and external investor confi-
dence were high, overall inflation was low, and foreign direct investment was ro-
bust. However, by the end of 1997 and in 1998 Indonesia was in a deep financial 
crisis. In 1998, the country experienced a contraction of 13.6% in GDP and only a 
very small positive growth of 0.12% in 1999. In 2000, the growth rate of real GDP 
was 4.8% and 3.4% by the last quarter of 2001. 
By mid-1997, the incidence of poverty was about 10.1% of the population, and in 
1998, as a consequence of output decline, the incidence of poverty was estimated to 
have increased to 14.1% in 1999, or about 29 million people (World Bank, 1998). 
However, based on the National Social Economic Survey (SUSENAS) in 2000 from 
the Central Bureau of Statistics in Indonesia (BPS) and using different measurement 
methods, the poverty rate in 1998 was about 23.6% (BPS, 2000b). 
Historically, the social security system in Indonesia was started in 1977 with the intro-
duction of a social security program for workers known as ASTEK (Employees’ 
Social Insurance / Asuransi Sosial Tenaga Kerja). In 1992, the government issued a 
Social Security Act for private employees, including state companies, and ASTEK 
was changed to JAMSOSTEK (Social Security for Private Employees / Jaminan 
Sosial Tenaga Kerja). JAMSOSTEK is a compulsory social protection scheme for 
employees against social hazards, such as employment injury, death, sickness, and 
old age. 
The existing social security system in the country has several shortcomings. One of 
these is the JAMSOSTEK scheme’s coverage of only employees in the formal sec-
tor. Also, not all JAMSOSTEK schemes comply fully with the law and government 
regulations on employee’s social security or with international standards (as defined 
by the International Labor Organization, ILO). 
In comparison with other Asian countries such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philip-
pines, government spending on social security in Indonesia is relatively small. For 
instance, in 1996, spending on employment injuries, survivors, sickness and health, 
and old age on average was not higher than 5% of GDP. 
                             
1 After the unsuccessful coup d’etat by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965, Soeharto took power 
from Soekarno and became the second president of Indonesia. Soeharto’s period is known as the ‘new 
order’ era (orde baru), which lasted until May 1998 when the reform (reformasi) started. 
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Recently, several ministries in Indonesia, i.e. the Ministry of Health (DEPKES), the 
Ministry of Social Welfare (DEPSOS), the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigra-
tion (DEPNAKERTRANS), and the Ministry of Finance (MENKEU) have been 
working on the reform of the social security system, including the JAMSOSTEK 
scheme. For this purpose, the government has proposed a new law that will support 
the reform. Under that new law PT2 JAMSOSTEK will become a Trust Fund. The 
proposed law is currently being processed. 
* The exchange rate of the rupiah against the US dollar at the time of writing was 
US$1 = Rp.10,500. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~äI=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
dÉåÉê~ä=_~ÅâÖêçìåÇ=
The total population in Indonesia by mid-2000 was 203.5 million people, with a 
growth rate of 1.35% during 1990–2000, and a fertility rate of 2.7 in 1998 (see Table 
1). The total population figure is the preliminary result of the year 2000 Population 
Census which encountered some obstacles, such as riots in some parts of Indonesia. 
The census for these regions could not be conducted completely or in some cases at 
all, so the total population in these regions must be estimated. 
q~ÄäÉ=NW= mçéìä~íáçå=~åÇ=dêçïíÜ=o~íÉ=çÑ=mçéìä~íáçå=áå=fåÇçåÉëá~I=NVUMÓOMMM=
 NVUMN= NVVMN= NVVRO= OMMMP= NVUMÓNVVM= NVVMÓNVVR= NVVMÓOMMM=
mçéìä~íáçå=
EíÜçìë~åÇF=
NQTIQVM= NTVIPTV= NVQITRR= OMPIQRS= = = =
dêçïíÜ=ê~íÉ=çÑ=
éçéìä~íáçå=EBF=
= = = = NKVU= NKSS= NKPR=
N= mçéìä~íáçå=`ÉåëìëÉë=
O= NVVR=fåíÉêJÅÉåë~ä=mçéìä~íáçå=pìêîÉó=Eprm^pF=
P= mêÉäáãáå~êó=êÉëìäí=çÑ=OMMM=mçéìä~íáçå=`Éåëìë=EpmF=
pçìêÅÉW= _mp=E`Éåíê~ä=_ìêÉ~ì=çÑ=pí~íáëíáÅë=áå=fåÇçåÉëá~=L=_áêç=mìë~í=pí~íáëíáâFK=
In 1980, the number of migrants totaled 3.7 million people, and increased to 4.3 mil-
lion in the period 1990–1995. Cumulatively, up until 1980, the total number of mi-
grants was 11.4 million people, increasing to 17.8 million in 1990. The level of ur-
banization in 1995 was 32.53%, and it was expected to increase in 2000 to 36.46% 
(see Table 2). 
The infant mortality rate has declined from 46‰ in 1995 to 43‰ live births in 1998 
and the maternal mortality rate was 390 per 100,000 deliveries. Currently, life ex-
pectancy is more than 65 years. 
                             
2 PT stands for perseroan terbatas, which means a corporate legal entity whose ownership of property 
and financial assets is limited by the number of shareholders. In the case of JAMSOSTEK, it refers to 
a government corporate legal entity operating on a profit-oriented basis. 
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q~ÄäÉ=OW= mçéìä~íáçå=~åÇ=mêçàÉÅíÉÇ=rêÄ~åáò~íáçå=áå=fåÇçåÉëá~I=NVVMÓOMOM=
mçéìä~íáçå=EíÜçìë~åÇ=éÉêëçåëF=
vÉ~ê= qçí~ä= rêÄ~å= oìê~ä=
iÉîÉä=çÑ=
ìêÄ~åáò~íáçå=EBF=
NVVM=
NVVR=
OMMM=
OMMR=
OMNM=
OMNR=
OMOM=
NUMIPUP=
NVRITRR=
ONMIOSP=
OOPINUP=
OPRINNM=
OQRIPUU=
ORPISST=
RNIVPO=
SPISTV=
TSISSO=
VMIPQQ=
NMQIRTT=
NNUITUO=
NPOIQSR=
NOUIQRN=
NPOIMTS=
NPPISMN=
NPOIUPU=
NPMIRPP=
NOSIRVR=
NONIOMO=
OUKTV=
POKRP=
PSKQS=
QMKQU=
QQKQU=
QUKQN=
ROKOO=
pçìêÅÉëW=_mpI=NVVRX=~åÇ=^å~åí~=~åÇ=^êáÑáåI=NVVQK=
The illiteracy rate has declined over the period 1995 to 1999 for adult males from 
10.3% to 8.5% and for adult females from 22.2% to 18.7%. In 1995, net school en-
rollment as a percentage of the population, for primary and secondary education re-
spectively, was 98.8 and 52.9; the rate for females for primary and secondary levels 
was 97.9% and 50.5%, respectively. However, the figures for higher education are 
much lower; less than 1% of the population has university degrees. Overall, most of 
the country’s economically active population has only primary education (see Table 3). 
q~ÄäÉ=PW= bÅçåçãáÅ~ääó=^ÅíáîÉ= mçéìä~íáçå=Äó= bÇìÅ~íáçå~ä=^íí~áåãÉåí= áå= fåÇçåÉJ
ëá~I=OMMM=
bÇìÅ~íáçå~ä=~íí~áåãÉåí= mÉêëçåë=
NK= kç=ëÅÜççäáåÖ=
OK= mêáã~êó=ëÅÜççä=åçí=ÅçãéäÉíÉÇ=
PK= mêáã~êó=ëÅÜççä=
QK= gìåáçê=ÜáÖÜ=ëÅÜççä=
RK= pÉåáçê=ÜáÖÜ=ëÅÜççä=EÖÉåÉê~äF=
SK= pÉåáçê=ÜáÖÜ=ëÅÜççä=EîçÅ~íáçå~äF=
TK= ^Å~ÇÉãó=
UK= råáîÉêëáíó=
TINOUIVSQ=
NQISOOIMTU=
PRIRMTIOVO=
NRIPSPIMNM=
NPITPTINQM=
QIUNQPIVUV=
OINQPIVUV=
OIOVQISVV=
pçìêÅÉW=_mpI=OMMM~K=
j~ÅêçJÉÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
In Indonesia’s economy the state plays an important role. The role of the state is 
stated explicitly in the Basic Guidelines to State Policy (GBHN, 1999), which un-
derline the policy direction on national economic development for the period 1999–
2004. It states that the economic system in Indonesia is the ‘people’s economic sys-
tem’, which is based upon the market mechanism with fair competition. At the same 
time it emphasizes economic growth, justice, and gives priority to quality of life, 
social, environmental and sustainable development. 
In 1998, the country experienced negative growth of almost 14%, but GDP was positive 
in 1999 and reached 3.4% in 2001. The inflation rate was almost 78% in 1998, and de-
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clined to 8.16% in 2001. The national income per capita in 1997 was over US$ 1,000, 
dropped significantly in 1998, and since 1999 has started to improve again (Table 4). 
In the 1980s, the Indonesian economy was still dominated by agriculture, but in 2000, 
the GDP share of manufacturing was 26%, while that of agriculture was almost 17%. 
The economy of Indonesia is dominated by small- and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
These enterprises are especially important in terms of employment creation, as they 
employed more people than large enterprises (LEs), including foreign multi-national 
companies operating in the country. 
q~ÄäÉ=QW= pçãÉ= fãéçêí~åí= j~ÅêçÉÅçåçãáÅ= fåÇáÅ~íçêë= çÑ= fåÇçåÉëá~= aìêáåÖ= ~åÇ=
^ÑíÉê=íÜÉ=`êáëáë=
fåÇáÅ~íçê= NVVT= NVVU= NVVV= OMMM= OMMN=
o~íÉ=çÑ=ÖêçïíÜ=çÑ=êÉ~ä=dam=EBF=
fåÅçãÉ=éÉê=Å~éáí~=ErpAF=
o~íÉ=çÑ=áåÑä~íáçå=EBF=
QKR=
NMUU=
NNKN=
ÓNPKS=
QQV=
TTKSP=
MKNO=
TSU=
MKOT=
QKU=
UMM=
VKPR=
PKQN=
Ô=
UKNSO=
N= cáêëí=èì~êíÉê=
O= g~åJpÉéí=EÅìãìä~íáîÉF=
pçìêÅÉW= _mp=Epí~íáëíáÅ~ä=vÉ~ê=_ççâ=çÑ=fåÇçåÉëá~FI=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êëK=
The percentage of informal employment to total employment in urban areas was 
about 46% in 1999 (Irawan et al., 2000). The urban informal sector has been playing a 
pivotal role in both employment creation and income generation, especially for women 
(ILO, 1999a,b). The share has increased since the crisis, as many employees in the 
formal sector (e.g. banks, industries, and services) have lost their jobs (ILO, 1999a). 
i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
In 2000, the working age population totaled 141.2 million males, while the labor 
force totaled 95,651,000 males, and the unemployment rate was 6.1%. The labor 
force participation rate has increased from 67.22% in 1999 to 67.76% in 2000. Out 
of 89.8 million working people, around 45.28% work in the agricultural sector. The 
other sectors with large employment include trade, hotel and restaurant (20.58%), 
manufacturing industry (12.96%) and services (10.66%) (see Table 5). 
q~ÄäÉ=RW= bãéäçóãÉåí=Äó=pÉÅíçêëI=OMMM=
pÉÅíçê= mÉêëçåë=
^ÖêáÅìäíìêÉI=ÑçêÉëíêóI=ÜìåíáåÖI=ÑáëÜÉêáÉë=
j~åìÑ~ÅíìêáåÖ=áåÇìëíêó=
`çåëíêìÅíáçå=
qê~ÇÉI=ÜçíÉä=C=êÉëí~ìê~åí=
qê~åëéçêí~íáçåI=ëíçê~ÖÉ=C=ÅçããìåáÅ~íáçå=
cáå~åÅáåÖI=áåëìê~åÅÉI=êÉ~ä=Éëí~íÉ=C=ÄìëáåÉëë=ëÉêîáÅÉë=
mìÄäáÅ=ëÉêîáÅÉë=
líÜÉêë=
QMISTSITNP=
NNISQNITRS=
PIQVTIOPO=
NUIQUVIMMR=
QIRRPIURR=
UUOISMM=
VIRTQIMMV=
ROOIRSM=
qçí~ä= UVIUPTITPM=
pçìêÅÉW= _mpI=OMMM~K=
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mçîÉêíó=~åÇ=aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=fåÅçãÉ=
Between 1980–1996, the number of individuals living below the official poverty line 
dropped dramatically from 42.3 million (28.6%) to 22.5 million people (11.3%). But 
as a result of the financial crisis, the number increased again to 24.2% in 1998, and 
dropped to 23.6% in 1999. During the period between 1996 and 1999, the poverty 
gap index increased from 1.6% to 3.8% in urban areas and from 1.8% to 4.8% in 
rural areas. In the same period, the poverty severity index increased from 0.4% to 
1.1% in urban areas and from 0.4% to 1.4% in rural areas. 
Based on expenditure data, inequality has increased during the period 1990–1996 
and declined during 1997–1999. Accordingly, in 1993 and 1996, the Gini index was 
recorded as high as 34.0% and 35.6% respectively, and in 1998 and 1999 was 31.6% 
and 31.1% respectively. 
^ääçÅ~íáçå=çÑ=_ìÇÖÉí=
The state budget (APBN) consists of internal revenues, which are mainly tax reve-
nues, and external resources, i.e. foreign aid and foreign loans, on the one hand, and 
routine and development expenditures on the other hand. For the year 2002, educa-
tion is targeted to receive routine and development expenditures of Rp.4,511.5 and 
Rp.11,552.8 billion, respectively; both are higher than the realized budget for 2001. 
In social welfare, health care, and women’s empowerment, the budgeted routine and 
development expenditures for the year 2002 are Rp.667.7 and Rp.4,304.1 billion 
respectively; both are higher than the realized budget for 2001. However, in percent-
age terms, it is only 0.3% and 9.0% respectively of the total national budget for 2002 
for routine and development expenditures. 
In Indonesia, social security contributions and benefits are kept outside the state 
budget; they are administered by state-owned institutions or companies outside gov-
ernmental departments (INSSA, 1995). This is with the exception of social assis-
tance, including social rehabilitation, of which the main aim is to alleviate poverty. 
Social assistance is the responsibility of DEPSOS with financing from the state 
budget. 
mçäáíáÅ~ä=póëíÉã=~åÇ=mçäáíáÅ~ä=páíì~íáçå=
Political reform in Indonesia in the form of freedom of political parties and general 
elections had actually begun with the resignation of President Soeharto. After 
Soeharto stepped down in May 1998 and was succeeded by B.J. Habibie, a general 
election was held and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), formed chiefly 
by newly-elected members, chose the president and vice-president by majority vote 
for the first time since the country’s independence. During this general election, Presi-
dent Habibie failed to be re-elected; and Abdurrahman Wahid, alias Gus Dur was 
elected as Indonesia’s fourth president, and Megawati Soekarnoputri, leader of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P / Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan), was elected as vice-president. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
26 
But, after almost two years, conflict between Gus Dur, the MPR and the House of 
Representatives (DPR) has forced him to step down. With President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, who succeeded Gus Dur, most Indonesians had hoped that the country 
could at last experience political and social stability and that Indonesia could pro-
ceed with recovery and further development. 
As with Gus Dur in the first year of his presidential period, the new government of 
Megawati is also built on a strong majority. Her cabinet consists of ministries from 
several parties such as PDI-P, GOLKAR (Golkar Party / Partai Golongan Karya), 
PKB (National Awakening Party / Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), and PAN (National 
Mandate Party / Partai Amanat Nasional). These major parties influence daily poli-
tics in Indonesia. However, the first hundred days of Megawati’s presidency show 
that the conflict between the political elite seems to be never-ending. The new gov-
ernment is also acting to reduce social disturbances, especially those with nuances of 
disintegration and sara (matters pertaining to ethnicity, religion, race and relation-
ships between different groups of society), and Islamic fundamentalists, as well as 
tackling the problem of economic recovery. However, the ability of the government 
to deliver the much-hoped-for turn around is still to be determined. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
To have a reliable social security system in Indonesia, comprehensive information on 
population, real income per capita, income distribution, poverty, labor market char-
acteristics, the size of the informal sector and individual expenditure on social wel-
fare, etc. is required. For some of these variables, data are available in Indonesia. For 
population, the main source of demographic data is obtained from the Population 
Census (SP). Compared to the previous censuses, the SP 2000 carried out the com-
plete enumeration method and covered more variables. In addition to the SP, BPS 
also conducted the Inter-censal Population Survey (SUPAS), which is designed to 
process demographic data between two censuses. 
The data collection on labor force is held by BPS through censuses and surveys. The 
National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) is a survey specifically aimed at col-
lecting information on manpower statistics. Formerly, labor statistics were collected 
through other surveys, such as the National Social-Economic Survey (SUSENAS), 
SP, and SUPAS. During 1986–1993, SAKERNAS was conducted quarterly in all 
provinces. 
With respect to income (GDP), the method used to estimate national accounts statis-
tics follows the standard guidelines set up by the United Nations known as the ‘Sys-
tem of National Accounts’. The implementation of the method, however, has been 
adjusted according to Indonesian socio-economic conditions. 
With respect to poverty and inequality, in the absence of income data, expenditure is 
commonly used as a proxy for income. This lack of data on income plus measure-
ments used for the poverty line may not give the real picture of poverty and income 
distribution conditions in Indonesia. 
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Information for the informal sector is derived from data on the labor market. The 
distribution of the labor force by employment status may indicate the distinction 
between formal sector and informal sector. The status of the employer (i.e. entrepre-
neur with fixed employees) and employee indicates the formal sector. The status of 
the self-employed with or without assistance by family members (family workers) 
and temporary helpers indicates the informal sector. Although this distinction has a 
number of shortcomings, it does give an indication of the size and characteristics of 
the informal sector in Indonesia. 
In summary, like all statistics generated in developing countries, measurement errors 
and arbitrary changes in definitions affect the indicators compiled here. Hence, a 
good deal of care and caution need to be exercised in interpreting the numbers.3 
It would help if Indonesia had data on individual expenditure on social security 
protection under the different insurance categories. In the future, SUSENAS should 
also include questionnaires on the proportion of expenditure paid for different social 
protection schemes. With this data, one could get an idea of the participation rate of 
the population in existing social security schemes and determine where there is need 
for improvement. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
In 1979, the Indonesian Tripartite Body (ITB), which is a forum of communication 
and consultation, was established in order to achieve the objective of so-called Pan-
casila Industrial Relation,4 comprising representatives of the government, workers, 
and employers. The government is represented by DEPNAKERTRANS, the workers 
by SPSI (All Indonesian Workers’ Union), while the employers are represented by 
APINDO (Indonesian Employers’ Association). 
Up to now, as a result of good cooperation between the three institutions, the ITB 
has already issued many joint decrees, some of them followed by government poli-
cies, such as presidential decrees and ministerial decisions. Both SPSI and APINDO 
have strong influence in the preparation or formulation of such decrees. One exam-
ple of a joint decree that has been issued as a result of strong influence by the trade 
union (SPSI) is the issue of Law No.3, 1992 concerning the Workers’ Social Secu-
rity Program, in which the coverage for workers has been expanded and improved. 
As a result, the total number of workers being covered by the state-run employees’ 
social insurance scheme (ASTEK) in 1993 increased significantly to 5,213,757 from 
2,978,069 in the beginning of 1988. 
The SPSI came into existence in 1973 when 21 industry-based trade unions merged 
to form the Indonesian Trade Union Federation (FBSI). In 1985, during the III FBSI 
                             
3 For a useful review of strengths and weaknesses of available labor market data in Indonesia, see Sigit 
(2000a, b). 
4 Pancasila is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. It comprises five inseparable and interre-
lated principles: belief in the one and only God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, 
democracy guided by the inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representa-
tives, and social justice for the whole population of Indonesia. 
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National Congress the federated structure of FBSI was changed to a unitary organi-
zation and renamed the SPSI. The 21 trade unions were reorganized into a depart-
mental structure under the SPSI. At the second national congress of the SPSI in 
1990, the existing departments of the SPSI were reorganized to provide for 13 sec-
tor-based trade unions, which were affiliated to the SPSI (Simanjuntak, 1995). 
In 1994, a new Ministerial Regulation No. 1 provides for workers at plant level to 
establish their own union without necessarily affiliating it to the SPSI. This provi-
sion permits broader participation of workers in a union. The shop floor or the plant-
level union and the SPSI have the same rights and protection to negotiate with an 
employer for a collective labor agreement (Simanjuntak, 1995). However, in reality, 
during the Soeharto period the right of workers to organize strikes or demonstrations 
was very limited. 
In 1998, as the political reform had also affected the trade union movement in Indo-
nesia, SPSI disintegrated into 30 trade union federations, and recently there were 
about 60 trade union federations and five confederations. Besides trade unions and 
APINDO, other important and influential pressure groups are the Indonesian Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN), and some business (commodity-based) asso-
ciations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations 
(CSOs). Especially since the crisis was followed by the reform (Reformasi), the 
influences of KADIN and business associations on government policies have become 
much stronger than before. Now, partly because of pressure from the World Bank, 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other international institutions with programs 
in Indonesia, NGOs and CSOs are more deeply involved in government decisions on 
poverty alleviation, environment, human rights, women’s empowerment, protection 
of children, development of SMEs, regional autonomy, and political and social is-
sues. Some multinational companies also have strong lobbying power with the Indo-
nesian government such as PT Free Port in Irian Jaya and Caltex in Riau. 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
Since the emergence of the economic crisis in 1997, the government has started to 
improve conditions of social security in the country. The willingness of the govern-
ment to improve the existing system of social security into one complying with inter-
national standards is stated in the National Development Program 2002. In this re-
spect, MENKEU is going to develop policy recommendations for changing existing 
laws and regulations to give better protection to users of social insurance services, 
for improving the performance of social insurance companies and providing em-
ployees in the informal sector with greater access to social insurance schemes. The 
government has also recently proposed a new law to change the legal status of PT 
JAMSOSTEK to a trust fund. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
In Indonesia, social security is based on the noble values of Pancasila, especially 
those related to the principles of solidarity and mutual-help (gotong royong) both in 
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the sense of intra-generation as well as inter-generation relationships. Although 
individually the performance principle may dominate the urban community, solidar-
ity, mutual assistance and justice are important values in Indonesian society. Even 
though insurance is not yet deeply rooted in the life of the Indonesian people, the 
spirit of mutual assistance prevailing in the community constitutes a solid basis for 
both horizontal (mutual help between members of different ages in the same income 
groups) and vertical cooperation (mutual help between different income groups), un-
derpinning the basic philosophical requirements for an effective social security sys-
tem (INSSA, 1995). The cultural values and social expectations of the people are thus 
likely to create a positive environment for the development of a good social protec-
tion system in Indonesia. The Indonesian social culture revering familial relation-
ships can promote the operational mechanism of social protection. 
In reality, however, the social security system in Indonesia is less established than in 
many other countries, even in comparison with many other developing countries. 
This is very likely due to the economic, political and social environment as well as 
the people’s attitude towards the government. Some studies conclude that the politi-
cal and social environment for the development of a social security system in Indo-
nesia is not very conducive at this time. 
Alkatiri et al. (2000) offer the following reasons for this: First, the general public’s 
or even the policymakers’ understanding of SHI (Social Health Insurance) is very 
limited. SHI is being understood as a program for the poor, based on charity or at the 
expense of the government budget.5 Second, social insurance involves mandatory 
enrollment. During the euphoria of democracy after the overthrow of the Soeharto 
regime, it was difficult to sell (politically) compulsory insurance. Compulsory insur-
ance is being understood as too much control of the central government and restric-
tion of freedom (understood as a key aspect of democracy) of the population. Fi-
nally, the existing SHI schemes (ASKES / Health Insurance Scheme for Public Ser-
vants and JAMSOSTEK), which will be discussed below, are being perceived as not 
providing good services. 
Besides the above factors, the contrast between the low percentage of waged / sala-
ried workers, the average low income of workers and the necessary premium to 
implement sustainable insurance schemes is an important economic factor that may 
also hinder the expansion of the social security system in Indonesia. Most of the 
population, especially those in low-income employment, expects that basic protec-
tion benefits should be fully provided by the government.6 However, as mentioned 
earlier, the people’s negative attitude towards the government because of corruption 
                             
5 This perception was derived from interviews with several relevant government officials. 
6 In contrast, among higher income employment there has been greater demand for health insurance as 
can be seen from the growth of the private health insurance market in the country (Alkatiri et al., 
2000). Currently, it is estimated that almost 90% of the population by the end of the 1990s did not 
have adequate health insurance (Thabrany and Pujianto, 2000). In 1990, the World Bank (1993) esti-
mated that the proportion of the population with health insurance was 13%. In 2000, it is estimated 
that only about 15% of the population have some sort of health insurance (Alkatiri et al., 2000). 
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may hinder many from participating in the scheme, even though the contribution 
requirement is reasonable for them.7 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
In Indonesia, politically as well as economically, more attention has always been 
paid to the formal sector. It generates export revenue and tax revenue for the state. 
This sector is generally considered to be more productive than the informal sector, 
as the GDP share of the former is always much higher than that of the latter. 
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The formal sector in Indonesia can be categorized based on the following points. 
First, it is dominated by medium and large firms (MLEs), including state-owned and 
foreign companies. Second, the largely well-qualified workers in the sector are re-
munerated in the form of regular wage payments and employees generally have the 
opportunity to join a trade union or to form an association of workers. In Indonesia, 
apart from sector-based trade unions and the employers’ association APINDO, there 
are also numerous workers’ unions at plant level in many industries. Moreover, wages 
are protected legally by the government through so-called regional minimum wages 
(UMR). Third, working conditions in this sector are generally legally protected; though 
in reality many companies / industries, especially the small ones, are found to have bad 
working conditions. Fourth, its market structure also exhibits specific characteristics, 
e.g. prices of some important commodities are often controlled and partially pro-
tected against foreign products by import duties or taxes, and the products are pri-
marily purchased by those in the middle and upper income brackets. Fifth, this sec-
tor is more capital intensive than the informal sector, which leads to higher produc-
tivity and higher profits and income in the formal sector. Finally, the formal sector is 
clearly privileged by the state. This applies also to the area of social security. The 
employees do not only have a higher and regular income, but are also protected by 
social security measures. 
Before the crisis, sectors with high growth rates of output were sectors such as the 
manufacturing industry, construction, banking, trade and tourism. In manufacturing, 
MLEs had higher productivity and a much larger contribution to GDP than micro 
and small enterprises (MSEs) but these sectors had practically collapsed during the 
crisis that led to increased unemployment. On the other hand, MSEs in the informal 
sector have proved themselves by demonstrating the ability to survive the crisis, and 
many were even able to grow amid the crisis. 
Currently, the main problem of the formal sector in Indonesia is therefore how to 
recover quickly, at least back to its condition before the crisis, and to face the coming 
                             
7 This is especially the case for SHI. The economic factor may hinder initiatives to expand SHI. 
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era of AFTA as the competitiveness of the formal sector in Indonesia is still low 
(WEF, 2001). 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Indonesia’s social security system has most of the types of benefits of social security 
systems around the world. It has a benefit payable upon old age, death, permanent 
disability, work accidents and occupational diseases, and it also has a health-care sys-
tem. A compulsory health insurance scheme for public servants (ASKES) has existed 
since 1968. In the 1970s, three separate programs were introduced to provide income 
security to private sector workers and employees of state enterprises (ASTEK), public 
servants (TASPEN), and members of the armed forces (ASABRI). Indonesia also 
has social insurance programs for the general public, i.e. JASA RAHARJA.8 How-
ever, Indonesia does not have cash sickness allowances, maternity allowances, fam-
ily allowances, and unemployment benefits, which are part of the social security 
system of many other countries. 
Historically, the social security system in Indonesia was started in 1977 based on 
Law No.33 by introducing a social insurance for workers in the formal sector (i.e. 
private and state-owned companies), known as ASTEK (Employee’s Social Insur-
ance / Asuransi Sosial Tenaga Kerja). The aim was to provide employment accident 
insurance, a provident fund, death insurance and health insurance. The schemes were 
administered by PT ASTEK, a state-owned company (persero). In 1992, Indonesia 
enacted a major reform of its social security system, as a new social security law 
was adopted (Act No.3, Employees’ Social Security of 1992).9 
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8 PT JASA RAHARJA is a state corporation administrating Law No.33, 1964 on the Mandatory Insur-
ance Fund for Passenger Accidents and Law No.34, 1964 on the Fund for Road Traffic Accidents (see 
Figure 1). 
9 Also in 1992, the Health Act was passed. JAMSOSTEK introduced the mandatory approach towards 
health-care insurance, but failed to actually enforce this mandatory system. Under this Act, the Minis-
try of Health has the responsibility to promote and develop JPKM (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan 
Masyarakat), which literally means Community Health Maintenance Protection / Insurance. 
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This law established a new security system known as JAMSOSTEK, effective from 
July 1, 1993. Under this revised law, the ASTEK scheme was changed to the 
JAMSOSTEK scheme (Social Security for Private Employees), and broadened with 
health-care benefits. Regulation No.36 of the Ministry of Finance formally changed 
the name PT ASTEK to PT JAMSOSTEK. This new program greatly improved the 
benefits for workers covered by the scheme. It provides basic protection in the for-
mal sector for workers and their families. It provides savings for old age and certain 
other circumstances, death benefits, benefits for accidents occurring at work or oc-
cupational illnesses as well as health-care coverage. 
The JAMSOSTEK law mandated all employers with ten or more employees or pay-
ing a monthly payroll of not less than one million rupiah for the whole company are 
obliged to register their employees in the scheme. However, if employers have in 
place better social protection for their employees from other providers then the em-
ployers are exempted from mandatory enrollment for the JAMSOSTEK insurance 
program. 
The most important change under this new law was an increase in the contribution 
rate for the Provident Fund (the savings program for old age). It is a mandatory sav-
ings scheme, where the monthly contribution from the employer and the employee 
are credited into the account of the employee in which interest (market-based, not 
government supported) is added annually. The benefits of the scheme are provided 
for the employee when he reaches the age of 55, or the heirs, in the event the em-
ployee dies before that age. 
Another important change under this new law was the introduction of health-care 
coverage for outpatient medical care and hospitalization. The health insurance pro-
gram, called JPK (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan) JAMSOSTEK, covers com-
prehensive (but limited) health services in kind for employees and their families: (i) 
ambulatory care through community health centers, general practitioners, and spe-
cialists; (ii) in-patient hospital care through general and private hospitals; (iii) ma-
ternity and delivery care; (iv) provision for medicines; (v) laboratory examination 
for diagnostic support; (vi) dental and eye care; (vii) emergency care (Dailey and 
Turner, 1997). 
By law, health-care providers must be paid on a prepayment and capitation payment 
system (per person). The scheme is financed by contributions from employers, 
which are 6% of monthly wages for married employees and 3% for singles.10 
The employment accident benefit provides for protection in cases of work accidents 
and work-related illnesses. The benefits constitute compensation to reimburse em-
ployers’ expenditure for transportation costs of injured workers, wages during tem-
porary disability, and medical and hospital care. Compensation is also provided for 
                             
10 For all of the presently existing health insurance schemes, co-payments of considerable size are neces-
sary for many services and pharmaceuticals. This in turn makes it difficult even for insured persons to 
get access to all the services needed. The main obstacle in the development of social health insurance 
in Indonesia is that the majority of the Indonesian people is as yet uninsured. 
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invalidity and death due to the loss of income. The scheme is financed by employ-
ers’ contributions. 
The death benefit consists of funeral expenses and cash benefits which are provided 
for the heirs of an employee who dies before the age of 55. The scheme is financed 
entirely by the employer. The order of beneficiaries in the payment of death allowance 
and benefits is as follows: spouse, children, parents, grandchildren, grandparents, 
siblings, parents-in-law. 
q~ÄäÉ=SW= pÅÜÉãÉë=~åÇ=`çåíêáÄìíáçå=o~íÉI=g^jplpqbh=
`çåíêáÄìíáçå=ê~íÉ=EBF=
pÅÜÉãÉ= dçîÉêåãÉåí= bãéäçóÉêë= bãéäçóÉÉë= qçí~ä=
NK= tçêâ=áåàìêó= Ô= MKOQÓNKTQ= Ô= MKOQÓNKTQ=
OK= aÉ~íÜ=ÄÉåÉÑáíë= Ô= MKP= Ô= MKP=
PK= eÉ~äíÜ=Å~êÉ= Ô= PÓS= Ô= PÓS=
QK= mêçîáÇÉåí=cìåÇ= Ô= PKT= O= RKT=
qçí~ä= Ô= TKOQÓNNKTQ= O= VKOQÓNPKTQ=
pçìêÅÉW= i~ï=kçK=P=L=NVVO=mq=g^jplpqbhK=
The distinctive features of JAMSOSTEK as a social security system set it apart from 
social security systems in the rest of the world in at least three aspects. First, 
JAMSOSTEK’s Provident Fund (old-age benefit), as a defined-contribution compul-
sory savings scheme paying out lump sums on the occurrence of the first of the three 
contingencies of invalidity, survivorship and old age, is not only fundamentally inca-
pable of providing adequate income support in retirement, but also allows members 
to withdraw their accrued balances when unemployed (ILO, 1999c). Second, PT 
JAMSOSTEK is a profit-making,11 taxable state-owned company that has a monop-
oly on social security contributions. Finally, there are no tax concessions for Indone-
sia’s social security system, except a deduction for employers’ contributions. 
Another important feature is that the benefits of the social security system in Indo-
nesia provide only floor protection. Hence, the system provides opportunities for 
private insurance to cover any additional benefits as required. Due to the fact that the 
majority of the population in Indonesia is from low-income groups, basic protection 
benefits should be provided by the government. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
In Indonesia social assistance, including social rehabilitation, is provided under Law 
No.6, 1974, on social welfare. This system covers various kinds of assistance: for 
those who fall victim to natural disasters like earthquakes, floods, riots, social unrest, 
as well as those who lack abilities to sustain a living, such as invalids, orphans, the 
aged, indigents, and drug addicts. Social assistance benefits are given in money or in 
                             
11 The company makes a profit from the return on investment of the money from contributions. 
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kind. Social assistance is the responsibility of DEPSOS with financing from the state 
budget (APBN). 
One important component of social assistance in Indonesia is the social safety net 
(JPS). The government has established the basis of a JPS through the social welfare 
activities of DEPSOS in coordination with other related departments and through the 
provision of subsidized health care. In 1998, in response to the crisis, new JPS pro-
grams were established, aiming to ensure a basic standard of living for those ad-
versely affected by the crisis (Table 7). Total expenditure of the programs increased 
from about 1% of GDP in fiscal year 1999 to 1.25% in fiscal year 2000 (World 
Bank, 2000). 
q~ÄäÉ=TW= pçÅá~ä=p~ÑÉíó=kÉí=mêçÖê~ãë=áå=fåÇçåÉëá~=aìêáåÖ=íÜÉ=`êáëáë=
mêçÖê~ã= ^Åíáîáíó=
cççÇ=ëÉÅìêáíó= kÉï=éêçÖê~ã=çÑ=í~êÖÉíÉÇ=ÅÜÉ~é=êáÅÉ=ÇáëíêáÄìíáçå=ElmhF=
pçÅá~ä=ÑìåÇë= `çããìåáíóJÄ~ëÉÇ=éêçÖê~ãëI=áåÅäìÇáåÖ=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=íç=ëã~ääJëÅ~äÉ=áåÇìëíêó=
eÉ~äíÜ=~åÇ=ÉÇìÅ~íáçå= _~ÅâJíçJëÅÜççä=éêçÖê~ã=ä~ìåÅÜÉÇ=EéêçîáÇÉë=ëÅÜçä~êëÜáéë=Ñçê=íÜÉ=éççêÉëí=ëíìÇÉåíë=
~åÇ=ëÅÜççä=Öê~åíë=Ñçê=ëÅÜççäë=áå=íÜÉ=éççêÉëí=ÅçããìåáíáÉëF=
pìÄëáÇáÉë=íç=ã~áåí~áå=éêáÅÉë=çÑ=ÉëëÉåíá~ä=ÇêìÖë=
tçêâJÑ~êÉ=éêçÖê~ã= bñáëíáåÖ=éêçÖê~ãë=Éñé~åÇÉÇ=~åÇ=êÉÇÉëáÖåÉÇ=
 
Although there is no unemployment insurance or assistance scheme in Indonesia and 
no system of social assistance under which income support through cash benefits is 
made to the poor, DEPSOS does have a small scheme to provide temporary cash 
payments to old persons who have no family or community support. This, however, 
is very exceptional and only 1,600 persons are currently covered. They receive only 
Rp.15,000 per month, but payment is made on a temporary basis with the under-
standing that the beneficiary will subsequently either be supported by his family or 
the community, and failing this, will be cared for in public residential accommoda-
tions (ILO, 1999d). 
OKNKQ= líÜÉêë=
The government has not yet implemented any other special, unique or innovative 
programs, apart from those already mentioned above. The only thing that the gov-
ernment has been doing in response to the economic crisis is reforming the social 
security system, including the JAMSOSTEK scheme. The main objectives of the re-
form are especially to enlarge the coverage (Table 8). To achieve this goal, the gov-
ernment has proposed a new law that is still being fine-tuned in an ongoing process. 
The main aims of this new law are to include companies with less than ten employees 
and to make law enforcement in the implementation of the system possible. 
With respect to social health insurance (SHI), the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare is going to establish a new SHI agency at the regional level that provides a 
comprehensive benefit package on a mandatory basis by the year 2012. This insur-
ance agency is built from human resources drawn from other existing agencies, which 
are merged into the new organization (Alkatiri et al., 2000). 
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q~ÄäÉ=UW= mä~ååÉÇ=`çîÉê~ÖÉ=çÑ=s~êáçìë=m~êíë=çÑ=íÜÉ=mçéìä~íáçåI=~í=OMNO=
dêçìé=çÑ=íÜÉ=éçéìä~íáçå= mÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉ=íçÇ~ó=EOMMMF= mÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉ=OMNO=
`áîáä=ëÉêî~åíë= NMM= NMM=
cçêã~ääó=ÉãéäçóÉÇ= [NM= RM=
oÉíáêÉÉë= YNM= OM=
fåÑçêã~ääó=ÉãéäçóÉÇ= YR= NR=
pçìêÅÉW= ^äâ~íáêá=Éí=~äKI=OMMMK=
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
There is still no generally accepted definition of the informal sector. However, the 
catalogue of criteria developed by the ILO may provide a good guideline. According 
to this catalogue, activities belong to the informal sector when either: (i) family mem-
bers work in a business, or economic activities are conducted by non-paid workers 
(mainly family members); (ii) there are no legal regulations or existing regulations; 
(iii) there are no regular working times; (iv) most of the workers have low education 
levels; (v) the work is seasonal, depending of course on the kind of activity; (vi) no 
electricity is available in the workplace; and (vii) there is no dependency on regular 
loans. 
Heterogeneous forms of employment and heterogeneous forms of income make it 
particularly difficult to categorize the informal sector. An alternative sub-classifica-
tion of the sector which would make sense in the context of the social security sys-
tem is: (i) persons with regular employment who do not enjoy the protection of so-
cial legislation or social security systems;12 (ii) persons who do not have a regular 
income due to the casual or seasonal nature of the work and who do not fall under 
the protection of the social security systems; (iii) the unemployed. 
In Indonesia, given the available data, the working definition of informal sector em-
ployment is defined by BPS to include those workers who are self-employed with or 
without the assistance of unpaid family members or paid temporary helpers. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The informal sector faces a variety of problems that can be seen as common prob-
lems of this sector in developing countries. First, because activities in the informal 
sector are non-legal (not registered) and hence pay no taxes, they are therefore out-
side the scope of government policies / regulations as well as labor and social protec-
tion. Second, due to their lack of capital, technology and human resources, they often 
have long working hours to achieve a certain minimum target of production / income 
amidst poor working conditions. As a result, the productivity and hence income of 
labor in this sector are low. The low income is also due to the fact that the sector is 
                             
12 This may include workers in the formal sector (companies) without any social protection, as there are 
still many employers who have not (yet) joined JAMSOSTEK. 
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characterized by low entry barriers and fierce competition. Therefore, the sector is 
often mentioned as a source of poverty. Third, probably because they are non-legal 
activities, they lack access to the formal finance market, education training programs, 
and information. Fourth, many activities have irregular workplaces and working 
hours, depending on the type of activities. Finally, as a rule, employees in the infor-
mal sector have no access to social protection provided by the government. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
While JAMSOSTEK may not cover the workers in the informal sector, the Indone-
sian government has an impressive array of other income and welfare programs that, 
at least indirectly, may provide a safety net to some members of the informal sector. 
One of these programs is Inpres Desa Tertinggal (Presidential Decree Program for 
Least Developed Villages / IDT), which is renowned for generating new income-
earning activities in backward areas. The program, implemented by BAPPENAS 
(National Planning Agency) has been designed (at least before the crisis) to channel 
roughly US$200 million each year to the poorest households in the least developed 
villages. 
Besides this, there are many other programs with less visibility that represent real 
safety nets, including efforts by DEPSOS and DEPNAKERTRANS. The most ambi-
tious program implemented by DEPSOS may be the Penyantunan dan Pengentasan 
Fakir Miskin (Assistance for the Poor / PPFM, for poor families), designed to com-
plement the IDT program. Another project also sponsored by DEPSOS focuses on 
Collective Economic Activity Groups (KUBE) and provides financial support and 
guidance to ten selected persons in poor villages to enable them to engage in an in-
come-generating activity, the proceeds of which are shared amongst the most needy 
in the village, as determined by a committee (ILO, 1999d). 
In addition to this program, DEPSOS is also active in providing assistance to victims 
of natural disasters (including floods, droughts, and earthquakes) through the pro-
gram Bantuan dan Rehabilitasi Korban Bencana (Natural Disaster Relief and Reha-
bilitation / BRKB). In the case of drought, food assistance in the form of free rice is 
provided to affected households. In response to other emergencies, much of the assis-
tance provided through this program goes towards rehabilitating damaged housing. 
One of the most common forms of government security, especially for people in the 
informal sector, implemented by DEPNAKERTRANS is a public works scheme 
called padat karya. By providing work at low wages, employment can be targeted at 
those who really need income support. In 1994, the padat karya scheme was ended 
and replaced by training and self-reliance promotion programs for workers. But 
because of the unprecedented drought conditions and the economic and political 
crisis, this scheme was revised in 1997. 
In addition, as discussed before, in response to the crisis the Indonesian government 
has established JPS programs. These programs are not exclusively for the informal 
sector, but given the fact that the majority of the poor is in the informal sector, they 
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are therefore the most important recipients of these programs. The benefits are pro-
vided in cash or in kind (see Table 7).13 
All these social assistance and services are provided free of charge by the govern-
ment to those who are really in need. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The government programs as described earlier may not protect everyone in the in-
formal sector from suffering the effects of income fluctuations. In this context, house-
holds and communities in the sector were forced to develop their own forms of in-
come security. There are also many schemes that were established voluntarily for 
certain reasons, for example more flexibility, less or no bureaucracy or complicated 
administrative procedures, and were probably cheaper than the formal schemes.14 
Two strategies that are still seen in Indonesia today involve households diversifying 
income sources and communities providing a minimal level of income security 
(Wiebe, 1996). 
The poor household strategy of diversifying income sources can be seen as a social 
security mechanism in the sector. There is some evidence that this security mecha-
nism is important in Indonesia. One study of urban poverty in Jakarta found that al-
most all poor households remit significant portions of their urban incomes to family 
members remaining in rural areas (Breinholt, 1992). This finding may indicate that 
the income stream of many workers in the urban informal sector may be closely con-
nected with extended families that remain in the rural sector. These income transfers, 
moreover, flow not only from urban to rural areas: A World Bank report (World 
Bank, 1995) shows that nearly three-fourths of rural households in Java, for exam-
ple, made money transfers to other households. Wiebe (Wiebe, 1996) argues that the 
important implication of these income transfers is that, even if income security for a 
given individual were to fail as that worker leaves agriculture for employment in the 
urban sector, overall income security for the household may improve through the 
diversification of income transfers to that household. 
Private income protection in the informal sector may also be provided by employers. 
Although a written contract may not exist, the relationships between workers and 
their employers are governed by social customs and traditions (Wiebe, 1996). The 
World Bank report (World Bank, 1995) shows that the agreements between them 
often include some elements of risk sharing; employers might agree, for example, to 
pay a fixed wage regardless of seasonal or other fluctuations in demand. 
Besides income security provided by households or individuals at the community 
level, many neighborhood associations (Rukun Tetangga / RT) collect an informal tax 
to provide welfare assistance in emergencies. Households contribute a cup of rice 
                             
13 More discussions on JPS in Indonesia are found in Abimanyu (1999), World Bank (2000), and Manning 
(2000). 
14 This information is based on informal discussions between the author of this paper and some indi-
viduals who engage in income-generating activities in the informal sector like petty traders and small 
street shops. 
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(or its monetary equivalent) every week and these resources are used to help families 
who do not have adequate resources (Wiebe, 1992). These so-called community-
based social insurance or saving schemes are not supported, sponsored or protected 
by the government. They are only privately organized and community-based. 
In addition, there are many voluntary village-level organizations providing insurance 
against the cost of primary health care. In 1992, it was estimated that there were 4,000 
villages in 18 provinces with these schemes, known as Dana Sehat. Coverage ex-
ceeded one million families and included communities in the urban areas as well as 
rural and fishing villages (ILO, 1999d). One pilot project described as a social wel-
fare insurance scheme (ASKESOS) has targeted poor workers in the informal sector 
who are already being supported by an NGO or self-help association. With the ad-
ministrative support of the NGO, these workers are encouraged to save Rp.5,000 per 
month for three years and while they are doing so, DEPSOS meets the cost of any 
hospitalization lasting at least five days (to the extent of Rp.1,000,000 per year) and 
provides a lump sum of up to Rp.600,000 in the event of their death (ILO, 1999d). 
Cooperatives can also be seen as another form of a voluntary community-based scheme 
that provides a certain kind of security to members. However, the development of 
cooperatives in the country has not yet adequately addressed the need and aspiration 
of the people. Cooperatives are condemned to be small with a large membership but 
limited coverage of services. 
Finally, there are various special credit schemes with low interest rates, which have 
been designed for micro-enterprises. These are formal schemes provided by the gov-
ernment and implemented by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People Bank / BRI). 
The funds are channeled either directly to individuals or through cooperatives. One 
of the schemes is a special credit scheme for farming (Kredit Usaha Tani / KUT) 
which has been implemented to address the crisis. However, not all of these credit 
schemes are really successful. Many producers, as good potential borrowers, are 
hardly informed about these schemes and so only a very low percentage have ever 
actually received loans from these schemes. Moreover, especially with respect to 
KUT, the program has ended with a corruption scandal involving a huge amount of 
money. 
There are also diverse kinds of informal micro-finance institutions, mainly in rural 
areas, such as the village-based rotating savings and credit associations which func-
tion around neighborhood groups of ten to 40 members, mostly women. These sav-
ings and credit associations seem to be more successful for two main reasons. First, 
as they know each other, there are strong social / personal relationships among them. 
Second, there are no bureaucratic or complicated administrative procedures to fol-
low. 
OKOKR= líÜÉêë=
As explained earlier, family and community play an important role in the informal 
sector in securing social / income protection. Many traditional social security schemes 
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are established through neighborhood associations, cooperatives, civil society organi-
zations, rotating savings and credit associations and family ties. However, there is no 
need to formalize these informal schemes of social security. Not only is it difficult to 
formalize these associations / schemes, but it is more feasible and probably highly cost 
effective to integrate them into the formal one. The integration can be in various forms. 
One of them is through an ‘investment link’, in which part of JAMSOSTEK’s social 
security fund is used to co-finance existing programs / schemes in the informal sector 
such as health care and accident protection as well as low interest-based credit 
schemes for micro-enterprises.15 
Though the government recognizes the role of civil society organizations, coopera-
tives and their networks in providing social protection, still it does not allocate money 
to support these organizations. One government official from DEPNAKERTRANS 
has commented that they have taken into consideration the possibility of supporting 
them financially but it may take some time. 
OKP= i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
Indonesia achieved remarkable success in economic development during the era of 
Soeharto. The GDP growth rate during 1990–1996 was above 7% per annum. On the 
employment front, however, performance has been somewhat less impressive. The 
growth of employment has lagged behind that of the labor force. During the crisis 
period (1997–1999), the open unemployment rate increased as a result of contraction 
in economic activities, especially in manufacturing, construction, and services.16 As 
employment creation has been an important issue in Indonesia since the Soeharto 
period up to now, the government has introduced and implemented many measures 
to generate more employment, which will be briefly discussed here. 
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=gçÄ=lééçêíìåáíáÉë=Ei~Äçê=aÉã~åÇF=
Many measures have been undertaken by the government to create job opportunities, 
both through supporting private sector development and creating public works 
schemes. In supporting the development of the private sector, special attention has 
been given to the development of SMEs. At the moment, there is a plethora of pro-
grams, including assistance with marketing and other business advice, manufactur-
ing / processing, and assistance with linkages of firms. 
Two implicit policies underpin most of these programs: (i) the provision of exten-
sion services and (ii) mandatory partnership programs. Extension services have been 
                             
15 The advantages of these various schemes are that they are informal, easily established and organized, 
the community can freely decide how the scheme should work, with no government intervention, and 
no complicated administrative procedures and regulations. When these schemes are formalized, the 
people face bureaucracy with many unwanted regulations. More importantly, the schemes become 
compulsory schemes. This perception is based on informal discussions between the author of this pa-
per and some members of the schemes. 
16 A comprehensive analysis of the effect of the crisis on employment is given in ILO (1998, 1999d). 
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provided in a variety of forms including Common Services Facilities (UPRT) and 
Industrial Estate Services (LIK)17 conducted by the Department of Industry and Trade 
(MoIT) as well as Small Business Consultant Clinics (KKB) conducted by the State 
Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises (MENEGKOP and 
PKM). The mandatory partnership program18 has been the approach of several min-
istries and government agencies and has been developed through a range of different 
laws and regulations (ILO, 1999d). Another important approach especially to create 
redeployment opportunities for those who were adversely affected by the unprece-
dented drought conditions, the economic crisis and political turmoil is the labor-
intensive job creation program, padat karya, which was revised in 1997. This pro-
gram is implemented by DEPNAKERTRANS in association with other relevant 
ministries. It is a program of wage employment through labor-intensive infrastruc-
ture development and other economic activities (ILO, 1999). 
The government has also provided a number of credit schemes and facilitated access 
to micro-finance institutions. There are at least 24 micro- and SME credit programs 
currently operating. Within this group there are large differences in terms of orienta-
tion, operation and structure. Some of these programs are directed primarily at spe-
cial groups, such as farmers or transmigrants. The most important credit schemes 
are: (i) KUK which is the requirement that commercial banks devote at least 20% of 
their outstanding loans to small borrowers, and some types of consumer credit; (ii) 
KUPEDES, a program that serves MSEs throughout the country but with a large pres-
ence in rural areas; (iii) subsidized credit programs targeting cooperatives and their 
members; (iv) the BPR rural banks; and (v) a number of donor-sponsored SME pro-
grams. But, as explained before, not all of these credit schemes can be considered as 
very successful. 
eìã~å=`~éáí~ä=cçêã~íáçåI=pâáääë=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=Ei~Äçê=pìééäóF=
Based on information in 1998, there were 19 government departments, which have 
established and regulated 815 vocational training programs. The most important de-
partment is DEPNAKERTRANS, which has several programs that were established 
to link training needs and market demand. The target groups of vocational training 
are mainly job seekers. The Ministry is a major contributor to the national training 
effort as it is responsible for training programs not only for job seekers but also for 
enhancing productivity, promoting self-employment, training overseas workers, and 
for the training of apprentices. 
During the crisis, the government was obviously concerned with the problem of mass 
layoffs and instituted a program for laid-off workers. A major program implemented 
                             
17 LIK (Industrial Estate Services) or similar industry clusters or districts are found in almost all districts 
in the country which are specially created by MoIT where SMEs are (re)located and they are provided 
with common facilities like UPRT, BDS (business development services) and UPT (technical service 
units). 
18 Partnership between SMEs and larger enterprises can be in various forms such as subcontracting in 
production processes or cooperation arrangements between SMEs and state-owned companies (BUMN) 
in marketing, research and development, and many others. 
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by DEPNAKERTRANS for retrenched workers is the P3T program (Program for 
Jobless Skilled Workers). While the main objective of this program is to assist skilled 
workers in paid employment or self-employment, one of the elements involve pro-
viding retraining to skilled retrenched workers (ILO, 1999d). 
Incubator systems19 for new entrepreneurs are the focus of another important pro-
gram implemented by MENEGKOP and PKM. The main aim of this program is to 
promote self-employment activities. 
líÜÉêë=
In another effort to increase employment, computerized systems have been installed 
in many local provincial offices of DEPNAKERTRANS in order to match job seek-
ers and job vacancies. However, from the ILO (ILO, 1999d) study it turns out that 
these pilot systems are as yet neither fully comprehensive nor fully operational and 
cannot therefore be considered as reliable labor exchange systems. 
As employment creation is not only the government’s responsibility but also that of 
the society as a whole, many existing programs such as vocational training are also 
undertaken by the private sector, e.g. education / training institutions and NGOs. 
There are estimated to be more than 20,000 private training providers catering to 4.5 
million trainees / job seekers (ILO, 1999d). 
In the past, the role of private stakeholders in the preparation and implementation of 
labor market policy programs was rather neglected. But, since the reform and im-
plementation of decentralization in 2001, the role and function of the tripartite sys-
tem has improved significantly. The influences of trade unions, NGOs, business 
associations and other private elements have become stronger than ever before in the 
preparation and implementation of almost any labor market policy program in Indo-
nesia. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
bÇìÅ~íáçå=póëíÉã=
Indonesia has witnessed a rapid expansion of education in the recent past, which can 
be seen as a result of the development of education facilities, facilitated by increased 
income during the Soeharto period.20 However, Indonesia still has the problem of 
unemployed postgraduate students and skilled workers, a situation which has worsened 
during the crisis. Since the early 1990s, the government has undertaken some con-
crete measures, including giving universities the freedom to determine their own 
curriculum and to reform the educational system in order to improve its effective-
                             
19 These are systems in which a new potential entrepreneur or individual who wants to establish a new 
business is guided by a business consultant who provides him with information on all the necessary 
aspects that are related to his business. 
20 Jones and Manning (1992) suggest that one of the most dramatic changes in Indonesia since the first 
Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA I) in 1969 / 70 up to the 1990s has been in the educational 
attainment of its labor force. 
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ness in preparing people for the labor market. Especially since the crisis, the reform 
in the education system is also aimed at giving individuals from the poor section of 
the population more access to the educational system by providing various study 
grants (Manning, 2000).21 
lÅÅìé~íáçå~ä=eÉ~äíÜ=~åÇ=p~ÑÉíó=
The World Bank’s study (1994) on labor legislation in several countries found that 
the Indonesian labor standards governing minimum work conditions such as hours 
of work, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, minimum age of employ-
ment, menstrual leave, maternity leave, and bonus and profit sharing are at least as 
generous as those in the other five APEC countries (i.e. Malaysia, Korea, Chile, 
Mexico and the United States). The reason for the poor working conditions of indus-
trial workers in Indonesia appears to lie in the difficulties associated with enforcing 
the centrally mandated standards. The main problems appear to be that Indonesian 
labor laws in that period (during the New Order) relied more on centralized en-
forcement systems rather than utilizing workplace delegates as the basis of self-
regulation (Agrawal, 1995).22 
jáåáãìã=t~ÖÉ=
Minimum wage legislation was first passed in the mid-1970s but had never been 
seriously enforced. The new legislation demanded regular revision of regional 
minimum wages so that they kept track of individuals’ minimum physical needs, 
cost of living, and labor market conditions. The minimum wage is set separately by 
region and sector. In 1989, the government introduced a regulation stating that 
minimum wages must be reviewed at least every two years. But, in 1990, a new 
decree was introduced which required that minimum wages be adjusted annually in 
proportion to the consumer price index (CPI). Attempts were also made to enforce 
this legislation for firms with 25 or more employees, initially around Jakarta and 
some of the other large cities. Recently, this legislation was enforced in all provinces. 
líÜÉêë=
As already discussed, the government has also introduced many policy measures to 
support actions leading to steady, productive employment to guarantee stable sources 
of income and to increase diversification of income sources to reduce households’ 
vulnerability to changes in income from any single source. Also, as discussed before 
                             
21 See ILO (1999) on the discussion of important measures taken by the Indonesian government since 
the crisis for developing human resources in the country. 
22 Katjasungkana (1993) suggests that widespread absence of adherence to the minimum standards for 
working conditions and the resulting poor working conditions, especially in the industrial sector, and 
especially for women, was also related to the fact that workers during the Soeharto period did not own 
the right to organize and form independent unions (that was before the Ministerial Regulation No.1, 
1994) They were therefore unable to legitimately participate in activities that monitor and regulate 
their working conditions. See also two reports from ILO (1993, 1996) on working conditions (espe-
cially of women), and existing government measures to improve the conditions in Indonesia. 
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in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, Indonesia does not have unemployment benefits and re-
trenchment payments, but it does have an early retirement scheme. 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
Systems of social protection or social security are neither good nor bad per se. Ini-
tially, social security systems should be assessed neither positively nor negatively. 
Instead, each system of social protection should be evaluated as a comparison be-
tween objectives and what has been achieved. This section provides a generalized 
picture and overview of the overall system and schemes of social protection or so-
cial security in Indonesia. 
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
The social security system in Indonesia is still focused almost entirely on workers in 
the formal sector whereas the much larger proportion of workers who are found in 
low-income enterprises or in the informal sector do not have any access to the sys-
tem. As shown in Table 8, less than 5% of the informally employed are covered by 
the system, as compared with more than 10% of the formally employed. Moreover, 
workers in the informal sector cannot afford to pay insurance provided by private 
companies or commercial banks. These informal workers face not only a much 
greater risk of income loss, but they are also more vulnerable to economic shocks 
due to their lower average incomes. Even in the formal sector there is a considerable 
disparity between the public sector and the small minority of private sector employ-
ees who are covered by good occupational benefits, the slightly larger minority 
covered by the modest JAMSOSTEK benefits and the majority who are dependent 
on the basic provisions of the labor law. Only 6% of the labor force can reasonably 
expect a pension on retirement. This existing degree of coverage may lead to unin-
tended negative distribution effects of income / welfare, not only between workers in 
the formal sector and those in the informal sector, but also within the formal sector. 
The government estimated that in the period 1996–1999 there were 183,000 compa-
nies (in the formal sector) with 26.3 million wage earning employees (in 1998), who 
were required to make social security contributions. However, until September 
1999, 86,600 companies with 15.9 million employees in 1999 or 14.9 million work-
ers in 1998 were participating in JAMSOSTEK. Thus, only 56.6% of those employ-
ees in 1998 who were entitled to participate actually are included, showing that 
apparently there is a widespread non-compliance (Table 9). 
Recent data provided by Alkatiri et al. (Alkatri et al., 2000) show that in 2000, there 
were about 17 million employees (of about 35.8 million wage earning and salaried 
workers)23 enrolled in JAMSOSTEK. From that total, only 1.2 million people were 
enrolled in the SHI (i.e. JPK) component of JAMSOSTEK, whereas from the entire 
                             
23 Irawan et al., (2000). 
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population24 JPK JAMSOSTEK covered only 2.9 million people in the same year, 
less than 5% of eligible people. Considering that the JAMSOSTEK Law No.3 was 
enacted in 1992, the achievement of this social security scheme, especially for the 
SHI program, is relatively low (Alkatiri et al., 2000; types of schemes are discussed 
in Section 2.1.2). 
q~ÄäÉ=VW= bãéäçóãÉåí=~åÇ=g^jplpqbhÛë=ãÉãÄÉêëI=NVVQÓNVVV=
aÉëÅêáéíáçå= NVVQ= NVVR= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU= NVVVN=
NK= kìãÄÉê=çÑ=ï~ÖÉ=ÉãéäçóÉÉë=
EãáääáçåF=
ORKN= ORKT= OSKP= OTKN= OSKP= OSKN=
OK= kìãÄÉê=çÑ=Ñçêã~ä=ÉãéäçóÉêë=
EíÜçìë~åÇF=
NUO= NUO= NUP= NUP= NUP= NUP=
PK= jÉãÄÉêëÜáé=çÑ=g^jplpqbh=
~K= t~ÖÉ=ÉãéäçóÉÉë=EãáääáçåFO=
ÄK= bãéäçóÉêë=EíÜçìë~åÇF=
=
TKS=
RNKV=
=
VKN=
SMKN=
=
NNKP=
SUKT=
=
NPKQ=
TTKT=
=
NQKVR=
UOKR=
=
NSKM=
USKS=
QK= mçíÉåíá~ä=ãÉãÄÉêë=EãáääáçåF=
~K= bãéäçóÉÉë=ENÓP~F=
ÄK= bãéäçóÉêë=EOÓPÄF=
=
NTKR=
NPMKQ=
=
NSKS=
NONKV=
=
NRKM=
NNQKP=
=
NPKT=
NMRKP=
=
NNKQ=
NMMKR=
=
NMKN=
VSKQ=
N= råíáä=pÉéíÉãÄÉê=NVVV=
O= p~ä~êáÉÇ=ïçêâÉêë=~êÉ=åçí=áåÅäìÇÉÇK=
pçìêÅÉW= jáåáëíêó= çÑ= j~åéçïÉêI= _mpI= g^jplpqbhÛë= äçåÖJíÉêã= éä~å= NVVSÓOMMMX= ^Ä~ëI= NVVVX= ~åÇ= Ñçê= NVVVW=
Éëíáã~íÉ=Äó=mìêïçâçI=NVVVK=
The 1999 study by ILO shows that about 93% of the population of Indonesia has ac-
cess to health services (though not to all services due to their financial constraints), 
although a much smaller percentage has adequate health insurance.25 While this is 
commendable given the level of economic development, comparison figures from 
other countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines indicate that the sector 
may be under-financed and that this is reflected in lower health standards. Indonesian 
expenditure on health care represents 2.7% of total public expenditure, and 0.7% of 
GDP (ILO, 1999d). 
There are several reasons why relatively few workers are covered by the system 
(Dailey and Turner, 1997). The following are some of the problems. 
First, JAMSOSTEK applies to workers in the formal sector only (both private and 
state companies), while the majority of workers is in the informal sector.26 Second, 
                             
24 According to the Law No.3, 1992, not only the employees but also their spouse and children are en-
titled to health-care benefits. 
25 The ILO’s study reached this level because it also includes poor people that can access general health 
services with relatively low costs. These services are provided by the government through centers for 
public health services (PUSKESMAS) that are found everywhere. 
26 This is different with some other developing countries. To give an example, in India the majority of its 
employed population work in the informal sector. This works differently in Indonesia under the social 
security law of 1992. Under the state system of social security in India, every person employed in the 
informal sector over a certain age is entitled to a basic pension. However, hardly anyone in the infor-
mal sector is informed about this entitlement and only a very low percentage actually claims the basic 
pension. See further studies on social security systems in other developing countries by van Ginneken 
(1998a, b, 1999), FES (1997), ILO (2000), and Fultz and Pieris (1999). 
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the law mandates employers to utilize the JAMSOSTEK scheme if they do not have 
a better scheme in place. Because of this optimal obligation, many employers choose 
to opt out by purchasing health insurance from private insurance companies.27 Third, 
many employees who should be covered by their employers are not. There are cases 
showing that employers who pay contributions for their employees often avoid cov-
ering their contract or temporary workers. Employers often retain workers on contract 
status, sometimes for years, instead of making them permanent employees. Appar-
ently, many employers believe that contract employees are exempt from JAMSOSTEK 
contributions. It is generally understandable that contract or other short-term workers 
are not supposed to be exempt from JAMSOSTEK contributions, at least for work-
related accident and death benefits.28 Fourth, in some industries, such as the cigarette 
industry, employees commonly subcontract to other employees for part of the work. 
The subcontracted employees legally do not benefit from JAMSOSTEK contribu-
tions. Fifth, employers with less than ten employees or with a monthly payroll of less 
than Rp.1 million are not required to cover their employees. Sixth, services provided 
by JAMSOSTEK are not satisfactory for many employers and employees.29 Seventh, 
the widespread lack of confidence in the management of JAMSOSTEK contributes 
to the low coverage (Ahmed and Dhanani, 1999). 
Another reason is corruption within the system. Since the political reform in 1998, 
corruption in the country has worsened, hence the people’s trust in any public sys-
tem (especially a system of great size) is almost non-existent. 
Given the above facts, it is thus necessary to adapt and improve the programs, opera-
tion, administration, and services provided by the scheme. Increasing the satisfaction 
of the population with services provided and enlarging the coverage so workers in 
the informal sector can also be included must be the main objectives of the reform of 
the social security system in Indonesia. Programs more appropriate to the informal 
sector that the system should have are more short-term in nature, such as health care 
and accident protection. In a complimentary way, the need of micro and small enter-
prises for capital may be provided with bank credits supplied by part of the social 
security investment funds. 
In fact, PT JAMSOSTEK has developed appropriate measures to deal with the in-
formal sector or low-income households by: 
                             
27 The number of insured individuals in private insurance is now growing very rapidly (faster than the 
growth of JAMSOSTEK), especially after the financial crisis that hit Indonesia badly in 1997 / 98 
(Alkatiri et al., 2000). 
28 Daily, casual and contractual workers are specifically mentioned as being covered by the scheme in 
the explanation in Article 4 of Act No.3. However, Regulation No.14, Article 3, states that member-
ship of casual, daily, and contractual employees in the employers’ social security program will be pro-
vided further by the Ministry of Manpower.. The issue does seem to be unclear. There is an exemption 
for Provident Fund contributions during a probationary period of a maximum of three months. 
29 Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies as yet about the degree of satisfaction in the population 
with the quality of the system. However, from evidence one gets the feeling that the degree of satisfaction 
of those who benefit from the JAMSOSTEK scheme is low. Based on their assessment, Alkatiri et al. 
(Alkatiri et al., 2000) argue that there is a social stigma that government-sponsored programs always 
provide poor quality of services and high administrative costs. It is this perception that causes even a 
company without adequate health or other insurance coverage for its employees to opt out. 
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(1) setting aside 5% of surplus funds for the purpose of providing soft loans to mi-
cro and small enterprises and cooperatives; 
(2) providing housing loans to members; 
(3) covering casual and daily wage workers in construction, cigarettes factories, and 
other undertakings; and 
(4) providing health care at very modest fees. 
PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=
Since it is a state company, PT JAMSOSTEK comes under the general supervision 
of the Directorate-General of State-Owned Enterprise Development, MENKEU. 
However, as a financial institution, PT JAMSOSTEK is regulated by the Directorate-
General of Financial Institutions, MENKEU, which supervises all financial institu-
tions in the state and private sector, including banks, insurance companies and pen-
sion funds. The sole shareholder of PT JAMSOSTEK is MENKEU. As a govern-
ment-owned corporation, PT JAMSOSTEK has a responsibility to pay dividends to 
its shareholders.30 
This positioning of JAMSOSTEK as a state-owned company has some deficiencies. 
PT JAMSOSTEK, as the institution implementing JAMSOSTEK’s programs, does 
not have authority to inspect whether or not employers do an under-reporting on 
their employees and wages list.31 Also, apparently, there is lack of compliance with 
JAMSOSTEK, with many employers simply not joining the programs.32 
It is difficult to see how PT JAMSOSTEK can develop as the administrator of a com-
prehensive national social insurance scheme without being accorded the responsibil-
ity and the powers associated with enforcement. So, law enforcement under the direct 
control of the executive body of JAMSOSTEK is absolutely required. This is be-
cause compliance and law enforcement are part of JAMSOSTEK’s operations, and 
this is not an easy task to do. Compliance and law enforcement are big problems to 
resolve for JAMSOSTEK, especially because of Legislation No.8 of 1981, which 
limits the authorization of state servants having an investigation certificate from the 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to conduct enforcement. JAMSOSTEK per-
sonnel are not authorized to do so, therefore, JAMSOSTEK’s operations problem is 
a matter of the organizing board’s legal entity as Persero or PT (Purwoko, 2001a). 
JAMSOSTEK’s schemes as provided in Article 3, Legislation No.3 of 1992, state 
that all employees are entitled to JAMSOSTEK, so the under-reporting of employees 
and wages is in violation of the law. For this reason, legal measures are taken by the 
executive body in cooperation with labor inspectors, as JAMSOSTEK cannot handle 
                             
30 The appointment of PT JAMSOSTEK as the organizing institution is based on the requirements of the 
1945 Constitution. Under Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, it states that any functional entity serving 
the whole population in the area of social security shall be managed by the state (Purwoko, 2001a). 
31 A team of ILO personnel specially formed for the restructuring of JAMSOSTEK have conducted a 
field survey in many parts of Indonesia over the period 2000–2001. Their findings indicate that there 
is a tendency for many employers to submit under-reported wages lists and employees’ records. 
32 The findings of the ILO team show that the compliance rate with JAMSOSTEK was only 40% 
(Purwoko, 2001a). 
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the enforcement. For law-enforcement, JAMSOSTEK can cooperate with the national 
police and the Office of the Attorney General (AG). Furthermore, in order for the 
law enforcement to be effective, the executive body of JAMSOSTEK can apply for 
outsourcing staff from DEPNAKERTRANS’ labor inspectors and the AG to be 
employed at any time (Purwoko, 2001a). 
Besides the fact that the existing law on the social security system in Indonesia should 
be enforced, that its coverage should be enlarged, and the status of PT JAMSOSTEK 
should be changed, some schemes, e.g. pension and health insurance also need to be 
improved in order to better manage the system. In addition, consideration should 
also be given to the introduction of a maternity benefits scheme based on social 
insurance principles to replace the employer liability system, which leads to abuse 
and tends to prejudice the protection and employment of women.33 
Currently, the government is undertaking a reform of the existing system in its ef-
forts to enlarge its coverage as well as to improve the programs and the quality of 
benefits, and also to improve its management.34 For this purpose, the government 
has proposed a new law that will support the reform. Under this new law the legal 
status of PT JAMSOSTEK will be amended to a new legal entity as a fiduciary trust 
fund with a board of equal tripartite composition, which is responsible for supervi-
sion and control. The proposed law is still under discussion.35 
As a matter of fact, there is an ongoing public debate right now on the management 
of the social protection system in Indonesia. The main issue raised is whether the 
system is best managed by local authorities or a regional government. This question 
has become very important since the implementation of decentralization of power to 
very small district or municipal governments creates a euphoria of self-governing by 
district or municipal government. Compulsory insurance is being understood as too 
much control of the central government and a restriction of freedom (understood as 
a key aspect of democracy) of the population. Any idea of compulsory membership 
                             
33 These changes have been recommended by an ILO mission in Indonesia in 1999. 
34 In relation to this, the Indonesian government had been recommended by a World Bank study to de-
velop supplementary private pension schemes and for this purpose, among other things, the so-called 
monopoly of JAMSOSTEK (or the compulsory membership of its Jaminan Hari Tua (JHT scheme or 
old-age benefits) should be ended (Leechor, 1998). 
35 The need to reform is also recommended by many studies that have been done on the legislated social 
security programs in Indonesia which show that the system has more disadvantages than advantages 
for the employees. Besides those already mentioned in the text, other studies are from World Bank 
(World Bank, 1994), McLeod (McLeod, 1993), and Agrawal (Agrawal, 1995). The World Bank’s 
study, which compares the social security system in Indonesia with those in some other APEC coun-
tries, found that while the details of the programs for the components mentioned above vary from 
country to country, the social security system (JAMSOSTEK) in Indonesia is relatively ambitious in 
coverage and compares favorably to those in the more developed APEC countries. While it may be 
viewed as an important step towards improving workers’ welfare, given the size and the cost of the 
program, too rapid and rigid implementation is almost certain to create problems. Both McLeod and 
Agrawal conclude that the cost implications of JAMSOSTEK, estimated at about 12% of the wage 
bill, are high and could have a major effect on limiting the growth of employment in Indonesia, espe-
cially in smaller firms whose capacity to make regular contributions is likely to be limited. According 
to McLeod, the JAMSOSTEK approach ‘substitutes the coercive power of government for the bar-
gaining power of trade unions in attempting to force employers to provide improved benefits (of a par-
ticular kind) to their employees’ (McLeod, 1993, p. 89). 
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by the central government is being understood as against decentralization. But, on 
the other hand, decentralizing the social security system by giving freedom to dis-
trict and municipal governments in designing their own social security systems may 
create uneven development of social security programs among regions. So, perhaps 
for the time being, the best way is to keep the system under the responsibility and 
management of the central government. This is also related to Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution stating branches of production that are needed for the benefit of the 
whole population shall be managed by or be under the control of the state, which 
means the central government. 
The role of trade unions is very important not only for the implementation and the 
development of concepts and schemes but also in the process of improvement. This 
is because they know exactly what the workers need or what kind of schemes the 
workers wish to have. Trade unions can also function as an effective controller of 
whether the system is fully implemented by employers. CSOs can also play a role 
monitoring the implementation of the system. 
With respect to the informal sector, it would make sense to have different manage-
ment methods and means of enforcement for the formal and informal sectors. The 
informal sector consists of low- / unstable / seasonal income and self-employment ac-
tivities, meaning that they have little earning power. Furthermore, they are unregis-
tered and many of them, depending on the kind of activities (e.g. manufacturing, 
trading and services) do not have a permanent address. These important aspects are 
to be taken into consideration when designing a social security system for workers 
in the informal sector. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
From a long-term point of view, the financial sustainability of the social security 
system in Indonesia will depend very much on the growth rate of participants and on 
their income level. In turn, this depends on economic conditions. So, in a bad eco-
nomic situation, as after the financial crisis in Indonesia, many employers face fi-
nancial problems, which will hence discourage them from joining JAMSOSTEK. The 
high inflation rate will also put the system in great financial risk. For instance, the 
growth in premiums of the ASKES scheme, on average, has been lower than the 
growth of health service expenses. The government determines the salary levels of 
civil servants approximately every two to three years. Sometimes, such as during the 
recent financial crisis, the basic salary is not increased. As a result, the premiums 
received by PT ASKES do not increase (because they are based on the basic salary). 
Nevertheless, health service prices must be adjusted to offset high inflation rates due 
to more expensive medical supplies and medicines caused by the falling exchange 
rate of the rupiah. This trend threatens the sustainability of the ASKES scheme. 
Many autonomous hospitals are expressing their unwillingness to provide services 
for ASKES members if the reimbursement levels are not adjusted to their normal 
user charge rates (Alkatiri et al., 2000). 
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The financial sustainability of the social security system is not only susceptible to 
economic changes, but also to demographic changes. If the percentage of the elderly 
is larger than the percentage of the working population (or labor force), or if the 
dependency ratio is high, there will be more demand for pensions and health care 
whereas, on the other hand, the supply of funds to the system will decrease as con-
tribution fees decline due to the smaller working population. 
With respect to the utilization of funds, they are normally invested in various forms 
such as time deposits, bonds, shares, bank certificates, equity, and investment in land 
and buildings. The composition of investment varies among different social security 
providers. For instance, TASPEN invested its funds mainly in time deposits and bank 
certificates; whereas approximately 80% of JAMSOSTEK’s funds were invested in 
time deposits in banks. But, JAMSOSTEK was apparently subject to political pres-
sure under the Soeharto regime as to how and where it invested its funds. This re-
sulted in considerable sums being invested for political reasons in banks or other 
financial enterprises at rates of interest which were unfavourable to the scheme’s 
members. This was particularly common in 1998 when the financial sector was very 
volatile (ILO, 1999c).36 
The government is not allowed to use JAMSOSTEK’s funds directly, although in 
the past it has tried to intervene in this matter. The government does get, however, 
dividend payment as a stakeholder in PT JAMSOSTEK. 
PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
Indonesia does not have policies that induce gender discrimination in the implemen-
tation of the social security system. There are no different standards or special 
treatment for women. However, women are less likely to be covered by the system 
as in the formal sector the number of female workers is traditionally smaller than the 
number of their male counterparts. In the informal sector, this gap is much smaller 
as the participation rate of females in this sector is much higher than in the formal 
sector. This structure is due to the fact that on average the educational level of fe-
male workers is lower in comparison with their male counterparts. Low education 
plus social and cultural factors are barriers for women to enter the formal sector. So, 
gender equity in the coverage of the system is linked to the gender structure of the 
labor force in the formal sector. If the system also covers workers in the informal 
sector, more women are likely to be covered in the system. 
Social insurance benefits do not include maternity and pregnancy benefits, nor are 
there other special measures which cover gender specific risk. The payment of these 
benefits is the responsibility of employers who pay full wages for three months with 
the possibility of up to three months more on medical certifications. Despite the 
legislative requirements for these payments and prohibitions against dismissal during 
pregnancy and maternity leave, discrimination and evasion usually occur to some 
extent (ILO, 1999c). 
                             
36 See Section 2.1.2 for who contributes to the funds and whether the contribution is voluntary or com-
pulsory. 
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PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
PT JAMSOSTEK’s 1995 unaudited income and expense report shows total adminis-
trative expenses to be Rp.115.1 billion. With respect to its structure, this includes 
management, operations, personnel, administrative and general expenses, but excludes 
the expenses of subsidiaries. Based on 9.1 million participants in that period, this 
represents administrative costs of Rp.12,648 per participant for one year. Adminis-
trative expenses are 3.4% of the total assets of Rp.3.4 trillion as of December 31, 
1995, excluding subsidiaries. Administrative expenses are 11.3% of the total 1995 
contributions of Rp.1 trillion (Dailey and Turner, 1997). These figures may give 
some idea about efficiency in administrating the social security system in Indonesia. 
Although data from other countries are only for the mandatory Provident Fund and 
are dated, they can be used here for a comparison. The figures show that the adminis-
trative costs of the social security system in Indonesia are high (Table 10). In respect 
to the availability, coverage and performance of duties by the administration, it can 
be said that the administrative costs of the social security system in Indonesia are too 
high and not feasible. Therefore, there is a need to administer the schemes more 
effectively, efficiently, and economically with a strong emphasis on higher standards 
of services.37 
As already explained earlier (see Section 1.1), in Indonesia social security contribu-
tions and benefits are kept outside the state budget; a state-owned company outside 
governmental departments, that is PT JAMSOSTEK, administers them. So, the cost 
for the implementation of the system must be covered by revenues from the invested 
funds collected from contributions. 
q~ÄäÉ=NMW= `çãé~êáëçå= çÑ= ^Çãáåáëíê~íáîÉ= bñéÉåëÉë= íç= qçí~ä= ^ëëÉíë= ~åÇ= qçí~ä=
`çåíêáÄìíáçåë=
^Çãáåáëíê~íáîÉ=ÉñéÉåëÉë=~ë=~=éÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉ=çÑ=
`çìåíêáÉë= qçí~ä=ÅçåíêáÄìíáçåë= qçí~ä=~ëëÉíë=
fåÇçåÉëá~=ENVVRF=
`ÜáäÉ=ENVVMF=
j~ä~óëá~=ENVUVF=
páåÖ~éçêÉ=ENVVMF=
w~ãÄá~=ENVUUÓUVF=
NNKPO=
NRKQM=
NKVV=
MKRP=
RNKTM=
PKQN=
OKPM=
MKNU=
MKNM=
SKUM=
pçìêÅÉW= a~áäÉó=~åÇ=qìêåÉêI=NVVTK=
                             
37 The 1999 ILO study (1999c) found that PT JAMSOSTEK experienced considerable difficulty in carry-
ing out administrative functions associated with registering members and employers, collecting and 
recording contributions and processing benefit claims accurately and speedily. Systems are computer-
ized and decentralized but it has not succeeded in compiling a national database in order to keep track 
of the movement of registered members. The organization has been under considerable public scrutiny 
over the last two years partly because of the public’s perception of its linkage with the previous ad-
ministration and partly because of highly published incidents which have drawn attention to limitations 
in the management and the performance of the scheme. 
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PKS= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
As already explained in Section 2.1.2, Indonesia has several social insurance pro-
grams administered by different institutions for private sector workers and employees 
of state enterprises, public servants, members of the armed forces, and the general 
public. Unfortunately, the intended target group of the system is only workers in the 
formal sector, at least for the time being. In JAMSOSTEK, for the Provident Fund, 
both employees and employers pay the contribution whereas for others, the employ-
ers pay the contribution. 
As the premium is fixed (flat rate) based on the basic salary, part of the population 
may pay more, and hence get more benefits than others. This is one current problem 
that PT JAMSOSTEK is going to change. 
PKT= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
Since the political reform in 1998, public demand has become very strong for trans-
parency in any political decision and implementation and in government administra-
tion, especially in dealing with activities using public money. This also includes the 
activities of state-owned companies, including PT JAMSOSTEK. Many people be-
lieve that information on JAMSOSTEK is hard to obtain, leading to widespread mis-
trust of JAMSOSTEK. But, in fact as requested, PT JAMSOSTEK supplies financial 
data and also produces brochures, booklets, forms and magazines, most of which are 
published in both Indonesian and English. The annual fact book published by PT 
JAMSOSTEK is nicely produced and informative. 
However, in general the process of change towards a ‘clean government’, including 
transparency, is not going as smoothly as publicly expected. There is still strong 
pressure from some political interest groups who want to keep the status quo as in 
the period before the reform. The country still has to face corruption; it has become 
even worse. This has created serious problems for Indonesia, especially concerning 
the financial situation, leading to a slow economic recovery. The government seems 
to have no idea how to handle the growing corruption effectively; also law enforce-
ment does not work. 
There is high affinity for corruption within certain sectors that yield financial reve-
nues, including rich state-owned companies, including PT JAMSOSTEK. There is 
the belief that the government may be spending workers’ retirement funds on luxu-
ries for its own officials and on projects that are not related to social security bene-
fits. In addition, PT JAMSOSTEK has committed itself to giving a significant an-
nual contribution to SPSI for the operating expenses of SPSI’s national headquar-
ters. Using JAMSOSTEK funds to subsidize SPSI contributes to the perception that 
the government treats PT JAMSOSTEK as a slush fund, and not as a legitimate social 
security organization (Dailey and Turner, 1997). 
But, currently some change is taking place. PT JAMSOSTEK has designed a system 
that can not only avoid the danger of misuse in the future, but can also monitor and 
supervise the financial management of the company on a regular basis. It is hoped 
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that this new system will lead to a more open and transparent process of allocating 
money and benefits. 
However, no matter how well-designed the new system is, it will not work as long 
as strong pressure remains from certain groups within the government who continue 
to behave in their own interest and prevent law enforcement. Unfortunately, these 
two are the greatest problems of the ongoing political reform in Indonesia right now. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
As discussed before, Indonesia does not yet have public pension and maternity bene-
fit schemes based on social insurance principles and unemployment insurance. With 
respect to the development of a public pension scheme, as suggested by the ILO based 
on its study in 1997 on the restructuring of the social security system in Indonesia, 
the Provident Fund of JAMSOSTEK can be converted to or replaced by a defined-
benefit social insurance pension scheme covering private sector employees. This 
scheme should provide continual periodic payments upon retirement, invalidity, or on 
death to surviving dependents in return for contributions of employers and insured 
persons. The level of benefits provided by the pension scheme may be set to allow 
scope for supplementation by private initiative. This would be simple to administer. 
With respect to the development of unemployment insurance, referred to in Article 6 
of Legislation No.3, 1992, JAMSOSTEK can redevelop its programs with the ap-
proval of DEPNAKERTRANS and other relevant institutions that of the total con-
tribution of 7.5% of the payroll, the employee contributes 2.5% and the remaining 
5% will be borne by the employer.38 The approval of this proposed plan will have 
financial consequences in the form of additional contributions at 7.5% to the current 
contributions, from between 9.24%–13.74% and 16.74%–21.24%. The additional 
contribution paid by employees will change from 2% to 4.5%. 
With respect to the development of a maternity benefit scheme based on social in-
surance principles, the payment of benefits becomes the responsibility of the social 
insurance fund. With this new scheme, female employees can be protected from dis-
crimination against pregnant women and evasion of the employers’ obligation to pay 
maternity benefits as explained above. Additionally, with this new scheme uniform 
standards of maternity protection and reduction in discrimination against the em-
ployment of female workers can be ensured (ILO, 1999c). 
Another important issue, the most significant feature of JAMSOSTEK, is the imple-
mentation of a national health insurance scheme. The implementation of the scheme 
should be linked with the introduction of full cost recovery for public health facili-
ties, and part of the income generated in this way should remain with the unit that 
                             
38 It is very risky to expand existing programs to include an unemployment insurance scheme during this 
crisis situation, because of numerous layoffs with regard to the moral hazard which probably appears 
both from the employer and the employee side. 
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provided the service in order to ensure continued improvement of facilities (ILO, 
1997). Whilst JAMSOSTEK should be responsible for the management of the scheme 
and should directly operate the necessary membership and contribution record sys-
tem, it would not be advisable for it to also seek to arrange for the provision of 
medical care or directly provide it. According to ILO recommendations, responsibil-
ity for arranging for the provision of medical care to insured persons and their fami-
lies should be contracted, under conditions of managed competition, to licensed 
health-care purchasers in return for a fee based on the membership covered by each 
purchaser.39 Each purchaser would have to satisfy prescribed conditions to be granted 
a license, which would be issued by the national supervisory authority in consulta-
tion with JAMSOSTEK. They could be other statutory bodies such as ASKES or 
commercial insurance companies (ILO, 1997). 
There has been an on-going discussion about the government’s responsibility in the 
development of the national security system in Indonesia. The legal basis for Indo-
nesia’s social security is provided implicitly in the 1945 Constitution, Articles 27 
and 34.40 Under these Articles, social security is the government’s responsibility 
with the objectives of the welfare state. Also given the fact that the majority of the 
country’s population is from low-income groups, the national security system should 
not be fully privatized. It does not mean, however, that the private sector cannot play 
a role. On the contrary, the private sector should be given a bigger role in providing 
alternative schemes, but basic security must come under the responsibility of the 
government. 
With respect to the informal sector, there is no need to formalize the sector for three 
reasons. 
First, as discussed before, there are various traditional financial support systems that 
can provide a certain security to many people in the informal sector. So, based on 
this fact, it is more feasible to integrate these traditional systems into the existing 
formal system of social security. Second, the informal sector itself acts as an alterna-
tive social security system for the involved persons as activities in the sector gener-
ate a certain income for them. For instance, during the crisis in 1998 many workers 
were dismissed from the formal sector; and because Indonesia does not have unem-
ployment benefits, almost all of them were pushed to do any kind of income-gener-
ating activities. Third, when the informal sector is formalized, which means that 
enterprises must be registered, have a permanent address, and must pay taxes, many 
of them will face a financial problem and probably they will be pushed out of busi-
ness as their income is not sufficient to pay taxes. The problem is more obvious for 
seasonal activities as the income is not permanent. Moreover, for the government the 
administrative burden of formalizing the sector is likely to be higher than its re-
ceived benefits, as the number of activities / enterprises in the informal sector is huge. 
                             
39 There should be a clear distinction between purchasers of health services, who negotiate contracts on 
behalf of JAMSOSTEK members, and the latter as the users of health services (insured persons). 
40 Article 27 states that every citizen is entitled to have an employment opportunity with a sufficient in-
come provision for humanitarian reasons, whilst Article 34 states that the government shall take care 
of the poor and the needy, including neglected children and the homeless. 
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Alternatively, the existing social security system (JAMSOSTEK) should be improved 
so as to give more access to those in the informal sector. However, this is not an 
easy task because of the reasons already discussed. Another alternative is to develop 
and strengthen the existing traditional social security schemes in the informal sector 
in an integrated manner with the formal social security system. The integration be-
tween the formal and the informal social security systems can be enforced by using 
part of the social security investible fund to co-finance some traditional schemes or 
programs that are more appropriate to the informal sector such as health-care and 
accident protection, and low interest credit schemes for micro-enterprises. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
As explained in Section 4, the social security system in Indonesia needs to be im-
proved. The improvement should be especially in four areas: (i) the coverage of the 
system; (ii) the compliance; (iii), the quality of the existing schemes; and (iv) new 
schemes i.e. unemployment benefits, pension scheme, and maternity and pregnancy 
benefits. But, for this purpose, three important pre-conditions must be met first. 
First, in line with Indonesia’s tripartite approach to industrial relations, there must be 
good cooperation between workers and trade unions, employers and employers’ asso-
ciations, and the government.41 Second, there must be good coordination amongst 
related ministries (e.g. DEPNAKERTRANS, MENKEU, DEPSOS and DEPKES) 
and government institutions. In other words, there should be an integrated policy 
framework on the development of social protection not only to avoid conflicting 
priorities and to create a consensus both on provisions and mechanisms, but also to 
facilitate the improvement of the quality of the existing programs. Third, there must 
be law enforcement. The third pre-condition is important for the increase of compli-
ance or in order for minimization of any employers to do under-reporting both on 
their staff and wages to JAMSOSTEK. The first pre-condition is important to meet 
the second condition. 
Efforts to improve the social security system in Indonesia should also include the 
development of public pension, maternity benefits and unemployment insurance 
schemes based on social insurance principles. With respect to the development of a 
public pension scheme, consideration should also be given to the restructuring of 
pension schemes in the public sector in order to regularize their financing and pro-
vide a greater measure of uniformity and consistency between schemes.42 Initially the 
reform should focus on establishing a fund for the public servants scheme that could 
be set up on a partially funded basis with payment for past liability met through in-
                             
41 In this case, represented by DEPNAKERTRANS, MENKEU and PT JAMSOSTEK. 
42 At the moment, TASPEN provides a pension scheme for civil servants and employees in the public 
sector. The problem is that the general pension scheme should be developed within JAMSOSTEK (from 
the Provident Fund), and it should be harmonized with the public sector pension scheme in TASPEN 
in order to have one national pension scheme. 
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stallments.43 Both pension and unemployment benefits shall be provided first for 
those laid off from current employment and the amount of benefits shall be made on 
a flat-rate basis. 
Meanwhile, a maternity benefits scheme based on social insurance principles should 
be developed to replace the employer’s liability. The payment of benefits should 
become the responsibility of the social insurance fund, so female employees can be 
protected from discrimination against pregnant women and evasion of the employers’ 
obligation to pay maternity benefits. Also with this new scheme, uniform standards 
of maternity protection and reduction in discrimination against the employment of 
female workers can be ensured. 
JAMSOSTEK should also seize the opportunity to provide more effective social pro-
tection to private sector workers through the introduction of a system that provides 
periodic payment so especially temporary or seasonal workers can also be insured. 
Further, as explained before, the implementation of a national health insurance scheme 
is the most significant feature of JAMSOSTEK, and it should be effected as soon as 
possible with due regard to the need to ensure both equity and access to treatment. 
As also recommended by ILO, to guarantee its effectiveness, the national health 
insurance scheme should be supervised by the national authority, not by the private 
sector. The existing health insurance scheme of JAMSOSTEK has been introduced 
without adequate preparation and without sufficient regard to other policy objectives 
relating to health-care delivery and financing. Therefore, to have a good national 
health insurance scheme, the existing health insurance scheme of JAMSOSTEK 
should be improved in coordination with other aspects of health-care delivery and 
financing. 
The improvement of the social security system in Indonesia must also include a change 
of the legal status of PT JAMSOSTEK. As discussed before, the legal status of PT 
JAMSOSTEK is a profit-making taxable public limited liability company, which is 
inconsistent with its role as a trustee of members’ social insurance contributions. 
JAMSOSTEK pays taxes to the government, instead of government revenue subsi-
dizing some of the social security benefits, as is done in many other countries. The 
social security entity in the vast majority of other countries is a non-profit govern-
ment organization, or ‘trust fund’, which has a mission to benefit the participants 
(Dailey and Turner, 1997). So, the government’s plan to change the current legal 
status of PT JAMSOSTEK to become a Tripartite Board of Trustee should proceed. 
With respect to the role of the private sector, based on the legal basis for Indonesia’s 
social security as already explained in Section 4, and given the fact that the majority 
of the country’s population is from the low-income group, the national social secu-
rity system should remain the government’s responsibility. However, while provid-
                             
43 One part could be financed by the government and the other part by public servants (the insured per-
sons). For the time being, this method is likely to be the best alternative of financing the pension 
scheme in the public sector due to the current public financial shortages (Purwoko, 2001b). 
Social Protection in Indonesia 
57 
ing basic security, the government should give the private sector a bigger role in 
providing alternatives schemes. 
The coverage of JAMSOSTEK should also be enlarged to give more access to those 
in the informal sector, or, as an alternative (as discussed in Section 4), part of the 
social security investible fund should be used to co-finance some of the existing 
traditional social security schemes or programs that are more appropriate to the 
informal sector such as health-care and accident protection, and low-interest credit 
schemes for micro-enterprises. However, there is no need to formalize the informal 
sector for reasons already given in Section 4. 
Finally, in almost all types of insurance, the employer pays all or at least much more 
than the employee in terms of contribution. This contribution system should be rede-
fined. In ‘wealthy’ companies the ratio of the proportion of the contribution paid by 
the employee and that by the employer should be higher than the ratio in ‘less 
healthy’ companies, as generally the average wage / salary of employees in the first 
group of companies is higher than that in the second group of companies. 
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AFTA – ASEAN Free Trade Area 
AG – Attorney General 
APBN – State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) 
APINDO – Indonesian Employers’ Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indo-
nesia) 
ASABRI – Social Insurance Scheme for Members of the Armed Forces 
(Asuransi Sosial Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) 
ASKES – Health Insurance Scheme for Public Servants (Asuransi 
Kesehatan Pegawai Negeri) 
ASKESOS – Health Insurance Scheme for the Informal Sector (Asuransi 
Kesehatan dan Sosial) 
ASTEK – Employees’ Social Insurance (Asuransi Sosial Tenaga Kerja) 
BAPPENAS – National Planning Agency (Badan Perencaan Pembangunan 
Nasional) 
BDS – Business Development Services 
BPS – Central Bureau of Statistics in Indonesia (Biro Pusat Statistik) 
BRI – Indonesian People’s Bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) 
BRKB – Natural Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation (Bantuan dan 
Rehabilitasi Korban Bencana) 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
CSO – Civil Society Organization 
DEPKES – Ministry of Health (Departemen Kesehatan) 
DEPNAKER – Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (Departemen 
TRANS  Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi) 
DEPSOS – Ministry of Social Welfare (Departemen Sosial) 
DPR – House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Indonesia) 
FBSI – Indonesian Trade Union Federation (Federasi Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia) 
GBHN – Basic Guidelines to State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara) 
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GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
Golkar – Golkar Party (Partai Golongan Karya) 
IDT – Presidential Decree Program for Least Developed Villages 
(Inpres Desa Tertinggal) 
ILO – International Labor Organization 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
ITB – Indonesian Tripartite Body (Badan Tripartit Indonesia) 
JAMSOSTEK – Social Security for Private Employees (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga 
Kerja) 
JHT – Old Age Benefits Programme (Jaminan Hari Tua) 
JKK – Employment Injury Programme (Jaminan Kecelakaan) 
JKM – Death Benefit Programme (Jaminan Kematian) 
JPK – Health Insurance Programme (Jaminan Pemeliharaan 
Kesehatan) 
JPKM – Community Health Maintenance Protection / Insurance 
(Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat) 
JPS – Social Safety Net (Jaringan Pengamanan Sosial) 
KADIN – Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar 
Dagang dan Industri Indonesia) 
KKB – Small Business Consultant Clinics (Klinik Konsultan Bisnis) 
KUBE – Collective Economic Activity Group (Kelompok Usaha 
Bersama Ekonomi) 
KUT – Special Credit Scheme for Farming (Kredit Usaha Tani) 
LE – Large Enterprise 
LIK – Industrial Estate Services (Lingkungan Industri Kecil) 
MENEGKOP – State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium Enter- 
& PKM  prises (Menteri Negara Koperasi dan Pengusaha Kecil dan 
  Menengah) 
MENKEU – Ministry of Finance (Menteri Keuangan) 
MLE – Medium and Large Enterprise 
MoIT – Department of Industry and Trade (Menteri Perindustrian dan 
Perdagangan) 
MPR – People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat) 
MSE – Micro and Small Enterprise 
NGO – Non-governmental Organization 
PAN – National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) 
PDI-P – Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan) 
PKB – National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) 
PPFM – Assistance for the Poor (Penyantunan dan Pengentasan Fakir 
Miskin) 
PT – Perseroan Terbatas 
RT – Neighborhood Associations (Rukun Tetangga) 
SAKERNAS – National Labor Force Survey (Survei Angkatan Kerja Nasional) 
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SHI – Social Health Insurance (Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat) 
SME – Small and Medium Enterprise 
SP – Population Census (Sensus Penduduk) 
SPSI – All Indonesian Workers’ Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indo-
nesia) 
SUPAS – Inter-censal Population Survey (Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus) 
SUSENAS – National Social-Economic Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi 
Nasional) 
TASPEN – Social Insurance Scheme for Public Servants (Tabungan 
Asuransi Pegawai Negeri) 
UMR – Regional Minimum Wage (Upah Minimum Regional) 
UPRT – Common Services Facilities (Unit Pelayanan Masyarakat) 
UPT – Technical Service Units (Unit Pelayanan Teknis) 
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) is a low-income LDC (least-developed 
country) with per capita income in the US$300 range. Approximately 38.6% of the 
population of 5.2 million lived below the poverty line in 1997 / 98. In 1986, the mar-
ket economy approach was adopted in the form of the New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM) with a series of objectives, including the downsizing of the public sector, de-
velopment of the private sector, privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
public administrative reform. Higher growth rates have been recorded averaging 5.8% 
over the period 1980–97, 4% in 1998 and 1999 and improved GDP rates are forecast 
for 2001 and 2002. Social indicators reflect some progress but there are major con-
cerns over the marked rural-urban disparities in health, education and general living 
standards. 
Since 1986, employees in the public sector were provided with comprehensive social 
security benefits featuring health care and pensions with high replacement rates. Con-
tributions of 6% of salaries are deducted and paid to the Social Security Fund in the 
Treasury. The Labour Law, which was promulgated in 1994, stipulates the rules gov-
erning contracts and their termination, minimum wages, severance pay and entitle-
ments to social security benefits. This is part of the measures to increase the attrac-
tiveness of the private sector and was followed by a decree in 1999 on a comprehensive 
social security system for employees, including those in SOEs. The initial emphasis 
is on health care for insured persons and their dependants. Implementation began only 
in the Vientiane municipality in June 2001. Financing is by employer and employee 
contributions of 5% and 4.5% of insurable earnings respectively. 
The public sector scheme is unsustainable and extensive reforms are planned to estab-
lish adequate financing and to equalize the pension ages of men and women at age 
60. In time, the two schemes may be merged to create a single scheme for the formal 
sector workforce. Extension of coverage is a prime objective once the new scheme 
has completed the initial implementation phase satisfactorily. 
Considerable changes are needed with regard to the provision of basic social services 
and the improvement of human capital if commitments for poverty eradication and 
equitable socio-economic development, expressed in Lao PDR as human resource 
development, are to be met. It is proposed in this report that a high-level and repre-
sentative Social Protection Coordination Commission should be established to ad-
dress all major issues within a broad framework integrating social, economic and 
fiscal policies. Such a body operating with a two-tiered structure should have suffi-
cient authority to determine needs and capacities to meet them and to formulate 
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short-, medium- and long-term plans for future development of appropriate, equita-
ble and sustainable systems of social protection for the country as a whole. 
* The exchange rate of the kip against the US dollar at the time of writing was 
US$ 1 = 9500 kip. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~ä=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
`çìåíêó=lîÉêîáÉï=
Laos is a landlocked country bordered by China, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam. In mid-2000, the population was estimated at 5.2 million with a population 
density of 22 per sq km. Administratively, there are 18 provinces with population 
density ranging from 152.5 per sq km in the Vientiane municipality to as low as 8.7 
per sq km in the Xaysomboun Special Region. About 45% of the population lives in 
the four most populous provinces. Some areas are remote mountainous regions in 
which ethnic minorities predominate and where poverty is concentrated. Approxi-
mately 12% of the total population lives in the capital, Vientiane. 
Lao PDR was established in 1975 by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party who be-
gan to build up a centrally planned economy based on the twin pillars of the collec-
tivization of agriculture and state management of the industrial sector. Due to a series 
of major economic setbacks and problems, the government decided in 1986 to halt 
the creation of agricultural cooperatives and to adopt the market economy approach 
in the form of the New Economic Mechanism. The NEM aims to generate rapid 
economic growth and to significantly reduce poverty in the country. The main policy 
objectives are extensive and structural reforms, which include measures to downsize 
the public sector, stimulate private sector enterprises, the privatization of some SOEs 
and public administrative reform. 
In 1986, a system of social protection was introduced for public employees, includ-
ing civil servants, the military and employees in state enterprises. A new Constitu-
tion was adopted in 1991 which accords Laotians specific rights to social protection 
as follows: 
• Article 20 stipulates state responsibility for the provision of medical services and 
for the social protection of war invalids, of the families of persons who died in 
the service of the country, or distinguished themselves in its service, and of civil 
servants; 
• Article 26 specifies the right to work, to rest, to medical care in the case of illness, 
and to assistance in the case of incapacity for work, invalidity, old age or other 
cases determined by law. 
The Labour Law was promulgated in 1994 and constitutes the framework for social 
protection for the formal sector except for health care since this was provided free 
through the public health system until 1995. From that date, user charges were in-
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troduced from which few exemptions are prescribed. A decree was approved in late 
1999 for a social insurance scheme for private sector workers, which came into force 
in June 2001. 
mçéìä~íáçå=~åÇ=aÉãçÖê~éÜáÅ=cÉ~íìêÉëN=
The need and process of developing social protection in Lao PDR have special di-
mensions due to its status as least developed country in transition to a market econ-
omy. The LDC ranking is due to such factors as: 
• the per capita income of about US$300; 
• the Human Development Index of 0.465 (gender-related 0.451) reflecting the 
mortality rates for infants of 93 per 1,000 and for children under 5 years of 150, a 
maternal mortality rate of 650 per 100,000 births and life expectancies at birth of 
52 years (male) and 54.5 years (female) for 1995 to 2000; 
• the high incidence of poverty, which was assessed as 46.1% in 1993 (an official 
estimate for 1997 / 98 gives the poverty incidence as 38.6% with wide variations 
from 12.2% in the capital to 74% in an area in the Northern Region). 
The 1995 Census found that the population numbered about 4.85 million and it is 
estimated that the total is now about 5.2 million with 77% in rural areas (reduced 
from 87% in 1980, see Table 1, Appendix). The population is relatively young with 
43.9% under age 15 (42.8% female and 44.3% male) and 51% in the main working 
age group 15–59 (51.7% female and 50.3% male) (see Table 2, Appendix). The total 
fertility rate (TFR) per woman was 6.7 in the period 1980–85 but this dropped to 5.8 
in 1995–2000 and is estimated as 4.9 in 2000. However, there are marked differences 
between urban and rural areas as the TFR was 2.8 in the former but 5.4 in the latter. 
Favourable trends are seen in health indicators, but the distribution of health facilities 
is poor, affecting the majority of the population. Although there is a national net-
work of provincial, district and central hospitals, personal health services are greatly 
restricted by resource deficiencies. Whilst urban dwellers, such as those in the capi-
tal Vientiane, have access to hospitals (five of the eight central hospitals are located 
in Vientiane itself), rural households are severely under-served by basic social ser-
vices, notably health services. For example, 70% of rural dwellers are more than 3 
kilometres from a hospital or dispensary and 49% of villages in rural areas are lo-
cated two to three days from health-care services. For the country as a whole, skilled 
health staff attends only 30% of births, and it can be assumed that the proportion in 
rural areas is extremely low. The urban-rural disparity is illustrated by the following 
data for 2000: 
• infant mortality rates for urban areas of 41.7 compared with 87.2 amongst the 
rural population; 
                             
1 The main sources for this section are National Human Development Report, 1998; Country Strategy 
Note Lao PDR and the UN until 2000, 1996; Basic Statistics of the LAO PDR, 2000; ILO, 2000; and 
World Bank, 2001. Data is provided in the Appendix. 
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• maternal mortality rates of 170 and 580 per 100,000 births, respectively, for ur-
ban and rural areas; 
• lower life expectancy at birth in rural areas with the extreme of ten years differ-
ence for males and nine for females between the least developed province and the 
capital city. 
Reductions in fertility and mortality rates are reflected in the changes projected in 
the proportion of young and older persons in the population (see Table 1, Appendix). 
For example: 
• the youth dependency ratio is now about 83.4% and a decline to 72.3% is fore-
seen by 2010 and to 51.9% by 2030; 
• the population over age 60 is only about 5.3% at present for both sexes, which is 
expected to rise to 5.6% by 2010 and 7.4% by 2030, causing the old-age depend-
ency ratio to rise from 6.3% to 6.5% in 2010 and 7.9% by 2030. 
• the total dependency ratio will therefore decline from about 89.6% in 2000 to 
78.8% by 2010 and 59.7% by 2030. 
For the immediate future the main priorities are for primary education, health and 
labour market policies. Planning for population ageing is another emerging priority, 
which is evident in the plans for higher female pension ages (see Section 2.1.2). 
Educational progress is limited and gender disparities are apparent. In 1998, the adult 
literacy rate was 82% for males over age 15 and 55% amongst females. Net enrol-
ment ratios (both sexes combined) have shown some improvement, as comparing 
1997 with 1980 they have increased from 72% to 73% at the primary stage but from 
53% to 63% at secondary level (see Table 8a, Appendix). The percentages reaching 
grade 5 in 1996 were 57 for males and 54 in the case of females (see Table 1, Ap-
pendix). The average number of years of schooling in 1998 was three for females 
and four for males, but the 15–19 years age group attended for one year longer. 
However, school periods were much shorter for the majority of children and youth 
in rural areas (see Table 8b, Appendix). With donor support, more village schools are 
opening up in previously deprived areas to encourage enrolments and longer periods 
of education, especially amongst girls. 
j~ÅêçJbÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Relatively high economic growth rates were achieved with GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) increasing by an annual average of 5.8% between 1980 and 1997. Real 
GDP per capita tripled in the period from 1989 to 1996. Changes in the composition 
of output occurred over the 1980 to 1997 period including a reduction in the share of 
agriculture from 61% to 52% and an increase from 11% to 21% for industry, due 
mainly to rises in manufacturing, especially garments, and construction, and in ser-
vices, which rose markedly to over 25%. The main increases were in trade and trans-
port. Real GDP increased by 7.3% and 5.8% in 1999 and 2000, respectively (see 
Table 5, Appendix) with industry recording the highest growth rates of 8% and 7.6%, 
respectively. 
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International donor support and foreign investments have played crucial roles in 
recent years. Grants from abroad over the period 1996 / 97 to 2000 / 01 averaged 
3.7% of GDP compared with 12% for government revenue. Nevertheless, total an-
nual revenues from taxes and grants have fallen short of expenditures for some years. 
For example, whilst revenues and grants over the period 1996 / 97 to 1999 / 2000 have 
averaged 15.86% of GDP, the equivalent percentage for expenditures was 21.84. 
Main tax revenues are from turnover tax, profits tax and excise tax, and more effec-
tive enforcement is planned to boost collections since the limited taxable capacity is 
a constraint on the government’s development plans. Approved foreign investments 
for the period 1997 and 1999 ranged between US$113.8 million to US$122.5 mil-
lion per year but only US$24.6 million was recorded for the first nine months of 
2001. 
Lao PDR joined ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area) in 1997 and is committed to reducing trade barriers by 
2006. About 70% of trade is within ASEAN, but, with growing international links, 
Lao PDR has applied to join the WTO (World Trade Organization). Some exposure 
to regional economic trends following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has resulted 
in lower growth rates averaging 4% in 1998 and 1999 (see Table 4, Appendix). The 
government forecasts increases to 5.84% in 2000 and 6.65% in 2001. The CPI (Con-
sumer Price Index) rose from 100 in December 1995 to 712.8 five years later (see 
Table 6, Appendix). However, by late 2000 the inflation rates were moderating and 
fell to 27.1% for 2000. Average inflation levels are projected to rise with an ex-
pected growth in imports. 
Public expenditures on education, which are heavily dependent on donor support, 
were only 2.1% of GDP in 1997 and health expenditures averaged 1.2% of GDP 
over the period 1990 to 1999. In contrast, military expenditures reached 9.8% of 
GNP in 1992 and were 3.4% in 1997. 
i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
The labour force numbered approximately 2,166,000 at the time of the 1995 Census 
with over 78% engaged in agriculture. Labour force participation rates for males are 
about 90% compared with 77% for females. The total participation rate was 83.8% 
in 2000 and was projected to fall slightly to 83.4% by 2010 (see Table 3a, Appen-
dix). The non-agricultural sector was estimated to have the following composition in 
19972: 
• public sector 70,000; 
• military and police 80,000; 
• private sector 183,000. 
Precise recent information is lacking on the informal sector but it is understood to 
provide the livelihood of a significant proportion of the labour force. The last full-
                             
2 Main source: Report to the Government on the Actuarial Valuation, 1999. 
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scale survey in 1994 found that about 43% of urban employment was in the informal 
sector. Further details are given in Section 2.2.1. 
Despite plans to downsize the civil service, it had grown to 91,144 by the end of 2001, 
or 29% more than in 1995 when public administration reform was launched. A proc-
ess of devolving functions to local government has contributed to the increase in 
numbers. Currently, only 20% of civil servants are assigned to the administrative 
centres and 80% work in provincial and district areas. The aim now is to reduce the 
number of civil servants by 5% by 2005. 
aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=fåÅçãÉ=~åÇ=^ääçÅ~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=_ìÇÖÉí=
The prevalence of poverty is a serious concern and is at the core of development 
policy for government and international donors. The data available dates from the 
early 1990s when the rural incidence of poverty was 53% and urban was 24% giving 
a national average of 46.1%. The Gini Index was 30.4 in 1992 as income distribu-
tion was as follows: 
• the lowest 10% had 4.2% compared with 26.4 % for the highest 10%; 
• the lowest 20% had 9.6% of income compared with 40.2% for the highest 20%. 
Further details are found in Table 7, Appendix. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
There are extensive limitations in statistical systems in Lao PDR, which hamper all 
types of planning for development in the country. These are manifest with regard to 
labour market information. Presently, data is gleaned from Urban Labour Force Sur-
veys but these have not been conducted regularly (official reports still quote 1994 
Census data and the labour force survey of 1995). There are no legal requirements 
for employers to report vacancies to employment exchanges or for the unemployed 
to register for work. Establishment surveys also have been lacking due to the Regis-
ter of Enterprises becoming obsolete. This has been rectified and survey data should 
become available on a systematic basis. Education statistics have been more reliable 
although affected by technical problems in achieving satisfactory reporting stan-
dards. 
The National Statistical Centre as the main government body in this area has drawn 
up plans for comprehensive improvements, including the approval of the necessary 
legislation for the collection of statistics. Budgetary resources are lacking for the 
implementation of these changes. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
The 1994 Labour Law stipulates in Article 11 that “A trade union shall be established 
in all labour units in accordance with specific regulations of the sectors concerned. 
Where there is no trade union, workers’ representatives shall be established”. The 
Article includes negotiation with employers on social security matters as part of the 
responsibilities of these representatives. 
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The mass organizations function under the direction of the Party and these include 
the Lao National Front for Construction, the Lao Women’s Union (LWU), the Lao 
People’s Revolutionary Youth Union and the Lao Federation of Trade Unions. The 
Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) is active in tripartite circles and is repre-
sented on Boards such as the Social Security Board. The main employers’ group is 
the Chamber of Commerce and sections are industry-wide such as the division re-
sponsible for the garment industry. The LWU is organized at four levels – village, 
district, provincial and central – and is very active throughout the country. The Lao 
National Front for Construction is responsible for relations with the ethnic minori-
ties living in the highlands. 
The formation of associations must be monitored by a government agency, which re-
stricts the development of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), but interna-
tional NGOs work closely with mass organizations. For example, the LWU is in-
volved in development projects at community levels and is the governmental partner 
for activities of international NGOs, including micro-finance and income generating 
programmes. Cooperatives are missing from the scene due to their negative public 
image after the collapse of the 3,000 or so agricultural cooperatives set up between 
1975 and 1977. Instead, savings and credit unions have been established widely 
throughout the country. 
Tripartism is seen in the context of social protection by the composition of Project 
Steering Committees on a tripartite basis. One example is the Project Steering Com-
mittee (PSC) for the UNDP / ILO (United Nations Development Programme / Inter-
national Labour Organization) project on the Development of Social Security, which 
made important recommendations for the type of social insurance scheme to be 
implemented in Lao PDR. 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
The planning of social protection does not take place in a vacuum as the social and 
economic aspects are inter-linked. There is a need for collaboration in and consis-
tency with the strategies for various other important relevant programmes and gov-
ernment initiatives. Lao PDR, in common with other low-income and transition 
economies, is engaged in extensive developmental activities originating internally, 
and those derived from commitments made to achieve various targets established at 
international conferences. The latter are listed below. A number of developed coun-
tries and international NGOs have established priority programmes in Lao PDR in 
relation to some of these objectives: 
• A reduction by one-half in the proportion of the world’s population living in ex-
treme poverty (from one-quarter to one-eighth) by 2015; 
• Allocation of at least 20% of government budgetary expenditures and 20% of 
official development aid to basic social services as soon as possible and prefera-
bly by 2000; 
• Demonstrated progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of women 
by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005; 
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• Universal primary education in all countries by 2015; 
• A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 
5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015; and 
• Access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for 
all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than by the 
year 2015. 
The government’s commitments to eliminate mass poverty and to break the vicious 
circle of underdevelopment by 2020 have been translated into a number of goals 
which include the allocation of more than 20% of public expenditures and invest-
ments to education, health and welfare. There are eight national priority programmes 
amongst which human resource development (HRD) is understood in Lao PDR to 
mean the government’s intention to enlarge socio-economic development for the 
well-being of the population as a whole. HRD is defined in Lao PDR to include 
health, education, employment and social security, as well as public administration and 
the development of children, youth and women. In summary, the concept of HRD 
encompasses social protection and provides a framework for the formulation of 
government policies for the development and extension of suitable systems for the 
different sections of the population. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
In common with other low-income countries, large sections of the population in Lao 
PDR who live in rural areas engaged in subsistence farming, and those working in 
the informal sectors are outside the scope of any statutory or other organized systems 
of social protection. Furthermore, there are no crop or livestock insurance schemes. 
Households live within narrow limits. Remittances from relatives abroad are a virtual 
lifeline for many families but are not guaranteed and fluctuate according to economic 
changes in the countries concerned. These persons can only rely on their savings, if 
any, and family and community solidarity in times of need. Households are vulner-
able to many risks, such as crop failure, illness, loss of income and food from work, 
and death; they follow the traditional approach to coping with a crisis or emergen-
cies by turning to family support in the first instance and secondly to the community 
for assistance on the basis of mutual obligation. This is generally accepted by rural 
populations being largely unaware of alternative approaches and with low expecta-
tions of significant reductions in their vulnerability. 
In this connection, Decree No. 102 / PM of 1993 states that any geographical area 
comprising over 20 houses, or with a population exceeding 100 persons, is classified 
as a village and as such elects a chief every two years. His duties include the man-
agement of social organizations and assistance to the poor, disabled, the elderly, wid-
ows and orphans. When a death occurs, the chief may call a village meeting to discuss 
how they can contribute towards some financial support for the bereaved family. 
The Rural Household Finance Survey (UNDP and UNCDF) in 1997 showed the abili-
ty and willingness of the rural population to save on a regular basis. However, the 
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average deposit levels were very low. A survey on savings habits in two provinces 
in 1998 found that despite poverty all rural households had some financial savings 
held in cash and a few assets such as precious metals and livestock. The purpose is 
to provide for emergencies, including the costs of medical care, and expensive social 
events such as weddings and funerals. Another traditional practice found more in 
urban areas is the savings club, which provides each member in turn with the ‘pot’ 
of the total monthly contributions. 
Considering the very low income levels and the extent of dependency in households 
it is clear that savings can only be marginal and that individuals remain very vulner-
able to the multiple risks faced by poor communities. At the present stage of social 
and economic development there is little expectation of government social assistance, 
subsidies or earmarked funds other than certain types of micro-finance programmes 
to deal with acute poverty and some public works projects. Coping through family 
and community solidarity has definite limits especially when covariant risks occur. 
The outcomes of serious or prolonged household crises may well be disposal of 
scarce assets, taking a child out of school to work, and an increase in indebtedness. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
Due to the lack of data and information, it is difficult to distinguish between the 
formal and informal sectors as precisely as desired, since at the current stage of 
development of the private sector it is described as a mixed set of formal companies 
and informal enterprises with multiple forms of ownership and different forms of 
linkages with the government.3 The available official data on the urban employed 
population in 1994 given in Table 3b, Appendix, indicates the relative sizes of the 
formal and informal sectors at that time. 
The public sector had 91,144 civil servants in central and local government by the 
end of 2001. Growth in the private sector has been assisted by foreign investments 
and these trends can be expected to continue, although not easily predictable due to 
the many factors affecting the supply of capital from abroad. The growth in wage 
employment is significant as the dependence on money incomes increases the needs 
for social security protection. The SOE privatization programme started in 1994 
rapidly reduced the number of SOEs from about 600 to about 90. In the longer term 
it is envisaged that a core group of 29 strategic SOEs, including state banks, will 
remain. SOEs ceased to be part of the public sector in 1994 when the Labour Law 
was promulgated for the non-public sector. Recently, the privatization programme 
slowed down as many were only leasing arrangements. Consequently, the sector 
                             
3 The main source on this subject: The Banking and Financial Sector of Lao PDR Financial Sector 
Note, 2001, with additional information obtained from various reports by the Ministry of Industry and 
Handicrafts. 
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contains SOEs, leased SOEs, joint ventures between foreigners and either the govern-
ment or Lao companies, wholly owned foreign firms and domestically owned firms. 
Enterprise size distribution was recently estimated as follows: 
• 95 companies with more than 100 workers; 
• 512 enterprises with 10 to 99 workers; 
• approximately 20,962 concerns with 1 to 9 staff, many of which operate in the 
informal sector. 
mêçãìäÖ~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=i~Äçìê=i~ï=áå=NVVQ=
In 1994, the Labour Law came into force. It applies to the private sector and SOEs, 
including the civil service and the Armed Forces, and remains the basic law for 
social protection of this section of the population. Its effect was to separate SOEs 
from the social security scheme for the public sector described in Section 2.1.2 leav-
ing the continued coverage of their staff dependent on any new scheme introduced 
within the framework of the Labour Law. Implementation of the Labour Law was 
entrusted to the newly established Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MOLSW). 
The Labour Law regulates employment conditions and stipulates the rights and obli-
gations of employers, workers and the system of labour administration. The form 
and nature of employment contracts are specified and the rules on dismissals are set 
out together with those on labour protection. Severance pay and minimum wages are 
prescribed. The right to organize and to belong to mass organizations that have been 
formed lawfully is laid down in Article 3. 
The Labour Law stipulates the responsibility of enterprises to provide social security 
protection especially through the provisions in Article 48 ‘Each labour unit4 in the 
socio-economic sectors shall establish a social security fund or pay contributions to 
a compensation fund to ensure the living standard of its workers in accordance with 
the social security system. Workers and employers shall contribute to the social secu-
rity fund in accordance with regulations adopted by the government. Where the em-
ployer has paid contributions to the compensation fund and the social security fund, 
these funds shall be entirely responsible for providing social security coverage to 
workers.’ Other relevant provisions are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Sickness Protection. Article 29 provides monthly paid workers with an entitlement 
to 30 days sick leave on full pay per year, which is available also to hourly and daily 
paid and piece-rate workers who have more than 90 days service. Sickness lasting 
more than 30 days becomes the responsibility of the social security system. 
Maternity Protection. Under Article 36, women workers are entitled to maternity 
leave on normal pay for 90 days from their employers or the social security fund if 
contributions have been fully paid, which shall include post-confinement leave of at 
                             
4 According to Article 5 of the Labour Law ‘labour units’ refers to ‘all workers and employers who 
carry on activities in any socio-economic sector’. 
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least 42 days. A maternity grant of at least 60% of the minimum wage is also pay-
able and that is increased by 50% for additional births. 
Employment Injury Protection. Articles 51–53 deal with occupational injuries and 
prescribed diseases. Medical expenses for immediate and continued treatment are 
the responsibility of employers plus payment of funeral grants and lump sum bene-
fits in the event of death. Article 53 specifies the following cash benefits to be paid 
by either the employer or the social security fund: 
– Full pay for up to six months whilst undergoing medical treatment and rehabilita-
tion and then 50% of salary or wages for up to 18 months; 
– It is then stipulated that ‘after 18 months, social security benefits shall be granted’ 
which leaves open the question of how this could apply to uninsured workers; 
– If disabled, workers or their heirs are entitled to compensation as specified in the 
regulations. 
Old-age Protection. Article 54 sets out the rights to retirement pension as condi-
tional upon satisfaction of the following conditions (persons failing these conditions 
are entitled to lump sum compensation): 
• attainment of ages 60 (men) and 55 (women); 
• completion of 25 years of service; 
• the above are reduced to ages 55 (men) and 50 (women) and 20 years service for 
persons who worked for over five years continuously in hazardous employment, 
and 
• payment of social security contributions for 25 years, or 20 years for persons who 
worked for over five years continuously in hazardous employment. 
This legislation has acted as a guide to enterprises that were considering the question 
of how to protect workers in various contingencies. However, it does not include 
needs for medical care that was provided free in 1994 by the public health services. 
The change of policy requiring user charges occurred in 1995 and there is no provi-
sion for health protection although only the very poor, students and monks are ex-
empt from user charges. 
In fact, in the absence of a health insurance scheme, enterprises were soon faced with 
the problem of heavy costs incurred by workers with serious illnesses and had to 
resort to salary loans in most cases. In a few instances, small health insurance funds 
were also established for this purpose. To some extent the Labour Law provisions on 
enterprise responsibility for social security arrangements inspired the latter. Overall, 
the absence of detailed rules on benefits and contributions limited the impact of the 
social security provisions in the Labour Law pending the introduction of a social 
security scheme for the private sector. This took place from June 2001 initially with 
respect to enterprises with 100 or more workers, as outlined in Section 2.1.2. 
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OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
lîÉêîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=mìÄäáÅ=pÉÅíçê=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The social security system for civil servants, army, and public employees introduced 
in 1986 covers sickness, invalidity, maternity, old age and death. These benefits were 
provided as a benefit of service until December 1989 when the law was changed, 
requiring civil servants to contribute 6% of their salaries to the Social Security Fund 
to continue coverage. However, the fund was only established in the Treasury in 
1992. The implementation of the scheme is the responsibility of MOLSW. The main 
features of the benefits are the following: 
• Medical care for civil servants (both active and retired), military and police, 
spouses and children up to age 18 consists of medical consultations, tests, medi-
cines, X-rays and artificial limbs on the basis that the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
covers the costs of hospital accommodation, food and other services; 
• Sickness benefit is payable to civil servants who are entitled to full salary for 30 
days per year, followed by 60% of salary and if hospitalized to 30 days at full sal-
ary and 80% for 12 months; there is also entitlement to 30 days at full salary if an 
infant child is sick; 
• Invalidity benefits5 are payable at the rate of 70% of the last basic salary to per-
sons with more than five years of service who are certified as having lost more 
than 80% of their working capacity; 
• Maternity benefits consist of three months leave on full pay, a grant of 60% of 
basic minimum salary, and medical care costs up to statutory limits; 
• Survivor’s benefits are payable to the surviving spouse in the form of a funeral 
grant (basic salary of the last 10 months or 12 months of the basic minimum salary 
in rural areas) and a lump sum of between six and 15 times the last monthly basic 
salary according to length of service; 
• Employment injury benefits, which are mainly paid to war veterans, consist of 
medical care (in accordance with stipulated amounts for each type of service), full 
salary for up to six months and 80% for a further six months, which is followed 
by invalidity pension. Additional allowances are paid to retired or working inva-
lids, including war invalids, residing in invalidity centres or returning to rural ar-
eas; and 
• Retirement pensions after 25 years eligible service and attainment of ages 60 
(men) and 55 (women). For civil servants the pension is 75% of their basic pre-
retirement salaries plus 1% for each year up to a maximum of 90% of salary and a 
lump sum of 15% of the last drawn basic salary6 per year of service. 
                             
5 Invalidity benefits have replaced convalescence allowance except for those persons who had their 
entitlement on 1 January 1994 and those with 20 years service who have not yet retired. 
6 The qualifying period is reduced to 20 years and pension ages to 55 (men) and 50 (women) for revolu-
tionaries and persons who worked in hazardous conditions for five years or more, and the benefit is 
75% per cent of the last basic salary after 20 years service plus 1% per additional year up to the 
maximum of 90%. 
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In addition, there are child allowances of monthly sums for civil servants and pen-
sioners for each child under age 18. Severance payments in the event of voluntary 
retrenchment are at the rate of one month’s salary per year of service plus one 
month’s salary and one year’s child allowance, and housing and education assistance. 
The rules for short-term benefit payments are not applied because of the low salaries 
in the public sector. Pensions in payment are fully indexed to the last salary grade of 
retirees and clearly are the major item of expenditure (details are in Table 9, Appen-
dix). 
The scheme is not sustainable as there is no system of funding, leaving the state 
budget to subsidize up to 70% of the expenditures in the past two years. The em-
ployee contribution of 6% of earnings is not based on any financial estimates and the 
income is used to meet short-term costs of the medical scheme. Options for reform 
have been under consideration for some time. The principle of equalization of male 
and female pension ages at 60 years is included in the plans for restructuring. 
pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=mêçíÉÅíáçå=Ñçê=íÜÉ=mêáî~íÉ=pÉÅíçê=
Main provisions. The Decree No. 207 / PM of 1999 provides for nine social security 
contingencies plus a death grant. The provisions introduce all but child benefits and 
unemployment insurance. The latter are to be brought into being at a time to be de-
termined in the future. The decree is based on the Labour Law and integrates rele-
vant benefit provisions with those under the Decree. 
The administration of the scheme is entrusted to the Social Security Organization 
(SSO) as an autonomous body under the MOLSW with appropriate powers and re-
sponsibilities. Its Board has 11 directors consisting of three representing the govern-
ment, four the employers and four the employees. The Minister submits the list of 
candidates for the approval of the Prime Minister. The Board elects its own Chair-
man and Vice-Chairman. Its main responsibilities are to ‘serve as the logistical arm 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in the consideration and adoption of 
short-, medium- and long-term social welfare plans’ and to undertake important func-
tions such as determining the contribution rates and the administrative expenses of 
the SSO under the final authority of the Minister in accordance with the provision 
that these expenses shall not exceed 10% of the total revenue of the scheme. 
The regulations stipulate that the SSO is legally and financially independent of the 
government but responsible to the Minister to whom it must submit its annual re-
ports and audited accounts. The scheme is backed up by the financial guarantee of 
the state. 
The legislation is applicable to enterprises with ten or more employees including 
their branches with fewer than ten staff. Regulations limit the initial coverage to en-
terprises with 100 or more employees in the Vientiane Municipality. There are 80 
such enterprises with an estimated 60,000 employees. The implementation commenced 
in June 2001. Voluntary insurance by enterprises is permitted and once accepted 
this, in effect, becomes compulsory and permanent. Any economically active person 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
88 
can apply for voluntary membership and if accepted will pay both employer and em-
ployee contributions. 
By November 2001, 70 large enterprises in the Vientiane Municipality had registered 
with over 20,000 workers of whom 61% were female. Some of these firms have 
fewer than 100 workers but are keen to join. In some cases this is in order to con-
tinue previous coverage under the public sector scheme as SOEs. Enforcement pro-
cedures are being developed in order to cover all liable companies in the near future. 
The preponderance of women is mainly due to the inclusion of the large garment 
factories that supply the export trade. Contributions for 13,213 workers were paid by 
60 employers. The income and expenditure is given in Table 10, Appendix. The 
main costs have been capitation payments to the accredited hospitals. 
Finance. The Decree provides for a self-financing scheme through the collection of 
contributions and receipt of other revenues for allocation to the following autono-
mous funds under the control of the SSO: 
• Health insurance; 
• Short-term benefits; 
• Employment Injury; 
• Pensions. 
The rates of contributions are determined by the Board on the principle that the em-
ployees’ share shall not exceed 50% of the total after making it clear that contribu-
tions for employment injury insurance are the sole responsibility of employers. Fol-
lowing an actuarial valuation, the contributions were determined as follows: 
q~ÄäÉ=NW= qçí~ä=`çåíêáÄìíáçå=o~íÉë=
_ÉåÉÑáí= o~íÉ= bãéäçóÉÉ= bãéäçóÉê=
eÉ~äíÜ=Å~êÉ= QKQG= OKO= OKO=
páÅâåÉëë= MKV= MKQR= MKQR=
j~íÉêåáíó= MKT= MKPR= MKPR=
_áêíÜ=Öê~åí= MKQ= MKO= MKO=
aÉ~íÜ=Öê~åí= MKQ= MKO= MKO=
bãéäçóãÉåí=áåàìêó= MKS= = MKS=
mÉåëáçåë= OKO= NKN= NKN=
qçí~ä= VKR= QKR= R=
G= cáÖìêÉë=~åÇ=íçí~äë=~êÉ=êçìåÇÉÇ=~åÇ=ã~ó=åçí=~ÇÇ=ìé=Éñ~ÅíäóK=
Different financial systems are in operation for each Fund, appropriate to the charac-
teristics of each benefit. For pensions, an intermediate system of funding, termed the 
scaled premium system, was selected between pay-as-you-go on the one hand and 
full funding on the other. Contributions will increase from time to time in future 
years. Regulations lay down financial rules for the maintenance of contingency and 
technical reserves and the principles for investment of social security funds. Actuar-
ial valuations are required at five-year intervals as a minimum. 
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Health Care. The insured person, spouse and children, who must be under age 18 or 
under age 25 if undergoing full-time education (with no age limit for disabled chil-
dren who are incapable of self-support), are entitled to medical care, consisting of 
medical consultations, treatment as out- or in-patients and approved medicines, pro-
vided that the insured person has paid contributions for a minimum of three months 
in the preceding 12 months. No co-payments are required for any of these services 
nor do patients meet costs and claim reimbursement, as under the public sector 
scheme. Medical providers are paid through regular capitation payments from the 
Health Insurance Fund maintained by the SSO. 
Sickness Benefit. Decree 207 / PM coordinates the sick leave entitlements under the 
Labour Law and the Decree in the following system of benefits: 
• after expiry of the 30 days sick leave per year on full pay liability of employers 
under the Labour Law, the scheme will pay 60% of insurable earnings averaged 
over the last six months subject to a contribution condition that a minimum of 
three months contributions were paid in the last 12 months; 
• the duration of benefit is given as one year at which point medical advice is to 
determine whether benefit should continue in expectation of recovery or a claim 
should be made for invalidity benefit; 
• benefit is also prescribed for partial incapacity after a period of being entitled to 
sickness benefit when the insured person is unable to resume his or her normal 
duties, at the rate of 60% of the difference between the old and the new insurable 
earnings. 
Maternity Benefits. Benefit is payable for childbirth, miscarriage and adoption sub-
ject to a contribution condition of at least nine contributions in the last 12 months. 
The rate is 70% of insurable earnings averaged over the last six months payable for 
three months. Extension of the sickness benefit rate is allowed based on medical 
advice. Under the regulations, employers are required to top up the SSO benefit to 
100%. Adoption is included where the child was under 12 months old. Maternity 
grant of 60% of the minimum wage is payable per newly-born child to an insured 
person or the wife of an insured person provided that at least 12 contributions have 
been paid in the last 12 months. 
Death Grant. Subject to a contribution condition of at least 12 months contributions 
in the last 18 months, which is waived for current beneficiaries, death grants are 
payable to relatives who are responsible for the funeral ceremonies of the following 
amounts of insured earnings: 
• six months with respect to the death of an insured person; 
• three months on the death of the spouse; 
• two months for the death of a child as defined in the Decree. 
Employment Injury Protection. The contingencies covered in this branch are tem-
porary incapacity, need for medical care, permanent partial disablement, permanent 
total disablement, and death. The main principles are: 
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• no fault coverage for all accidents which could reasonably be accepted as arising 
out of and in the course of employment, which may include commuting accidents; 
• employees facing risks of occupational injuries are protected without contribution 
conditions from the first day of insurable employment; 
• financing is solely by employers; 
• the medical and cash benefits should be provided throughout the contingency and 
should extend to medical and vocational rehabilitation. 
The main features of the benefit system are: 
• temporary incapacity benefit is an employer responsibility, comprising full salary 
or wage for a maximum of 30 days. After this, the SSO is liable to pay 100% of 
insurable earnings, as averaged over the last six months, for a maximum of six 
months. This may be followed by a further period of 18 months with benefits at 
the rate of 60%; 
• as under the sickness benefit provisions, there is provision for a return to work 
even if the person is unable to return to former duties and for SSO to make up the 
difference between the old and the new wages; 
• claims for permanent disability have to be dealt with by medical boards to deter-
mine the degree of disability, which determines the proportion paid; the benefit 
rate is calculated by multiplying 67.5% of insurable earnings, as averaged over 
the last 12 months, by the degree of disability; 
• persons adjudged to require the services of a caregiver can receive benefit based 
on the minimum wage according to the number of hours of care-giving; 
• in case of death from employment injury, death grant is payable of six months in-
sured earnings and survivors’ benefits as outlined below: 
• if the deceased had paid a minimum of five years contributions, adaptation benefit 
of 80% of the insured earnings, as averaged over 12 months, for up to 12 months 
to a spouse and eligible children (this is to ensure the same entitlement as pro-
vided by the Pensions Branch), which may be succeeded by the longer term bene-
fits described below where there are eligible survivors; 
• for the following benefits, survivors are defined as follows: 
– as the spouse, being the wife aged 44 years or more, or who has one or more 
minor children (defined in regulations as children under age 15) or who is dis-
abled and unable to work or the husband who is disabled and unable to work; 
– if no spouse, parents who were supported by the deceased (the regulations stipu-
late ‘main source of financial support’) and who meet the qualifying rules, and 
– children of the deceased, stepchildren and adopted children; 
• survivors’ benefits are calculated from the average of the insured earnings over 
the last 12 months and consist of pensions up to a total of 100% of the rate of 
permanent total disablement benefit applicable to the deceased, of 50% for the 
spouse or parent and 15% per child, or 20% if no spouse or parent, up to a maxi-
mum of 60% for children. 
Pension Protection. Old-age, invalidity and survivors’ benefits should be integrated 
into one pension system. In the case of old-age pension, the Decree prescribes pen-
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sion age as 60 years for men and women and the qualifying period for pension as 
five years pension insurance. Persons reaching pension age with shorter periods of 
insurance qualify for lump sum payments in lieu of pensions. Pension rates are de-
termined from the number of accumulated pension points, the total average earnings 
and the accrual rate of 1.5%. Early claims are permitted from age 55 subject to the 
reduction of pensions by 0.5% per month between the month the pension commences 
and the month age 60 will be attained. Deferred retirement is rewarded by increasing 
the pension by 0.5% for each month of continued employment beyond age 60. 
Pension points are derived each year from dividing the annual average earnings by 
the total average earnings of all insured persons.7 Older persons joining the scheme 
may have difficulties in accumulating enough pension points to qualify for adequate 
pensions and therefore pension points to the value of 0.8 per year are credited to 
persons who are 31 years old or more when first registered. These are allocated ac-
cording to age on entry as follows: 
• the number of pension points is calculated for persons aged 31 to 45 by deducting 
30 years from their ages; and 
• persons aged 45 or more shall receive free pension points for 15 years. 
Pension points of husband and wife are to be divided in the event of divorce before 
pension age to the extent of the duration of the marriage within the insurance period. 
For divorces after pension age the pension shall be divided according to the divorce 
decision. 
Survivors’ Benefits. On the death of an insured person who has paid contributions 
for at least five years, or a pensioner, the eligible survivors shall be entitled to bene-
fits as follows: 
• Adaptation benefit of 80% of the insured earnings, as averaged over 12 months, 
for up to 12 months to a spouse and eligible children, which may be succeeded by 
the longer term benefits described below where there are eligible survivors; 
• Widow or widower benefit for the widow if aged 44 years or more, or has one or 
more minor children (aged under 15 years), or is disabled and unable to work, or 
the widower who is disabled and unable to work at the rate of 60% of the deceased’s 
pension or pension rate (the extent of disablement must be 66% or more); 
• Children of the insured person, or step children or adopted children who are with-
in the age limits of 18 years or 25 years if under full-time education, with a disabled 
child who is unable to work included without age limit, are entitled to 20% of the 
deceased’s pension or assumed invalidity rate up to a maximum of 60% for chil-
dren; 
• The widow / widower and children’s benefits are subject to an overall maximum of 
80% of the pension rate or 100% of the invalidity pension rate which would have 
been payable if the insured person had qualified for such pension prior to death. 
                             
7 Periods of non-payment for any reason are excluded from the calculation but periods in receipt of 
sickness, maternity, temporary incapacity, permanent disability benefits for 60% disability or more 
and caregiver benefits qualify for inclusion. 
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Invalidity Benefits. The definition of invalidity in Article 96 is that an insured per-
son ‘cannot fulfil his duties and undertake his work tasks attributable to ill health or 
disability and that the SSO has evaluated that the relevant person is unable to work’. 
The contribution condition for pensions is that at least five years’ contributions have 
been paid. Lump sum benefits are due for shorter periods of insurance. Invalidity 
benefit is calculated in the same way as old-age pension plus the addition of the re-
maining period up to age 60 as insurance years. Caregiver benefits are provided if 
necessary on the same basis as for employment injury victims. The Decree provides 
for medical care and rehabilitation and sanctions in the form of benefit reductions or 
termination for persons who refuse these services. The invalidity pensions are con-
verted into retirement pensions at age 60. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
The MOLSW is responsible for social welfare and operates very limited programmes. 
These programmes cover disaster relief, reintegration of refugees and assistance to 
orphans and children in difficulties. These activities respond to donor priorities and 
rely heavily on external financial support and grants. The Decree No. 52 / PM of 
1995 on health financing exempts monks, students and indigents from payment of 
user charges. There are few other free or subsidized services. Poor villagers tend to 
utilize local pharmacies, licensed or not, when sick rather than take the time and pay 
the costs of transportation to and the charges levied by health facilities that usually 
lack essential medicines. 
The rudimentary nature of social welfare leaves the responsibility for the care of 
destitute persons and those suffering from temporary financial hardship with families 
and communities. 
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The growth of the informal sector is a fact of life in developing and transitional 
economies with the effects of downsizing of the public sectors, the drift away from 
agriculture and the limited capacity for absorption in the emerging private sectors. 
According to various surveys, in 1993 the informal sector provided the livelihood of 
about 14% of the national labour force comprising all types of small-scale private 
business activities, small shops, street vendors, crafts, repair shops and similar micro-
enterprises. The 1994 Urban Labour Force Survey used the international definition 
for the informal sector established by the 15th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians in 1993. This refers to two characteristics: a private non-agricultural 
business which is household-operated and has no more than five paid employees.8 
The results of the survey are given in Table 3b, Appendix. 
In terms of the current status definition about 43% of urban employment was classi-
fied as informal and 53% formal with 4% engaged in small-scale agriculture. Women 
                             
8 ILO / EASMAT, 1996. 
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accounted for 61% of informal sector workers. Industry-wise, the main sector is 
wholesale and retail trade followed by construction, hotels, restaurants, business 
services, manufacturing and transport. Self-employed persons constitute 72% of the 
informal workforce and unpaid family workers account for 17%. Wage levels were 
about 15% lower on average than in the formal sector although working hours tend 
to be about 11% longer for informal sector workers. Up-to-date information is lack-
ing but some of the more general information on types and conditions of work may 
be valid today. 
A later study in 1996 found about 146,000 small and micro enterprises employing 
260,000 persons including home-based units. Only 10% had paid employees. The 
main activity was wholesale and retail trade followed by handicrafts, services and 
transportation. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
Longer hours, lower pay, lack of job security, absence of any welfare provisions, 
poorer working conditions and exposure to higher levels of risk are all features of 
informal sector employment. This may be defined as that segment of the economy 
and labour market characterized by very small production units, own-account work-
ers and the low-income self-employed in household and micro-enterprises. The main 
features are: 
• low levels of capital, skills and technology; 
• operating outside the scope of regulations on business registration, labour and 
social protection; 
• low and unstable levels of income, especially amongst employees, with the owner 
liable for gains and losses; and 
• poor working conditions. 
Due to the lack of capital, small and micro-enterprises function with a minimum of 
technology and chronically low productivity. The reasons for persons seeking work 
despite these obvious drawbacks are deficiencies in building up human capital through 
adequate educational systems and training schemes, and the limitations of labour 
market information. For example, school leavers often are ill equipped to find work 
in formal sector enterprises where they could have opportunities to improve market-
able skills. Furthermore, due to the weaknesses of employment services in providing 
information on job vacancies, and the lack of training schemes to assist workers with 
their job search, retrenched workers with little or no financial benefits are often forced 
to take the first available option to maintain earning levels and ensure continued 
membership of social security schemes. Such persons can subsequently become 
trapped and lose their ability to obtain suitable jobs with the working conditions they 
were used to. 
It may be more realistic to plan expansion of social protection schemes to the infor-
mal sector as part of comprehensive action programmes that address the basic con-
cerns and problems of those whose livelihood is derived from this sector. The first 
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priorities may be strengthening prospects of survival and improving incomes, rather 
than with investing scarce resources in social protection, such as social insurance 
schemes. Those countries that have adopted strategies for the uplifting of informal 
sector activities usually have the following objectives as a minimum: 
• improvement of the productive potential, and therefore of the employment and in-
come-generating capacity; 
• improvement of the welfare of the poorest groups; and 
• establishment of the appropriate regulatory framework, including appropriate forms 
of social protection and regulation. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
In the current economic situation, the main poverty alleviation measure is micro-
finance. As stated in Section 2.1.3, there are extremely limited resources available 
for social assistance, social services and disaster relief. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
In general, insurance concepts are not widely understood in Lao PDR and commer-
cial insurance products are not well known or sought after. There is only one insur-
ance company that provides insurance cover for motor vehicles and occupational in-
juries. The fact that the legal liability to insure motor vehicles for third-party risks is 
widely ignored (only about 25% take out this insurance) illustrates the low esteem in 
which insurance is held. 
The issue of priority needs arises as the costs of medical care are clearly a concern 
for sections of the population relying on uninterrupted earning capacities, but in 
rural areas with high incidences of poverty amongst subsistence farmers, food secu-
rity may well be the most important aim. Due to the unsatisfactory standards of health 
facilities and their relative inaccessibility, the rural communities are accustomed to 
self-medication with traditional remedies and medicines bought from local pharma-
cies. 
Consequently, support for micro-insurance may be more likely amongst urban house-
holds. In fact, WHO (World Health Organization) is due in early 2002 to launch a 
community-based health insurance project in a district of the capital Vientiane on a 
pilot basis. The strategy is to develop design guidelines in semi-urban areas with con-
tributory capacities and some health facilities and then to apply these in rural areas 
meeting certain criteria. This project is designed for collaboration between WHO 
and the Ministry of Health and, in the longer term, the schemes which are developed 
may be replicated in other areas of the country. 
The formation of associations in Lao PDR must be monitored by a party or govern-
ment agency. Whether this is an obstacle to community or group action is difficult to 
ascertain but the existence of some associations is accepted in the agricultural sector. 
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p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Mutual Assistance Fund (MAF) of LFTU. MAF was set up by the Lao Federation 
of Trade Unions in 1993 to supplement the public sector social security scheme 
described in Section 2.1.2. The membership, which is voluntary, recently stood at 
approximately 33,000 out of the trade union membership of about 77,000. 
MAF is a savings scheme to which members contribute a standard 1,000 kip per 
month, but local autonomy exists, as there are district committees that can vary rates 
to suit local preferences. Consequently, some districts levy contributions as high as 
6,000 kip per month. Benefits are paid with respect to sickness, maternity, employ-
ment injury, death and marriage. Examples are as follows: 
• 20,000 kip upon marriage; 
• 20,000 kip per child upon birth; 
• 30,000, 50,000 and 80,000, respectively for minor, medium and major surgical 
operations; 
• disaster relief of up to 100,000 kip per year; and 
• on the death of a member, from 200,000 kip for under one year’s membership up 
to 600,000 kip for over three years’ membership. 
These payments are deducted from the individual accounts that can go into deficit. 
However, no interest is added to the accounts and only 70% of the balance is repaid 
when the account is closed for whatever reason (death, retirement or withdrawal 
from MAF). Although these features detract from the attractiveness of the scheme, 
LFTU states that it has other features increasing its popularity. These include addi-
tional financial and some social support for sick persons or others in difficulties with 
resources from the reserve funds. In fact, the lack of other means of savings with 
interest may account for the sizeable membership. Also membership in the trade 
union may entail joining MAF semi-automatically rather than voluntarily. 
Welfare Fund for Teachers. Information was obtained on the voluntary welfare 
fund established in 1992 in the Hai Xai Phong District of Vientiane Municipality with 
the aim of promoting solidarity amongst the teachers of the district. With about 560 
members (290 women and 270 men), who are either primary or secondary school 
teachers or former teachers, the fund operates on insurance principles. Members con-
tribute 2,000 kip per year and may receive 1,000 kip per day if hospitalized up to a 
maximum of 20 days per case and two episodes of hospitalization per year. Mem-
bers may have access to loans and payments are made to families upon the mem-
bers’ death. 
This scheme may be an example of similar schemes for groups such as teachers who 
have a professional connection with each other and may be drawn to a system of 
mutual support. Nevertheless, as teachers are public servants and therefore members 
of the public sector scheme, which provides medical benefits, the rationale for this 
scheme may lie mostly in the access to credit at low rates of interest. 
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`êÉÇáí=pÅÜÉãÉë=
A variety of credit schemes have been established at village levels in recent years 
through international donors and NGO efforts in support of specific development 
goals. More attention has been paid to micro-finance projects that include savings 
components. Few if any have insured loan recipients against sickness and death. 
When the momentum of micro-finance projects, including capacities to repay the 
loan, is affected by illnesses, usually there is no established procedure but a low-in-
terest loan may be provided to pay medical costs. This adds to the indebtedness and 
increases the difficulties of improving economic status and therefore some persons 
may delay receiving medical care only to worsen prospects of recovery. Health and 
life insurance cover could be negotiated by the micro-finance institution for loan 
recipients and charged to the applicants. Alternatively, insurance cover could be 
made an obligation for applicants but this would be less appropriate when insurance 
facilities are unavailable in remote areas of the country. 
bãÉêÖÉåÅó=cìåÇë=
Emergency funds are schemes set up in workplaces as an expression of group soli-
darity to assist employees faced with crises such as a death in the family or to pay 
for the customary celebratory gifts on the occasion of marriage or births. No infor-
mation is available on the number of these funds but some are known to exist in 
garment factories that are staffed by young single females from rural areas. Living in 
dormitories and seeking to maximize savings to take home at the end of their con-
tracts, as well as to send regular remittances home, these workers have limited re-
sources for any lengthy illness for which user charges are levied at urban facilities. 
These funds arise out of the discussions amongst workers on the respective merits of 
contributing regularly to funds or meeting requests for donations as they arise. Usu-
ally, contributions are kept as low as possible because of the general reluctance to 
make regular contributions to funds amongst persons who are unfamiliar with the 
notion of risk pooling. 
OKP= i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
Since employment is the primary source of income for the poor, well-functioning 
labour markets with the appropriate balance between adequate standards and flexi-
bility are crucial for their welfare and social protection. Active labour market pro-
grammes may be instituted for many purposes, such as to facilitate and promote op-
portunities for employment, reduce labour market segmentation, and increase access 
to skills upgrading and micro-credit schemes. Designated categories, such as youth 
and females, can be given special attention. In many countries, the focus of job crea-
tion policies includes the promotion and well-being of small- and medium-sized en-
terprises or SMEs. They need support and assistance in many respects to which gov-
ernment agencies and international NGOs respond with appropriate programmes. 
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For example, in Lao PDR there is a demand for schemes and projects for the im-
provement of capacities to establish and operate small businesses. One development 
is an Agricultural Market Information System that is designed to improve market 
access for farmers. SMEs also require ready access to credit, which is more prob-
lematical due to the weaknesses of some state banks and difficulties in undertaking 
restructuring exercises in this sector. 
Currently, employment promotion in Lao PDR is focused on two main objectives: 
1. Encouragement of self-reliance in rural areas in absorbing labour through expan-
sion of activities in areas such as handicrafts and in the improvement of the in-
frastructure, including the construction of major bridges across the Mekong 
River with bilateral financing. 
2. Promotion of foreign contract employment to gain a larger market share and 
foreign exchange, and protect workers from exploitation. 
Under point 1, some training is provided for handicrafts and income generating activi-
ties, such as fish breeding and mushroom growing for vulnerable groups. Labour ex-
changes deal mostly with unskilled workers and lack training facilities for the up-
grading of working capacities. This is linked to point 2 since it is necessary to meet 
demands for various types of skilled labour. 
Active labour market policies call for significant investment of public funds in net-
works of labour exchanges using effective systems of labour market information and 
well-designed and appropriate training programmes. Even if national networks of 
labour exchange exist, the usual situation is that skills training programmes and em-
ployment services are not sufficiently accessible to informal sector groups on the 
fringes of labour markets and rural workers. In LDCs such as Lao PDR, with limited 
tax revenues compared with needs for public expenditure, the budgetary allocations 
for these purposes tend to have insufficient priority, and there is little to suggest that 
the importance of active labour market policies is fully appreciated. 
This is a cause for concern in today’s world of trade liberalization to which the country 
is committed through AFTA and eventually WTO. In fact, an urgent reappraisal of 
active labour market policies is warranted on the basis that they are not an option but 
a necessity in one form or another. For example, there would be much to gain from 
building up capacities for import substitution and expansion of exports in sectors 
where the country still has a comparative advantage. The wide range of imports gives 
some scope but the small domestic market is a constraint leading to suggestions that 
Lao PDR should identify niche markets both inside and outside the country and also 
follow the classical developmental path of establishing labour-intensive industries. 
The proviso is that increased efforts are made to create a more business-friendly 
environment including enforcement of commercial laws and a reduction in corrup-
tion. 
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OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
bÇìÅ~íáçå=
Lao PDR is committed to the goal of universal primary education by 2015, and, as 
explained in Section 1.4, aims to invest more heavily in basic social services, nota-
bly education, health and welfare. Poverty alleviation and its eradication is another 
major priority and requires actions across the board including the comprehensive 
strengthening of education and training throughout the country, but especially in de-
prived areas. Some progress is evident from the data in Table 8, Appendix, on en-
rolment, duration of schooling and educational facilities. From this data, the teacher-
student ratio in 2000 was 1 to 27.51 and about 32 students per classroom, but if the 
total numbers in the 5–14 age group are included, the teacher ratio drops to 1 to 40 
and the classroom ratio to 47 students. This indicates the extent to which the 5–14 
age group is underserved and reflects the reality that most urban children are rea-
sonably well provided for at the expense of serious deficiencies in many rural areas. 
Considerable expansion of facilities and training facilities and capacities is vital for 
future progress considering the demographics resulting from the high fertility rates 
in rural areas of recent years. 
jáåáãìã=t~ÖÉë=
The importance of the minimum wage system for social protection is to the extent of 
its effectiveness in reducing the vulnerability of low-income households to such risks 
as unemployment, and in establishing basic standards for the various programmes 
that are based on earnings. Examples of the latter are social insurance schemes and 
provisions on severance pay. Minimum wages are also important for their effects on 
wages in general since workers on higher wage scales may benefit from adjustments 
designed to preserve differentials. 
In Lao PDR, minimum wages were increased in October 2001 from 93,600 kip per 
month to 150,000 kip for the government sector and to 220,000 kip in the private 
sector. These are very low by any standards. Formal sector workers at least have 
some allowances, which improve take-home pay. However carefully minimum wages 
are formulated, some sectors and enterprises will find them too high and evasion 
occurs. The extent of compliance is not known but it is possible that the levels are 
relatively high due to the role of trade unions in enterprises. 
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=råÉãéäçóÉÇ=
The inadequacies of social protection for workers who become redundant were evi-
dent during the period of mass layoffs during the Asian financial crisis. With rela-
tively few unemployment insurance schemes in developing countries, severance pay 
is the main method of compensating these workers. Receipt of a lump sum allows 
some time to find suitable new jobs, but this type of benefit suffers from delays and 
evasion. Linkage with length of service makes severance pay more a form of retire-
ment provision than an unemployment benefit. As an employer liability benefit, there 
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is no requirement for advance funding and the system is not well designed for situa-
tions where enterprises run into severe financial difficulties and have to terminate 
large numbers of workers. The provisions are seen at their most ineffective when: 
• enterprises make little or no advance provision and have inadequate capital re-
sources to make large-scale payment in addition to wages when redundancies oc-
cur; 
• enforcement through labour inspection is weak; 
• mass layoffs are required due to bankruptcy; 
• widespread unemployment results from a general economic crisis and bank credits 
are unavailable. 
The rates of severance pay under the Labour Code are 10% of monthly salary for 
each month of service except that for more than three years’ service the rate is in-
creased to 15% per month. MOLSW does not maintain records of severance pay-
ments and the extent of compliance is not known. 
Participating in labour markets exposes workers to risks, and social protection for 
the workforce should, when conditions are suitable, include appropriate schemes 
which meet requirements for income maintenance in certain contingencies, includ-
ing unemployment, without weakening incentives to work or adding excessively to 
labour costs. The purpose would be to allow some time for the unemployed to 
search for the best available jobs rather than opt for readily available lower paid jobs 
and continued exposure to risks and insecurity. 
When the question of the feasibility of suitable modest unemployment protection 
schemes arises it is evident that effective labour market machinery is required for the 
process of adapting labour supply to demand and that active labour market policies 
are a pre-requisite for the introduction of unemployment insurance. Usually, this 
would require upgrading of the existing labour market machinery. If this is not pos-
sible for financial or other reasons, the main alternative would be unemployment 
assistance financed from general revenues. This would impose fiscal burdens and 
inevitably reduce the scope of protection to the most needy and raise concerns about 
increases in poverty. 
This is the type of dilemma faced by a number of developing countries that are con-
sidering how to adapt labour market policies and social protection to the changing 
economic conditions in their countries. 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉI=cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=~åÇ=cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
There are as yet no informal sector schemes of any significance and the assessments 
in this section are of the two statutory schemes outlined in Section 2.1.2 designed for 
the public and private sectors, respectively. 
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Responsibility for these schemes rests with MOLSW, which has been advised by a 
tripartite Project Steering Committee (PSC) attached to an ILO / UNDP project enti-
tled ‘Development of Social Security’. The PSC made important recommendations 
on the reform of the public sector provisions, the structure and scope of the new 
scheme for SOEs and private sector enterprises, and for the evolution of one uniform 
system for all formal sector employees. The latter is not attainable in the short term 
because of factors such as: 
• the public sector scheme, which is not designed on strict social insurance princi-
ples as it reflects the intention to reward public servants with a package consisting 
of secure but low-paid employment and generous pension provisions in terms of 
qualifying periods including periods of war and patriotic service, high replace-
ment rates, and full indexation to salary increases; 
• the un-financed accrued liabilities of the public sector pension scheme which has 
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis since its inception; and 
• the marked disparities in salary levels between the public sector and private sector 
workers that could undermine the financial systems of the new scheme for pen-
sions and medical care, respectively. 
mìÄäáÅ=pÉÅíçê=pÅÜÉãÉ=
Coverage is for the 91,144 pensionable staff (whilst other personnel are eligible for 
the private sector scheme), so extension of coverage is not an issue and the assess-
ment is in relation to the objectives of the scheme. These are to provide adequate 
standards of health and income protection for public sector staff and their depend-
ants. The general view is that performance has fallen far short of the objectives, as 
explained below. Furthermore, the scheme is not sustainable financially. 
In the case of medical care, the benefits are provided on a fee-for-service and reim-
bursement basis and the complaint is the low rate of reimbursement and the delays 
in settling claims. Often public servants are unable to pay for the provided medical 
services and hospitals have to absorb the medical costs. This causes concern to hos-
pital authorities because of the extent of unpaid bills. Consequently, the financial 
barriers to access to health care are still in evidence for the covered population. The 
cash benefits are criticized for their low rates but in fact the scheme merely reflects 
the low earnings levels amongst the public sector staff. Indexation to salary in-
creases ensures continued protection at the same replacement rates. 
Public administration reform envisages the gradual downsizing of the public sector 
and its upgrading in terms of efficiency and the payment of salaries on a par with the 
private sector. The PSC has identified reform options with the objective of eventually 
achieving uniform standards for all formal sector employees. This involves changes 
in the re-distributive elements separating war veterans from the general scheme, 
equalizing pension age at 60 years for men and women and adequate bipartite fi-
nancing on full salaries. 
In this connection, an actuarial valuation found that pension costs alone would be 
between 11% and 12.5% of earnings by 2020, depending on the insured growth 
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assumptions, compared with 6% presently collected from the payroll. Another issue 
is the preservation of the pension rights of the SOE staff who were excluded from 
the public sector in 1994. Evidently, concepts of state financing from tax revenues 
were still prevalent when this scheme was introduced. Debiting 6% from employee 
salaries came later, establishing the principle of bipartite financing for the future re-
form of the scheme. 
An actuarial valuation will be needed to establish costs of the reform proposals in 
the context of any definite plans for revision of public sector salaries, and to propose 
suitable financial systems for each benefit branch. The method of administration 
should be determined on the principle that the funds of the private and public sector 
schemes, respectively, are separate entities. 
mêáî~íÉ=pÉÅíçê=pÅÜÉãÉ=
Due to the strategic importance of a dynamic private sector for economic growth, 
government policy changed by giving first priority to the design and an introduction 
of social insurance scheme for the private sector rather than the reform of the public 
sector provisions. Comparable social security benefits to those of the so-called 6% 
scheme were seen as an essential inducement to qualified personnel to opt for ca-
reers in the private sector, within the framework created by the Labour Law 1994, 
rather than to aim for pensionable status in the civil service. Originally a modest 
scheme consisting of some short-term cash benefits, it was envisaged for implemen-
tation initially in Vientiane and later throughout the country. 
Scope of Protection. The PSC took the major decision in July 1997 that the out-
standing priority of employees and their families was health insurance and that this 
should be included in the new scheme from the outset not only for insured workers 
but also their dependants, defined as spouse and children meeting the conditions in 
the Decree. This was seen as possible using the capitation payment system for medi-
cal providers as a means of establishing appropriate incentives and strengthening 
cost containment. 
This far-reaching decision strengthens gender equity in access to health care, but 
raises the issue of feasibility of delivering adequate medical services in an acute 
form in view of the difficulties in predicting utilization under a pre-payment system 
and the limitations of the public health system. 
The PSC also decided to include old-age pensions since actuarial studies found that 
pensions could be financed through low contribution rates in the initial years under a 
system of partial funding appropriate to the social and economic situation in Lao 
PDR. The introduction of pensions insurance when demographic factors are favour-
able constitutes an important stage in developing a comprehensive social security 
system. The payment of the first pensions after five years should mark a gradual 
change in needs for support of the elderly. 
Delayed Implementation. These far-reaching changes from a modest to a very ambi-
tious scheme have presented considerable challenges, although due to be imple-
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mented initially only in the Vientiane area. The Decree 207 / PM on the social secu-
rity regime for private sector employees submitted by the PSC in November 1998 
was promulgated only in December 1999, and after further delays the Social Secu-
rity Organization (SSO) was established in June 2000. It was necessary to delay 
implementation until June 2001 and to restrict the initial coverage to enterprises in 
Vientiane with 100 or more workers. The scheme was finally launched in June 2001 
with contribution rates of 5% of insurable earnings by employers and 4.5% by em-
ployees, but initially medical benefits were restricted to insured persons and children 
under age 6. 
Extension of Coverage. The scheme has started slowly with an initial 20,000 em-
ployees but SSO plans both to expedite implementation in the Vientiane municipal-
ity and then to extend coverage as widely as possible. The Decree envisages com-
pulsory inclusion of all private sector enterprises with ten or more workers. Other 
enterprises may apply for voluntary coverage. The question arises whether the intro-
duction of a comprehensive scheme will hamper the extension of coverage to smaller 
enterprises and to areas outside the capital because of: 
• difficulties in upgrading the medical facilities to the required standards for accredi-
tation to the scheme; 
• higher costs than if a more modest scheme for initial membership had been intro-
duced to allow for a gradual process of increasing contribution levels over a pe-
riod of years. 
Good Governance. In developing countries aiming for good governance of social 
security systems, it is customary to establish an autonomous body to manage the 
social security programmes under tripartite supervision in the form of a governing 
board answerable to the responsible Ministry (Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and 
Korea). The concept envisages that staff will become professionals through long-
term careers acquiring experience and skills through training and that services to the 
insured will be enhanced. This is the aim in Lao PDR but is still not in prospect 
because of lack of funds in the initial years of the scheme. For this period, the gov-
ernment provides budgets and there is concern that trained staff in the key areas such 
as the computer and accounting sections will not be retained because of the more 
attractive salaries available in the private sector. 
Gender Issues. The scheme aims for gender equity but issues arise in relation to the 
large numbers of young single women recruited from rural villages to work in gar-
ment factories for a few years before returning home. These workers live on the 
premises, send remittances home to maintain their families and expect to settle down 
to rural life when their contracts expire. Although expected to contribute at the same 
rates as married insured persons, their dependants cannot benefit from the medical 
benefits. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether pension rights will ever be realized. 
Although this is normal in defined benefit schemes, this may become an obstacle to 
achieving high compliance standards in the initial period of implementation. 
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PKO= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
A key element in both the private and public sector schemes is the equalization of 
pension ages of men and women at 60 years. This enhances: 
• gender equity by reducing the vulnerability of female employees to the redundancy 
policies of enterprises which target persons who can qualify for a pension, and also 
increases opportunities for female persons to build up full pension rights; 
• equality of treatment of men and women since longer female life expectancy 
results in some subsidization of female old-age pensioners; and 
• the financial sustainability of the pension schemes. 
Changes in pension age of this type invariably require phasing over several years be-
cause of acquired pension rights and the need for labour market changes which per-
mit female employees equal access to work up to age 60. Until such changes occur, 
female employees who are forced to retire at age 55 and unable to find other insured 
jobs will be faced with the following choices in respect to their pension entitlement: 
• Paying voluntarily both the employer and employee contributions up to five years; 
or 
• Claiming early retirement pension and suffering reductions of 0.5% per month in 
advance of age 60 (or 6% per year). 
Evidently, at least in the initial years a pension age of 60 years could disadvantage 
some sections of the female labour force and it will be advisable to phase-in changes 
gradually over a period of about ten years. Furthermore, rapid reforms of official 
employment policies are needed relating to older workers in both public and private 
sectors. Otherwise, many women may qualify only for lump sums in lieu of pensions. 
It is therefore urgent to equalize retirement at 60 years in Article 54 of the Labour 
Law and to promote measures for the continued employment of women workers up to 
age 60. This change would benefit working women whether or not they are insured. 
Gender equity is strengthened by provisions for the sharing of pension rights in the 
event of divorce and enabling widowers to qualify for survivors’ benefits on the same 
terms as widows. 
PKP= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
The public sector scheme is administered by MOLSW through the government budget 
since no separate funds have been established. Specific figures have not been pub-
lished but it appears that costs are relatively low because there is no contribution col-
lection system and pension payments are computerized. 
Decree 207 / PM on the private sector scheme provides for the administrative costs 
which are limited to 10% of all revenue. These will be drawn from each autonomous 
fund as costs are incurred. Table 10, Appendix, shows that administrative costs in the 
initial stages were only 2.16% of income. True cost levels will be established when 
more operational systems come into force and contribution collections reach opti-
mum levels. 
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The aim for the public sector scheme is to be self-financing using autonomous funds 
and to operate efficiently and economically. In time, both schemes will be under 
supervision by Boards to monitor performance and keep costs within legal limits. 
PKQ= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
The public sector scheme is financed from tax revenue, and benefits public servants 
and their families. The problems of the public service include low pay, which has 
required high replacement rates for social security benefits. Tax-financed systems 
raise equity issues since low-income persons outside the social security scheme con-
cerned may be paying regressive taxes that subsidize persons with secure employ-
ment even at low salary levels. In this sense, public sector staff has clear advantages 
over other groups such as informal sector workers. 
The private sector scheme is designed to be self-financing although like all statutory 
schemes, the government guarantees its solvency. Employers and workers pay con-
tributions from their incomes and the question arises whether these costs are absorbed 
or lead to additional costs for consumers. Either approach is possible in individual 
cases or in different sectors, but with relatively low charges in force (5% by em-
ployers and 4.5% by employees) this may not constitute a major issue in the initial 
years of implementing the scheme. 
PKR= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
The new private sector scheme has been designed to achieve good governance and 
will rely on extensive public information to disseminate information on rights and 
how to obtain them, quality assurance for the health insurance services, internal and 
external auditing, publication of annual reports and accounts and, above all, on tri-
partite supervision. Realistically, accountability and transparency, and good govern-
ance in general, may be achieved gradually depending on such factors as how well 
the tripartite Board of Directors becomes an effective defender and promoter of the 
scheme. It will be a difficult transition for some persons from being representatives 
of government departments or institutions to that of independent (but part-time) direc-
tors placing the interests of the insured persons first. For example, in some countries 
pension schemes may be under pressure to increase benefits for political reasons 
when this is inadvisable for financial and other reasons. How such boards react in 
these circumstances will be all-important for the evolution of sound and accountable 
systems of social security protection. 
Much depends therefore on the development of the social security institution. Essen-
tially, such developments usually follow the accepted norms in a country but in this 
instance the processes will be assisted by externally financed technical assistance for 
the first four years of implementation. 
In addition to effective performance and services for the insured population, over-
coming bureaucratic tendencies in favour of prompt actions placing the interests of 
insured persons and their families first, attention has to be paid to issues such as 
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corruption. Will some benefit claimants believe that they should pay if they want 
quick service and will a few of the defaulting employers try to avoid detection and 
prosecution through bribes to inspectors? These are well-known problems in coun-
tries similar to Lao PDR and it is only realistic to expect that such practices may occur 
and to prepare accordingly. The new administration aims to prevent such practices 
and to detect and punish any which are reported or discovered by checking and su-
pervision as well as maintaining good communications with employers and insured 
workers. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ããÉë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
píê~íÉÖáÉë=Ñçê=bñíÉåÇáåÖ=`çîÉê~ÖÉ=
Extension of coverage is now fully recognized as a critical issue in many developing 
countries that are examining ways of strengthening their systems of social protec-
tion. Many have expressed concern about the lack of social protection of the excluded 
groups. As regards the farming communities, some countries are examining the feasi-
bility of new agricultural insurance schemes. A number of countries have prioritized 
public works projects and micro-credit schemes as effective instruments for poverty 
reduction. In the urban informal sector, one of the main aims has been to extend 
existing social insurance schemes. The problems of doing so have proved to be in-
tractable and little progress has been made. 
The basic problem is that compulsory comprehensive social insurance schemes do 
not permit partial coverage for each benefit separately and are designed for employ-
ees who are able to contribute regularly together with their employers. This is speci-
fied in the legislation by excluding other types of workers whose coverage would re-
quire adaptation of the contribution and benefit systems. A re-thinking of this ap-
proach is required. 
Important issues arise when planning extensions to excluded informal sector groups: 
• whether these persons will join schemes on a voluntary or compulsory basis as vol-
untary insurance cannot ensure effective targeting and may not be financially sound; 
• whether the group is self-financing and can participate in the general scheme or 
needs a special scheme or subsidies. 
With regard to social insurance, special efforts are needed to overcome obstacles to 
coverage, including: 
• low contributory capacities and limited or no resources from employers; 
• adverse selection and under-financed participation in general schemes where 
minimum pensions are payable and in health insurance programmes; 
• concern about manipulation of earnings declarations to pay low contributions 
until it is profitable to pay high rates to qualify for high earnings-related benefits; 
• administrative problems in registering individuals working on their own account, 
as opposed to employees, and in collecting contributions. 
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Undoubtedly, challenges on this scale raise the issue of whether developing countries 
can overcome the numerous difficult problems involved in designing and implement-
ing sound innovative special schemes for the priority needs of these groups. One 
prerequisite in many countries would be significant increases in the institutional 
capacities of social insurance organizations. 
Some of the self-employed persons in small household and micro-enterprises may 
have sufficient resources to insure themselves against some risks. There is a poten-
tial role for the private sector in meeting some of the needs of the self-employed and 
other persons for low-cost pension and health insurance plans and for greater in-
volvement in the agricultural insurance sector. 
`çããìåáíóJ_~ëÉÇ=~åÇ=jáÅêçJfåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Types of schemes. One option for informal sector groups in both urban and rural 
areas is self-insurance not only for health care but also funeral costs and similar 
short-term risks through voluntary schemes established by mutual benefit societies, 
cooperatives and similar organizations or civil society groups that rely on trust en-
gendered through occupational groupings or community solidarity. Work-based or-
ganizations may start with credit and savings schemes and develop an interest in 
establishing contributory social protection schemes. 
Micro-insurance principles can provide an alternative approach to agricultural insur-
ance where public schemes are lacking or unable to meet the needs of smaller scale 
farmers. Another potentially important area is micro-credit schemes to improve the 
capacity of small-scale farmers to develop production and in time qualify for com-
mercial credit. 
There is increasing recognition in national and international circles that these initia-
tives should be encouraged as part of the strategies for strengthening social protec-
tion for sections of the labour force with demonstrably little hope of coverage by 
public schemes or lacking protection when schemes are non-existent, as in the case 
of agricultural insurance. However, equity concerns may arise where micro-in-
surance schemes have restricted coverage as some are organized for particular groups, 
and poorer persons may be excluded, especially if their health record is below aver-
age. Social exclusion can be reinforced rather than overcome since the basic objec-
tive is to minimize risks to the pooled funds. 
Problems of Sustainability. The most popular sector for action has been health 
insurance mainly for primary health care only but some schemes cover hospital care. 
Small-scale voluntary schemes have to overcome difficult challenges in 
• establishing the required contribution and benefit levels, and building up adequate 
reserves; 
• coping with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard; 
• providing adequate services, given the unequal distribution of medical personnel 
and facilities; and 
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• administering the scheme efficiently and economically and retaining the confi-
dence of members in pooling funds. 
Covariant risks are a special problem for such small-scale local pooling arrange-
ments. A sickness epidemic or widespread crop failure could consume all reserves in 
the relevant schemes. The existence of public disaster relief schemes could reduce 
incentives to contribute to private schemes unless some additional disaster relief 
benefits are provided in recognition of the fact that by coping with manageable risks 
these schemes reduce the dependence of members on public support through social 
assistance and public works projects. 
Comprehensive voluntary social security schemes, such as that operated by the Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) for many years in Gujarat state, India are 
an example of what can be achieved with some external support. Evidently, there are 
few such schemes that are able to demonstrate sustainability. Rural health insurance 
schemes in China are progressing with the help of financial support from local gov-
ernments, but such subsidies are generally not a viable option for mutual benefit 
schemes in other countries. Another approach to financing is the use of excise taxes 
on the products of certain types of home-workers and miners in India for non-con-
tributory welfare funds. This requires government action and support for the man-
agement of the funds. 
The strategy of broadening membership and enlargement, for the purpose of wider 
risk pooling, also presents difficulties because this may weaken the defences against 
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, which can be contained in small 
schemes by local knowledge and social pressures. As expansion is vital for survival, 
it must be a priority on the basis that this helps to achieve economies of scale and 
sufficient bargaining power with health-care providers. 
Strategies for Improvement. In general, developing countries have very little ex-
perience of micro-insurance and may need external technical support in order to 
formulate effective policies and strategies for the promotion of sound and well-de-
signed micro-insurance schemes. Because of viability issues, it is unlikely that mi-
cro- and community insurance schemes can meet pressing needs for even basic so-
cial protection for significant numbers of the groups lacking protection without some 
form of government assistance towards ensuring the sound development and sus-
tainability of such schemes. This should include facilitating reinsurance of the risks, 
which has to be taken into account in financial systems as an essential expenditure. 
In the case of the health insurance schemes, it is often suggested that social insurance 
institutions should provide technical advice and support on such key aspects as the 
contribution and benefit structures and maintenance of records. This is unlikely on 
any large scale in the short-term where these bodies are themselves struggling to 
cope but could become an objective in strategies for improving institutional capaci-
ties. Suitable associations such as credit unions, or their equivalents, could assist in 
implementing any government plans for promoting micro-insurance but this would 
be best if coordinated or guided within a framework established by governments. 
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This should in time include regulatory legislation for the operations of this type of 
scheme and support such as tax relief on contributions where schemes meet legal 
requirements. 
Collecting and dissemination of information on existing schemes and publicity on 
best practices, and some of the pitfalls, could generate pressures for action and mo-
tivate suitable bodies and groups to consider how to establish their own suitable 
schemes. Another important step would be for governments to increase efforts to 
rectify deficiencies in the health infrastructure in deprived areas rather than rely 
solely on market forces to meet organized demand from micro-insurance schemes. 
^ÖêáÅìäíìê~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
In rural areas, the smaller scale, traditional subsistence farmers, who have high ex-
posure and vulnerability to risks, can rarely participate in voluntary agricultural in-
surance schemes for crops or livestock unless the relatively high premiums are heavily 
subsidized. The benefits are not only income protection but also better access to 
credit. Where such schemes are yet to be introduced or have been discontinued after 
suffering severe financial losses, these groups have to rely on family and community 
support networks if crops fail or government disaster relief if covariant shocks oc-
cur. It appears that few group and community micro-insurance schemes have been 
organized to cope with these types of risks. The question of subsidizing agricultural 
insurance or finding alternative solutions to the problems of the vulnerabilities of 
these large farming communities is a major one considering the magnitude of the 
possible costs involved. A start could be made on a small scale in particular regions 
in order to experiment with and evaluate different types of schemes. 
jçíçê=sÉÜáÅäÉ=^ÅÅáÇÉåí=fåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
There is a serious and growing problem of meeting the costs of medical care of acci-
dent victims arising from the constantly increasing numbers of motor vehicle acci-
dents in Lao PDR and especially in Vientiane, where vehicle ownership is concen-
trated. This is largely a problem of younger persons driving uninsured motorcycles 
with little or no training. Accident victims are unprepared for the heavy costs of hospi-
tal treatment and they and their families face severe financial problems in meeting 
these charges. The injured include pedestrians and others who are unable to obtain 
redress from uninsured drivers. A Motor Vehicle Accident Insurance Fund could be 
established with finance from a levy on the insurance premiums or higher vehicle 
registration fees. The fund’s main purpose would be the financing of medical care, 
in conjunction with insurance companies, but it also should aim to promote compre-
hensive insurance and to reduce accidents through preventive measures. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
The description and analysis of social protection in Lao PDR shows that a policy 
basis exists for the formal sector employees. Two social insurance schemes are in 
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operation for the public and private sectors and they constitute the framework for 
further development of social protection for these workers and their families. Two 
major issues are the priorities attached to and the feasibility of: 
• the further development of social security protection for the formal sector; 
• the development of adequate systems of social protection for other economically 
active persons and their families, and other population groups, ranging from mod-
est micro- or community based insurance schemes for one contingency, public 
works projects, social assistance, micro-credit and savings programmes to fully 
fledged statutory schemes of one type or another. 
How to devise appropriate, realistic and affordable policies and strategies for the 
short-, medium- and long-term development of social protection for the country as a 
whole is a difficult question facing many countries since responsibility is spread 
amongst several government departments such as MOF (Ministry of Finance), MOLSW 
and MOH. These ministries may have their own objectives, which may overlap such 
as the desire of fiscal authorities to develop capital markets with the aid of defined 
contribution schemes for which investments are managed by the private sector. 
However, such objectives may conflict with the preferences for risk pooling as the 
basis for social security schemes. Limited resources must be allocated in the most 
effective way in order to benefit as many persons as possible. In time, countries may 
develop multi-pillar systems but these rarely result from a process of overall plan-
ning in which social, economic and fiscal considerations are carefully balanced. 
It is a matter for each country to determine how best to coordinate entitlements and 
to meet aims for providing adequate remuneration and benefits within a policy frame-
work for ensuring that levels of labour costs are consistent with strategies for eco-
nomic development and employment generation. Since determining these objectives 
and establishing the most suitable approaches on particular issues involves the re-
sponsibilities of several government departments, as well as the social partners and 
civil society, a forum is needed in which to work out policies and future strategies. 
However, Lao PDR, like many other developing countries, has no formal framework 
to address such issues and to determine overall policies and strategies in the field of 
social protection. The establishment of a Social Protection Coordination Commis-
sion or Committee is one approach that warrants consideration in view of the vari-
ous standpoints that should be included in the equation. 
The objective should be to devise policies and strategies for the orderly development 
of effective and sustainable social protection systems for the entire population of the 
country. This would entail analysing needs and capacities (human, financial and insti-
tutional) to meet them. Such a Commission should be two-tiered with the political 
leaders and decision makers directing and overseeing the work at official levels. 
Membership of the technical level of a Commission would comprise high-level repre-
sentatives of the relevant government ministries, trade unions, employers’ groups, civil 
society, the existing schemes and the commercial insurance industry. It would be es-
sential for persons outside the formal sector to have a voice in the debates and discus-
sions on the way ahead to achieve equitable progress in the field of social protection. 
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AFTA – ASEAN Free Trade Area 
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
HRD – Human Resource Development 
ILO – International Labour Organization 
ILO Easmat – ILO East Asia Multi-Disciplinary Advisory Team 
LDC – Least-Developed Country 
LFTU – Lao Federation of Trade Unions 
LWU – Lao Women’s Union 
MOLSW – Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
MAF – Mutual Assistance Fund 
MOF – Ministry of Finance 
MOH – Ministry of Health 
NEM – New Economic Mechanism 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
PDR – People’s Democratic Republic 
PSC – Project Steering Committee 
SEWA – Self-Employed Women’s Association 
SOE – State-Owned Enterprise 
SSO – Social Security Organization 
TFR – Total Fertility Rate 
UNCDF – United Nations Capital Development Fund 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
WHO – World Health Organization 
WTO – World Trade Organization 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=j~ä~óëá~=
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p~~áÇ~Ü=^ÄÇìäJo~Üã~å=
^Äëíê~Åí=
Malaysia is a small nation with 23.8 million people in 2001 with a per capita income 
of US$3,508. The country had an average annual growth rate of about 9.2% during 
the five years prior to 1998 when GDP plunged by 7.4%. Fortunately, the economy 
bounced back in 1999 and 2000 when it grew at 6.1% and 8.3% respectively, before 
contracting again in 2001. The rapid growth is associated with the intensive growth 
in the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, despite the volatility in the growth rate, 
poverty incidence continued to be reduced from 17.1% in 1990 to 6.8% in 1997 but 
worsened a little to 8.1% in 1999 as a consequence of the crisis. 
There are several social protection schemes in the country, although not all are na-
tional in coverage and function, including: 
(i) the Employer’s Liability Scheme (ELS) covering employment injury compensa-
tion since 1952, and sickness and maternity benefits since 1955; 
(ii) Civil Service Pension (1951), a non-contributory pension scheme for civil ser-
vants; 
(iii) the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) (since 1951) for all workers not covered by 
the civil service pension; 
(iv) the Workers’ Compensation Scheme (1952) to determine the terms and amounts 
of compensation in the case of death or accident, which never attained much 
significance. In March 1998, the Foreign Workers’ Compensation Scheme was 
formed to cater primarily for foreign workers’ insurance needs. The main social 
insurance scheme for workers earning less than RM2,0001 a month in Malaysia 
is the Social Security Organization (SOCSO) established in 1969. There are also 
several private savings schemes, which workers can fall back on in times of need 
if they are members of these schemes. Social assistance in Malaysia is classified 
only as residual welfare. 
The coverage of the formal social protection system in Malaysia is inadequate. The 
ELS rests solely on the employers, which causes problems to employers who are not 
financially stable. The civil service pension is financed through taxation largely pro-
vided by the low-income groups and therefore regressive. EPF does not pool risks 
and provide life-long security as benefits are based on contributions with dividend 
rates fluctuating over the years. Moreover, workers in the informal sector and the 
self-employed, such as petty traders and hawkers, are not compelled to have ac-
                             
1 The exchange rate of the ringgit against the US dollar at the time of writing was US$1 = RM3.8. 
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counts with the EPF and contribute only on a voluntary basis. As far as SOCSO is 
concerned, the real incidence rests with the consumers as employers can shift the 
burden as production costs, while social assistance is insignificant. 
The Asian financial crisis has altered perceptions somewhat, due to the sheer magni-
tude of adversity that workers and vulnerable groups faced. The inadequacy of extant 
measures was exposed, for instance in retrenchment benefits and foreign worker social 
insurance. This is a significant development, though much work remains to be done. 
However, Malaysia still emphasizes employment generation and poverty eradication 
while reserving direct transfers only for those unable to enter the job market. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~äI=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
dÉåÉê~ä=_~ÅâÖêçìåÇ=
Malaysia is an independent nation in Southeast Asia with a total area of 329,758 sq km 
and a population of 22.7 million in 1999 (69 people per sq km), 23.3 million in 2000 
(71 people per sq km) and an estimated 23.8 million in 2001 (72 people per square 
km). 
Table 1 shows that the average annual population growth rate between 1996 and 2000 
was 2.4%. This growth rate continued to slow down with the declining fertility rate 
as the country continues to develop. The median age for the population was 23.9 in 
2000 reflecting that Malaysia has a young population age structure. There has been a 
drop in the dependency ratio from 62.7% in 1995 to 59.1% in 2000 due to the rise in 
the proportion of working age population (15–64 years) and fall in the population be-
low 15 years and a slower growth of those aged 65 and above. This dependency ratio 
will continue to drop until the end of this decade as the share in the 0–14 age group 
contracts from 33.1% in 2000 to 29.7% in 2010. On the other hand, the proportion 
of the working age group will rise from 62.9% to 65.8% over the same period. At 
the same time, the number and proportion of the 65 and above age group will also 
increase following the rise in life expectancy due to the improvements in the quality 
of life. While this phenomenon can lead to the problem of an ageing society, the 
problem is not expected to be critical in the next decade or so since the annual rate 
of growth of this group seems to be falling. 
Life expectancy has been increasing steadily with that for males being 69.9 years 
and for females being 74.9 years in 2000. For the same year, the fertility rate for 
Malaysians is about 3.2 while the birth rate per 1000 population is 24.4; infant mor-
tality rate per 1000 live births is 7.91 and death rate per 1000 population 4.4. 
By 2000, the proportion of the population living in the urban areas increased from 
55.1% to 61.8% over the last five years, rising at an average annual rate of 4.8%. The 
increase is due to the migration of workers lured by better economic opportunities 
and the expectation of an improved quality of life in urban areas as well as the ex-
tension of administrative urban boundaries. It is expected that the urbanization rate 
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will rise to 66.9% by 2005. The main component of inter-state migration in Malay-
sia is the urban-urban direction, followed by that of urban-rural (see Table 1, Ap-
pendix). In contrast, the main component of intra-state migration direction is that of 
rural-rural, followed by that of urban-urban. However, the importance of these com-
ponents for individual states varies, since for highly urbanized states the urban-urban 
components are very high. 
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Table 2 shows that Malaysia had achieved an impressive record of growth prior to the 
financial crisis of 1997–98. The real (in 1987 prices) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
grew at over 9% per annum during the first half of the 1990s, reaching a peak of 
10% in 1996. However, the growth rate plunged by 7.4% in 1998. Nevertheless, the 
economy made a speedy recovery and achieved a growth rate of 6.1% in 1999 and 
8.3% in 2000. Unfortunately, the dampening of the US economy and the continuing 
recession in the Japanese economy (two of Malaysia’s leading trade partners) had a 
negative impact on Malaysia. The growth rate for 2001 has been revised downwards 
to 2% and more recently to about 1% due to a protracted and severe economic slow-
down in the United States, which had also spread to other economies. The event of 
11 September 2001 has made the prospect of an early recovery even more uncertain. 
Table 2 also shows that the high growth rate of the whole economy is associated with 
the intensive growth of the manufacturing and construction sectors. The two sectors 
together with the non-government services sector accelerated at double-digit growth. 
In contrast, the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing), was experiencing 
negative growth in the years before the crisis except for 1996 and 1997. This rapid 
growth of the manufacturing sector in the face of a much slower rate of the primary 
sector over the past three decades has resulted in a significant transformation of the 
Malaysian economy. The share of the latter declined from 29% in 1970 to 8.5% in 
2000, while the share of the industrial sector (mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
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and construction) rose from 31.4% in 1970 to 43.6% in 2000. The share of the ser-
vices sector fluctuated between 36.2% and 54.6% over the same period. It is increas-
ingly obvious that the services sector, comprising government and non-government 
services, has become more important. 
Real per capita GDP (in 1987 prices) rose from RM7,235 in 1993 to peak at RM9,065 
in 1997, but dipped to RM8,245 in 1998 and climbed to RM8,493 in 1999 and 
RM8,899 in 2000. GNP per capita in current prices rose from RM8,299 in 1993 to 
reach RM13,361 in 2000. However, in US dollar terms, it increased from US$3,073 
in 1993 to peak at US$4,446 in 1996. The devaluation of the ringgit in the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis resulted in a sharp decline in GNP per capita in terms of 
US dollars since 1998. It has slowly picked up again to reach US$3,516 in 2000. 
A remarkable feature of the development process of the Malaysian economy is that 
the high growth rate throughout the period has also been accompanied by low infla-
tionary rates (see Table 2, Appendix). The inflation rates were stable except for 1980 
due mainly to the oil price shock of 1979. However, due to the tight factor and goods 
markets during the expansionary period of the 1990s, inflation had risen again but 
could be controlled at a relatively low level. Nevertheless, examination of the com-
ponents of the consumer price index (CPI) reveals a worrying trend, in that the CPI 
for food and medical services tends to be higher than for all other groups. Increase in 
the cost of these items would negatively affect the poor more than the rest of the popu-
lation since a larger portion of their expenditure comprises food and basic needs. For 
the first eight months of 2001, the inflation rate stood at 1.5%. It is expected that con-
tinued moderation in economic activities, the less favourable employment prospects 
and relatively weaker consumer confidence will continue to have a moderating effect 
on domestic prices (Malaysia, 2001c). The sub-index for food, which accounts for 
more than a third of the total weightage of the CPI, rose by only 0.6% during the 
first eight months of 2001. 
The total (development and operating) Federal Government expenditure on social 
services (education, health, housing and others) between 1970 and 2001 is shown in 
Table 3. It can be seen that the share of expenditure as a percentage of the GNP on 
social services was decreasing till the mid-1990s as a consequence of the govern-
ment’s effort to privatize some of these services. However, this share (particularly 
that of education) has been rising in recent years as the government pursues an ex-
pansionary budget as a counter-cyclical measure following a slowing down of world 
economic growth. The rise in the share of education is necessary in order to equip 
workers to face the knowledge-based economy. 
Small and medium industries (SMIs) play an important role for social protection be-
cause they are said to be able to generate more employment relative to large indus-
tries and are more flexible, being able to adjust to the changing economic environ-
ment faster than large-scale industries (Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, 2000). It is also claimed 
that SMIs have a favourable impact on income distribution. This is because SMIs 
involve a greater number of relatively lower wage earners and a relatively low capi-
tal income, resulting in relatively small income increases for a large number of people. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
124 
q~ÄäÉ=PW= cÉÇÉê~ä=dçîÉêåãÉåí=bñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=EaÉîÉäçéãÉåí=~åÇ=léÉê~íáåÖF=çå= =
pçÅá~ä=pÉêîáÅÉëI=j~ä~óëá~I=NVTM=Ó=OMMN=
= pçÅá~ä=ëÉêîáÅÉë=Eoj=jáääáçåF=
B=çÑ=íçí~ä=
ÖçîÉêåãÉåí=ÉñéÉåÇáíìêÉ= B=çÑ=dkm=
=
vÉ~ê=
pìÄJ
íçí~ä=
bÇìÅ~J
íáçå=
=
eÉ~äíÜ=
pìÄJ
íçí~ä=
bÇìÅ~J
íáçå=
=
eÉ~äíÜ=
pìÄJ
íçí~ä=
bÇìÅ~J
íáçå=
=
eÉ~äíÜ=
NVTM= TRP= RON= NTR= OSKN= NUKN= SKN= SKO= QKP= NKQ=
NVTR= NIVTP= NIPTM= QNU= OUKM= NVKQ= RKV= VKN= SKP= NKV=
NVUM= QIQTT= OITUS= TTU= ONKO= NPKO= PKT= VKM= RKS= NKS=
NVUR= TINPN= QIPQR= NINOV= OSKO= NSKM= QKN= VKV= SKN= NKS=
NVVM= VISNN= SIPSN= NITTO= OSKM= NTKO= QKU= UKT= RKT= NKS=
NVVN= NMIQOT= TIMST= OIMPR= OTKR= NUKT= RKQ= UKR= RKU= NKT=
NVVO= NOIOSN= UIMRV= OIQNQ= OVKQ= NVKP= RKU= UKU= RKU= NKT=
NVVP= NOISMN= UIQTU= OIQMT= OVKU= OMKM= RKT= UKM= RKQ= NKR=
NVVQ= NQIUOS= NMINMU= OIROV= POKM= ONKU= RKR= UKO= RKS= NKQ=
NVVR= NRISRQ= NMISMP= OITTO= PMKV= OMKV= RKR= TKR= RKN= NKP=
NVVS= NUIUMU= NOIQUV= PIQTQ= POKO= ONKQ= RKV= TKV= RKP= NKR=
NVVT= NVIVTM= NOIUUN= PITOT= PPKN= ONKP= SKO= TKS= QKV= NKQ=
NVVU= OMIUQR= NPIQQP= QIMQT= POKN= OMKT= SKO= TKU= RKM= NKR=
NVVV= OPIRQU= NRIPOP= QIQSO= PQKM= OOKN= SKQ= UKQ= RKR= NKS=
OMMMN= OVIUSM= OMIMOO= RIQMP= PRKP= OPKT= SKQ= VKS= SKQ= NKT=
OMMNO= PRIOSP= OPISRU= RIQSN= PTKU= ORKQ= RKV= NNKN= TKQ= NKT=
N= bëíáã~íÉÇ=~Åíì~ä=
O= oÉîáëÉÇ=Éëíáã~íÉ=
pçìêÅÉW=j~ä~óëá~I=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êëK=bÅçåçãáÅ=oÉéçêíK=
In Malaysia, a SMI is defined as a firm employing not more than 150 full-time work-
ers, with annual sales value not exceeding RM25 million; with a small-scale indus-
try being one that employs not more than 50 workers and with annual sales value not 
exceeding RM10 million, and a medium-scale industry being one that employs be-
tween 51 and 150. The principal statistics of manufacturing industries by size of es-
tablishments show that while the SMIs form a substantial portion of Malaysia’s manu-
facturing base, their contributions to the gross value of output, total value-added, 
and employment are still low (see Table 3, Appendix). Hence, SMIs are not quite 
able to be one of the sources of social protection during times of crisis especially 
when they themselves face financial constraints. 
The Bank Negara Annual Report 2000 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001) states that for-
eign direct investments (FDIs) into Malaysia peaked in 1992–93, accounting for 8.7% 
of GDP, but moderated thereafter to around 6.6% of GDP between 1994–97. It then 
dipped to below 4% in 1998, but has since recovered to about 4.9% of GDP in 1999 
and 2000. During the 1990–97 period, 65% of the inflows were channelled into the 
manufacturing sector, 18% into the oil and gas sector, 10% into the services sector 
and 7% into the property sector. Since then, the share of FDI in the manufacturing 
sector contracted to about 43% of the total FDI inflows in the 1998–2000 period, 
while that of the oil and gas sector remained stable at 19% and that of the services 
sector jumped to 35%. 
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i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
The growth and structural transformation of the Malaysian economy has had wide 
implications on the growth of employment opportunities as well as the distribution of 
labour force by sectors. The employment share in the primary sector decreased from 
53.5% to 15.2%, while that of the industrial and services sector increased from 14% 
and 32.5% to 36.1% and 48.7% respectively between 1970 and 2000 (see Table 2). 
While the structural transformation of the economy was rapid in terms of output, it has 
been rather slow in terms of employment structure. This invariably indicates disparities 
in labour productivity and earnings between sectors, and thus on the share of the poor. 
With the rise in the employment opportunities in the modern sectors, the unemploy-
ment rate contracted to a low of 2.4% in 1997, but has since then risen slightly to 
3.1% by 2000. The labour market became so tight in the 1990s that some sub-sectors 
had to resort to imported labour from abroad. There is no accurate estimate of the 
number of foreign workers in this country as different sources have different esti-
mates. Edwards’ (1997) estimates put it at 500,000 for 1985, one million for 1990 and 
1.7 million for 1995, while the official estimate was about 1.6 million in 1999. Al-
though the financial crisis had seen workers being retrenched from certain sub-
sectors, particularly construction, many have been re-deployed to other sectors still 
experiencing a labour shortage, such as some sub-sectors in the manufacturing and 
services sectors as well as the agriculture sector. 
The Malaysian labour force grew steadily before the Asian financial crisis, but dipped 
slightly in 1999, before returning to its pre-crisis level of almost 10 million (see Table 
4). The labour force participation rate (LFPR) fluctuated during the 1990s, being around 
65% for the nation as a whole. The male LFPR is much higher than that of the female 
LFPR, the former fluctuating around 85% while the latter is about half of the male LFPR. 
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The mean income of a Malaysian household has increased significantly and con-
tinuously from RM514 in 1976 to peak at RM2,606 in 1997. The Malaysian achieve-
ment in reducing income inequality between 1976 and 1990 is also impressive with 
the Gini ratio falling from its peak of 0.529 in 1976 to 0.446 in 1990. The state of in-
come distribution both in the rural and the urban areas also exhibits similar trends. 
In terms of the income shares, the top 20% of households reduced their share from 
57.7% to 50.5%, while the middle and bottom 40% increased their shares from 31.2% 
and 11.1% to 35.3% and 14.3% respectively for the same period. However, the Gini 
ratio has shown a trend reversal in the 1990s when it rose to 0.459 in 1993, 0.462 in 
1995 and 0.470 in 1997. Similarly, the income shares of the top 20% of households 
increased to 51.3% in 1995 and 52.4% in 1997. On the other hand, the shares of the 
middle and bottom 40% decreased to 35.0% and 13.7% respectively in 1995 and to 
34.4% and 13.2% respectively in 1997. This U-turn in income inequality almost wiped 
out all the gains that were made under the New Economic Policy (Ragayah Haji Mat 
Zin, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the crisis resulted in the moderation of the mean income of the top 
20% of households when it fell from RM6,854 in 1997 to RM6,268 in 1999. On the 
other hand, the mean income of the middle and bottom 40% fell at much lower rates. 
As such, it is not surprising that income disparity between the urban and rural areas, 
which rose from 1.7 in 1990 to 2.04 in 1997 moderated to 1.81 in 1999. The Gini also 
fell to 0.443 from 0.470 in 1997 with the income share of the top 20% of households 
contracting to 50.5% in 1999, while the shares of the middle and bottom 40% in-
creased to 35.5% and 14.0% respectively. Still, while the crisis puts a break on the 
rising inequality of the 1990s, this improvement comes with a reduced size of the 
economic pie. 
Malaysia has achieved a remarkable record in the progress of poverty eradication. 
The poverty incidence has plunged from 52.4% in 1970 to 9.3% in 1995. Over the 
same period, urban poverty incidence shrank to 4.1% (99,300 households), while the 
rural poverty incidence fell to 15.6% (319,000 households), indicating that poverty 
in Malaysia continues to be a largely rural phenomenon. In 1995, the overall incidence 
of poverty stood at 9.3% numbering 418,000 households. The incidence of poverty 
was further reduced in 1997 to 6.8% (332,400 households), 2.4% (64,900 house-
holds) for the urban areas and 11.8% (267,500 households) for the rural areas. How-
ever, the incidence of poverty for 1999 rose to 8.1% (409,300 households), 3.8% 
(102,700 households) for the urban areas and 13.2% (306,600 households) for the 
rural areas as a consequence of the crisis (see Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, 2001). 
The value and share of Federal Government development expenditure in the various 
categories for the period 1970 to the present indicate that the percentage share of de-
velopment expenditure in social services went up in the mid-1980s and then followed 
a downward trend in the first half of the 1990s (see Table 4, Appendix). Since then 
this share has increased again to reach a peak in 2001 when almost half of the devel-
opment expenditure has been allocated to social services, particularly education. This 
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was the result of a continued effort to revive the economy, and the budgets since 1998 
continued with an expansionary fiscal stance. Of the additional allocation for devel-
opment expenditure in 1998, RM1,000 million was directed at social development 
projects to address and ameliorate the effects of the economic crisis on the lower 
income groups. In 1999, priority in government spending was given to projects that 
address structural and socio-economic issues (education and skills training, health 
services, low-cost housing, and agriculture and rural development), as well as revival 
of selected infrastructure projects to increase efficiency of the economy (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2000). In order to overcome the weak domestic demand and excess capacity 
as well as the negative external developments, the government continued with an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy resulting in a fiscal deficit of 5.8% of GDP, which is re-
garded as still within a prudential level. The September event and its adverse impact 
on the global economy necessitated the government to further inject a stimulus pack-
age of RM4.3 billion in September 2001 to contain and minimize the negative spill-
over effects from the deteriorating global economy (Malaysia, 2001c). 
mçäáíáÅ~ä=póëíÉã=
Malaysia has a parliamentary democracy, with one dominant party. The National 
Front coalition has won every general election and continues to dictate political af-
fairs. Surpassing power is vested in the Executive, and various laws have been insti-
tuted that restrict political freedom or contain social activism. The federal govern-
ment dictates the content and priority of objectives and policies, but state govern-
ments play an important role in overseeing economic development. 
The Malaysian development strategy since independence in 1957 has always encom-
passed the two important objectives of, first, allocating resources in such a way as to 
ensure the growth of real per capita income and second, ascertaining that income 
and wealth are distributed in an equitable manner. However, prior to 1970, while the 
policies implemented during this period were able to attain satisfactory growth, they 
failed to improve equity or significantly eradicate poverty. This growing inequality – 
overall as well as along intra-ethnic lines – and persistent poverty was said to be one 
of the proximate causes of the May 1969 ‘race riots’ which culminated in the proc-
lamation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970. 
The NEP, which was implemented between 1971–90, was hailed as a successful 
model of redistributing income without sacrificing growth. It was launched with the 
objective of attaining national unity and fostering nation building through poverty 
eradication and economic restructuring so as to eliminate the identification of race 
with economic functions. Since the implementation of this policy, Malaysia has 
achieved growth, structural transformation, and poverty alleviation and improved in-
come distribution in an ethnically diverse society. 
The NEP was succeeded by the National Development Policy 1991–2000 (NDP), 
which retains the basic strategy of growth with equity of the NEP. This in turn was 
followed by the current National Vision Policy (NVP) contained in the Third Outline 
Perspective Plan 2001–10. In essence, the NVP represents the consolidation of all 
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past development efforts (NEP and NDP) to attain a united, progressive and pros-
perous Malaysian society. The quest of the nation is to become a developed nation 
in its own mould, and in meeting the challenges towards this end the same strategies 
expounded in the NEP and NDP of building a resilient, competitive nation and an 
equitable society to ensure national cohesion and social stability will also be empha-
sized in the NVP. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
The income data used to estimate poverty incidence and income distribution in Ma-
laysia are derived from several official surveys, namely the Agriculture Census 1976 
(AgCensus, 1977) and the Household Income Surveys (HIS), which were conducted 
by the Department of Statistics (DOS). Most are not available to the public except 
for summary data published in official documents. It is generally agreed that the cen-
sus / surveys have employed a consistent and comparable income concept and approach 
in conducting the various surveys. Bhalla and Kharas (Bhalla and Kharas, 1992) 
asserted that “the overwhelming result from cross-checks of the data is that these 
surveys have been extremely well conducted, and it is likely that they are amongst 
the most reliable of the surveys conducted in the developing world”. 
Most of the other data reported in this paper are also collected by DOS, which has a 
reputable reliability in its data collection. However, data relating to the informal 
sector is scarce, so much so that here the informal sector is restricted to the self-
employed and unpaid family workers. Also, there are difficulties in getting access to 
data, for example from studies conducted by SOCSO. Much important survey data 
and reports have been concealed from public view; it remains difficult to obtain statis-
tics on a range of issues, particularly those deemed ‘sensitive’. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Generally, the institutional framework in Malaysia consolidates the role of govern-
ment, and limits the room for movement of trade unions and civil society organiza-
tions. The state has assumed a ‘developmentalist’ position, in which formulation and 
implementation of development plans are held to be the sole prerogative of the state. 
This type of system asserts that socio-political stability is necessary for smooth 
state-led development – which includes containing civil activism. Society’s main role 
is to comply with the terms, co-operate, and perhaps offer suggestions. The activities 
of unions have been particularly stigmatized in Malaysia; industrial action is consid-
ered as disruptive, disrespectful, and unreasonable. The relationship between the 
Malaysian government and NGOs has been strained, especially for groups that voice 
dissent at government policy or action. 
The 1950 Trade Unions Act outlines procedures for registering and operating a trade 
union. The Director General for Trade Unions has discretionary power to decide 
whether to recognize a trade union applying for registration. The Industrial Relations 
Act 1967 imposes severe strictures on collective bargaining, going on strike and other 
forms of industrial action. Trade unions are generally small and fragmented. The de-
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finition of a trade union – as one that comprises workers in a particular trade, occu-
pation or industry – has been used to disapprove the expansion of membership or the 
establishment of large unions (Ayadurai, 1993). 
Recent data statistics confirm that the institutional framework continues to restrict 
trade unions. Until 2000, there were only 577 unions in Malaysia. This small num-
ber of trade unions, in spite of a substantial number of applications for trade union 
recognition (184 in 2000), reflects the low rate of approval and the power vested in 
the Director General’s hands. Unions had a total of 734,525 members in 2000, mak-
ing for an average union membership of 1,270 members.2 In other words, only 8.2% 
of Malaysian workers were unionized in 20003, which is a drop from 9.9% in 1990 
and 11.8% in 1982 (Zulkifly and Ishak, 1998). In-house or enterprise unions have 
also become more common.4 The declining trend in membership and gravitation to-
ward in-house unions mirrors a shift away from industrial negotiation to a market-
driven and decentralized form of industrial relations. Activities of unions are subdued, 
as corroborated by industrial action incidences – or lack thereof. In 2000, only 11 
strikes or lockouts and 22 pickets were recorded. 
In a wider context, combined bodies or large unions may gather sufficient momentum 
to make larger impacts. The Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) was formed 
in 1950, as an umbrella body to represent unions. Because it encompasses various 
sectors, it has not been approved as a union. Thus, the MTUC has the status of a peak 
society, and hence cannot engage in the activities of trade unionism. It has advocated 
worker concerns, though its leaders often face criticism for not pushing the labour 
agenda enough, or for capitulating to government or employer terms too often. The 
plantation sector got as far as instituting a minimum wage, but at a level that can 
scarcely guarantee subsistence.5 The National Union of Plantation Workers, which 
led the campaign, is the union with the largest membership. 
At the other end of the bargaining table, employers have generally had the upper hand 
in negotiations. Malaysia’s industrialization strategy has placed high emphasis on em-
ployer interests. The Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) was established more 
recently, in 1978. The favourable policies that employers enjoy pre-date the forma-
tion of this group, although the MEF occasionally publicly advocates employer in-
terests. Tri-partite discussion and negotiation take place within organizations, such as 
on the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) board, which includes representation from 
the government, employees’ (including the MTUC) and employers’ representatives. 
The views of the MTUC, MEF, and government are sometimes solicited for public 
enquiries related to industry. Tri-partism, however, cannot be said to be equilateral: 
                             
2 This compares with 1989, when there were 369 trade unions with 560,339 members, with an average 
of 1,520 members. 
3 Data obtained from Malaysian Ministry of Human Resources website, http://www.jaring.my/kms. 
4 Private sector membership of in-house unions, as a proportion of total union membership, increased 
from 6.5% in 1982 to 29.7% in 1992. Corresponding figures for the combined public and private sec-
tor are 24.6% in 1982 to 41.8% in 1992 (Zulkifly and Ishak, 1998, Table 9.5). 
5 The fixed component of the minimum wage of RM325 even falls under the Peninsula poverty line of 
RM510. Productivity and commodity price factors are to determine the plantation worker’s income 
beyond RM325. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
130 
disproportionate weight at the negotiating stage tends to reside on the government 
and employer fronts. Nonetheless, the MTUC has recently raised significant objec-
tions to EPF approved policies. 
Directly related to social protection are two main statutory bodies: one each for old-
age savings and social security. The EPF, established in 1951, serves foremost as a 
retirement savings fund. With the 1969 Employees Social Security Act, the Social 
Security Organization (SOCSO) was formed to cover accident and death incidences 
on the job. The concept and application of social security, however, has remained 
contained to the provision of injury and incapacitation benefits. This legislative con-
ception, though termed social security, did not introduce a full-scale institutionaliza-
tion of social insurance or social assistance. 
The 1997–98 economic crisis seems to have altered perceptions somewhat, due to the 
sheer magnitude of adversity that workers and vulnerable groups endured. The in-
adequacy of existing social protection measures was exposed, for instance in re-
trenchment benefits, urban poverty and insurance of foreign workers. This is a sig-
nificant development, though many gaps remain to be filled – the longer term impli-
cations are less certain. We witness continual outcries against abuse of EPF funds, 
primarily through purchasing shares of politically connected companies, and the low 
dividend resulting from such misplaced investment. 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
The Malaysian government has maintained a cautious distance from involvement in 
social protection. Historically, this ideological stance may be traced to the Commu-
nist emergency period of 1948–60, during which trade unions were labelled as leftist 
insurgents. Socialist parties also posed a credible political threat to the establishment 
until the 1960s. The lack of trade union penetration and civil organization, over time, 
contained social pressures for state welfare provisions. The NEP introduced a devel-
opmental programme oriented toward poverty alleviation and income redistribution. 
Understanding and application of social welfare, thus, took the form of affirmative 
action, primarily on ethnic grounds. 
Thus, poverty reduction and income redistribution policies find more sympathy than 
social protection. The government plays a key role in propagating lukewarm percep-
tions toward various instruments of social protection. Existing social institutions are 
generally regarded as sufficient; the government has not indicated any desire to sub-
stantiate or expand the instruments of social protection on a wide scale. The country 
has adopted development strategies in line with mainstream ideology, which empha-
sizes the private sector and employs supply-side strategies such as human resource 
development and labour flexibility. These strategies, in line with a growth-centred 
development formula, tend to stress market outcome as the determinant of welfare. 
Perceptions that social safety nets induce indolence and discourage productivity have 
been perpetuated till present day. 
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NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
While the coverage of the formal social protection system in Malaysia is greatly in-
adequate, transfer payments within the extended family have acted as an informal 
shock absorber in times of economic downturn. Children who earned a steady income 
normally try to send some money to support their ageing parents or needy relatives, 
implying that solidarity and justice are important values in the Malaysian society. The 
Muslims are supposed to pay the religiously compulsory ‘zakat’ to the state religious 
department or pay directly to those who qualified, particularly the very poor. More-
over, in developing countries such as Malaysia, traditionally the family and kinship 
and community-based institutions, like mutual benefit societies, catered for needy 
people. For example, the agricultural and the fishing sectors rely strongly on their 
respective cooperative societies for financial, social and moral support in cases of 
misfortune. In this instance, the Farmers’ Association and the Fishermen’s Associa-
tion, initiated by the government, were established for the purpose of promoting the 
welfare of its members, but membership of these occupational cooperatives is not 
obligatory. However, industrialization and urbanization plus social mobility have re-
sulted in the disintegration of traditional forms of social protection. Development 
creates the need for formal social security provisions. 
A more progressive tax system would be more easily acceptable to the people in the 
lower income group since those who could not really afford to pay would not have 
to pay and yet would be likely to qualify for benefits. However, this type of tax re-
gime is no longer tenable in the era of liberalization and globalization when each 
government is forced to lower its taxes in order to make the country a more competi-
tive place for doing business in order to attract FDI. While certain insurance schemes 
might be a more attractive alternative to taxes, the government has to come in to pay 
for the premiums of those who simply could not afford to pay. In its poverty eradica-
tion strategy, Malaysia would like to avoid the ‘dependency syndrome’ and would 
like to assist the needy through job creation rather than forking out subsidies. Hence, 
when the Eighth Malaysia Plan targets poverty incidence to be reduced to 0.5% in 
2005, it envisages that only these people will be left under poverty to be assisted by 
transfers. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
Contemporary social security schemes in Malaysia derived its origin from provisions 
introduced during the colonial era. Malaysia’s social security schemes tend to cover 
those in the waged or salaried groups only. The earliest social security provisions 
were a workmen’s compensation scheme, established in 1929, and an employer’s 
liability, sickness, and maternity scheme for plantation workers, introduced in 1933 
(Midgley, 1984, p. 144). 
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OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The formal sector in Malaysia comprises organized and registered economic activi-
ties that operate within the legal institutional framework, and generally generate regu-
lar wages and incomes. Employers are required to comply with legal social protec-
tion institutions, in particular old-age savings for all employees and accident / death 
insurance for low-income workers. Workers have the option of joining trade unions, 
although subject to severe restrictions as mentioned above. Working conditions and 
hours also have to fall within certain limits, and workplaces abide by safety regula-
tions. 
Although the formal sector, compared to the informal sector, enjoys obvious advan-
tages of state priority, higher potential for income generation, capital intensity and 
technical progress, the returns to economic growth from a largely capital accumula-
tion regime have been diminishing. One of the main problems faced in the formal 
sector is that it is not very efficient after the mid-1990s; labour productivity registered 
negative growth in 1998 (see Table 4). Labour productivity did pick up in 1999 and 
2000 but fell again in 2001. Unit labour cost and real wages also rose significantly 
last year. The formal sector is dominated by the private sector, particularly since 
Malaysia embarked on privatizing many of the public utilities and other non-finan-
cial public enterprises from the mid-1980s. Malaysia once had an obvious compara-
tive advantage in natural resource intensive and unskilled labour intensive industries, 
but now has a comparative advantage in industries which are technology intensive 
(see Table 5, Appendix). A pressing challenge ahead is how well Malaysia forges 
towards skill-intensive industry and services. In the long term, there are potential 
positive consequences of advancing to high technology and high-skills production, 
in the form of higher wages and abilities to allocate toward savings and insurance. 
Social protection measures exist for workers in the formal sector – limited as they 
are. Receiving these benefits, however, is contingent on the participation of employers 
and employees, and on the monitoring activity of government authorities. Social pro-
tection has not been accorded high priority in economic development – in policy and 
practice. However, the need for state-sponsored or state-coordinated social schemes 
will rise further, in the continuing climate of volatility and with the diminishment of 
the family support tradition. The Malaysian government has demonstrated a commit-
ment to ‘social expenditure’. Nonetheless, the bulk of this expenditure goes towards 
education and health facilities and provisions (see Table 3). 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Currently there are several formal social security schemes in the country, although 
not all are national in coverage and function. Only employees in the government ser-
vice are entitled to receive pensions upon retirement while all other employees are re-
quired to contribute to an old-age retirement scheme known as the Employees Provi-
dent Fund (EPF). The coverage of these social security schemes is shown in Table 5. 
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q~ÄäÉ=RW= oÉíáêÉãÉåí=fåÅçãÉ=`çîÉê~ÖÉI=OMMM=
= kìãÄÉê= B=çÑ=íçí~ä=
qçí~ä=ïçêâáåÖ=éçéìä~íáçå= VIRTPIMMM= NMMKM=
bmc=ãÉãÄÉêëG= VIVVMIMMM= NMQKPS=
bãéäçóÉÉë=ìåÇÉê=dçîÉêåãÉåí=mÉåëáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ= NNUIURQ= NKOQ=
oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=ÑçêÉáÖå=ïçêâÉêë= TPOIRUU= TKSR=
bëíáã~íÉÇ=ÑçêÉáÖå=ïçêâÉêë=ïÜç=~êÉ=åçí=êÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ= RMMIMMM= RKOO=
bëíáã~íÉÇ=j~ä~óëá~å=ïçêâÉêë=åçí=ÅçîÉêÉÇ=Äó=~åó=Ñçêã~ä=êÉíáêÉãÉåí=ëÅÜÉãÉ= RURISMM= SKNO=
bëíáã~íÉÇ=ïçêâáåÖ=éçéìä~íáçå=åçí=ÅçîÉêÉÇ=Äó=~åó=Ñçêã~ä=êÉíáêÉãÉåí=ëÅÜÉãÉ= OIUTTIPMM= PMKMS=
G= bñÅÉÉÇë=NMMKMB=ëáåÅÉ=~=êÉíáêÉÇ=ïçêâÉê=Å~å=ëíáää=ÄÉ=~=ãÉãÄÉêK=
pçìêÅÉW= mìÄäáÅ=pÉêîáÅÉë=aÉé~êíãÉåíI=ÅáíÉÇ=áå=o~à~ëÉâ~ê~åI=OMMNK=
áK= bãéäçóÉêÛë=iá~Äáäáíó=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The employer’s liability scheme covers mainly two types of benefits. Firstly, employ-
ment injury compensation is provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1952, 
and secondly, sickness and maternity benefits are provided under the Employment 
Act, 1955. Paid sick leave entitlement, as stipulated by the Employment Act, 1955, 
depends on the employee’s length of service. It ranges from 14 days for those em-
ployed for less than two years, and 18 days for those employed between two to five 
years, to 22 days if the employee has served the employer for more than five years. 
Maternity protection is one of the few areas where employees in the private sector 
get better benefits than employees in the public sector. In general while contribution 
rates are higher in the private sector, benefits tend to be less compared to the public 
sector. Yet in terms of maternity leave, employees covered by the Employment Act 
1955 enjoy a longer period to recuperate from birth. All female employees covered 
by this Act are entitled to 60 days maternity leave, subject to a maximum of five 
surviving births, plus a maternity benefit which is an amount equivalent to her wages 
at the time of confinement. This sum should be paid even if the employee dies (from 
any cause) during the maternity leave. 
Since 1993, the Workmen’s Compensation Act is particularly important to foreign 
workers in Malaysia. Previously these workers were covered by the SOCSO. How-
ever, with the huge influx of foreign workers, SOCSO found it increasingly difficult 
to cope with the problems of providing compensation to workers who have left the 
country. Foreign workers are employed in high-risk industries such as construction, 
where the number of accidents is high. Workers who were involved in work-related 
accidents and were no longer able to work returned to their home countries. Paying 
out the compensation on a monthly basis could not be managed smoothly by SOCSO. 
Tracing the families of foreign workers who have died was equally difficult. Hence, 
the Ministry of Human Resources revived the Act. 
The schemes discussed are enforced by the Labour Department and are entirely the 
responsibility of the employers, who are legally bound to meet the costs and provide 
benefits to their workers who qualify for such benefits. Since the responsibility of 
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payment of compensation is placed on the employer, it may be a disadvantage to 
employers who are not financially stable. They might find it difficult to discharge 
their obligations to the injured workers, particularly if the claims involve heavy finan-
cial liabilities arising out of permanent disablement or fatal cases. Thus, in order to 
prevent small or financially weak employers from becoming insolvent, it is a com-
mon practice for employers to purchase commercial insurance plans to cover their 
liabilities under the workmen’s compensation schemes. Payment of compensation is 
not automatic, and claimants might encounter delays and difficulties in demanding 
their claims. Moreover, the payment of a lump sum has its disadvantages as the lump 
sum often diminishes in a short period and the claimant might become a charge of 
public welfare. 
ááK= `áîáä=pÉêîáÅÉ=mÉåëáçå=
The Government Pension Ordinance of 1951 introduced a non-contributory pension 
scheme for civil servants, which was amended by the Pensions Act of 1980. This 
scheme provides income protection for all employees in the public sector. Benefits 
include those relevant to employment injury, disability, superannuation or gratuity 
payment upon retirement and dependents’ pension in the event of death while in 
service and death after retirement. 
The generous provisions of the civil service pension scheme are funded by the gov-
ernment, through tax revenues. Table 6 shows the gradual increase in government 
expenditure on public pensions and gratuities over the years 1998 to 2002. This trend 
reflects a system in which members of low-income groups not covered by social 
security are at a disadvantage, not only by being excluded in coverage but also as a 
result of their contribution to the general taxation, which are largely provided by the 
low-income groups through regressive indirect taxation. 
q~ÄäÉ=SW= bñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=çå=`áîáä=pÉêîáÅÉ=mÉåëáçåë=~åÇ=dê~íìáíáÉëI=NVVUÓOMMO=
vÉ~ê= oj=ãáääáçå=
B=çÑ=íçí~ä=ÖçîÉêåãÉåí=
çéÉê~íáçå~ä=ÉñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=
NVVU=
NVVV=
OMMM=
OMMN=
OMMO=
PISRU=
PITVO=
QINUT=
QIUVN=
QIRRS=
TKU=
UKN=
TKQ=
UKM=
TKM=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~I=OMMNÅK=
áááK= bãéäçóÉÉ=mêçîáÇÉåí=cìåÇ=EbmcF=
For the majority of employees outside the civil service, there is the statutory provi-
dent fund that provides retirement benefits under the Employee Provident Fund Act, 
1951. Currently there are some 9.97 million members of the EPF, and some 318,218 
employers. However, there is a portion of members who are not active, that is, they 
have some amount of savings but do not continue to contribute, perhaps due to un-
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employment, or for the reason that they are civil servants who have been absorbed 
into the public pension scheme,6 or foreign workers who have left the country. Table 
7 gives a picture of the membership and employer situation from 1996 to 2000, 
while Table 8 shows the wage structure and balance of members for 1999. The latter 
reflects that a large majority is earning less than RM2,000 a month. 
q~ÄäÉ=TW=kìãÄÉê=çÑ=bãéäçóÉêë=~åÇ=jÉãÄÉêë=NVVSÓOMMM=
vÉ~ê=
qçí~ä=ãÉãÄÉêë=
EãáääáçåF=
^ÅíáîÉ=ãÉãÄÉêë=
EãáääáçåF=EB=çÑ=íçí~äF= bãéäçóÉêë=
NVVS=
NVVT=
NVVU=
NVVV=
OMMM=
UKMR=
UKOT=
VKNS=
VKRQ=
VKVT=
QKNU=ERNKVF=
QKPN=EROKNF=
QKSR=ERMKTF=
QKTU=ERMKNF=
RKMP=ERMKQF=
OTSIQNT=
OVSIOVV=
OVTITVO=
PMNINVN=
PNUIONU=
pçìêÅÉW= bmcI=OMMMK=
q~ÄäÉ=UW= bmcW=t~ÖÉ=píêìÅíìêÉ=~åÇ=^îÉê~ÖÉ=_~ä~åÅÉ=çÑ=jÉãÄÉêëI=NVVV=
^ÅíáîÉ=ãÉãÄÉêë=áå=ï~ÖÉ=ê~åÖÉ=
t~ÖÉ=ê~åÖÉ=çÑ=
ãÉãÄÉêë=EojF= kìãÄÉê= mÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉ=çÑ=íçí~ä=
^îÉê~ÖÉ=Ä~ä~åÅÉ=áå=
NVVU=Eoj=íÜçìë~åÇF=
ré=íç=RMM= NIPPRINTR= OTKV= RKV=
RMN=Ó=NIMMM= NIRSMISOM= POKS= NOKS=
NIMMN=Ó=OIMMM= NIMUQIRSR= OOKT= OVKR=
OIMMN=Ó=PIMMM= PPSIVMO= TKM= RMKO=
PIMMN=Ó=QIMMM= NOSIUVN= OKT= TQKU=
QIMMN=Ó=RIMMM= STISQU= NKQ= VUKQ=
RIMMN=Ó=SIMMM= PVINPS= MKU= NNUKV=
SIMMN=Ó=TIMMM= OQIUMR= MKR= NQNKU=
TIMMN=Ó=UIMMM= NTIQMV= MKQ= NSOKT=
UIMMN=Ó=VIMMM= NNIPMO= MKO= NTVKS=
VIMMN=Ó=NMIMMM= VIPOM= MKO= NVVKN=
jçêÉ=íÜ~å=NMIMMM= NTMIQMN= PKS= OSRKV=
qçí~ä= QITUQINTQ= NMMKM= PNKV=Eqçí~ä=~îÉê~ÖÉF=
pçìêÅÉW= bmcI=NVVVI=éK=RSX=iÉÉ=eçÅâ=içÅâI=OMMNK=
The EPF scheme consists of individual and entirely separate accounts for each worker. 
Contributions are paid by workers and employers, and these accumulate to earn divi-
dends until the amount is paid out on the occurrence of the prescribed contingencies 
of retirement or death, provided that retirement is not before the statutory age. Con-
tribution rates for employees and employers have increased over the years. Between 
1952 and June 1975, both employee and employer contributed 5% each, but this in-
creased to 6% and 7% respectively between July 1975 and November 1980, 9% and 
11% between December 1980 and December 1992, 10% and 12% between January 
                             
6 A majority of civil servants contribute to the EPF for a period of three to ten years before they are 
absorbed into the Civil Service Pension scheme. 
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1993 and December 1995, and 11% and 12% between January 1996 and December 
2000. Since then, the government has reduced the employee’s contribution to 9%. 
Each worker’s EPF account is divided into three components. 
1. Account 1 comprises 60% of total savings and can be withdrawn only upon 
reaching the age of 55 years; 
2. Account 2 comprises 30% of total savings and withdrawals are allowed for the 
purpose of purchasing a house, a computer and education; 
3. The last 10% of the savings are deposited into Account 3, and withdrawals are 
allowed for medical expenses.7 
Table 9 shows the amount of contributions and withdrawals for 1996–2000. 
q~ÄäÉ=VW=^ååì~ä=`çåíêáÄìíáçåë=~åÇ=táíÜÇê~ï~äëI=NVVSÓOMMM=Eoj=jáääáçåF=
vÉ~ê= `çåíêáÄìíáçåë= táíÜÇê~ï~äë=
NVVS=
NVVT=
NVVU=
NVVV=
OMMM=
NOIUVV=
NQISNQ=
NQITUO=
NRINVO=
NTIMQM=
PISPU=
RISTV=
UIQQN=
TINOQ=
VIVSN=
pçìêÅÉW= bmcI=OMMMK=
The Fund has provisions for periodical withdrawal of savings upon reaching retire-
ment age, so as to ensure that there is a guaranteed flow of income. Still, this does 
not ensure that account holders are not tempted to withdraw all their savings, espe-
cially those in the lower income groups whose savings are small. In 2000, for exam-
ple, only 0.06% of the amount withdrawn was for the purpose of periodic payments. 
Provident funds, though useful in their own way, have their limitations. It provides 
for a measure of protection for old age, but where invalidity or permanent disability 
is concerned, it can hardly provide the desired or adequate income security. Lump sum 
payments do not provide the life-long security as is available under a social insurance 
scheme that provides periodical payments throughout life. Furthermore, the provi-
dent fund has the disadvantage of not pooling risks. Benefits are based directly on 
contributions and, therefore, they are not always sufficient to deal adequately with 
contingencies that may arise. The lump sum payment may be small and is soon used 
up. This problem is particularly pressing in the case of workers who are disabled or 
die at a young age or who join the fund shortly before retirement. Moreover, the divi-
dend rates of the Fund have fluctuated over the years. When the country achieved its 
independence in 1957 and economic development accelerated, the rates ranged be-
tween 5% and 7%, with a peak of 8.5% between 1983 and 1987, but since then have 
                             
7 EPF withdrawals for medical expenses are envisaged for payment of expensive surgeries, etc. The 
amount may not be sufficient to cover the total costs incurred. The public are encouraged to buy 
health insurance plans under the Sihat Malaysia programme, overseen by the government. Medical 
services are free for low-income people who are not covered by the 1955 Employment Act or the 
1952 Employer’s Liability Act, or are not employees in the public sector. 
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declined to 6% in 2000 (EPF, 2000, p. 38). Besides, 72% of EPF contributors who 
withdraw their savings at the age of 55 tend to spend all funds within three years.8 
Thus there is a need for the EPF to educate its members on how to use their savings 
prudently upon retirement since life expectancy has risen and these figures are ex-
pected to increase to 82 and 85 for males and females respectively by the year 2020. 
In general, the EPF was established mainly for employees in the formal sector, that 
is, employees who have a regular paymaster. Thus, workers in the informal sector 
and the self-employed, such as petty traders and hawkers, are not compelled to have 
accounts with EPF and may contribute on a voluntary basis. There is no enforcement 
by the authority to encourage them to open up provident fund accounts. Unlike in 
some countries where business licenses may not be renewed unless there is proof of 
provident fund contributions, this prerequisite is not practiced in Malaysia. Hence, it 
is crucial for the government to look into this matter in the near future. 
áîK= tçêâãÉåÛë=`çãéÉåë~íáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The Workers’ Compensation Scheme was conceived from the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, 1952. The injured or deceased workman is compensated by his employer, 
who is required to insure his company against such liabilities. Unlike SOCSO, this 
scheme operates as a law governing the terms and amounts of compensation in the 
case of death or accident. It does not handle the funds itself; the employer is fully 
responsible for the social insurance through private companies. 
The benefits under this scheme are as follows: 
1. Death: a lump sum equal to 60 months’ earnings or RM18,000, whichever is 
lesser; 
2. Permanent total disablement, according to age of worker (of the following, 
whichever is lesser): 
a) less than 16 years: 108 months’ salary or RM23,000; 
b) 16 to 18 years: 84 months’ salary or RM23,000; 
c) more than 18 years: 60 months’ salary or RM23,000. 
This scheme never attained much significance in scope or magnitude, particularly 
since the establishment of SOCSO in 1971. Nonetheless, it has been utilized by for-
eign workers, some public servants and workers in statutory bodies. More recently, 
the Workers’ Compensation Fund has been modified to be a major source of indem-
nity for foreign workers in case of injury or death. In March 1998, the Foreign Work-
ers’ Compensation Scheme was formed to cater primarily to foreign workers’ insur-
ance needs. 
Benefits for the Foreign Workers’ Compensation Scheme include: 
a) RM2,000 ‘ex gratia’ payment for death resulting from commuting to work; 
b) a maximum of RM20,000 payment for death or permanent disability outside of 
regular work hours; 
                             
8 Statement by the Chairman, EPF Board, 21 January 2002. 
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c) guarantee of RM4,800 payment for cost of sending worker to his / her home 
country in the case of death or permanent disability. 
From 1997 to 1998, the total nation-wide number of cases increased (2,285 to 2,716) 
but the amount of benefits paid remained constant (RM3.85 million and RM3.86 mil-
lion) (MHR 1998: 37). Another source notes a significant rise in cases and benefit 
payments between 1998 and 1999 in Peninsula Malaysia: respectively, 3,224 to 3,951 
and RM4.6 million to RM5.4 million. This data discrepancy reflects the poor standard 
of information provision. Nonetheless, the upward trend is clear. Still, the total amount 
of funds disbursed is miniscule, considering the approximately 730,000 registered 
foreign workers in Malaysia. 
îK= bãéäçóãÉåí=fåàìêó=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=fåî~äáÇáíó=mÉåëáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The Employees’ Social Security Act, 1969 formed the basis of a social insurance 
system in Malaysia. It also meant that for the first time the principle of social insur-
ance and the pooling of risks and finances were introduced in the country. The scheme 
covers workers who earn less than RM2,000 a month and is financed by contribu-
tions by the workers and employers, and administered by a corporatized central 
government agency, that is, the Social Security Organization, or popularly known as 
SOCSO. However since April 1993 foreign workers are exempted from coverage by 
this scheme and they have to rely on the Workmen’s Compensation scheme instead. 
There are two types of benefits that are administered by SOCSO, namely, the Em-
ployment Injury Insurance scheme and the Invalidity Pension scheme. Under the for-
mer, the contribution rate is 1.25% of the employee’s monthly earnings, and in the 
latter scheme it is 1%; the contributions are shared equally between the employer and 
the employee. Under the first scheme, the benefits provided include medical benefit, 
temporary disability benefit, permanent disability benefit, dependents’ benefit, death 
benefit, and rehabilitation benefit. On the other hand, the Invalidity Pensions scheme 
provides coverage against invalidity or death due to any cause. The benefits provided 
are related to temporary or permanent disability and rehabilitation, funeral grant, sur-
vivors’ pension and educational benefits. Benefits are paid out in the form of periodi-
cal payments, calculated on an earnings-related basis. 
Contributions by employers may appear as a transfer of income from employers to 
workers. Nevertheless, in reality it is difficult to comprehend whether employers’ 
income are really affected by social security contributions. In this instance, the real 
incidence is on the consumers, as the employers are able to assume their contribu-
tions as production costs and transfer them to consumers, and thus social security 
benefits financed out of employers’ contributions represent a redistribution of income 
from the consumers to the insured persons. 
Table 10 shows the registrants, accidents and benefits paid from 1996–2000. The 
number of registered employers and employees has been increasing during the five-
year period. However, the number of registrants and active membership diverge 
greatly. For example, although some 385,916 employers are registered with SOCSO 
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in 1999, only 267,197 or 69.4% are active employers, having made at least one con-
tribution in that year. Similarly some 8.598 million employees are registered, but of 
these only 4.61 million or 53.6% are active members. There were 106,508 reported 
industrial accidents in 1996, but this figure has come down since then to 73,400 in 
2000. On the other hand, commuting accidents and the number of recipients have 
been rising. Total contributions in 1999 amounted to RM898.7 million; while benefit 
expenditure amounted to RM497 million. At present it is believed that SOCSO’s 
expenditure far exceeds the rate of increase in contributions, which stands at 60% of 
SOCSO’s earnings.9 One reason for this increase, it is believed, is the abuse of the 
workplace disability assessment by doctors, employers and employees. 
q~ÄäÉ=NMW=pl`plI=kìãÄÉê=çÑ=oÉÖáëíê~åíëI=^ÅÅáÇÉåíë=~åÇ=_ÉåÉÑáíë=m~áÇI=NVVSÓOMMM=
= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU= NVVV= OMMM=
oÉÖáëíê~íáçå= = = = = =
= oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=ÉãéäçóÉêë= PMRIRMM= PPUITVQ= PRUIRQP= PURIVNS= QNRIROP=
= ^ÅíáîÉ=ÉãéäçóÉêë= ONTIROQ= OPSIRVP= ORPIPMR= OSTINVT= ORQIVMN=
= oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=ÉãéäçóÉÉë= TISNPISPR= UIOROISUM= UIQOUIRUV= UIRVUIMMR= UIUTTIPMQ=
^ÅÅáÇÉåíë= = = = = =
= oÉéçêíÉÇ=áåÇìëíêá~ä=~ÅÅáÇÉåíë= NMSIRMU= USIRUV= URIPPU= VOIMTQ= TPIQMM=
= `çããìíáåÖ=~ÅÅáÇÉåíë= NQITTN= NPIRMP= NSITRV= NUIPMV= NVIOTS=
= aÉ~íÜ=Å~ëÉë=EëÉííäÉÇF= NIMOM= NIQTP= NIOTP= VUQ= VNN=
oÉÅáéáÉåíë=çÑ=ÄÉåÉÑáíë= = = = = =
= qÉãéçê~êó=Çáë~Äáäáíó= UMIPOM= TUIPNR= STINSU= SVIQVN= TPIVUT=
= mÉêã~åÉåí=Çáë~ÄäÉãÉåí= NTIMPU= NVIPTQ= ONINPM= NTIOSQ= OMIMMV=
= aÉéÉåÇ~åíÛë=ÄÉåÉÑáí= NSIRNS= OMINPT= OPIOMM= ORINQV= ORIVMM=
= fåî~äáÇáíó=éÉåëáçå= NMIMQM= NNISUS= NPIPNS= NRITOQ= NUIPOQ=
= pìêîáîçêëÛ=éÉåëáçå= QPIPTT= RVINVQ= STIMPQ= TRINUV= UOINNP=
=qçí~ä= NSTIOVN= NUUITMS= NVNIUQU= OMOIUNT= OOMIPPP=
pçìêÅÉW= pl`pl=EÜííéWLLïïïKéÉêâÉëçKÖçîKãóFK=
Total investments by SOCSO amounted to RM4 billion in 1999. Some RM1.63 billion 
are invested in government securities, while another RM1.87 billion is invested in 
bonds used to finance vast development projects such as the Kuala Lumpur Interna-
tional Airport, the North-South expressway and others. This reinforces the argument 
that social security contributions play a prominent role in the supply of long-term in-
vestment funds for the country’s economic development. 
îáK= p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
There are quite a number of unit trust funds in the market since the number of ap-
proved funds increased from 67 in 1995 to 127 in 2000 with the number of investors 
rising from 6.8 million to 9.6 million over the same period. These unit trusts include 
the government guaranteed schemes under the Permodalan Nasional Berhad, such 
as the National Unit Trust (ASN) and the ASB (Bumiputera Unit Trust), which are 
                             
9 Personal communication between the writer and a SOCSO official. 
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only open to Bumiputeras (ethnic Malay citizens), and the Amanah Saham Wawasan 
2020 (open to all Malaysians between the ages of 12 and 29) and the Amanah Saham 
Malaysia (also open to all Malaysians). These savings schemes have yielded much 
better returns than the EPF and fixed deposit rates provided by the banks. In order to 
raise the income of the hardcore poor (those with income equal or less than half the 
poverty line), the government launched the Bumiputera Unit Trust (ASB)-PPRT loan 
scheme in 1992. This programme enabled each hardcore poor household to obtain a 
RM5,000 interest-free loan to participate in the ASB scheme. A total of RM75.7 mil-
lion was paid out to those who participated in the scheme by the end of 1995 in the 
form of dividends and bonuses. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
Under this scheme monetary benefits and other benefits in kind such as clothing and 
food parcels, as well as apprenticeship training and small business launching-grants 
are provided by the government and administered by the Department of Social Wel-
fare, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development. 
This scheme is strictly means-tested, and low income is the principal determinant of 
eligibility. However, benefits are not provided for claimants who have relatives that 
are liable and able to support them. 
The federal government sets limits for the amount of public / social assistance given 
to claimants. Benefits are based on the total monthly income of a family,10 and should 
not be above RM400 a month. Monthly allowances are given at a rate of RM80 per 
person, up to a maximum of RM350 per family. Old people above the age of 60 years 
who are destitute, not able-bodied and do not have any relatives to depend on for 
support are eligible to apply for assistance of RM130 a month. Benefits at the state 
level vary between RM40 per person in Negeri Sembilan to RM135 per person in 
Trengganu; these levels are set by each state. Table 11 shows the differences in 
levels of benefits in each Malaysian state. 
Besides, there is a tendency for benefits to be biased towards claimants in the urban 
areas. Theoretically, all needy people qualify for social assistance, but most rural 
dwellers are excluded, either through ignorance or through the administrative tech-
nique of limiting procedures for receiving and processing applications in the large 
urban centres. 
                             
10 For the first half of the Eighth Malaysia Plan, the income eligibility criterion for assistance is set at 
RM1,200 and below, per month per household (Malaysia, 2001a). 
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q~ÄäÉ=NNW= mìÄäáÅ=^ëëáëí~åÅÉNN=
pí~íÉë= jáåáãìã=EojF= j~ñáãìã=EojF=
cÉÇÉê~ä=qÉêêáíçêó=
gçÜçê=
hÉÇ~Ü=
hÉä~åí~å=
jÉä~â~=
kÉÖÉêá=pÉãÄáä~å=
m~Ü~åÖ=
mÉê~â=
mÉêäáë=
mìä~ì=máå~åÖ=
pÉä~åÖçê=
qêÉåÖÖ~åì=
p~Ä~Ü=
p~ê~ï~â=
UM=
RR=
TM=
TM=
VM=
QM=
UM=
VR=
TM=
TM=
VR=
NPR=
UM=
UM=
ORM=
NRR=
OMM=
NOM=
PNM=
UM=
OPR=
OMM=
OMM=
OMM=
OPR=
PPR=
NUM=
PRM=
 
In general, we may safely classify public or social assistance in Malaysia as residual 
welfare. Economic development planners regard the role of social welfare services 
as marginal to the development process precisely because these services do not gen-
erate income. What is urgently needed is a reassessment of the role social assistance 
can play in ameliorating the problem of poverty and deprivation. The Department of 
Social Welfare has acquired experience mostly in assisting the handicapped, elderly, 
and juveniles; social income transfers to the destitute have not advanced substan-
tively into social income transfers and social protection schemes. 
OKNKQ= ^ìñáäá~êó=pÅÜÉãÉë=
There are a number of auxiliary social security schemes that are ad hoc in nature. 
áK= oìÄÄÉê=pã~ääÜçäÇÉêëÛ=^ÅÅáÇÉåí=`çãéÉåë~íáçå=pÅÜÉãÉNO=
This scheme was initiated in March 1982 by the Rubber Industry Smallholders’ De-
velopment Authority (RISDA). This was a social insurance scheme, which covered 
all registered smallholders and their families. Smallholders contribute a small sum of 
RM8 annually.13 Benefits provided included a lump sum payment of RM10,000 for 
contingencies arising out of death or permanent disability of the smallholder, RM200 
a year for medical expenses and a weekly allowance of RM30 for a maximum of 52 
weeks for loss of income due to injury or sickness. However, this scheme was re-
pealed in May 1987. Smallholders felt this scheme was not run according to Islamic 
principles, but what was pertinent was the fact that claims far exceeded contribu-
tions by smallholders. 
                             
11 Personal communication between writer and an official of the Welfare Department Headquarters, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
12 Information in this section is based on the writer’s interview with an official of RISDA. 
13 This scheme was highly subsidised by the government, partly due to the fact the smallholders paid 
cess (tax on latex) and partly because this scheme had underlying political objectives. 
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ááK= cáëÜÉêãÉå=
E~F= cáëÜÉêãÉåÛë=dêçìé=^ÅÅáÇÉåí=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The Fishermen’s Association has initiated an insurance scheme for boat owners, who 
have to buy an insurance plan for their boat and workers each time they renew their 
licences. In the past fishermen were also encouraged to purchase some form of in-
surance for themselves, at the rate of RM5 per month, but the response was poor. 
Furthermore, there is no administrative mechanism to ensure they comply with this 
suggestion. Generally, therefore fishermen do not have adequate social security cov-
erage. 
EÄF= qÜÉ=qêÉåÖÖ~åì=cáëÜÉêãÉåÛë=tÉäÑ~êÉ=cìåÇ=
In January 1978, the Trengganu state government introduced a system of social secu-
rity for contingencies arising out of accidents at sea specifically for fishermen who 
are born and residing in the state. The fishing industry is one of the main traditional 
employment sectors (the other one being the agriculture sector) in this state. Currently, 
there are some 2,300 fishing boats in operation in Trengganu. This scheme, known 
as the Trengganu Fishermen’s Welfare Fund, is financed fully by the state govern-
ment, and administered by the Trengganu Fisheries Department. Fishermen need not 
register formally for the scheme, but they must be sons of Trengganu or have resided 
for at least ten years in the state. Furthermore, they must spend at least 120 days in a 
year employed as fishermen in order to be eligible for the benefits. However, they 
are encouraged to be members of the Fishermen’s Association. 
Benefits include a lump sum payment of RM10,000 for death due to an accident at 
sea, or RM6,000 for invalidity or permanent loss of disability as a result of accidents 
at sea. Other benefits include medical expenses, hospital allowances (RM10 daily, for 
a maximum of 90 days), compensation for loss of boat, and contributions towards the 
cost of repair of boats. Although this scheme does not guarantee permanent income 
maintenance for permanently disabled fishermen or survivors (in cases of death), it 
does provide some form of assistance to fishermen. Thus, this proves the commit-
ment of the state in recognizing the fishermen’s contribution towards the economy. 
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
A large section of the population, in particular the self-employed, petty commodity 
trades, and those employed in the informal sector, are excluded from any formal so-
cial security measures. We should recognize the importance of this sector in providing 
job opportunities for the lower income groups. Quijano-Obregon (Quijano-Obregon, 
1974), for example, sees the informal sector as a marginal activity at the peripheral of 
the formal sector, which provides a potential source of workers for the other sectors. 
There is no official categorization of the informal sector in Malaysia. Thus, in this 
paper this refers to the self-employed (own account and unpaid family workers, 
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including petty traders, food and merchandise hawkers, insurance agents, and others). 
In the context of social protection, it is quite likely that these self-employed do not 
have access to formal protection, or do not involve themselves in such programmes. 
Registering as EPF contributors, for instance, requires declaring incomes that they 
may not wish to disclose. In 1980, there were 1.14 million self-employed or 26.2% 
of the employed population. This number rose to 1.42 million in 1991 or 23.7% and 
2.03 million in 1999 or 23% of the employed population. The distribution of employed 
persons by employment status, strata and sex is shown in Table 12. In 1999, there 
were 427,800 or 13.9% of males compared to 253,900 or 14.5% of females who 
were self-employed in the urban areas. In contrast, there were 897,600 or 32.4% of 
males and 453,800 or 36.6% of females who were self-employed in the rural areas. 
Thus, the informal sector features relatively more in the rural than in the urban areas. 
This is not surprising as a majority of the self-employed is found in the agriculture, 
forestry and fishing sector (see Table 13). Most of the self-employed in the urban 
areas are found in the wholesale and retail trade and service sector. 
q~ÄäÉ=NOW= aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=bãéäçóÉÇ=mÉêëçåë=Äó=bãéäçóãÉåí=pí~íìëI=píê~í~=~åÇ=
pÉñ=NVVV=EíÜçìë~åÇF=
rêÄ~å= oìê~ä=
bãéäçóãÉåí=ëí~íìë= j~äÉ= B= cÉã~äÉ= B= j~äÉ= B= cÉã~äÉ= B=
bãéäçóÉê= NPMKQ= UUKPR= NTKO= NNKSR= QTKV= STKRT= SKU= NOKQP=
bãéäçóÉÉ= OIROPKS= SPKNO= NIQTQKQ= PSKUU= NIUOPKV= TMKMP= TUMKR= OVKVT=
lïå=~ÅÅçìåí=ïçêâÉê= PURKO= TNKUN= NRNKO= OUKNV= TQTKN= TUKQO= OMRKS= ONKRU=
råé~áÇ=Ñ~ãáäó=ïçêâÉê= QOKS= OVKPO= NMOKT= TMKSU= NRMKR= SMKSQ= OQUKO= SOKOT=
qçí~ä= PIMUNKU= SPKUQ= NITQRKR= PSKNS= OITSVKQ= SVKMR= NIOQNKN= PMKVR=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~I=OMMMK=
q~ÄäÉ=NPW= aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=tçêâÉêë=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=Äó=fåÇìëíêóI=OMMM=
pÉÅíçê= bãéäçóÉÉ=
lïå=~ÅÅçìåí=
ïçêâÉê=
råé~áÇ=Ñ~ãáäó=
ïçêâÉê=
^ÖêáÅìäíìêÉI=ÑçêÉëíêó=~åÇ=ÑáëÜáåÖ= SUSIRMM= TMQISMM= PMQIVMM=
jáåáåÖ=~åÇ=èì~êêóáåÖ= OSISMM= SMM= M=
j~åìÑ~ÅíìêáåÖ= NIVTMIMMM= NNMITMM= NVIPMM=
bäÉÅíêáÅáíóI=Ö~ë=~åÇ=ï~íÉê= QTIRMM= RMM= M=
`çåëíêìÅíáçå= SQVIRMM= NMOINMM= PIQMM=
tÜçäÉë~äÉ=~åÇ=êÉí~áä=íê~ÇÉI=êÉëí~ìê~åíë=~åÇ=ÜçíÉäë= NIMRVIQMM= QNTIOMM= NVUIPMM=
qê~åëéçêíI=ëíçê~ÖÉ=~åÇ=ÅçããìåáÅ~íáçåë= PPSIVMM= TRINMM= OIQMM=
cáå~åÅÉI=áåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=êÉ~ä=Éëí~íÉI=~åÇ=ÄìëáåÉëë=ëÉêîáÅÉë= QNVINMM= OTIQMM= UMM=
`çããìåáíóI=ëçÅá~ä=~åÇ=éÉêëçå~ä=ëÉêîáÅÉë= NITQTIQMM= NQMITMM= UIVMM=
qçí~ä= SIVQOIVMM= NIRTUIVMM= RPUIMMM=
pçìêÅÉW= pí~íáëíáÅë=aÉé~êíãÉåí=j~ä~óëá~K=
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OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The self-employed (including unpaid family workers) represent some 11% of the total 
workforce. Usually they have low educational attainment and possess minimum skills 
deemed necessary for advancement. More often than not, they are exposed to poten-
tial risks from natural, social and economic hazards, are least protected against these 
hazards compared to employees in the formal sector. They face economic insecurity 
due to unstable income; while at the same time they lack the skills and capital 
needed to diversify into other forms of income generating activities or seek better 
opportunities elsewhere. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
w~â~í=
The zakat is an Islamic welfare institution that collects funds and distributes them to 
a specified list of qualifying recipients. In the modern Malaysian context, it may be 
considered a form of social assistance. Although it operates openly and has a formal 
structure, the means of allocating assistance are more informal, i.e. based on the de-
liberation of zakat councils subject to Quranic guidelines, not strict and consistent 
economic criteria. Zakat collection and distribution is not centralized at the national 
level, but is overseen by 14 Islamic Councils – one in each state, and the Federal 
Territories. Beneficiaries may qualify under one of eight categories.14 The regulations 
are also decentralized to the state level. Zakat councils comprise elected politicians, 
religious officials, academics, businessmen, and other prominent individuals. Nation-
wide zakat collection amounted to RM203 million in 1997, RM198 million in 1998, 
and RM195 million in 1999. We are unable to ascertain the specific direction of these 
funds; their disbursement is decentralized, to a vast array of benefits. As a whole, 
however, approximately RM150–200 million is distributed through zakat channels 
(Zakat Report, 1999–2000, p. 102–103). The destitute and poor are known to com-
prise a large portion of zakat recipients, although in recent years more priority has 
been given to fund transfers for upholding the Islamic faith. 
This system reaches out to needy persons, but faces limitations in scope and size. In 
scope, the eligibility of recipients is based on scriptural criteria as decreed in the 
Quran, not necessarily on economic need, such as measured by household income. 
In addition, this form of social assistance is only applied to Muslims. Accumulation 
of funds flows through one channel: zakat collection by relevant establishments. It 
operates more as a transfer payment system than an investment mechanism. 
Similarly, Zakat functions more as a poverty assistance programme, although it also 
serves as a means of social assistance. Its efficacy as the latter will depend on the 
speed at which it identifies the needy and extends aid to them. A difficulty with ad-
ministering zakat as a social assistance mechanism is the reference to static criteria 
and lack of dynamic, functional evaluation. For instance, a sustainable social assis-
                             
14 Zakat may be granted to the destitute, poor, zakat collectors, new converts and travellers, and for 
payment of debts, freeing of slaves and upholding the religion. 
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tance programme will arguably function more effectively if employment status or 
insurance availability are added to income level as a means of adjudging need. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The self-employed may make voluntary contribution to the EPF. However, this stipu-
lation is neither carried out assiduously by the self-employed nor is it enforced by 
the relevant authorities. Officials of the EPF often cite inadequate staff as a reason 
for not being able to attend to this matter fully. Unless they are compelled by the law 
to make social security contributions, the self-employed may regard voluntary EPF 
contribution as something insignificant. 
OKP= i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
áK= `êÉ~íáåÖ=gçÄ=lééçêíìåáíáÉë=
Having a job and earning a sufficient income can be a self-sustaining and preventive 
step of social protection. However, policies that purposely provide or stimulate em-
ployment are difficult to distinguish from general development or poverty reduction 
policies. Since lower-income or lower-skill workers, or those with little collateral, 
typically face lower job security and capacity to obtain loans, we may link active 
labour market policies with efforts to simulate smaller scale enterprise or provide 
micro-credit. 
In this regard, programmes are limited. The Small and Medium Industries Develop-
ment Corporation (SMIDEC) aims to promote investment, efficiency and technologi-
cal progress in the sector. Workers in SMIs have less recourse to trade unions to 
bargain for their concerns, due to the small size of their firm and the near impossibility 
of setting up industry-wide unions. This amplifies the need for skill development and 
technological competence. The Human Resource Development Council, discussed 
below, sets aside a certain portion of its funds for skills acquisition and training in 
SMIs. However, responses have been lukewarm. The Malaysian government has 
provided a wide range of financial assistance that caters for the varied needs of the 
SMIs, but the SMIs still lament that access to these various assistance programmes 
is difficult (Ragayah, 2000). 
Poverty alleviation programmes have perhaps elicited a relatively wider reception. 
While the government was the main force in eradicating poverty, some NGOs played 
quite a significant role in cutting poverty incidence. Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) 
is the most well-known NGO involved in reducing hardcore poverty incidence by 
providing interest-free micro loans to the poor to undertake income-generating ac-
tivities under close supervision. Similar to the Grameen Bank case, most of the AIM’s 
beneficiaries are women. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991–1995), the govern-
ment provided RM20 million loan to AIM, while AIM provided interest-free loans 
worth RM77.1 million to about 36,200 poor and hardcore-poor households to enable 
them to venture into poultry and livestock rearing and small-scale businesses such as 
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retailing of groceries, and the servicing and repairing of vehicles. Most of these ven-
tures were successful, as reflected in the increased household income of the partici-
pants and the loan repayment rate of almost 100%. During the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan period (1996–2000), AIM provided micro-credit financing to 22,800 poor fami-
lies from the RM300 million interest-free loan allocated by the government. In times 
of greater need, funds can also be injected through AIM for speedier seeding of 
investments, such as during the 1997–98 crisis, in which the government allocated 
RM100 million to AIM under the hardcore poverty programme (Jomo and Lee 2000, 
p. 248). We should note that these job-creating programmes apply to the formal sector 
only. 
Another NGO is the state-based Yayasan Basmi Kemiskinan (YBK),15 which also 
complemented the government’s efforts to eliminate hardcore poverty with the sup-
port of private companies. YBK programmes focused on skills training with guaran-
teed employment, educational assistance and better housing. The private sector pro-
vided support to NGO programmes through skills training as well as in-kind and 
financial contributions to the poor. Among these NGOs are YBK Selangor, Yayasan 
Kemiskinan Kelantan and Yayasan Membasmi Kemiskinan Kedah. 
ááK= qê~áåáåÖ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
E~F= eìã~å=oÉëçìêÅÉ=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=cìåÇ=EeoacF=
The HRDF was established in 1992, under the Human Resources Ministry, to be an 
agent for training and retraining of workers in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
The main objective, similar to job creation policies, is preventive: to avoid redun-
dancy or skill deficiency of workers that may stifle their employability or wage-
earning capacity. More positively, training and retraining also enhances technologi-
cal progress and productivity. Employers of a particular size are required to partici-
pate, and begin so by registering with the Human Resource Development Council 
(HRDC) and paying one percent of their wage bill as a levy. The government matches 
employer contributions of smaller companies. Registered employers are entitled to 
apply for training assistance, drawing from the balance in their levy accounts. The 
HRDC co-ordinates various training schemes, it links companies with training agen-
cies, and provides financial assistance from its pool of resources. Most HRDC spon-
sored training programmes are conducted by the private sector. Participation in the 
HRDC has witnessed substantial growth in recent years, as shown in Table 14 be-
low. As a proportion of total workers employed in the manufacturing and service 
sectors, participation is estimated at 7.2% in 1998 and 4.3% in 1999. 
The opportunity for this training, of course, is restricted to participating firms, which 
tend to be already technologically equipped. The distribution of training opportunities, 
however, is concentrated in certain sectors and regions. Sectorally, the electronics 
and electrical sector constitutes the largest membership and, accordingly, receives 
the biggest share of training places and finances. Combined with the telecommuni-
                             
15 Which can be translated as Poverty Eradication Foundation. 
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cations sector, the two account for 40% of places and 48% of financial support in 
1999. In line with the priority given to high-tech industries, the number of workers 
trained, as well as financial allocation, is heavily skewed toward Johor, the Federal 
Territory, and especially Penang and Selangor. 
q~ÄäÉ=NQW= eoacI=m~êíáÅáé~íáçå=~åÇ=cáå~åÅÉI=NVVQÓNVVV=
= oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=ÉãéäçóÉêë=
vÉ~ê= j~åìÑ~ÅíìêáåÖ= pÉêîáÅÉë=
iÉîó=ÅçääÉÅíÉÇ=
Eoj=ãáääáçåF=
cáå~åÅá~ä=~ëëáëJ
í~åÅÉ=Eoj=ãáääáçåF=
NVVQ= PISSV= Ô= TPKS= QTKU=
NVVR= PIVSS= TTU= NMMKV= UVKS=
NVVS= QIPVP= NIMOT= NOSKU= NRUKV=
NVVT= QITMO= NINUN= NQQKR= NRVKR=
NVVU= QIUMP= NIPOP= SPKO= NQNKP=
NVVV= QIVQU= NIQMQ= UOKT= NMSKN=
pçìêÅÉW= eìã~å=oÉëçìêÅÉë=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=`çìåÅáäI=jáåáëíêó=çÑ=eìã~å=oÉëçìêÅÉëK=
Within Penang, the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) is a more localized 
body that conducts training. Industry-government participation and collaboration has 
been encouraging, raising the international profile of the PSDC. In the wider con-
text, however, the Centre is very much focused on the core industries of the state – 
again, electronics and electrical manufacturing. 
EÄF= qê~áåáåÖ=çÑ=oÉíêÉåÅÜÉÇ=tçêâÉêë=
As mentioned above, the training conducted by the HRDF is primarily for skills 
upgrading and retraining. That is, the workers involved are sent by their employer, 
and return to their place of work. Training for the unemployed or retrenched was not 
specifically organized until mid-1998, after the financial crisis struck. The training 
scheme for retrenched workers is now instituted, with a government allocation of 
RM117 million. In 1998 and 1999, respectively, the number of retrenched workers 
that were retrained amounted to 572 and 426, involving financial assistance of RM2.5 
million and RM2.0 million (Jomo and Lee, 2001, p. 253). In 1999, out of the 426, 275 
(64.5%) attended courses at the diploma level while 151 (35.5%) attended courses at 
the certificate level. As for the skills upgrading and retraining, 76 (17.9%) received 
training in computer / information technology, 166 (38.9%) in technical / engineering 
disciplines, and 184 (43.2%) in management. 
The number of training places and financial assistance that accrues to retrenched 
workers is almost negligible relative to the total. In 1998, 405,300 places were avail-
able with financial assistance of RM113.6 million; in 1999, the corresponding figures 
were 246,725 and RM97 million. On average, over the incipient two years (1998–
99) of this training of retrenched workers scheme, 0.15% of total training places and 
2.2% of total financial assistance benefited this particular group. 
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áááK= gçÄJéä~ÅÉãÉåí=
The Manpower Department within the Ministry of Human Resources offers job-
seeking services. Unemployed persons and employers may register with the man-
power department, which then attempts to match the two so that workers find new 
jobs. The department acts as an intermediary. As shown in Table 15 below, between 
35% to 40% of officially unemployed workers register with the department. Within 
this group, about 20% have been placed in new jobs from 1998 to 2000. 
q~ÄäÉ=NRW= oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=råÉãéäçóÉÇI=s~Å~åÅáÉëI=~åÇ=mä~ÅÉãÉåíëI=NVVUÓOMMM=
= kÉï=êÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=ìåÉãéäçóÉÇ= mä~ÅÉãÉåíë=
=
kìãÄÉê=
B=çÑ=íçí~ä=
ìåÉãéäçóÉÇ=
oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=
î~Å~åÅáÉë= kìãÄÉê=
B=çÑ=êÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=
ìåÉãéäçóÉÇ=
NVVU= NNQINVM= PRKV= SVIMVN= OMIUSQ= NUKP=
NVVV= NOOIVOM= PUKT= NMUIPNU= OPIMVR= NUKU=
OMMM= NNOIUPR= PRKR= NOPIQUQ= OQITPU= ONKV=
pçìêÅÉëW=jáåáëíêó=çÑ=eìã~å=oÉëçìêÅÉëI=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êëK=j~åéçïÉê=aÉé~êíãÉåí=oÉéçêíK=
Registration and placement programmes have been divided into a few categories – 
which are relatively new initiatives. First, for retrenched workers, this scheme was 
launched in January 1998. Retrenched workers numbered 74,899 in 1998, 35,457 in 
1999 and 22,785 in 2000. Those that the programme managed to place in new jobs 
numbered 12,062, 7,548 and 4,917 respectively for a success rate of 16.1%, 21.3% 
and 21.6%. Second, the registration and placement programme for under-employed 
rural sector workers was started in May 1997, primarily to increase the incomes of 
housewives and rubber tappers, who would be placed in factories. Until the end of 
1998, 5,485 vacancies were reported, but very few candidates were placed in new 
jobs. Third, the parallel programme for rural youth was initiated in October 1997, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and with the collaboration of 
youth associations and government agencies. Throughout 1998, this programme 
managed to register 1,282 youths and place 511 of them in factory jobs. 
Recently, there has been an increasing use of electronic labour exchange like Job 
Street, Job Link and Hotspot to match demand with supply. The jobseekers serviced 
through these agencies are mainly in the professional category. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
Basic education is provided broadly in Malaysia. The country registered a high liter-
acy rate of 87% in 2000. This flat rate, of course, does not portray the shape of the 
distribution of education. Educational attainment statistics of employed and unem-
ployed give significant insight into the status of education in the Malaysian labour 
force. The vast majority of the employed Malaysian workforce has at least primary 
level education, and more than half have completed secondary schooling, though the 
percentages are higher among males and those located in the urban areas (Table 16). 
Those with primary level of education form the next biggest group among employed 
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Malaysians, but the situation is the reverse among foreign workers. The proportion 
with tertiary education, however, is still low, especially in rural areas. 
q~ÄäÉ=NSW= iÉîÉä=çÑ=bÇìÅ~íáçå=çÑ=bãéäçóÉÇ=mÉêëçåëI=s~êáçìë=`~íÉÖçêáÉëI=NVVV=EBF=
iÉîÉä=çÑ=ÉÇìÅ~íáçå= lîÉê~ää= j~äÉ= cÉã~äÉ= rêÄ~å= oìê~ä= j~ä~óëá~å= cçêÉáÖå=
kç=Ñçêã~ä=ÉÇìÅ~íáçå= SKS= RKO= VKQ= PKP= NMKS= RKS= NPKO=
mêáã~êó= OSKQ= OUKO= OPKM= NVKQ= PQKU= OOKU= RMKS=
pÉÅçåÇ~êó= RPKU= RQKT= ROKM= RVKS= QSKU= RTKU= OTKT=
qÉêíá~êó= NPKO= NNKV= NRKS= NTKT= TKU= NPKU= UKR=
=qçí~ä= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~=OMMMK=i~Äçìê=cçêÅÉ=pìêîÉó=oÉéçêí=NVVVI=aÉé~êíãÉåí=çÑ=pí~íáëíáÅëK=
Among the unemployed persons, those with secondary level of education again form 
the majority followed by those with primary level of education, with the percentages 
being higher among the males and those located in the rural areas (Table 17). The 
situation is reversed among those with tertiary level of education, with more females 
and urban dwellers being unemployed relative to the other groups. Up to 22% of un-
employed women have tertiary level education, which is not unexpected since there 
are more females registered in Malaysian tertiary institutions than males. Currently, 
there is rising concern for the unemployed graduates who are finding it increasingly 
difficult to find a job. Some of the ways in which the government is tackling this 
problem is by encouraging them to further their studies to post-graduate levels, to 
take courses to enhance their skills or improve their language communications (es-
pecially English), or find an attachment in institutions of higher learning as part of 
their training. 
q~ÄäÉ=NTW= iÉîÉä=çÑ=bÇìÅ~íáçå=çÑ=råÉãéäçóÉÇ=mÉêëçåëI=s~êáçìë=`~íÉÖçêáÉëI= =
NVVV=EBF=
iÉîÉä=çÑ=ÉÇìÅ~íáçå= lîÉê~ää= j~äÉ= cÉã~äÉ= rêÄ~å= oìê~ä=
kç=Ñçêã~ä=ÉÇìÅ~íáçå= OKQ= OKP= OKS= OKM= PKM=
mêáã~êó= NRKO= NTKU= VKU= NQKT= NRKU=
pÉÅçåÇ~êó= SUKQ= SVKS= SRKU= SSKP= TMKU=
qÉêíá~êó= NQKM= NMKP= ONKT= NTKM= NMKR=
=qçí~ä= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM=
pçìêÅÉW= i~Äçìê=cçêÅÉ=pìêîÉó=oÉéçêí=NVVVI=aÉé~êíãÉåí=çÑ=pí~íáëíáÅëK=
An ongoing, pressing issue is whether the education system meets the needs of the 
labour market. Needs are twofold: first, in equipping the workforce with specific 
skills, particularly in dynamic sectors; second, in cultivating generic analytical and 
critical capacities to enable workers to be more flexible and adaptable to changing 
market conditions. There are shortcomings in this respect. For the first, we note that 
with 500 scientists and engineers per million of the population, Malaysia lags behind 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
150 
other newly industrializing countries.16 In general, only 25% of 20–24 year-olds re-
ceive tertiary education. Qualitatively, it has been widely acknowledged that graduates 
from Malaysian education institutions lack the critical and creative thinking skills 
required in a modern, dynamic economy. 
Existing measures of passive labour market policy include: 
áK= oÉíêÉåÅÜãÉåí=`çãéÉåë~íáçå=
Retrenchment practice and compensation is regulated by the Employment Act, 1955. 
The employee is to be compensated by the employer in accordance with length of 
service, under the Employment (Termination and Lay-off Benefits) Regulations, 1980: 
• Less than one year: no benefit; 
• Between one and two years: 10 days wages per year of service; 
• Between two and five years: 15 days wages per year of service; 
• More than five years: 20 days wages per year of service. 
Assistance to retrenched workers has not been made a priority in the past, and con-
tinues to be subordinated to other interests, ostensibly under human resource devel-
opment. Nonetheless, the government made it mandatory for all employers to report 
retrenchments to the Minister of Human Resources, beginning in February 1998. 
The first step to assisting retrenched workers is to monitor market dynamics and 
record job losses. 
The number of retrenchments reported to the Ministry of Human Resources increased 
from 7,773 in 1996 to 18,863 in 1997, then leapt to 83,865 in 1998, before falling to 
37,357 in 1999. The drastic rise in 1998 was a direct consequence of the economic 
downturn, bolstered by the new law making it mandatory for employers to report 
retrenchments. 
ááK= k~íáçå~ä=oÉíêÉåÅÜãÉåí=~åÇ=råÉãéäçóãÉåí=cìåÇ=
This fund has been proposed by the Malaysian Trades Union Congress in 1997, to 
provide benefits to retrenched workers who are not entitled to receive them, and to 
provide unemployed workers allowances until they get a new job. This proposal has 
been publicized, but no decision has been made yet. Employers and workers will 
each make statutory contributions of RM1 per month towards the scheme. The con-
tributions will grow at the rate of RM2 per worker per month, so that contributions 
from the existing 5 million SOCSO members will amount to RM10 million per month, 
and RM120 million per year. The quantum of monthly benefit should be based on 
stipulations of the Employment (Termination and Lay-off Benefits) Regulations, 1980, 
or according to the terms and conditions of their collective agreements (Rajasekaran, 
2001, p. 6). The MTUC recommended that this fund be administered by SOCSO, 
since it is an established body with an existing network. 
                             
16 The corresponding figures for other countries are 2,728 for Singapore, 2,636 for South Korea, and 350 
for China (OPP3, p. 126). 
Social Protection in Malaysia 
151 
áááK= jáåáãìã=t~ÖÉ=
Wage regulation is confined to four categories of workers: catering and hotel work-
ers, shop assistants, cinema workers, and stevedores and cargo handlers in Penang. 
Minimum wage provision is effectively non-existent. The MTUC has proposed a 
minimum wage of RM900, based on a basket of basic needs (Rajasekaran 2001: 6–
7). Productivity-based wage setting schemes may apply in excess of this wage, but 
the wage received remains above this level. Other groups, especially the Malaysian 
Employers’ Federation, have protested against this minimum wage proposal – and 
against minimum wage in principle. A key aspect of the debate is whether Malay-
sia’s transition to higher technology and higher value-added industries – which is 
inevitable given the economy’s waning comparative advantage in offering cheap 
labour – prepares the way for the introduction of a minimum wage. Productivity 
gains are expected to raise wages, potentially above the minimal level. 
áîK= sìäåÉê~ÄäÉ=dêçìéë=çÑ=tçêâÉêë=
E~F= cçêÉáÖå=i~Äçìê=
Foreign labour warrants a special mention in this section, for migration into Malay-
sia’s labour market has resulted from an under-regulated labour programme. The 
first issue to note about foreign labour in Malaysia is that many are unregistered. 
Thus, they are situated outside the boundaries of formal social protection. More are 
participating in the Workers’ Compensation Scheme, and as noted earlier, in 1998 
this institution was specialized in the Foreign Workers’ Compensation Scheme. EPF 
coverage was extended to foreign workers in 1998. Out of 728,000 new registrants 
with the EPF in 1998, 369,000 were foreign workers (Lee, 2001, p. 31–32). Addition-
ally, since 1998, it is mandatory for foreign workers paid below RM2,000 per month 
to contribute to SOCSO. Administering social protection to foreign workers requires 
striking a delicate balance between providing adequate protection while maintaining 
domestic priorities. The large number of unregistered / illegal foreign workers raises 
concerns about their social protection. On the other hand, large amounts of survi-
vors’ pension payments flowing out of the country also cause leakages in the sys-
tem. 
EÄF= `çåíê~Åí=i~Äçìê=
The situation of contract workers is pertinent to this survey, for they have been 
found to be under-provided with social insurance – although they are entitled to the 
same benefits, since the Constitution does not distinguish between contract and 
direct workers. Contract workers are favoured for various reasons, according to a 
wide-ranging survey by Lee and Sivananthiran (Lee and Sivananthiran 1996) of 44 
contractors employing a total of 1,275 workers in the construction and plantation 
sectors. Domestic contract workers are hired to overcome shortages in workers in 
general, as well as due to the ease of management. Foreign contract workers are often 
sought after because of the high turnover of domestic workers, lower wages de-
manded by foreign contract workers and their willingness to work long hours. In the 
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construction sector, in particular, there is a high prevalence of contract workers 
(71% of total construction workers in 1990). 
A large section of the contract labour category, we may note, comprises foreign work-
ers. Where domestic contract labourers are treated poorly, foreign contract labourers 
are treated worse. Lee and Sivananthan (Lee and Sivananthan 1996, pp. 80–82) 
found that domestic contract workers receive less provision of social protection – 
contributions to SOCSO and EPF, in particular – and are therefore more vulnerable 
to be uncovered in the event of injury, disease or death. In case of job loss, they will 
have fewer avenues for assistance, since most contracts are mere verbal agreements. 
îK= eÉ~äíÜ=~åÇ=p~ÑÉíó=
The rise in claims from SOCSO has raised concern toward the prevention of indus-
trial accidents. Towards this end, health and safety checks by department officials, 
and courses on work hygiene and safety are conducted. Incidents of industrial acci-
dents have followed a declining trend, though they still fluctuate, from 106,508 (1996) 
to 85,338 (1998) to 73,400 (2000). The number of death cases settled went from 1,020 
(1996) to 1,273 (1998) to 911 (2000). Reported commuting accidents, however, 
increased from 14,771 (1996) to 16,759 (1998) to 19,276 (2000). 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
áK= oÉíáêÉãÉåí=~åÇ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The civil service pension covers all government employees. Although the amounts 
for the lowest income groups are sometimes claimed to be inadequate, the govern-
ment does make periodic adjustments to the amount of the pension. On the other 
hand, the EPF covers workers in the private sector, mainly the formal sector. How-
ever, for a large majority the amount saved is not adequate especially when they 
make lump sum withdrawals. The self-employed become members only on a volun-
tary basis; not surprisingly, most have yet to become members. These people would 
have no personal resources to support themselves unless they save in any of the unit 
trusts or savings schemes. While SOCSO covers all workers who earn below RM2,000 
a month, it is restricted only to employees. Membership in many of the auxiliary 
schemes is optional and confined to a particular interest. Public health policy has 
focused on the provision of health facilities and subsidization of medical costs. 
Withdrawals for medical expenses are permitted from EPF members’ Account 3. 
However, this source will be slim for many members, and in any case, this takes 
away from old-age savings. All these findings imply that social protection coverage 
in Malaysia is sporadic and not universal. 
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ááK= i~Äçìê=mçäáÅó=
As noted in Section 2.3, training and retraining schemes, especially of lesser skilled 
labour, are quite limited in their scope. The majority of unemployed workers does 
not register with the Manpower department, and do not have access to the job bro-
kerage services that the department offers. The Manpower Department’s 49 network 
offices nationwide are inadequate to thoroughly conduct registration of the unem-
ployed and facilitate their re-employment. It is good that the Human Resource De-
velopment Council maintained a large amount of financial assistance for training 
and re-training programmes in 1998, in spite of the economic downfall and the 
shortfall of levy collection (firms were exempted from paying the levy on a volun-
tary basis). However, the allocation to retrenched workers was a mere 2.5 million, or 
1.8% of total financial assistance. 
SMIs, in particular, are quite reluctant to send their workers for training due to a 
number of reasons. The main obstacle in providing training to the workers is the threat 
of losing them to their competitors. Firms have no incentive to train their workers if 
the returns to the investment could not be recouped. In tight labour markets labour 
turnover is high. If this is the case, firms consider investment in training as wasteful. 
Moreover, sending workers for training also interrupts their production schedule, 
which they cannot afford to upset. Finally, there are employers who felt that the courses 
were too general and not necessary or relevant for their employees (Ragayah 2000). 
PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=~åÇ=cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
áK= `áîáä=pÉêîáÅÉ=mÉåëáçå=
The civil service pension fund is a non-contributory fund and is fully funded through 
taxation and other government revenue. Thus, it is crucial for the government to 
check the impending increases in this type of benefit. Perhaps it is time that the 
government reverts back to the proposal made in 1987, whereby all new recruits into 
the civil service would have to contribute to the Employees’ Provident Fund instead 
of being absorbed into the civil service pension scheme. 
ááK= bmc=
Currently, contributions and returns from investments exceed withdrawals and ex-
penditure. However, bearing in mind that the EPF is a savings fund for old age, in 
reality only 60% of each member’s savings are reserved for withdrawal at age 55 
years. Thus, savings of lower income groups in particular might not be adequate for 
old age, since withdrawals for other purposes are available. For example, the with-
drawal scheme for purchase of computers has been abused; whereby with the col-
laboration of computer vendors (who are appointed by the EPF) withdrawals of up 
to RM5,000 are used for other purposes instead. Such unscrupulous practices need 
to be checked by the authorities. 
There is also concern regarding the dividend paid, which at 6% for year 2000 is the 
lowest in 27 years, particularly when compared to the others, such as the Pilgrims’ 
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Fund, the Armed Forces Fund and ASN, as shown in Table 18. The declaration of 
5% for 2001 raised even more concern regarding the prudence and profitability of 
the EPF portfolio. As in all financial portfolios, there is a trade-off between volatility 
and rate of return. The EPF has in its history channelled most of its funds into gov-
ernment bonds, which are theoretically valued for security more than profitability. 
Through the 1990s, other financial instruments were added to the EPF portfolio, es-
pecially shares of publicly listed companies that constitute about 20% of total EPF 
investment. The declining performance of dividends in the 1990s, in spite of the stock 
market boom until 1997, has therefore raised serious doubts on the motives behind 
EPF share acquisition: whether to maximize returns or support government-favoured 
projects. The extremely low 2000 and 2001 returns are widely perceived to be due to 
corporate ‘bail-outs’. For future sustainability and recovery of trust, the EPF must 
demonstrate more transparency and accountability. There is also concern that many 
employers failed to remit contributions on behalf of thousands of workers. It is 
claimed that the EPF’s failure to act quickly and decisively has led to huge losses 
(Rajasekaran 2001). 
q~ÄäÉ=NUW= o~íÉ=çÑ=aáîáÇÉåÇ=aÉÅä~êÉÇ=Äó=bmc=~åÇ=líÜÉê=qêìëí=cìåÇë=
vÉ~ê= bmc= máäÖêáãëÛ=cìåÇ= ^êãÉÇ=cçêÅÉë= ^pk=
NVVN= UKMM= UKMM= NMKMM= SKOR=
NVVO= UKMM= UKMM= NNKMM= UKOR=
NVVP= UKMM= VKMM= NOKMM= NOKRM=
NVVQ= UKMM= VKRM= NPKMM= NQKMM=
NVVR= TKRM= VKRM= NPKMM= NPKMM=
NVVS= TKTM= VKRM= NPKOR= NPKTR=
NVVT= SKTM= VKRM= NNKRM= NMKRM=
NVVU= SKTM= UKMM= NMKRM= SKRM=
NVVV= SKUQ= UKMM= NOKMM= UKOR=
OMMM= SKMM= RKRM= NMKMM= UKMM=
pçìêÅÉW= o~à~ëÉâ~ê~å=EOMMNFK=
áááK= pl`pl=
Currently it is evident that income exceeds expenditure, being RM1.679 billion com-
pared to RM585,773,504 in 1999 (SOCSO Annual Report 1999). However, if present 
trends were to continue in the future, it may be a burden to the organization. Abuse 
of medical claims by doctors must be discontinued. Accidents at the workplace must 
be minimized. Towards this end the government has implemented the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 1994. Regular training courses on occupational safety and 
prevention of accidents at the workplace are provided by the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health. Like the EPF, its returns on investment are also 
relatively low compared to other funds, being 7.7% in 1998 and 6.2% in 1999. 
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áîK= líÜÉê=mêçÖê~ããÉë=
The government had expected the private sector firms to increase their involvement 
in poverty eradication by collaborating with various state-based YBK in conducting 
skill training and providing financial contributions to the poor. However, given the 
financial problems faced by these corporations since the financial crisis, their ability 
in contributing to this programme would be severely curtailed, if not ceased alto-
gether. The Retrenched Workers and Unemployed Training Scheme depends on gov-
ernment allocations. The government’s RM117 commitment is substantial, though it 
should be topped up regularly – although the first priority is to ensure that the funds 
get disbursed and expended. 
PKP= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
Labour laws in Malaysia do not discriminate according to gender. In practice, how-
ever, male-female wage differentials are known to exist. This phenomenon impacts 
on the earnings of women, which in turn affects their savings and capacity to allo-
cate towards social protection. Inequities also surface in terms of the added burdens 
faced by women, which may make a case for more ‘female-friendly’ labour and social 
policies. Female-headed households number an estimated 630,500, or 16.6% of all 
households. Besides the requirements of paid work, they usually have to bear re-
sponsibilities at home with little help. Another point to note is the apparent gender 
bias in retrenchment. Although women constitute two-fifths of the industrial work-
force, they absorb almost half of all retrenchments. In addition, 64.5% or about three-
fifths of women retrenched were working in the manufacturing sector, where weak 
unionization and labour abundance make them more vulnerable to coercion and 
manipulation (Jomo and Lee, 2000, p. 233–234). 
PKQ= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
Government pension has constituted an average of 7–8% of the federal budget. 
Demographic trends appear to favour the sustenance of pension payments, since the 
body of tax payers will be growing in the years ahead. The dependency ratio is pro-
jected to fall from 59.1% in 2000 to 55.3% in 2005 and 52.2% in 2010. 
Labour market policies have fallen under the purview of the Ministry of Human Re-
sources. This ministry has shown its inadequacy in dealing with the adversity of 
economic downturn, particularly in helping the unemployed find jobs and in retrain-
ing retrenched workers. A strong case can be made for the resources of such pro-
grammes, in view of their current slim figures: the Manpower Department’s operating 
budget amounted to RM43.1 million in 1999 and RM66.9 million in 2000 (actual ex-
penditure fell just short of it). The development budget leapt from RM216.7 million 
in 1999 to RM630.6 million in 2000, an indication of the importance attached to la-
bour in the development plan. Increasing the operating funds of this department, 
however, will be vital to the long-term expansion of its services. 
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Many labour market schemes involve private sector financial contributions, and 
some already have an infrastructure in place that needs to be expanded and consoli-
dated. The pooled financing from employers earnings to HRDC programmes helps 
regulate the inflow of contributions and outflow of payments. Training and skills de-
velopment schemes cater mostly to the employed. In the context of social protection, 
the access of retrenched and unemployed persons to such programmes is severely 
limited. The registration and placement of unemployed persons also only involves a 
minority of workers who may benefit from this programme. This will involve public 
expenditure in expanding and improving information and service networks. 
PKR= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
Because the programmes are targeted at workers who are found mainly in the urban 
areas, while the informal sector, which is not covered, is located mainly in the rural 
areas, there is a tendency for these benefits to be urban biased. Moreover, urban 
dwellers are also more aware of the programmes and know how to benefit from them. 
PKS= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
These attributes are typically lacking in public institutions in Malaysia. For example, 
Rajasekaran (Rajasekaran, 2001) wrote that apart from stating a loss of RM749.68 
million, there was no further detail to explain the loss in the EPF. He quoted A. 
Kadir Jasin who wrote in the New Straits Times, 4 March 2001, “EPF must be made 
accountable for the losses, more so when it was reported that as much as RM1 bil-
lion was from a single banking and finance group. They are believed to be RHB, RHB 
Capital and RHB Sakura. The sole purpose of the RM1 billion irredeemable non-
cumulative convertible preference shares was for the rescue of SIME Bank which 
RHB carried out at the request of Bank Negara Malaysia.” Rajasekaran also wrote 
that EPF was reported to have taken up 78.7 million shares from the Time dotCom 
initial public offer (IPO) and overnight incurred a whopping loss since only 25% of 
Time dotCom IPO was subscribed. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ããÉë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The scope for innovative programmes and alternative social protection schemes ap-
pears narrow. Malaysia’s development thrust toward the future places responsibility 
for social protection on family ties and traditional means. Malaysia adopts a residual 
welfare approach. The role of the family in terms of welfare and social security is 
greatly emphasized by the state. Hence, there has been a slow progression towards 
implementing formal comprehensive income maintenance and social protection pro-
grammes particularly geared to fulfilling the needs of the lower income groups. 
In his paper, Malaysia: The Way Forward (1991), the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad, said that the Malaysian objective is to be a developed nation in 
its own mould by 2020. Malaysia should then be a united nation, with a confident 
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Malaysian society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in a society 
that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, pro-
gressive and prosperous, and in full possession of the economy that is competitive, 
dynamic, robust, and resilient. The roles of the public sector in this society are al-
luded to in the seventh and eighth challenge stated in this document: the challenge of 
establishing a fully caring society and a caring culture, a social system in which society 
will come before self, in which the welfare of the people will revolve not around the 
state or the individual but around a strong family system; and the challenge of ensur-
ing an economically just society, in which there is a fair and equitable distribution of 
wealth of the nation, in which there is full partnership in economic progress. 
A crucial aspect in designing a social protection system for Malaysia is to ensure that 
the system is sustainable and financially viable. The main idea here is not to burden 
the government financially, since many industrialized countries engaged in redis-
tributive programmes / transfer payments, which require public budgets amounting to 
40–50% of their GDP (Ragayah, 1997). As a consequence, the public sector in de-
veloped countries faced pressures as reflected in the rapidly growing rates of public 
expenditures, persistent budget deficits and debts, high unemployment, and taxpayer 
resistance. In order to avoid this quagmire, the approach to social protection is through 
employment creation and increasing productivity while transfers should only be for 
those who cannot enter the job market. 
While social protection should not burden the state or the individual, some kind of 
system must be in place to ensure a caring society but the state is not to be fully 
responsible for the social security provisions. The people must be more conscious of 
the necessity to care for their own welfare. Towards this end, the following sugges-
tion may be considered. 
áK= dì~ê~åíÉÉÇ=jáåáãìã=pçÅá~ä=fåÅçãÉ=cìåÇ=
One specific option that policymakers could consider is the establishment of a scheme 
specifically for the low-income groups, the self-employed, and workers in the in-
formal sector. This scheme could be named the guaranteed minimum social income 
fund. This scheme should be run by a new institution, thus leaving EPF and SOCSO 
to cater for workers in the formal sectors only. 
This fund should serve as a long-term solution for the establishment of a basic social 
security and pension for the general population. Anyone could take part in the 
scheme, including the self-employed and those employed in the informal sector, 
both in the rural and urban areas, homemakers and students. A minimum age limit of 
16 years is recommended for anyone who wishes to join the scheme. Members of 
this scheme pay a flat-rate basic contribution. As a non-income related scheme the 
aim is to provide for a basic income guarantee in old age, sickness and unemploy-
ment. Hence, this fund should be extended to cover health care, sickness and inva-
lidity. A social security card should be issued to every member, and this card could 
also be used for access to public health care facilities. 
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A defined-contribution and a defined-benefit scheme are recommended but changes 
in the levels of contribution and benefits are possible from time to time. However, 
based on the experiences of other countries it should be noted that this scheme may 
take at least 20 years to fully mature from the time of its initiation. In the long run, 
this scheme should be made mandatory for all adult citizens. 
The crucial question that would concern policymakers would be: what could be the 
sources of funding for the scheme, apart from flat-rate contributions from members? 
In order to avoid the pitfalls which some developed countries have fallen into, it is 
suggested that the government should contribute only on behalf of those who really 
cannot afford to pay, that is the targeted 0.5 % poor in 2005 (Malaysia, 2001a). 
This scheme is not supposed to be managed fully by the market or the private sector. 
Rather it is recommended that a public-private smart partnership should be set up in 
the provision of social protection for the population. There is a need for a dominant 
control by the state in this scheme. Thus, the government should have at least 60% 
control of the scheme. 
Additionally funding for the fund could be generated through the 40% joint owner-
ship by the private sector. Perhaps in this instance Bank Rakyat, which is a coopera-
tive bank and has shown remarkable rates of returns for investors in the last few 
years (despite the economic crisis of 1997–98), could play a prominent role. As it 
stands, Bank Rakyat does play a major role in providing assistance in the form of 
saving accounts and in kind to the needy. However, this form of assistance serves 
only on an ad hoc basis and does not cover a large section of the poor or lower in-
come population. Thus, there is scope for them to strengthen their social commit-
ment by forming a smart-partnership with the government. 
ááK= ^ÇÇáíáçå~ä=pÅÜÉãÉë=
There is a lot of scope for financial institutions and cooperatives in offering a variety 
of income maintenance plans in the event of loss of income due to old age or retire-
ment or sickness. For example, cooperatives could also act as fund managers for its 
members. Padi farmers, for instance, market their produce through the cooperative. 
They are paid for their products, but a small portion of the income should be re-
tained by the cooperative. Part of this income could be invested in government secu-
rities, and another part of it could be used to purchase group insurance for cases of 
premature death and disability. This plan would be over and above the basic guaran-
teed social income fund proposed above. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
áK= p~ÑÉÖì~êÇ=~åÇ=ãçåáíçê=ÉñáëíáåÖ=áåëíáíìíáçåë=
The EPF should maintain its prime function as an old age-savings institution. Over 
the years, new functions have been added piecemeal, such as house ownership and 
computer procurement. These purchases should be left to private bank loans, to 
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avoid bleeding EPF accounts. Alternatively, as proposed by Lee (2001), withdrawals 
for housing or computer purchases, or children’s education, should be administered 
as a zero-interest loan, so that the EPF member is obliged to replenish his / her ac-
count, but at a much more comfortable rate than any bank can offer. The body also 
has to restore the eroded public confidence in the safety and profitability of its in-
vestments. The EPF ought to display a higher degree of transparency and account-
ability, to demonstrate that the savings of employees are being managed in a trust-
worthy manner. Fund management and expenditures of the SOCSO should also be 
monitored, to ensure it is transparent and efficient. 
ááK= bñíÉåÇ=íÜÉ=ëÅçéÉ=íç=íÜÉ=ëÉäÑJÉãéäçóÉÇ=
Participation of the self-employed in EPF, as repeatedly mentioned above, is op-
tional. Insurance for the self-employed should be encouraged, whether through the 
EPF or private financial institutions. Opportunities for people in this group of occu-
pations to register and contribute to obtain SOCSO coverage have not been avail-
able. Since there is pooling of funds here, enlisting the participation of self-employed 
workers will be less problematic. SOCSO has conducted studies on the feasibility of 
extending coverage to such workers, who comprise an estimated 1.5 million. This is 
a positive step that should be pursued resolutely. 
áááK= fåíÉÖê~íÉ=ÅçãéäÉãÉåí~êó=~åÇ=Åçãé~íáÄäÉ=ëçÅá~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=áåëíáíìíáçåë=
SOCSO and the Workers’ Compensation Fund, for instance, are presently under 
different governmental jurisdictions. Although agglomerating may enlarge bureauc-
racies to the point of inefficiency and wasted resources, it may be useful to integrate 
at least information networks and help centres. 
áîK= båä~êÖÉ=~åÇ=ÉåÜ~åÅÉ=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=éêçÖê~ããÉë=Ñçê=íÜÉ=ìåÉãéäçóÉÇ=~åÇ=
êÉíêÉåÅÜÉÇ=
Facilities for unemployed or retrenched job seekers have much potential to be ex-
panded. The Manpower Department presently has only 49 network centres across 
the nation. By opening more centres and improving services, the number of regis-
trants and beneficiaries can be substantially increased. Importantly, these outlets can 
play a key role in channeling information and intermediating between workers and 
employers. 
The MTUC’s proposal of a National Retrenchment Fund should be seriously taken 
up. This can fill in major lacunae. Other measures should still be followed, in spite 
of limitations. As a preventive step, retrenchment should be discouraged as an early 
means of coping with adversity. Indeed, guidelines provided by the Ministry of Hu-
man Resources stipulate that retrenchment should be used as a last resort, and sug-
gests other avenues for coping with market downturns. These guidelines are useful, 
but there are also risks, for the legal requirement that employers compensate re-
trenched workers may compel employers to coerce workers to accept other terms of 
termination or to resign. Monitoring of payment of retrenchment has slackened 
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when it is most crucial, as in the aftermath of the 1997–98 economic crisis (Jomo 
and Lee, 2001, p. 229). 
îK= oÉëçäîÉ=íÜÉ=ãáåáãìã=ï~ÖÉ=áëëìÉ=
In principle, the minimum wage institution concurs with a social welfare sensitive 
economy and society. An effective and meaningful minimum wage regime will have 
to weigh in a host of factors, especially cost and adjustment. The level may differ 
according to each state, to account for regional differences in living expenses. Im-
plementing a minimum wage is always fraught with varying degrees of dissension 
and dislocation, but the long-term gains may outweigh painful adjustments in the 
short term. The minimum level, of course, has a direct impact on the labour market 
and on the amenability of negotiating parties to the new wage regime. In view of 
Malaysia’s aim to advance to a higher technology and higher value-added produc-
tive economy, setting a minimum wage is timely. It may also yield efficiency out-
comes and encourage skills acquisition, in line with broader policy objectives. 
îáK= píáãìä~íÉ=~ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçìê=ã~êâÉí=éçäáÅáÉë=
In addition to the above, policies must also be in place to ensure continuous em-
ployment in the face of rapid changes in technology. Ragayah and Tham (Ragayah 
and Tham, 2000) argue that flexibility in production demands equally flexible skills 
as they may necessitate workers and managers to make decisions that are not the 
same every day or even every hour. The jobs also may require updating knowledge 
even in the course of a single year. This need is further accentuated by the technol-
ogy revolution that reduces the shelf life of technology and increases the need for new 
skills to match with the new technology that is continuously emerging. Since em-
ployment is one source of helping the socially disadvantaged to participate meaning-
fully in society, retraining becomes essential to enable workers to move into the new 
economy. Alternatively, retraining will help this group to find continued employ-
ment in the old economy. Thus, it is recommended that: 
• Firms should not only contribute to the HRDF but should be encouraged, through 
the provision of tax rebates, to fully utilize the funds that they have contributed 
for the training of workers so that they are equipped to compete with international 
firms. For this purpose, firms need to have a planned systematic training schedule 
that can rotate their workers for training without disrupting the production process; 
• Since the digital divide will cause some workers to be redundant, it is important 
to provide incentives for retraining and the upgrading of skills. Hence, a retraining 
insurance scheme can be set up to fund the acquisition of new skills for workers 
that have been laid off due to obsolescence. The new skills will enable them to 
find new employment. Both employers and workers can make joint contributions 
to these schemes to reduce the burden on the government; 
• For the self-employed poor, the government should contribute the employers’ 
share while the self-employed themselves contribute the workers’ share. The fund 
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can then be used to pay for apprenticeship training and retraining in the event of 
unemployment; 
• At the same time, the government needs to set up training institutions for ‘profes-
sionalizing’ some of the manual jobs in the old economy such as converting gar-
dening into landscaping, or cooking into catering as found in developed countries. 
This is to enable self-employed manual workers to continue to be gainfully em-
ployed in the old economy as they do not fit into the new economy; 
• The restructuring of production to move up the technology ladder will require the 
government to phase out the dependency on unskilled foreign workers. Moreover, 
the shift into the new economy implies that these workers will crowd out jobs or 
employment opportunities for the domestically unskilled and disadvantaged work-
ers. Hence, it is important to ensure that the shrinking employment opportunities 
must be preserved for the domestically unskilled and disadvantaged workers in 
the interest of social cohesion. However, given the current necessity to utilize these 
foreign workers, it is important to establish clear guidelines on their health and 
educational needs. The establishment of health and education insurance or similar 
schemes for financing their needs is recommended. Employers and foreign work-
ers can jointly contribute toward these schemes. 
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^ééÉåÇáñ=
q~ÄäÉ=NW=j~ä~óëá~W=mÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉ=aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=fåíÉêJ=~åÇ=fåíê~Jpí~íÉ=jáÖê~åíë=Äó=
jáÖê~íáçå=aáêÉÅíáçåI=NVVOÓNVVV=
fåíÉêJëí~íÉ=
ãáÖê~íáçå=ÇáêÉÅíáçå= NVVO= NVVP= NVVR= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU= NVVV=
oìê~äJêìê~ä= NRKT= NQKU= NNKS= VKS= NNKU= NOKT= NOKR=
oìê~äJìêÄ~å= NUKQ= OMKS= NTKN= NSKM= NSKU= NRKN= NRKQ=
rêÄ~åJìêÄ~å= QQKO= QQKM= QTKT= RNKP= QTKR= QQKP= QQKP=
rêÄ~åJêìê~ä= ONKT= OMKS= OPKS= OPKN= OPKV= OTKV= OTKU=
qçí~ä= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM=
fåíê~Jëí~íÉ=
ãáÖê~íáçå=ÇáêÉÅíáçå= NVVO= NVVP= NVVR= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU= NVVV=
oìê~äJêìê~ä= PSKU= POKO= PVKM= PSKV= PQKN= PRKR= PMKP=
oìê~äJìêÄ~å= OOKT= OPKV= NVKT= OMKU= NVKO= OMKN= ONKQ=
rêÄ~åJìêÄ~å= ORKT= OPKP= ONKP= ONKS= OPKQ= OPKT= OSKP=
rêÄ~åJêìê~ä= NQKU= OMKS= OMKM= OMKT= OPKP= OMKT= OOKM=
qçí~ä= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~I=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êëK=jáÖê~íáçå=pìêîÉóK=
q~ÄäÉ=OW=j~ä~óëá~W=fåÑä~íáçåI=qçí~ä=~åÇ=pÉäÉÅíÉÇ=`mf=`çãéçåÉåíëI=NVUMÓOMMN=
vÉ~ê= ^ää=Öêçìéë= cççÇ=
jÉÇáÅ~ä=Å~êÉ=~åÇ=
ÜÉ~äíÜ=ëÉêîáÅÉë=
dêçëë=êÉåíI=ÑìÉä=
~åÇ=éçïÉê=
NVUM= SKT= PKS= TKR= VKS=
NVUR= MKQ= ÓOKR= OKR= QKO=
NVVM= PKN= QKO= OKS= MKQ=
NVVN= QKQ= QKU= RKP= PKM=
NVVO= QKT= SKR= PKR= PKS=
NVVP= PKS= OKO= RKN= PKR=
NVVQ= PKT= RKP= PKQ= OKQ=
NVVR= PKQ= QKV= PKN= PKQ=
NVVS= PKR= RKT= PKT= PKO=
NVVT= OKS= PKU= PKQ= PKP=
NVVU= RKO= UKS= RKU= QKP=
NVVV= OKU= QKS= PKN= NKS=
OMMM= NKS= NKV= OKM= NKQ=
OMMNG= NKR= MKS= OKU= NKS=
G= g~åì~êó=íç=^ìÖìëí=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~I=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êëK=bÅçåçãáÅ=oÉéçêíK=
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q~ÄäÉ=PW= mêáåÅáé~ä= pí~íáëíáÅë= çÑ= j~åìÑ~ÅíìêáåÖ= fåÇìëíêáÉë= Äó= qçí~ä= bãéäçóãÉåí=
páòÉ=dêçìéI=j~ä~óëá~W=NVVPI=NVVS=~åÇ=NVVT=
qçí~ä=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ëáòÉ=Öêçìé=EojF= NVVP= NVVS= NVVT=
iÉëë=íÜ~å=RM=ïçêâÉêë=Eëã~ää=áåÇìëíêóF=
Ó= kçK=çÑ=Éëí~ÄäáëÜãÉåíë=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=Öêçëë=çìíéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= `çëí=çÑ=áåéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=~ÇÇÉÇ=Es^F=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= qçí~ä=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=EiF=
Ó= p~ä~êáÉë=~åÇ=ï~ÖÉë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=ÑáñÉÇ=~ëëÉíë=EhF=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= h=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s^=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
=
NUIVPN=EUNKUFG=
NPIOTNIUNP=EUKPF=
RITSOIRMQ=ERKOF=
TIRMVIPNM=ENRKSF=
NURIRNT=ENRKMF=
NIOMOITUS=ENRKMF=
QIOPPITVR=ESKPF=
OOKUOO=
QMKQTU=
=
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NVINNUIMMO=ESKVF=
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NSKTVO=
=
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NPITMMIPUS=ESKPF=
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SPKUVS=
PPKPRS=
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Ó= kçK=çÑ=Éëí~ÄäáëÜãÉåíë=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=Öêçëë=çìíéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= `çëí=çÑ=áåéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=~ÇÇÉÇ=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= qçí~ä=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
Ó= p~ä~êáÉë=~åÇ=ï~ÖÉë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=ÑáñÉÇ=~ëëÉíë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= h=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s^=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
=
OISOP=ENNKPF=
OVINTQIQRR=ENUKOF=
NVITMVISNQ=ENTKSF=
VIQSQIUQN=ENVKSF=
OOUIQOR=ENUKRF=
NISQRIRNR=EOMKQF=
NMISOQIOQO=ENRKTF=
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QNKQPR=
=
OISRS=ENPKNF=
QSITUSIQQR=ENTKMF=
PSISORINMN=ENUKMF=
TIPSPIRUM=ENOKNF=
OOVISMP=ENRKTF=
OIVVUISTP=ENRKRF=
NQIQVVIOOV=ENOKQF=
SPKNQV=
POKMTN=
=
PIQVR=ENRKOF=
QTIRNOIQNN=ENSKMF=
PTIMUTIQQQ=ENTKMF=
NMIQOQIVSS=ENPKOF=
NVUITNT=ENQKNF=
PIONMIVUM=ENRKTF=
NSIPQNIQUT=ENOKUF=
UOKOPR=
ROKQSN=
jçêÉ=íÜ~å=NRM=ïçêâÉêë=Eä~êÖÉ=áåÇìëíêóF=
Ó= kçK=çÑ=Éëí~ÄäáëÜãÉåíë=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=Öêçëë=çìíéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= `çëí=çÑ=áåéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=~ÇÇÉÇ=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= qçí~ä=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
Ó= p~ä~êáÉë=~åÇ=ï~ÖÉë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=ÑáñÉÇ=~ëëÉíë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= h=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s^=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
=
NISMO=ESKVF=
NNTIQRVIOSP=ETPKRF=
USIOPNIVQP=ETTKOF=
PNIOOTIPON=ESQKUF=
UOMIQUS=ESSKRF=
RINVRINRT=ESQKSF=
ROISRQIVST=ETUKMF=
SQKNTR=
PUKMSM=
=
NIVPP=EVKSF=
ONMINQPIMVR=ETSKNF=
NROITRQIPMV=ETRKOF=
RMIQTRIMQR=EUPKMF=
NIMRSITQQ=ETOKPF=
NQIRVNIVRT=ETRKPF=
VOIQMSIVRT=ETUKVF=
UTKQQR=
QTKTSR=
=
OIRVS=ENNKPF=
OPMIUSMIMUS=ETTKTF=
NSTINSVIQQT=ETSKTF=
SPISVMISQM=EUMKQF=
NIMSNINNN=ETRKOF=
NRISNMIQTQ=ETSKNF=
NMNIUORIOMQ=ETVKSF=
VRKVSN=
SMKMOP=
lîÉê~ää=
Ó= kçK=çÑ=Éëí~ÄäáëÜãÉåíë=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=Öêçëë=çìíéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= `çëí=çÑ=áåéìí=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=~ÇÇÉÇ=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= qçí~ä=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
Ó= p~ä~êáÉë=~åÇ=ï~ÖÉë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s~äìÉ=çÑ=ÑáñÉÇ=~ëëÉíë=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= h=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
Ó= s^=L=i=EojÛMMMF=
=
OPINRS=ENMMKMF=
NRVIVMRIRPO=ENMMKMF=
NNNITMQIMSM=ENMMKMF=
QUIOMNIQTN=ENMMKMF=
NIOPQIQOU=ENMMKMF=
UIMQPIQRU=ENMMKMF=
STIRNPIMMP=ENMMKMF=
RQKSVO=
PVKMQU=
=
OMIOMQ=ENMMKMF=
OTSIMQTIRQO=ENMMKMF=
OMPIOQSIRRR=ENMMKMF=
SMITURIOMN=ENMMKMF=
NIQSNIUON=ENMMKMF=
NVIPTUIUVT=ENMMKMF=
NNTINMMISNS=ENMMKMF=
UMKNMS=
QNKRUO=
=
OPIMOV=ENMMKMF=
OVTINPMIOTT=ENMMKMF=
ONTIVRTIOTTENMMKMF=
TVINTPIMMM=ENMMKMF=
NIQNNIQQT=ENMMKMF=
OMIRMMIOQV=ENMMKMF=
NOTIURQISMO=ENMMKMF=
VMKRUQ=
RSKMVP=
G= cáÖìêÉë=áå=Äê~ÅâÉíë=~êÉ=ëÜ~êÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=íçí~äK=
pçìêÅÉW= j~ä~óëá~I=NVVQI=NVVTI=NVVUK=
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q~ÄäÉ=RW= oÉîÉ~äÉÇ=`çãé~ê~íáîÉ=^Çî~åí~ÖÉ=fåÇÉñ=Ñçê=^pb^kÓR=NVVRÓVU=
= NVVR= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU=
j~ä~óëá~= = = = =
= k~íìê~ä=êÉëçìêÅÉ=áåíÉåëáîÉ= NKMU= NKNP= NKMO= MKUV=
= råëâáääÉÇ=ä~Äçìê=áåíÉåëáîÉ== MKUN= MKTU= MKTN= MKTP=
= qÉÅÜåçäçÖó=áåíÉåëáîÉ= NKQT= NKPV= NKPT= NKQP=
= eìã~å=Å~éáí~ä=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKUM= MKTU= MKSQ= MKSO=
fåÇçåÉëá~= = = = =
= k~íìê~ä=êÉëçìêÅÉ=áåíÉåëáîÉ= OKUM= OKSU= OKOQ= NKUO=
= råëâáääÉÇ=ä~Äçìê=áåíÉåëáîÉ== OKNQ= NKVU= NKOV= NKPQ=
= qÉÅÜåçäçÖó=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKPN= MKOU= MKOR= MKOV=
= eìã~å=Å~éáí~ä=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKRM= MKQT= MKQN= MKRU=
qÜ~áä~åÇ= = = = =
= k~íìê~ä=êÉëçìêÅÉ=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKVT= NKPM= MKUR= MKTV=
= råëâáääÉÇ=ä~Äçìê=áåíÉåëáîÉ== NKSN= NKSR= NKQO= NKQR=
= qÉÅÜåçäçÖó=áåíÉåëáîÉ= NKMR= NKMT= NKMM= NKMU=
= eìã~å=Å~éáí~ä=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKRU= MKSM= MKSP= MKSV=
mÜáäáééáåÉë= = = = =
= k~íìê~ä=êÉëçìêÅÉ=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKSR= MKSU= MKRN= MKPO=
= råëâáääÉÇ=ä~Äçìê=áåíÉåëáîÉ== OKMT= NKTR= NKPT= NKNS=
= qÉÅÜåçäçÖó=áåíÉåëáîÉ= NKVS= NKSR= NKTO= NKVR=
= eìã~å=Å~éáí~ä=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKOT= MKOU= MKOO= MKNV=
páåÖ~éçêÉ= = = = =
= k~íìê~ä=êÉëçìêÅÉ=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKQR= MKQR= MKQR= MKPR=
= råëâáääÉÇ=ä~Äçìê=áåíÉåëáîÉ== MKQP= MKQN= MKPS= MKPU=
= qÉÅÜåçäçÖó=áåíÉåëáîÉ= OKMQ= NKVP= NKUP= NKVM=
= eìã~å=Å~éáí~ä=áåíÉåëáîÉ= MKRU= MKSM= MKRO= MKQU=
pçìêÅÉW= qÜ~ãI=OMMNK=
^Åêçåóãë=
AgCensus – Agriculture Census 
AIM – Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (NGO) 
ASB – Bumiputera Unit Trust 
ASN – National Unit Trust 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
DOS – Department of Statistics 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GNP – Gross National Product 
ELS – Employers’ Liability Scheme 
EPF – Employees Provident Fund 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
HIS – Household Income Surveys 
HRDC – Human Resource Development Council 
HRDF – Human Resource Development Fund 
Social Protection in Malaysia 
167 
LFPR – Labour Force Participation Rate 
MEF – Malaysian Employers’ Federation 
MTUC – Malaysian Trades Union Congress 
NDP – National Development Policy 
NEP – New Economic Policy 
NVP – National Vision Policy 
PSDC – Penang Skills Development Centre 
RISDA – Rubber Industry Smallholders’ Development Authority 
SMIs – Small and Medium Industries 
SMIDEC – Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation 
SOCSO – Social Security Organization 
YBK – Yayasan Basmi Kemiskinan (NGO) 
oÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë=
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=mÜáäáééáåÉë=
bÇì~êÇç=qK=dçåò~äÉò=~åÇ=oçë~êáç=dêÉÖçêáç=j~å~ë~å=
^Äëíê~Åí=
The Philippines is a fairly governed developing country with nominally democratic 
political institutions. There is broad consensus on the desirability of a society oriented 
to human development and welfare, but the country is confronted with resurgent 
poverty, a budget deficit, and the problem of restoring investor confidence in the 
wake of persistent concerns about the escalation of conflict in Southern Philippines. 
The Philippine economy has a significant boom-and-bust cycle, as a result of which 
it has lagged behind many of its neighbors with its GDP growing only by 3.2% yearly 
on average during the last decade. In the context of liberalizing reforms, modest 
economic upsurges were largely driven by investments, exports and remittances of 
overseas Filipino workers. Poverty incidence has declined modestly to 32% in 1997, 
but following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 / 98, the proportion of poor families 
crept up to 34.2% in 2000. 
Social protection in the Philippines is well defined in the formal sector, which is led 
by manufacturing and services firms and public agencies. Both private sector em-
ployees and government workers are covered by contributory social insurance 
schemes covering industrial accident, health, old age, and death, although the sup-
port value for all is less than desired. In the informal sector, there is no coverage, 
except for the self-employed, who contribute on a voluntary basis. The government 
occasionally launches programs that have social protection elements, such as rice 
price subsidy, labor-intensive public work schemes, and integrated community-level 
social assistance. There are also a number of microfinancing schemes, as well as 
reskilling programs for those adversely affected by the Asian crisis and displaced by 
‘flexibilization’ processes. 
However, most of these programs come far and few between, and although many are 
targeted at the poor, they are not efficiently run and the benefits are prone to middle 
class capture. Formal social insurance is increasingly becoming unsustainable, in 
part because of badly managed investments, corruption, and payroll tax collection 
problems. Studies also suggest an inequitable setup, with poorer members subsidiz-
ing the better off. The difficulties facing social protection are compounded by weak-
nesses in the bargaining power of workers. Organized labor is now only 10% of the 
work force and labor unions have diminishing leverage in the workplace. 
Reforms will have to be put in place. In formal social insurance, some immediate 
steps should include changes in the contribution and benefit structure, automatic 
indexation of benefits, and wider coverage. The social insurance system will also 
have to be run more efficiently, in a sustainable manner. In the informal sector, the 
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government will have to cast a wider social safety net, by protecting basic social 
services from budget cuts, more focused targeting of social assistance and microfi-
nancing programs, and better governance structures in order to avoid the wastage of 
resources intended for poor and disadvantaged workers. 
* The exchange rate of the Philippine peso against the US dollar at the time of writ-
ing was US$1=PhP50. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~äI=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
mçäáíáÅ~ä=píêìÅíìêÉ=
The Philippines has a presidential system of government, with the 1987 constitution 
limiting presidents to a single six-year term of office. The legislative branch of gov-
ernment is modeled on the U.S. system and is composed of the Senate, with 24 seats, 
and the House of Representatives, with 208 directly elected seats and a few party list 
representatives. Joseph Estrada’s presidential term, which ends in June 2004, is now 
being completed by the former Vice-President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 
At the moment, the Philippines is faced with problems of reducing the budget deficit 
and of restoring domestic and international business confidence in the face of con-
cerns on social order, global anti-terrorism and recession of the U.S. economy. The 
culture is open, with freedom of expression and broad social consensus on the desir-
ability of an outward-oriented society. Despite the persistent potential for escalation 
of conflict in Southern Mindanao, peace and order hold sway. 
The colonial era bequeathed concentration of political and economic power in the 
hands of a small number of families, culminating in the 21-year rule of Ferdinand 
Marcos (1965–86), which was characterized by economic mismanagement, corrup-
tion and martial law. A democratic system was re-established under Corazon Aquino 
(1986–92), maintained under Fidel Ramos (1992–98) and consolidated with the elec-
tion of Joseph Estrada in May 1998. His removal by a civilian coup backed by the 
military in January 2001, which was later judged to be in accordance with the con-
stitution, ironically seems to have strengthened the prospects for the continuation of 
responsible democracy in the Philippines (The Economist Country Briefings, 2002). 
Political parties in the Philippines are based on personalities rather than ideologies. 
Most of those represented in Congress come from the economic elite, and often 
switch parties in exchange for political favors from the ruling administration. There 
are thus continual shifts in allegiance. The new president’s party is Lakas ng Edsa 
(National Union of Christian Democrats / Lakas), which was formed in 1992 to sup-
port the presidential candidacy of Fidel Ramos. In February 2001, Lakas merged with 
several small parties to form the People’s Power Coalition and now controls the 
majority in the two chambers. The three parties that backed Joseph Estrada in 1998 
and formed the pro-government coalition, Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP) re-
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sumed their separate identities in the wake of his removal. Party lists, meanwhile, 
continue to be one of the minor political instruments for social mobility. 
bÅçåçãáÅ=píêìÅíìêÉ=
The Philippine economy in the last 25 years has been characterized as one following 
a boom-bust cycle (Fabella, 1994). The Philippines has had three crises in the period 
1975–2000. The worst occurred in 1984–85 when GDP contracted by 7.3% in two 
consecutive years. Then, two milder ones took place in 1991 and 1998, with GDP 
declining by 0.6% in both years. Because of the large fluctuations in its economic 
development, the Philippines economy has lagged behind many of its neighbors with 
its GDP growing only by 3.2% yearly on average during the period. 
However, in the five years immediately prior to the East Asian crisis in 1997, the 
Philippines enjoyed what appears as strong macroeconomic fundamentals. This 
came about largely because of the restoration of democracy during the Aquino years, 
and the stabilization of the political situation during the Ramos administration. An-
other contributing factor was the continuous implementation of structural economic 
reforms aimed at reforming the tax system, liberalizing trade, privatizing state-owned 
enterprises, deregulating telecommunications and banking, and rehabilitation of ailing 
government financial institutions. Thus, the economy posted modest rates of eco-
nomic growth that was largely driven by growth in investments and exports (see 
Table 1, Appendix). Moreover, because of the persistent pursuit of trade liberaliza-
tion from 1980 onwards, manufactured goods accounted for an increasing propor-
tion of exports, thereby reducing the country’s dependence on exports of primary 
commodities that were often subject to price volatility. 
However, despite the many initiatives mentioned above, liberalization in non-trad-
ables lagged behind. In addition, the terms of trade shifted against industry and in 
favor of services. Consequently, a corresponding shift in the composition of output 
by sector became evident. Thus, the share of industry in total output contracted, de-
spite the impressive performance of manufactured exports, from 35% in 1990 to 32% 
in 2000, while that of services expanded from 43% to 52%. 
As emphasized in the Economist Country Briefings, foreign-debt ratios, which had 
improved markedly in recent years, deteriorated following the peso depreciation in 
1997. Improvements had been made in government finances through privatization 
and tax reform, but were undermined by the economic downturn in 1998 and poor 
tax administration since, which resulted in a fall in the taxes taken relative to GDP. 
The new government’s aim is to remedy the budget imbalance and restore domestic 
and international business confidence, which had been slipping since mid-1999 and 
collapsed in late 2000. 
The relatively stable growth environment in the first half of the 1990s translated into 
greater employment opportunities and the unemployment rate dipped from 9.0% in 
1991 to 7.4% in 1996 and 11.2% in 2000. Labor shifted away from agriculture to the 
more labor-intensive sectors of services and construction in line with the overall 
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reallocation of resources towards the non-tradable sectors (World Bank, 2000). 
Thus, the share of services in total employment expanded from 39.6% in 1990 to 
46.7% in 2000, while agriculture’s share contracted from 44.9% to 37.1% (see Table 
2, Appendix). Meanwhile, the share of the industrial sector has stagnated around 
15% and in the same manner that of manufacturing remained almost constant around 
10%. The increase in the share of the services sector is an indication of the growth 
of the informal sector, which has had to absorb ‘an expanding labor force that is 
unable to find adequate employment in the agriculture and industry sectors’ (HCIEE, 
2001). 
pçÅá~ä=~åÇ=aÉãçÖê~éÜáÅ=píêìÅíìêÉ=
The Philippines exhibited improvements in key human development indicators be-
tween 1986–96, particularly those related to poverty, education and health. In par-
ticular, poverty incidence declined from 44.2% in 1985 to 39.9% in 1991 and 32.1% in 
1997, although poverty incidence in the country remains the highest in the ASEAN 5 
(see Table 3, Appendix).1 However, following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 / 98, 
the proportion of poor families crept up to 34.2% in 2000. 
Meanwhile, the basic literacy rate rose from 89% in 1989 to 94% in 1994. Also, clear 
gains in school participation have been made – 97 % at the elementary level and 
72% at the secondary level in school year 2000–01. However, the progress when 
measured in terms of the completion rate is more limited, as can be seen in the less 
than modest improvement in the completion rate, 68% and 71% in school year 
2000–2001 (see Table 4, Appendix). 
With respect to improvements in health status, life expectancy at birth rose from 65 
years in 1990 to 69 years in 1999. This came about as the infant mortality rate, the 
under–5 mortality rate and the maternal mortality rate all exhibited a definite down-
trend in 1990–2000.2 
The reason why real per capita GDP has been sluggish is not only its unstable growth 
path but also the rapid population growth. A country of 76.5 million people in 2000, 
the Philippines stands out as having one of the highest population growth rates (2.36% 
yearly) in Asia at present. Meeting the demand for basic public goods generated by 
its young population (49% of whom are aged 0–19) presents a serious challenge to 
the government and clearly exerts pressure on the already strained government re-
sources. Although social services continue to account for the biggest share of the 
budget of the national government with the exception of debt service, its proportion 
continues to decline (see Table 5, Appendix). The current trend of public finances 
appears unsustainable: either public debt will rise from an already high level, and / or 
                             
1 Based on the international poverty line of US$1 per person per day, the poverty incidence in the 
Philippines was 26 compared to Indonesia’s 11, Malaysia’s 4 and Thailand’s less than 1 (Reyes et al., 
1999). 
2 In particular, the infant mortality rate improved from 56.7‰ live births in 1990 to 48.9‰ in 1995 and 
35‰ in 1998. At the same time, the under–5 mortality rate slid from 79.6‰ live births in 1990 to 
66.8‰ in 1995 and 55‰ in 1998. On the other hand, the maternal mortality rate declined from 209 
per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 180 in 1995 and 172 in 1998. 
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resources will remain inadequate for social expenditure (Philippine Country Assis-
tance Strategy, World Bank Group, 1999). Corruption is also linked to lower spend-
ing on health and education, which in turn narrows opportunities for poor people to 
invest in their human capital. 
The Philippines did not manage to keep the number of poor people from growing 
considerably. While its economy was not badly affected by the crisis, the number of 
poor Filipinos rose greatly. The Philippines joined the likes of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in the high-poverty column. The vulnerability of the non-poor has in-
creased. About 40% of the population was vulnerable in 1997, compared with 25% 
who were observed to be poor (Chaudhuri and Datt, 2001). Social safety nets are in 
place to cushion the impact of shocks, and the presence of some social risk manage-
ment instruments may be contributing a lot to mitigate the worst features of poverty. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
Most of the data for this article was gathered from secondary sources – both local and 
foreign studies and researches – and official agency documents. Local researches 
provided a national situationer. Foreign studies, such as from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), International Social Security Association (ISSA), World Bank 
(WB), and Asian Development Bank (ADB), gave global perspectives on social pro-
tection systems. Most data are up to date, to 2001 at the latest, and are of good qual-
ity, having come from official statistical sources. 
Insufficient government resources preclude gathering of data that track the informal 
sector. Coverage of ‘flexibilized’ workers is often scanty, which adds to the difficulty 
of creating a good social protection system for them. The census is a good instru-
ment to reach out to ‘undocumented’ workers, but it is undertaken only every ten 
years. Yearly spot surveys, such as the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS), 
may shed some light. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
The right to organize and the right to strike are legally protected under the country’s 
labor code and various policy issuances. In the public sector, employee organizations 
are supervised by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), with restrictions on strikes. 
The interests of the public service are often invoked to discourage protest actions by 
government employees. 
fåÇìëíêá~ä=oÉä~íáçåë=
Organized labor has little power in the Philippines. Only around one in five workers 
was a member of a trade union in the late 1990s, although the rate was significantly 
higher in multinational firms, where around one in three was unionized. This reflects 
the weak bargaining position of workers in a labor-surplus economy (The Economist 
Country Briefings, 2002). 
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In 1997, the total number of labor organizations was 8,822 and they cover 3,634,038 
workers. The number of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in 1997 totaled 
2,987 covering 525,007 workers, which represent only 1.7% of the labor force and 
1.9% of the total employed. Most of them are in the manufacturing and services 
sector. Welfare benefits – monetary and non-monetary benefits – enjoyed by the 
workers were covered by 309 CBAs filed at the Department of Labor and Employ-
ment (DOLE) Regional Offices in 1999 (see Table 6, Appendix). Trade unions cover 
only 13% of the employed labor force and 12% of the total labor force. This means 
that collective bargaining as an industrial relations process, although not insignifi-
cant, is not dominant even in the formal sector of the economy. What prevails is the 
paternalistic unilateral decision-making process practiced in most micro-, small- and 
medium-scale enterprises. This also suggests that the bulk of the Philippine labor 
force is still outside the social security system. 
kçåJÖçîÉêåãÉåí~ä=lêÖ~åáò~íáçåë=
Non-profit and non-governmental organizations active in the field of human develop-
ment and welfare are a very recent phenomenon in East Asia, where in the past they 
have been discouraged by authoritarian regimes (Yamamoto, 1999). The one excep-
tion is the Philippines where they have a longer history due to the American legacy 
and the Catholic Church. However, technically, civil society organizations (CSOs) 
have minimal influence on issues on social protection. 
Community development in the Philippines is not yet a flourishing part of social pol-
icy, and innovations such as community health financing are not seriously considered. 
Moreover, all NGOs (non-governmental organizations) remain heavily dependent on 
external sources for funds, notably official overseas aid organizations, U.S. philan-
thropic funds and Japanese corporate funds (Gough, 2000). 
bãéäçóÉêë=
The influence and power of the local industry, multinational companies and employ-
ers in general have been somewhat weakened by the Asian crisis. But numbers are 
still important: for instance, the ten largest families in the Philippines control half of 
the corporate sector (in terms of market capitalization). These families have a sorry 
effect on the economic policy of the government. The Ayalas, for example, control 
17.1% of the total market capitalization (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999). 
Such wealth concentration, and the interlocking links between owners and govern-
ment officials, casts doubt on the independence of legal institutions in Southeast 
Asia, including the Philippines. In a situation of ‘state capture’, legal institutions are 
subverted and less likely to evolve in a manner that promotes transparent and mar-
ket-based activities. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines seem to have the lowest 
level of legal institutional growth because of heavy ownership concentration in the 
corporate sector. 
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fåíÉêJáåëíáíìíáçå~ä=`ççéÉê~íáçå=
A tripartite system among government, trade unions, and employers, exists through 
regional wages and productivity boards (which are supervised by the National Wage 
and Productivity Commission). Board discussions center mostly on minimum wage 
adjustments in relation to the consumer price index and cost of living, and gain-sharing 
schemes. Less discussed, although boards have the power to initiate action, are the 
needs of workers and their families, the need to induce industries to invest in the 
countryside and the equitable distribution of income and wealth along the impera-
tives of economic and social development. A recent action of the tripartite board in 
Metro Manila is to ratify a PhP.30 emergency cost-of-living allowance. 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
All presidents, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo not excepted, have paid obeisance to the 
protection of the rights of workers, tripartism and social dialogue. In a May Day 
speech before workers, for example, Arroyo said she shared the sentiments of labor 
for an adequate social protection mechanism, particularly those affected by the 
changes brought about by the challenges and demands of globalization (Macapagal-
Arroyo, 2001). Her action to scrap the guidelines on labor-only subcontracting has 
won her praises from most labor groups. 
Stronger measures on social protection, such as unemployment insurance and uni-
versal health care coverage, have either been waylaid or deferred. Newer moves, 
such as the implementation of the 20 / 20 Initiative, have yet to take off. 
Inefficiencies in the management of the current social insurance system are wide-
spread. There is a strong clamor for merging the two financing institutions (the So-
cial Security System for private sector workers and the Government Service Insur-
ance System for public sector employees) in order to achieve economies of scale and 
to eliminate inefficiencies. But ‘turfing’ has undermined such demands. Reforms are 
also hard to come by, as proven by the recent ouster of the Social Security System’s 
(SSS) chief executive officer, a known reform advocate, ironically at the instance of 
the agency’s union. Top managers of both SSS and the Government Service Insur-
ance System (GSIS) have also been embroiled in a recent controversy involving 
reportedly exorbitant salaries and perks. 
On a more general plane, the government’s performance has been constrained by 
widely acknowledged weaknesses in implementation capacity and governance. To 
be sure, there are landmark laws to control the system and set standards: the revised 
Labor Code, the Wage Rationalization Act, the Social Security Law and the new 
GSIS Law, the new Medicare Law. But improvements are needed in the capacity for 
policy formulation and implementation; program management; procurement; control-
ling corruption, transparency and accountability; and congressional and judicial pro-
cesses. Lobbying is a fact of life. Congressional measures are natural targets, but so 
are executive actions. This can work both ways. NGOs can lobby for progressive 
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measures, although those with deeper pockets – big business – might call the shots. 
Sometimes, lobbying plus public pressure can bring about good policies. 
Years of internal warfare have undermined both human development and social pro-
tection particularly in Mindanao. Statistics on basic health and education show utter 
neglect of basic social services provision especially for particular ethnic and reli-
gious groups, like the Muslims. Such deprivation has aggravated the existing con-
flict in the area. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
Throughout East Asia, the extended family continues its role as a provider, saver and 
redistributor, despite rapid economic development and urbanization. This should 
permit more families to mitigate risk by ‘self-insuring’: saving in good times and 
spending in bad times. The level of savings is extremely high in East Asia, the Philip-
pines excepted (WDR, 2000). 
Nonetheless, calculations of private transfers show high levels in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, adding 9% to 20% to the average incomes of recipient 
households. In the 1980s, the majority of people aged over 60 were receiving in-
come from family members and an even higher proportion lived with children or 
family – between 75% and over 90% in the Philippines and Thailand (Gough, 2000). 
It is no surprise that the family support element has found its way also within the 
structures of social security. As in most social security schemes in Asia, eligibility, 
and amount of benefits in the Philippines are based on the family situation of the 
beneficiary. Heads of families, with dependents, qualify more easily or receive higher 
benefits (Langendonk, 2000). 
The value of family or group orientation in the Philippines greatly helps Filipinos in 
coping with human poverty and insecurity. Social security for an individual often 
includes the income and / or assets of other members of his family, from whom he 
could claim financial support. 
Too much reliance on the protective shield of the family has a tradeoff, however. 
Filipino rank-and-file, in contrast to their Western counterparts, are less autono-
mous, more dependent on superiors for guidance, and less accepting of risk and re-
sponsibility (Mendoza, 2001). Acceptance of the authority of the superior, and hier-
archical authority structures, and an inability of the inferior to decide, precludes job 
autonomy. Filipinos also ranked high in a related value: uncertainty avoidance, which 
is related to the need for employment stability; stress in the workplace; and willing-
ness to follow rules (Acuña and Rodriguez, 1995). 
The state, on the other hand, is widely perceived as the key provider of social assis-
tance. It provides social assistance as a safety net, assuring some kind of social pro-
tection for individuals and families with few sources of income. Though social safety 
nets are in place to cushion the impact of shocks, they are still short of social risk 
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management instruments to mitigate the worst features of poverty. Ironically, the 
Philippine government is organizationally weak to enforce its own formal structures 
on the routines of family and community life (Mendoza, 2001). 
The government is judged by the people in its role as provider. Overall, based on the 
Social Weather Survey, July 2001, the public is satisfied – 46% satisfied, and 29% 
dissatisfied – with the current government’s performance. That is also the reason in 
part why entitlements are welcome but not obligations, such as taxes. Such imbalance 
is somewhat mitigated by other mediating instruments, such as user fees, which have 
been introduced in some sectors, such as health care, water supply and sanitation. In 
fact, to sustain devolved hospitals and clinics, a number of local governments have 
adopted user charges. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=éêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
In general, the Philippine economy is a dualistic economy, that is, it is divided into a 
modern but small sector and a backward but large sector (Ofreneo, 1991). This charac-
terization directly leads to segmentation of the formal labor force. The industrial 
sector has three major sub-sectors: import-substituting, export-oriented, and numerous 
small domestic fabricators / assemblers and cottage or home-based producers (Ofreneo 
and Barriatos, 1991). The agricultural sector has three segments: the export-oriented 
crop and plantation sub-sector, commercialized home-oriented agricultural sub-sector, 
and subsistence farming. The services sector is diversified from modern and large 
service establishments (government service, educational institutions, banks, hotels, 
department stores), which cater mainly to the needs of the elite and the middle class; 
a constellation of medium- and small-scale establishments (retail stores, market stalls, 
barber shops, and so on); and a galaxy of micro enterprises, which are generally 
unregistered and are engaged in the buy-and-sell business and in the delivery of all 
kinds of personalized and customized services (Ofreneo and Barriatos, 1991). 
The private sector (mostly family-owned) is the biggest employer in the Philippines. 
It takes on about 37% of the total employed. The government sector, on the other 
hand, employs only 8% of the total employed. In 2000, there are 14.33 million wage 
and salaried workers and they account for 50% of the total employed. 
The general working environment is legally protected, through a revised labor code. 
There are also protective laws, which establish labor standards and mechanisms for 
the organized sector. Despite remarkably extensive labor legislation covering mini-
mum wages, hours of work, paid leave, employment security, protection against dis-
missal, redundancy pay and occupational health and safety (Deery and Mitchell, 1993 
and Rigg, 1997), protection in practice is poor. This is due to weak government 
agencies, bribery of officials and weak trade unions (Gough, 2000). 
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In recent years, as a result of globalization and liberalization, local firms have had to 
cope with a less sheltered environment. They are no longer protected against foreign 
products by high import duties. Domestic companies are experiencing downturns in 
the short run, their products are no longer competitive in a largely middle-class mar-
ket, with severe consequences for labor and social protection. Corporate reorganiza-
tion, organizational rationalization, reengineering and downsizing facilitate the casu-
alization of the workforce to lower wage bills (Maragtas et al., 1999a). To avoid 
high overhead costs, manufacturing firms keep a leaner number of workers – a key 
component of a ‘labor flexibilization’ strategy – and trade off overtime pay for so-
cial compensation (Aganon, 1993). 
Relatively slow growth in the industry sector has been symptomatic of economic per-
formance in recent years. Unlike some of its neighbors, the Philippines has lagged 
behind in shifting its output and employment structure away from agriculture to indus-
try and to services. Industry’s share in GDP contracted from more than 35% two 
decades ago to nearly 32% in 2000. Manufacturing, which dominates the sector at 
over 70% of industrial value added, was at the forefront of the expansion, spurred by 
a strong performance in electronics arising from buoyant U.S. demand for semicon-
ductors and other high-technology products. 
The overall productivity and competitiveness of the Philippines remain a challenge. 
Estimates of total factor productivity (TFP)3 point to low productivity. The country 
experienced slight increases in productivity during the periods 1992 and 1995, but 
these gains were completely eroded in 1996. TFP recovered in 1997 and showed an 
increasing trend since then, but the growth rate remained negative. The country’s 
capital productivity (measured by ICOR)4 was stagnant during the same period. The 
fluctuation in the TFP was attributed to the roller-coaster growth of labor productivity. 
The country’s labor productivity dived to a negative in 1991, rose to 2.05% in 1995 
and seesawed since then until 1999 (Mendoza, 2001). 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Social security in the Philippines covers the formal sector labor only, and is built on 
a narrow membership base. In the Philippines, this is being taken care of separately 
by the SSS and the GSIS for private and public sector employees respectively. This 
partition could also be considered as its weakness – two administrative centers with 
separate budgets, bipolar centers of accountability, possibility of duplications, and 
the like (Maragtas, 2001). 
About 25 million workers (which is 65% of the labor force) from both the private and 
the public sectors receive social security benefits in the form of health care, retire-
                             
3 TFP measures the growth arising from technical progress and technical efficiency. It is measured by 
the residual between the growth of the economy and the weighted sum of the growth of the primary 
factor inputs – labor and capital (Medium-Term National Action Agenda for Productivity, 2000–
2004). 
4 ICOR means inverse of incremental-capital output ratio (∆GDP / I) (Philippine Council for Productiv-
ity 2000 Annual Report). 
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ment and social disability pensions and other minor assistance in the form of mater-
nity and funeral benefits. This fact simply means that around 35% or 11 million of 
the workforce are without social protection as mandated by the Philippine Constitu-
tion (Maragtas et al., 1999a). Subscription to social security by these workers is 
through an employee contribution to social insurance. 
The social security apparatus in the country has all the characteristics described by 
Schulz (1993): 
1. Participation is compulsory for all modern sector workers and public employees. 
2. Benefit schemes are financed by contributory payroll taxes levied on both em-
ployers and workers. Employers finance employment injury insurance wholly. 
Contributions are accumulated in special funds out of which benefits are paid. 
Any excess funds are invested to earn further income. 
3. Benefits (and contribution rates as well) are directly related to the level of earn-
ings and / or length of employment. 
4. A person’s right to benefits is secured by his contribution record without any 
test of need or means. 
5. Retirement benefits are designed to meet ‘minimum income needs’ during the 
retirement period and are paid out regularly (e.g. monthly) till death. The ‘right 
to retire’ involves providing compensation based upon years of service rather 
than upon need per se. The financial obligations are based on actuarial calcula-
tions that allow for the pooling and sharing of risk. 
The SSS presently administers two programs: 
Social security (SS) includes maternity, disability, retirement, death and funeral ser-
vices. It provides replacement income for workers in times of death, disability, sick-
ness, maternity and old age. 
Employee’s compensation (EC) includes the following industrial injury-related ser-
vices: income cash benefit for temporary total disability or sickness and permanent 
total disability, medical services appliances and supplies provided to the affected 
member beginning on the first day of injury or sickness, and rehabilitation services 
consisting of medical, surgical and hospital treatment. The EC program, started in 
1975, provides double compensation to the worker when the illness, death or acci-
dent is work-related. EC benefits are granted only to members with employers other 
than themselves. 
The sickness benefit is a daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member 
is unable to work due to sickness or injury. The amount of an employee’s sickness 
benefit is computed as the daily sickness allowance times the approved number of 
days. Effective from 1997, the daily sickness allowance is 90% of the average daily 
salary credit. A member can be granted sickness benefit for a maximum of 120 days 
in one calendar year. 
The maternity benefit is a daily cash allowance granted to a female member who is 
unable to work due to childbirth or miscarriage. The maternity allowance is equiva-
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lent to 100 % of the member’s average daily salary credit multiplied by 60 days for 
normal delivery or miscarriage, 78 days for caesarian cases. All female members with 
qualifying contributions, including self-employed and voluntary members, are now 
entitled to maternity benefits that cover only the first four complete deliveries in-
cluding miscarriages on or after May 1997. The disability benefit is a cash benefit 
paid to a member who becomes permanently disabled, either partially or totally 
(Maragtas et al., 1999b). 
The retirement benefit is a cash benefit paid to members who can no longer work 
due to old age. Any Filipino who is 60 years old and unemployed and has made at 
least 120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement; and any person 
who is 65 years old, whether employed or not (if employed, he should have made 
120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement, whether employed or 
not) is qualified for this long-term insurance benefit. There are two types of retire-
ment benefit. First, the monthly pension, which is a lifetime cash benefit paid to a 
retiree who has made at least 120 monthly contributions to the SSS prior to the se-
mester of retirement; and the other, the lump sum amount, is granted to a retiree who 
has not paid the required 120 monthly contributions (Maragtas et al., 1999b). 
The principal benefit package of the GSIS consists of compulsory and optional life 
insurance, retirement, separation and injury-related compensation benefits. Active 
GSIS members are entitled to the following loan privileges: salary, emergency and 
housing loans. In addition to government workers, the GSIS services the members’ 
dependents and beneficiaries, the retirees and pensioners, and the survivors of the 
deceased members or pensioners. The GSIS issues policies for Compulsory Life In-
surance (Regular), and Optional Life Insurance. Member privileges also include ser-
vice loans, salary and emergency loans, Bahay Ko housing loan, socialized / special 
housing, and pension loans. 
Another major program, which both the SSS and the GSIS had, is the medical care 
program. The National Health Insurance Act of 1995 transferred the administration 
of the Medicare program to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Phil-
Health) for an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development. 
Also engaged in other forms of social security are the Retirement and Separation 
Benefits System (RSBS) for military personnel; the Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA), which administers a welfare fund for overseas Filipino 
workers; and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) for social housing. 
Loans are non-insurance social benefits that SSS provides to member workers at re-
duced interest rates. Loan categories include salary, educational, calamity, emergency, 
and housing. Provident funds are virtually non-existent, except for those provided in 
some government financing institutions like the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 
Employers, whether private or public, pay half of the social insurance premiums, the 
other half being drawn from the employees in the form of employee contributions. 
The individual partly bears the risks of the existing schemes. In Medicare, for exam-
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ple, support value has hovered between 40% and 60% in recent years, forcing work-
ers to rely in part on family resources. 
Companies engaged in community and social services, and manufacturing firms (to 
a lesser extent), augment the salaries of workers by encouraging overtime work. 
Overtime pay, however, is not really a part of a social compensation: workers earn it 
by extending their working hours. The idea is to rechannel surpluses to direct pro-
ductive work. Community and social services firms are plausibly firms not dedicated 
to earning profit. Altruistic considerations make it possible for these firms to motivate 
workers to do extra hours of working time, in exchange for which they get overtime 
pay. 
Variations in employment benefits across regions may reflect differing employment 
practices, or responses to varying workers’ needs, and this could be a minefield for 
further investigation. It would be interesting to find out why firms in Ilocos, Cagayan 
Valley, and Northern Mindanao register above average shares of employment bene-
fits. Metro Manila establishments, as expected, do provide one of the highest pro-
portions of employment benefits. Yet, for every peso earned by Metro Manila work-
ers, a third of it is accounted for by overtime pay. This could be indicative of the high 
costs of living, as workers have to earn more to override budget constraints and pay 
for costly basic needs. 
Studies on cross-subsidization in Medicare also yield wide inequities. Generally, 
poor workers subsidize well-off employees (who have a higher incidence of catas-
trophic illnesses requiring more expensive treatments), and the workers in lagging 
regions (such as Eastern Visayas) subsidize Metro Manila employees (Urquico, 
1994). 
To date, the Philippines has not been in a position to put in place a comprehensive 
formal social safety net. While some elements of such a safety net do exist, such as 
severance pay and pensions, coverage is incomplete and often difficult to enforce. 
Other key elements, such as unemployment benefits, are completely absent. The fo-
cus of the government remains on economic growth supplemented by targeted pov-
erty alleviation measures. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
For children and youth, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) 
has enacted a total of eight national policies, inclusive of the Early Childhood Care 
and Development (ECCD). ECCD is designed to enhance the quality and coverage 
of essential health, nutrition, psychosocial development and early education services 
of Filipino children aged 0 to 6 years. These policies cover issues such as employ-
ment of children, child abuse and discrimination, and international and domestic 
adoption. 
The DSWD has achieved milestones in attending to the needs and welfare of all sec-
tors in society. One of the major contributions is its commitment to advocate self-
reliance by incorporating skills development to every social sector. Family welfare 
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targets social preparation for project participation and community volunteer resource 
development; women’s welfare aims at self-enhancement skills development, ma-
ternal and childcare skills development and productivity skills development; emer-
gency assistance tackles disaster management capability-building; and the program 
for disabled persons caters to self-social enhancement services. 
Among the different levels of Local Government Units (LGUs), the municipality has 
the biggest responsibility in implementing social welfare services. Community par-
ticipation is being harnessed in the services the DSWD has devolved to LGUs, such 
as family and women’s welfare; while it is also implied in child and youth welfare, 
through the institution of community-based services. Its key program for poverty 
alleviation managed by the national office applies community organizing before ser-
vices are delivered to the community, which they themselves pick out as relevant to 
their needs (Bautista, 2002). 
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The International Labor Organization (ILO, 1998) defines the informal sector as 
“small-scale self-employed activities (with or without hired workers) at a low level 
of organization and technology with the primary objective of generating employ-
ment and incomes. The activities are usually conducted without proper recognition 
from authorities and escape the attention of the administrative machinery responsible 
for enforcing laws and regulations.” On the other hand, the Social Reform Agenda, 
which was launched by the Ramos administration in 1994, defines the informal sector 
as “very small scale units producing and distributing goods and services and consist-
ing of independent, self-employed producers in urban and rural areas some of whom 
also employ family labor and / or a few hired workers or apprentices, which operate 
with very little capital or none at all; which utilize a low level of technology and 
skills; which operate at a low level of productivity; and which provide low and ir-
regular incomes and highly unstable employment” (Lazo 2000). Lazo (Lazo 2000) 
proposed that the definition of the informal sector might gain more clarity by enu-
merating the sub-sectors within the informal sector, thus: 
• home workers; 
• microentrepreneurs / petty producers; 
• small miners; 
• small-scale construction workers; 
• street vendors, hawkers, peddlers; 
• drivers and operators of taxicabs, jeepneys, tricycles; 
• petty retailers such as owners of sari-sari stores; 
• barter traders; 
• domestic helpers. 
In addition to the groupings mentioned above, the Department of Labor and Employ-
ment (ILS / DOLE, 1994) also includes the unemployed in the informal sector. 
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Given the nature of the sector, informal sector activities are largely unrecorded and 
unregistered in official statistics. Thus, estimating the size of the informal sector is 
fraught with difficulties. However, estimating the informal sector to consist of self-
employed own-account workers and unpaid family members, Soriano and Sardana 
(1998) reckon the informal sector to have grown from 11.3 million in 1986 to 13.5 
million in 1996, accounting for 51.5% of the total number of employed persons 
during the period. On average, 57% of those in the informal sector are in the agricul-
ture sector, 33% in the services sector and 6% in the industry sector. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
Precisely because the informal sector is outside the scope of most government regu-
lations, workers in the informal sector have limited access to social protection (e.g. 
social insurance and labor legislation) enjoyed by workers in the formal sector. Lazo 
(Lazo 2000) succinctly summarizes the issues confronting the informal sector: 
pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=~åÇ=mçäáÅó=fåîáëáÄáäáíó=
Because of the dearth of official statistics, there is little appreciation of the magni-
tude and importance of the informal sector. As a result, the lack of data translates to 
policy and budget invisibility. In addition, informal sector workers are not organized. 
This fragmentation perpetuates the invisibility of the sector to policy makers. 
mççê=tçêâáåÖ=`çåÇáíáçåë=~åÇ=i~Åâ=çÑ=pí~åÇ~êÇë=
There is no well-defined employer-employee relationship in the informal sector. In 
most cases, workers in the informal sector are self-employed. Also, in cases where 
some semblance of an employer-employee relationship exists, there are no formal 
contracts, only verbal agreements on the terms and conditions of employment, thus 
making the workers vulnerable to exploitative working conditions. As such, terms 
and conditions of work are substandard and are not subject to strict enforcement and 
regulation. Work hours are long and the workplace tends to be inadequate. Wages 
are low and other fringe benefits are non-existent. 
i~Åâ=çÑ=^ÅÅÉëë=íç=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pçÅá~ä=pÉÅìêáíó=póëíÉã=
Although self-employed workers with a net monthly income of PhP.1,000 per month 
have the option to enroll with the SSS, only 13 % of the total SSS members in 2000 
are self-employed workers (a total of 3 million registered as self-employed out of the 
23 million SSS members). Thus, workers in the informal sector remain largely out-
side the reach of the formal social security system. This occurs because of the ad-
ministrative difficulties involved in collecting their contributions. Specifically, given 
the irregular and seasonal nature of their incomes, it is difficult to determine the ap-
propriate amount of contribution that will be required of the informal sector worker. 
Also, because informal sector workers are widely dispersed, the administrative ma-
chinery for collecting contributions and paying benefits remains inadequate (SRI, 
1996). 
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i~Åâ=çÑ=^ÅÅÉëë=íç=mêçÇìÅíáîÉ=oÉëçìêÅÉëI=mêÉÅ~êáçìë=bãéäçóãÉåí=~åÇ=råÅÉêí~áå=
fåÅçãÉë=
Limited access to productive resources such as raw materials, training, credit, tech-
nology and markets are major obstacles in improving productivity and increasing 
incomes in the informal sector. Because of lack of assets, those in the informal sec-
tor find it difficult to access the formal credit market. Thus, they rely mainly on 
microfinance programs. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
Some social assistance / transfer programs address the needs of the informal sector. 
These programs are generally designed to help the poor. In the Philippines, the most 
important social assistance program is the rice price subsidy program. At the height 
of the Asian financial crisis in 1998, this program received the most in terms of 
government funding (PhP.8 billion). The government also experimented with a public 
works program in addressing past crises (e.g. in the mid-1980s). It has also initiated 
a health insurance scheme for indigents in the late 1990s. In addition, the govern-
ment has implemented the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Ser-
vices (CIDSS) program in poor communities as an integrated approach to poverty 
alleviation. 
oáÅÉ=mêáÅÉ=pìÄëáÇó=mêçÖê~ã=
Essentially, the rice price subsidy program aims to provide rice to consumers at a 
price below that prevailing in the market by setting a ceiling price and to protect 
farmers’ income by setting a floor price for palay (paddy). It is administered by the 
National Food Authority (NFA), which transfers income to consumers by subsidiz-
ing the cost of the consumption of rice. 
However, studies (Clarete et al., 1998; Roumasset, 1999) indicate that the NFA has 
not been able to prevent high consumer prices or low producer prices. Figure 1 in 
the Appendix shows that retail prices have been consistently higher than the official 
NFA release price from 1995–999. Similarly, farm-gate prices of palay were typically 
above the official NFA support price in the same period – making the latter irrele-
vant to farmers. Roumasset (1999) attributes the divergence between official and 
actual market prices to the fact that the NFA is a relatively small player in the total 
rice market of the country. 
mìÄäáÅ=tçêâÑ~êÉ=~åÇ=bãéäçóãÉåí=mêçÖê~ãë=
The Philippines has had rich experience in implementing public works programs as 
counter-cyclical interventions from 1973 to 1994. However, documentation on the 
experience has been poor and scanty. 
Food for Work Program. This program was implemented progressively from 1986–
91 in Negros Occidental and five other provinces. It was meant to mitigate the im-
pact of the sharp decline in world sugar prices on sugar cultivators, particularly the 
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wage-dependent but unemployed sugar workers or sakadas. It included activities 
involving land development (small irrigation projects and agro-forestry work in the 
uplands), physical infrastructure development (constructing and rehabilitating roads 
and bridges, public markets) and social infrastructure development (day care centers, 
health and training facilities). Participating workers received both cash and in-kind 
(rice) payments. 
Rural Works Program. The Rural Works Program funded small infrastructure pro-
jects (repair and maintenance of schoolrooms, health and daycare centers, roads, 
bridges and irrigation networks; cleaning of estuaries, drainage and waterworks sys-
tems; and reforestation programs) in selected depressed and rural communities to 
assist workers displaced by company closures / retrenchment and those affected by 
El Niño. Workers were paid minimum wage. Some 3,364 unemployed workers 
found temporary jobs in various government infrastructure projects worth PhP.4.4 
million under this program (Reyes et al., 1999). 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=Ñçê=fåÇáÖÉåíë=
The ‘Medicare para sa Masa’ (Medicare for the Masses) of the National Health 
Insurance Program (NHIP) extended the coverage of Medicare benefits to the indi-
gent or marginalized sector which accounts for about 40% of the population. 
Beneficiaries are given health cards or IDs which entitles them to in-patient curative 
care, including room and board, drugs and medicines, x-ray and laboratory expenses, 
doctors’ fees, operating room / surgical operations, regular out-patient benefits and 
special out-patient services for specific illnesses including primary consultation with 
physicians, chest x-ray, urinalysis, fecalysis, sputum microscopy and complete blood 
count. The program provides a built-in response mechanism that will help the poor 
gain better access to health services during times of crisis. Given their low incomes, 
indigents typically utilize government health facilities. 
`çãéêÉÜÉåëáîÉ=~åÇ=fåíÉÖê~íÉÇ=aÉäáîÉêó=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=pÉêîáÅÉë=E`fappF=
The primary goal of the CIDSS is to empower impoverished and disadvantaged fami-
lies, sectors and communities so that their minimum basic needs are met. Among the 
social protection strategies that the CIDSS pursues (Bautista, 1999) are: 
(1) Convergence of services provided by government and civil society organiza-
tions; 
(2) Targeting of primary beneficiaries of services to be delivered at the local level; 
(3) Community organizing; 
(4) The prioritization of the basic requirements for survival and security of margin-
alized individuals, including other enabling needs; 
(5) Upgrading of administrative, technical and managerial capabilities of local gov-
ernment units (LGUs) in the delivery of social services; and 
(6) Generation of revenues from alternative sources aside from those allotted by the 
national government. 
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The focal programs of CIDSS include the following: family and community welfare, 
women’s welfare, child and youth welfare, emergency assistance, self-employment 
assistance (SEA-K), food and nutrition, health, water and sanitation, income secu-
rity, peace and order, basic education and literacy, participation and governance and 
infrastructure. There are numerous projects under each of these programs, which 
require the close coordination with other government instrumentalities. 
An independent evaluation of the CIDSS indicated that the program had achieved 
some degree of success in addressing the minimum basic needs of local communi-
ties (Bautista, 1999). Ninety-eight percent of respondents in CIDSS areas indicated 
that the quality of life in their local communities improved compared to 84.8% in 
non-CIDSS areas. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
A large segment of poor households in the Philippines are involved in some form of 
microenterprise. Because of stringent requirements (especially with respect to col-
lateral) and inadequate information on financing sources, the poor do not borrow 
from formal financial institutions. Additionally, the high transaction costs involved 
in the processing of small loans, predisposes banks against providing their services 
to the poor. Thus, the poor usually get credit from relatives, friends or from private 
moneylenders who charge high interest rates but do not require collateral. 
Access to credit can be an important instrument for social protection. It not only 
provides the poor with capital for their livelihood. It can also help the poor in smooth-
ing their consumption and income streams in times of crisis. In the Philippines, 
microcredit to the poor has come from two main sources: government-directed credit 
programs and private microfinance institutions. 
Government-directed credit programs are funded out of the government’s budgetary 
allocation or loans / grants from donor agencies and are lent out at subsidized rates. 
On the other hand, private microfinance institutions including credit cooperatives, 
credit unions, rural banks and credit NGOs, are also an important source of seed 
capital for the livelihood or microenterprise activities of the poor. 
pÉäÑJÉãéäçóãÉåí=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=Ó=h~ìåä~ê~å=Epb^JhF=
The SEA-K is a community-based microfinance project under the Comprehensive 
and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS) program of the Department of 
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). It is aimed at building the capabilities of 
people’s organizations (POs) to self-administer the provision of socialized credit. In 
Level 1 of the program, 20 to 30 members are organized to form a group called SEA 
Kaunlaran Association (SKA) and are provided with training in microfinance devel-
opment. 
SEA-K provides these people’s organizations some seed capital (no more than 
PhP.150,000) at zero interest to lend to their members for their livelihood needs. The 
average size of the individual loan is PhP.6,000. Some SKAs impose a 10 % service 
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fee (NCC Policy Notes 98–05). Individual borrowers pay weekly amortization to the 
SKA, which in turn repays the DSWD. The collection is deposited in a bank and 
forms part of a revolving fund. 
The 25 to 30 member POs are then subdivided into smaller groups of five, which act 
much like a pressure group. If one of the members fails to pay his dues, the other 
members are obligated to pay on his behalf. Failure to repay the loan may result in a 
non-release of the loans to the other group members. These sanctions in effect foster 
a sense of responsibility for the loans that one avails and places an element of shame 
on the borrower when he cannot meet his dues, since it will put undue financial 
burden on the part of his co-members. 
Level 2 deals with the institutionalization of the gains of Level 1 through the organi-
zation of the SEA Kabayans, which are comprised of two to five SKAs that have 
established a good track record in terms of their capability to manage their finances 
and to generate savings. In this regard, the program has been rather successful in 
encouraging its members to save. As of 1997, its beneficiaries have been able to 
save PhP.52 million. 
mÉçéäÉÛë=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=cáå~åÅÉ=`çêéçê~íáçå=Em`c`F=
The PCFC was intended to be the lead institution in the wholesale delivery of funds 
to microfinance institutions (e.g. rural banks, cooperatives, NGOs, and people’s or-
ganizations) for re-lending to the poor. 
The PCFC operates a number of credit programs: the Helping Individuals Reach 
their Aspirations through Microfinance (HIRAM), the Rural Microenterprise Fi-
nancing Program (RMFP) that is funded by ADB, the International Fund for Agri-
cultural Development (IFAD), and the UNDP Microfinance Support Program (MSP). 
All programs make funds available to eligible microfinance institutions for on-
lending to the poor. The RMFP uses the modified Grameen Bank approach (GBA) 
to lending, while the MSP aims to assist retail microfinance institutions by providing 
them loans concurrently with technical assistance. 
The PCFC provides both investment credit (e.g. loans for on-lending) and institu-
tional credit (loans to strengthen the capability of partners to implement and manage 
their PCFC funded credit programs). It charges an interest rate of 12 % and a service 
fee of 1%. The maximum initial end-borrower loan that is allowed is PhP.6,000. Fur-
thermore, conduits are required to re-lend the funds within 90 days from the date of 
release of the original loan from the PCFC. For the various conduits, the average 
loan size is PhP.8,000. So far, the PCFC has released a total of PhP.2.5 million in 
loans – PhP.1.5 million under the HIRAM and PhP.0.8 million under the ADB-
IFAD. 
mêáî~íÉ=jáÅêçÑáå~åÅÉ=fåëíáíìíáçåë=
A survey of 86 organizations of informal sector workers (with a combined member-
ship of close to 40,000) in Metro Manila in 1996 indicates that these organizations 
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provide a wide range of innovative programs and services that serve to protect their 
members from contingencies with little or no help from the government. Prominent 
among these programs are the mutual assistance programs, the savings and credit / 
lending services (SRI, 1996). 
Under the mutual assistance program, members are required to contribute a fixed 
amount on a regular basis to a common fund, which is used to service the claims of 
members in times of contingencies such as death, sickness, accident, disability and 
natural calamity. Thus, these organizations take on the character of an informal social 
security system. 
Death and disability benefits are generally given in the form of grants, while other 
contingent benefits are in the form of loans. In most cases, the loans are sourced 
under the savings and credit / lending services of the organization in which case the 
principal is determined by the amount of savings deposits or capital shares that a 
member has. Meanwhile, 65 of the organizations surveyed offer some type of savings 
program to their members while 84 provide a credit program. 
On the other hand, the amount of contributions varies according to what is considered 
affordable to members. Note that the majority of members of these organizations 
come primarily from the urban poor with an average monthly income of PhP.2,500 
to PhP.7,500. The case studies of four of the 86 organizations included in the SRI 
survey indicate that microinsurance schemes can be financially sustainable despite 
the small contributions that members can afford. It appears that key to this success is 
the establishment of a link between savings and credit so as to maximize savings 
mobilization and the capital base to service social protection needs (SRI, 1996). 
^Üçå=ë~=eáê~éI=fåÅK=E^pefF=
The ASHI has the distinction of being the oldest existing replication of the Grameen 
Bank approach (GBA) to credit delivery to the bottom poor in the Philippines. ASHI 
bases its mission on the principle that given direct access to non-collateral loan funds, 
the poor can increase their income and employment opportunities and in so doing 
not only rise from poverty, but contribute to the social and economic development 
pursuits of the country. Founded in 1989 as an action-research project of the Univer-
sity of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB), ASHI is now an NGO that can enter into 
contract and loan arrangements with and receive grants and donations from various 
local and international agencies. 
ASHI members have grown from 100 in 1989 to 8,802 to date. Its loan portfolio has 
increased from an initial PhP.40,000 in 1989 to PhP.21.1 million as of March 2000. 
More notable is the achievement of a 98.89% loan repayment. ASHI attributes this 
to its earnest effort to impress among its clients the four core values of unity, disci-
pline, hard work and perseverance. 
Access to microfinance services through ASHI has been associated with a substan-
tial reduction of poverty. Among clients in the fourth loan cycle and above, the 
number of very poor was reduced from 76% to 13%. About 51% of members in this 
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group have progressed from being very poor to moderately poor and some 22% have 
completely come out of poverty. In comparison, about half of those who did not join 
four years ago are still very poor and another half are moderately poor. 
ASHI clients have also improved their quality of housing. More than half (53%) of 
ASHI clients now live in houses that score ‘out of poverty’ on the ASHI house in-
dex. Also, there was a significant difference between the educational attainment of 
ASHI clients and the children of non-clients. Although only ten out of the 152 ASHI 
families have children attending college or have already graduated, this rate is still 
better than that of the non-client group, of which there are no children in college. 
During times of poor catch or poor harvest, clients and non-clients had similar coping 
strategies – tightening their belts and eating less. However, only a small percentage 
of ASHI clients compared with non-clients borrowed from usurious sources. This is 
because ASHI does function as a safety net in times of calamities or ‘hungry’ sea-
sons, as members could withdraw from their emergency fund savings (group savings) 
or from their personal savings (savings which earn interest can be withdrawn any-
time). Also, rescheduling or restructuring of loan payments during such times is pos-
sible. In addition, there are special loan windows for home repairs, as well as health 
and educational loans. 
Lastly, there is a striking difference between ASHI clients and non-clients in savings 
behavior. Eighty-four percent of ASHI clients reported that they had personal sav-
ings while only 16% of non-clients had any. This may be due to the fact that savings 
is an important feature of Grameen banking. 
OKP= i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
mêçãçíáçå=çÑ=pã~ää=båíÉêéêáëÉë=
The promotion of small and medium enterprises is a major development strategy being 
adopted by the government. The role of SMEs in the Philippines is not limited to the 
simple creation of wealth or capital. They are vital to dispersing new industries to 
the countryside and stimulating gainful employment. In this sense, they bring about 
more balanced agro-industrial growth and equity in income distribution. 
SMEs tend to be far more innovative in developing indigenous or appropriate tech-
nology, which could then grow into pioneering technological breakthroughs. Avail-
able SME programs may generally be classified into four categories: 
(1) Financial; 
(2) technical, which covers entrepreneurial and workers training; 
(3) backward linkages; and 
(4) research information. 
Ninety-five percent of enterprises in the Philippines are SMEs, employ 55% of the 
labor force, and contribute some 25% of value-added. As such, their promotion and 
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enhancement are of vital importance and necessity in order to maximize their poten-
tial to push the nation into sustainable development and global competitiveness (APO, 
1999). 
Available data from the Department of Trade and Industry indicate that 88% of manu-
facturing establishments are cottage-type size. About 10% are small enterprises, and 
about 1% are large enterprises. Employment generation by cottage-size enterprises 
is 23%; small enterprises, 8%; medium enterprises, 19%; and large enterprises, 50%. 
Significantly, 97% of exporters are SMEs. 
SMEs face a number of problems, including poor policy and institutional environ-
ment, inadequate technology and production skills, limited access to finance and 
other inputs, poor access to information and knowledge, and lack of good manage-
ment structures, systems and capacities. These are exactly the areas of strength of 
large enterprises. 
The government directly participates in the provision of financial services to SMEs 
and poor households through its banking institutions and numerous directed credit 
programs. Two government financing institutions – the Development Bank of the 
Philippines (DBP) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) – lend to MicroSMEs 
and poor households including farmers and land reform beneficiaries either directly 
through their retail lending windows or indirectly through their wholesale lending 
windows. 
The financial sector reforms initiated by the government in the 1990s, e.g. bank 
entry and branching liberalization, have laid the groundwork for promoting microfi-
nance in the country. This was further boosted by the recent passage of the General 
Banking Law of 2000, which includes provisions that set a much clearer policy 
framework for promoting microfinance (Lamberte, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this considerably improved policy environment for microfinance to 
flourish, banks still face some constraints in expanding their financial services to 
MicroSMEs and poor households. Lending to MicroSMEs and poor households is a 
very risky venture, especially if lenders base their decisions solely on the strength of 
the cash flow position and character of borrowers. Instability of the economy can 
make those loans much riskier because cash flows can easily dry up during a sudden 
downturn of the economy. Also, poor infrastructure increases the cost of providing 
financial services to MicroSMEs and poor households (Lamberte, 2001). 
dì~ê~åíÉÉ=~åÇ=cáå~åÅáåÖ=pÉêîáÅÉë=Ñçê=pjbë=
The government is not lacking in programs to assist SMEs financially. The Guarantee 
Program provides a guarantee cover of up to a maximum of 90% on the loans of quali-
fied entrepreneurs. The guarantee primarily works as a collateral substitute or as a 
collateral supplement. A microfinancing facility provides credit by co-financing with 
umbrella NGOs, and allows financing institutions to rediscount their SME loan / credit 
instruments. It can also finance up to a maximum of 90% of the total project cost of 
the SME, with the financing institutions co-financing at least the remaining 10%. 
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A short-term direct financing facility makes available a credit line for working capi-
tal and receivables financing or a short-term loan which can be repaid within one 
year for the purchase of simple machineries and equipment, setting up of sales out-
lets and other business expansions. There is also a direct lending program which 
addresses the credit needs of SMEs for financing their purchase orders for domestic 
or foreign markets. 
eìã~å=`~éáí~ä=cçêã~íáçåI=pâáääë=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=Ei~Äçê=pìééäóF=
The country’s Department of Labor provides bridging or transition opportunities, 
especially to the vulnerable sectors, to help them graduate into more productive, 
remunerative, secured or more formal employment or livelihoods. The key programs 
for this purpose are: 
Promotion of Rural Employment Through Self-employment and Entrepreneur-
ship Development (PRESEED). The Department provides under PRESEED self-
employment opportunities among rural workers and their families, particularly the 
‘assetless’ and ‘landless’ groups who have entrepreneurial potential, through access 
to entrepreneurship training, credit and technical assistance. 
Support to Kabataan Program. The Kabataan Program is the government’s flag-
ship program for the youth. It encourages high school, college and vocational stu-
dents and out of school youth to engage in constructive and productive activities 
throughout the year. Its components are: 
• Special Program for Employment of Students (SPES). The SPES helps poor, 
but deserving students pursue college education by providing them with employ-
ment opportunities during summer and / or Christmas vacations. Employers are en-
couraged to hire the youth by giving them the incentive of paying only 60% of 
the minimum wage, with the government paying the balance of 40% through edu-
cation vouchers. 
• Work Appreciation Program. This year-round youth program promotes work 
appreciation and work ethics among youth by exposing them to actual work situa-
tions, familiarizing them with work procedures / standards, use of machines and 
tools and providing them other practical knowledge relevant to specific occupa-
tions. 
Tulong Alalay sa Taong May Kapansanan. Pursuant to the Magna Carta for Dis-
abled Persons, this program attempts to integrate persons with disabilities into main-
stream society by providing them with training and employment opportunities. 
Rural Works Program. The Department’s Rural Works Program aims to generate 
temporary job placement in community-based infrastructure projects that are labor 
intensive to address the displacements caused by the recent financial crisis and other 
economic restructuring problems, particularly in rural areas. 
The ILO has developed practical guidelines in employment-intensive infrastructure 
programs, which are being introduced in the Philippines (ILO, 2000). 
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Other DOLE carrier programs and projects are: 
Human Resource Development Program. The program seeks to empower employ-
ers, the end-users of skilled workers to achieve productivity and competitiveness and 
to train workers to think critically and creatively, and to nurture the values of work 
ethics, self-reliance, self-discipline and nationalism. The programs in this area in-
clude the Industry Capability Build-up Program (ICBP), Technical Vocational Edu-
cation and Training (TVET) for Workers, Skills Training and Certification, the Dual 
Training System (DTS) and the Apprenticeship Program (TESDA). 
Maritime Training Program. To maintain the world class standing of Filipino sea-
farers and in compliance with the country’s commitments to the Standards for Train-
ing, Certification and Watch-keeping (STCW) Convention, DOLE conducts refresher 
and upgrading courses for maritime officers. 
Labor Standards Enforcement Program. Through the inspectorate program, DOLE 
regulates and enforces compliance with existing laws on general labor standards, 
technical safety standards and general health and safety standards. It also undertakes 
development initiatives like the Work Improvement for Small and Medium Enter-
prises to promote voluntary compliance with labor laws and promote appreciation of 
their value to a productive work place. 
Occupational Safety and Health Program. To inculcate awareness of safety and 
health at the workplace among employers and workers, DOLE conducts training and 
research projects on occupational safety and health. The training conducted includes 
courses on Basic Occupational Safety and Health, Work Environment Measurement, 
Construction Safety, the Zero Accident Program and an appreciation course address-
ing substance abuse. 
oÉëâáääáåÖ=
In the context of displacement of the workers during the Asian crisis, reskilling 
provided the means to equip retrenched workers with skills for new jobs, and offer a 
means to generate some form of income, either through regular employment or self-
employment. Reskilling programs ensure that workers are equipped with functional 
literacy and high value added skills (in the case of overseas workers), which are within 
global standards. To ensure availability of skills for export industries, the govern-
ment made investments in equipment and technology for skills building. The Tech-
nical Education Skills Development Authority put in place a Safety Net Training 
Grant Scheme to address primarily the displacements due to the Philippines’ acces-
sion to the WTO-GATT (Mendoza and Guillermo, 2000). 
iáåâáåÖ=qê~áåáåÖ=kÉÉÇë=~åÇ=j~êâÉí=aÉã~åÇ=
Job Watch of DOLE, as the name implies, generates and publishes information of 
worker displacement with the intention of matching this with available job vacancies. 
Displaced workers register with the Public Services Employment Offices (PESO), 
which carry out Job Watch in each municipality / city. Reports from the municipali-
Social Protection in the Philippines 
195 
ties are summarized into provincial and regional reports. The Bureau of Labor and 
Employment Statistics (BLES) integrates this in order to come up with a national 
picture of the extent of displacement and the potential for reemployment (see Table 
7, Appendix). Only those who registered get information on the government’s pro-
gram for displacement. 
The use of information on displacement is limited to reports generated by DOLE as 
part of its monitoring system. In some local government units like Cebu City, the 
data from the PESO are utilized for the city’s manpower planning and development 
efforts and other social welfare projects of the government. 
Another component is Job Link. It provides different kinds of interventions that aim 
to accelerate reemployment of displaced workers either through jobs or through self-
employment. Reskilling programs fall under this component, through the different 
skills development programs and access mechanisms of various government agen-
cies. Programs range from skilling programs for individuals and companies, liveli-
hood generation programs and employment assistance to some forms of assistance 
to dependents of displaced workers through scholarship programs. Job Link, facili-
tated through the PESO, also offers training cum production for rural workers, an 
expanded livelihood development program and a place assistance program for over-
seas workers. 
iáîÉäáÜççÇ=~åÇ=båíêÉéêÉåÉìêëÜáé=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=
The Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) spearheads enterprise de-
velopment and the creation of livelihood opportunities, particularly benefiting mar-
ginalized sectors, through an integrated and strategic approach covering the promo-
tion, utilization and funding of resource and technology breakthroughs. In partner-
ship with local governments, the TLRC brings its expertise and resources through 
the establishment of Technology and Livelihood Development Centers (TLDCs) in 
cities and provinces. The TLDCs act as channels to deliver TLRC’s livelihood inter-
ventions at the local level. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
nì~äáíó=
The Philippine educational system is one of the most mature in Asia and permeates 
even the remote barangays. However, the Philippine government is faced with the 
challenge of improving the quality of education. Education quality is a function of 
many factors: qualification and number of teachers; availability of learning materials 
and facilities; classroom space and quality. Unfortunately, most Philippine public 
schools are lacking in these areas. Notwithstanding improvements in providing uni-
versal access, the performance of Filipino children in achievement tests and the dif-
ferences in the performance between public and private schools reveal a quality prob-
lem. For instance, Filipino students ranked poorly in the Third International Mathe-
matics and Science Test (TIMST) administered in several countries in 1999, i.e. 
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ranking fourth from bottom in science and third from bottom in mathematics (The 
20 / 20 Initiative: A Comprehensive Agenda of Action for the 21st Century, 2001). 
^ÅÅÉëë=
As of school year 1999–2000, about 97% of children who should be in elementary 
school were actually enrolled. Enrollment in high schools also rose as the participa-
tion rate improved to 65% in the same year. In 1999, the adult (age 15 and above) 
literacy rate was 95.1%. The government is said to have at least coped with the growth 
in enrollment, which had swelled to more than 2% annually for elementary school 
and more than 3% for high school since 1981, together growing faster than the 
population. However, the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 undermined the gains 
as indicated by the increase in drop-out rates and the transfer of students from pri-
vate to public schools (Presidential Task Force, 2001). 
Access to education depends largely on family income and infrastructure. Children 
of low-income households cannot meet their demand for education, because there 
are no credit markets for education. 
Access and cohort-completion rates vary greatly between regions, and the quality of 
education is widely regarded as having declined. The gains in access to basic educa-
tion are overshadowed by the difficulty in enhancing the school’s holding power. 
For instance, for every 100 children who enter Grade 1, only 69 are able to finish 
Grade 6 and less than half (about 48 only) are able to complete secondary schooling. 
More than 30% of children drop out before reaching Grade 6. 
The existing system does not fully prepare Filipinos for the most pressing challenges 
of the labor market today. Education and training policies must provide an environ-
ment for all, especially the talented poor, to seek and access training and retraining 
for the needed skills. This can be achieved through scholarships and education loans. 
Further research and development training is also needed for a government-financed 
center of excellence. 
Inadequate investments in education and training have kept a large proportion of 
workers in low-productivity sectors. Nearly 40% of the employed are still in agricul-
ture at this stage of the country’s development. Lacking industrial skills and disci-
pline, workers in agriculture who are no longer needed due to gains in agricultural 
productivity are absorbed not by the high-productivity sectors, but by the low-
productivity ones like community, social, and personal services. 
Trends in education financing are not encouraging: the rapid expansion of state 
colleges and universities (there are 130 of them today, compared with 25 in Japan 
and 30 in Thailand) has begun to ‘crowd out’ basic education, which has the highest 
social rate of return. 
líÜÉê=fåÅçãÉ=pìééçêí=
The National Statistics Office (NSO) includes as income support and as components 
of employment benefits the following items: bonuses, food subsidies, cost-of-living 
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allowances, commutable transportation and representation allowances, commissions 
paid to employees, retirement and terminal pay, and gratuities. They are designated 
as ‘other benefits’ in the Annual Survey of Establishments. A much broader defini-
tion would include a wider assortment of benefits. Welfare plan provisions found in 
collective bargaining agreements, for example, could range from Christmas (13th 
month) pay and job enrichment programs to scholarships and wedding gifts. 
There is no provision for unemployment benefits. Retrenchment benefits usually take 
the form of early retirement benefits, which are both provided by the government 
and private sectors. In the public sector, the most popular employee services are 
uniforms, meal benefits, and rice benefits (Binghay, 1998). 
lîÉêëÉ~ë=bãéäçóãÉåí=
The Philippines is a big exporter of labor. By 1995, 1.5 million Filipinos lived abroad 
as permanent immigrants and a further 2 million at least worked temporarily abroad 
or at sea (Woodiwiss, 1998). The remittances they send home amount to 6.4% of 
Filipino GNP, and 10% if unrecorded cash and goods brought home by workers are 
included (ILO 2000: Tables 2, 4). These inflows, together with the household flows 
within the country, constitute a significant element of the Filipino welfare regime 
(Gough, 2000). Today, DOLE estimates that there are five million Filipinos working 
abroad. 
The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) provides pre-departure, 
on-site and reentry programs for OFWs through the Overseas Workers Welfare Fund. 
Pre-departure services include grants of insurance coverage, pre-departure loans and 
the Medicare Program, among others. On site services consist of repatriation assis-
tance, family assistance loans, the setting up of Filipino Workers Resource Develop-
ment Centers, community outreach programs, and public assistance, among others. 
Additionally, there is a program for returning OFWs to reintegrate them into main-
stream society. The program components are airport assistance, disability assistance 
for those who suffer a work-related accident or injury; a burial gratuity program for 
legal heirs of deceased OFWs, training grants for seaman’s career development and 
the ‘skills for employment’ scholarship program for children of deceased or disabled 
OFWs. Table 8, Appendix shows the status of welfare cases from 1984–2000. 
jáåáãìã=t~ÖÉ=mçäáÅó=
In the Philippines, the decentralization of minimum-wage setting and the greater re-
liance on bargaining between workers and employers in wage setting are directed at 
relaxing or removing restraints that prevent the price of labor from adjusting to re-
duce unemployment (House of Congress, 2001). Operationally, it is the Regional 
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, which decides on the minimum wage for 
every region (as discussed earlier). 
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PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
Coverage gaps occur due to statutory exclusions, poor enforcement, or the lack of 
attractive benefits despite high contributions for particular groups. 
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Statutory Exclusions. Contributory social insurance covers only the larger enter-
prises in the formal sector. Smaller employers, particularly in industries that com-
pete with the informal sector, are often excluded from many of the provisions, as are 
household workers, daily-rated laborers, farmers, fishermen, and many urban self-
employed. The informal sector thus operates outside the scope of regulations, with 
low and unstable levels of income, and poor working conditions. The result of the 
statutory exclusions is that many of the most vulnerable people are not protected. 
In the Philippines, about 25 million workers from both the private and the public sec-
tors, and another 1 million dependents, receive social security benefits in the form of 
health care, retirement and social disability pensions and other minor assistance in 
the form of maternity and funeral benefits (Figure 1). If the target constituency is the 
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entire labor force of about 34 million workers, then social security is largely off the 
mark. 
The population coverage of the formal social security system in the Philippines is 
among the highest in Asia. That suggests that at least the workers as a group pay the 
costs of their own security. The majority clearly lack any ‘exchange entitlement’ to 
secure social security needs – health care, housing, education, and retirement bene-
fits. 
Even among those covered, the poor workers benefit disproportionately little from 
social security services. The employee contribution is regressive, and poor cross-
subsidization among income groups, among age groups and across regions makes 
the social insurance program a benefit for the better off, paid for in part by the poor. 
The better off have better access to social insurance because they live in urban areas 
where the services abound, and they know how to use the system. 
nì~åíáÑóáåÖ=íÜÉ=_ÉåÉÑáíë=
Short-term insurance benefits include sickness, funeral grants, maternity benefits, and 
rehabilitation service (see Box 1, Appendix). In 2000, Medicare captured the largest 
share of short-term insurance benefits, at 71%. Maternity benefits have a share of 
19%, with rehabilitation service having the lowest share at 0.2%. 
Statistics in 2000 obtained from SSS suggest that death benefits, at 45%, have the 
largest share of benefits among the three long-term programs. Retirement collected 
40% of all long-term benefits in the same year. 
Disability pensions had a share of only 19% of benefits. These claimants received an 
average of PhP.2,669 each. Although rigorous screening procedures by SSS and the 
Employees Compensation Commission ensure the payments accrue to those inca-
pacitated by work-related accidents, it is also possible that high disability claims may 
also reveal moral hazard problems when there are incentives to characterize oneself 
as disabled. 
SSS statistics also show that housing accounted for only 1.2% of total loans in 2000. 
Salary loans, on the other hand, pulled in 98% of all the loans during that year. To-
gether, salary and housing loans accounted for 99% of total loans. 
pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
oáÅÉ=pìÄëáÇó=mêçÖê~ã=
From 1995 to 1998, NFA’s rice releases as a percentage of the country’s total rice 
consumption were 10.7. This indicates that on average only about 11% of the coun-
try’s 14 million households could have actually benefited from the NFA’s rice sub-
sidy. However, during the height of the Asian financial crisis in 1998, NFA’s rice 
releases expanded to 22.2% of total rice consumption as the NFA increased imports 
of rice to about 2 million tons. 
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On the other hand, in 1995–98, NFA procurement of palay as a percentage of total 
palay production was less than 1% on average. This suggests that less than 1% of 
the estimated 3 million farmers could have actually benefited from the implicit sub-
sidy on palay farmers. 
mìÄäáÅ=tçêâÑ~êÉ=~åÇ=bãéäçóãÉåí=mêçÖê~ãë=
The number of individuals employed by the food for work program fluctuated be-
tween 179,000 and 883,000 during the period 1986 to 1991. On the other hand, the 
rural roads project created 247,600 work days per year at its peak, while some 3,364 
unemployed workers found temporary jobs in various government infrastructure 
projects worth PhP.4.4 million under the rural works program in Mindanao in 1998 
(Reyes et al., 1999). 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=Ñçê=fåÇáÖÉåíë=
As of October 2000, only 551,328 households (or some 2.5 million individuals) in 
84 provinces and cities and 777 municipalities were participating in the Indigent 
Program. However, the Arroyo administration plans to accelerate the expansion of 
the program. 
`fapp=
By 1997, CIDSS was in 1,154 barangays in 432 municipalities in 77 provinces. This 
corresponds to 28.1% of the target municipalities and in 2.7% of the target baran-
gays (see Table 1). Thus, the coverage of the CIDSS is by no means large. 
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jáÅêçÅêÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Because of the very nature of the informal sector, data on the reach of microcredit 
and microinsurance schemes are sketchy. Despite this, it is clear that coverage of 
these schemes is small relative to the total number of informal sector workers. For 
instance, SRI (SRI, 1996) found that only 40,000 workers are members of the in-
formal sector organizations in NCR (National Capital Region) that implement micro-
credit and microinsurance schemes. This number represents one percent of the total 
number of informal sector workers in NCR. 
pÉäÑJÉãéäçóãÉåí=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=Ó=h~ìåä~ê~å=Epb^JhF=
This program has been found to be fairly effective in terms of outreach, having 
reached nearly four times its estimated number of beneficiaries (Lamberte et al., 
1997). This is attributed to the network of social workers in SEA-K. Thus, commu-
nity-based development workers and community associations are found to be effec-
tive facilitators and conduits of credit funds to the poor. 
As of 1997, around 3,461 SKAs representing 77,470 individuals in 16 regions have 
benefited from PhP.292 million in seed money released for Level 1. Beneficiaries 
are women (receiving more than 11% of total loans granted), and also include those 
who search for and collect discarded items, out-of-school youth, street children and 
persons with disabilities, poor families, single parents, the unemployed and senior 
citizens. 
In 1998 alone, 19,757 member beneficiaries were provided a total of PhP.53.4 mil-
lion for livelihood projects under Level 1. On the other hand, PhP.12.6 million was 
granted to 16 SEA Kabayans composed of 49 SKAs to augment their capital base. 
mÉçéäÉÛë=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=cáå~åÅÉ=`çêéçê~íáçå=
As at the end of December 2000, the PCFC had 178 active conduits. Of this number, 
37% were rural banks, 31% were cooperatives, and 15% each were NGOs and coop-
erative banks. In turn, some 324,108 individuals have benefited from its various pro-
grams. 
PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=
qÜÉ=ëçÅá~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=éêçÖê~ãë=~êÉ=áåÜÉêÉåíäó=áåÉÑÑáÅáÉåí=~åÇ=Åçëíäó=íç=êìåK=
Because social insurance is tied to a narrow contribution structure on a struggling 
formal labor sector, this has led to inefficiencies. Prior to 1998, SSS has stockpiled 
unnecessarily high surpluses – due to extremely well-managed investment portfolios 
and restrained spending – at the price of inadequate benefits for workers. Today, it is 
on the verge of bankruptcy because of bad investments. 
For SSS, significantly higher benefits can be given to worker members, or a wider 
net of benefits can be cast, without threatening the viability of the program. For GSIS, 
balancing expenditures with revenues is a clear priority. Systematic reform must 
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make sure social insurance leads to neither deficits that oblige the national govern-
ment to intervene nor excessive surpluses that reduce benefit payments to workers. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
How adequate are the funds of the system? Without significant reforms leading to 
improved compliance levels, higher tax rates or reduced benefits, a lower ratio of 
administrative costs to contributions, and significant improvements in the rate of 
return obtained in investment, the present social security programs are unlikely to be 
sustainable in the medium-term (Asher, 1998). 
A youthful working population, combined with a shrinking pool of potential workers 
who can contribute to social insurance through payroll taxes, can set the stage for 
actuarial difficulties for both SSS and GSIS. The same problems may be caused by 
bad investments made by the SSS, which has drained the agency of its reserves. 
Without any payroll tax increases, SSS will fold up in a year or two, according to 
newspaper accounts. 
råÇÉêäóáåÖ=ÇÉãçÖê~éÜáÅë=ïçìäÇ=Å~ìëÉ=ÑìíìêÉ=éêçÄäÉãë=áå=ÄÉåÉÑáí=ÇáëÄìêëÉãÉåíëK=
Demographics suggest that the aging of current SSS and GSIS members (which will 
increase retirement payments) will combine with a shrinking pool of potential work-
ers (which will decrease contributions to social insurance through payroll taxes). 
The actuarial imbalance – projected expenditures for the benefit of retirement pen-
sioners would exceed likely future rates of wage taxation from the working popula-
tion – means that serious difficulties lie ahead for the social insurance system. Of 
course, even if there were no underlying demographics involved, there would still be 
rising concerns about the existing retirement benefit inequities. 
Outside the two social security agencies, factors are at work that sustain stresses on 
social compensation. Average social wages at the firm level are expected to decline 
in the wake of increasing ‘flexibilization’, which entails labor cost-cutting, subcon-
tracting, and accompanying cutbacks in wages and employer-based benefit programs. 
Tax-based programs of social protection are likewise expected to suffer as a slow-
down in the growth of regular employment in the formal sector reduces the revenue 
basis of contributory social insurance schemes. 
All these would maintain pressure on workers to meet security needs with other 
sources of income, mostly from social networks. 
pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ L qê~åëÑÉê=mêçÖê~ãë=
The financing of social assistance / transfer programs is a critical area of concern in 
countries where the coverage of the social insurance system is limited. This is the 
case because that segment of the population which is excluded from the social insur-
ance system has no recourse but to rely on publicly provided social safety net pro-
grams during times of crisis. However, the principal issue with respect to the financ-
ing of this type of social assistance programs stems from the fact that the need for 
Social Protection in the Philippines 
203 
such financing increases precisely when the government can afford it least. That is, 
the government’s fiscal position tends to be adversely affected by natural disasters 
and economic disruptions. 
The Philippine experience in 1997 to 1998 illustrates this problem well. Central gov-
ernment revenues started to falter in the last half of 1997 following the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis. In 1998, total tax revenues were PhP.96.5 billion short of the 
original target. All in all, the tax effort plunged from 16.3% of GNP in 1996 to 
14.8% in 1998 and 13.7% in 1999. 
Nonetheless, the budget of basic social services as well as poverty alleviation appear 
to be better protected relative to the other sectors from the fiscal austerity measures 
implemented in 1998. Thus, Table 9, Appendix shows that the share of poverty 
alleviation activities (net cost of NFA operations, which was largely financed off-
budget) in the government budget as well as the share of basic social services in the 
government budget was maintained in 1998. Despite this positive development, real 
per capita government spending on poverty alleviation (net cost of NFA operations) 
and basic social services declined that year. This is indicative of the inadequacy of 
government spending on social safety nets during the crisis (if one abstracts NFA 
rice price subsidies). 
oáÅÉ=mêáÅÉ=pìÄëáÇó=mêçÖê~ã=
Because the NFA is engaged in an activity that inherently entails some losses, the 
government supports the NFA by providing it with budgetary support in terms of 
both equity infusions and operational subsidies. 
This is consistent with international experience in general food subsidy programs 
which reveals that the cost of transferring income to the poor is high since non-poor 
families also benefit from such a subsidy. The leakage from such schemes was esti-
mated to be about 50% in India, 60% to 70% in Egypt and Morocco and 50% to 
70% in Pakistan (Subarrao, 1996; citing Kennedy, Alderman, 1987). If one assumes 
a 50% leakage, then the cost-benefit ratio of the NFA rice subsidy is equal to 2.5. 
mìÄäáÅ=tçêâÑ~êÉ=~åÇ=bãéäçóãÉåí=mêçÖê~ãë=
The public works program represents a continuous drain on the national government 
budget. However, in the final analysis, their sustainability should be judged on their 
ability to make a real contribution to the build-up of physical infrastructure that will 
increase productivity. Thus, the choice of projects is critical. 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=Ñçê=fåÇáÖÉåíë=
With the premium for the health insurance set at PhP.1,188 per household, the target 
number of indigent population enrolled would cost the central governments and 
LGUs some PhP.2.2 billion each year beginning 2004. However, it is envisioned that 
both the national government and the LGUs will recoup these expenditures through 
increased cost recovery in government hospitals as the National Health Insurance 
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Program achieves universal coverage. At this point, the current difficulty in expand-
ing the coverage of the self-employed is a major obstacle to achieving universal 
coverage. 
jáÅêçÅêÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
pÉäÑJÉãéäçóãÉåí=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=Ó=h~ìåä~ê~å=Epb^JhF=
The program’s repayment rate is quite high at 90%. This is indicative not only of the 
strong social preparation of the SKAs, but also of the consistency between the loan 
size and the borrower’s absorptive capacity. At the same time, the administrative cost 
per peso of SEA-K loan (at PhP.0.10 per peso) is low compared to similar programs. 
However, since SEA-K loans are interest-free, the program is not able to recover its 
financial, operational, and administrative costs. This makes the program unsustainable 
and dependent on the continuous infusion of funds from the government’s budget. 
mÉçéäÉÛë=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=cáå~åÅÉ=`çêéçê~íáçå=
An assessment of the Grameen-type program of the PCFC indicates that the per 
capita household expenditures of clients tend to be higher than those of non-clients. 
Moreover, poverty rates for clients are lower than those for non-clients. These find-
ings suggest that participation in the Grameen-type program helps improve the wel-
fare of clients.5 However, Lamberte et al. (Lamberte et al., 1997) show that the said 
program is not able to recover cost, regardless of whether cost reflects administra-
tive cost only or includes financial cost also. Thus, the PCFC is financially unsus-
tainable like the SEA-K. 
In an effort to reduce the fiscal costs associated with government-directed credit pro-
grams, the government adopted a market-oriented policy framework for microfinance 
in 1999. With this reform, the government will veer away from the direct involve-
ment of government non-financial agencies (GNFAs) and government-owned and 
controlled corporations (GOCCs) in the implementation of credit programs. Instead, 
it is envisioned that private financial institutions will play a greater role as retailers 
in the provision of financial services to the poor with the government financial insti-
tutions (GFIs) acting as wholesalers. 
PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
Women workers dominate in the services sector (community, social, and personal 
services); and in financing, insurance, real estate and business services, including 
retail and wholesale trade. There are more women than men in professional, techni-
cal, and related jobs (Maragtas et al., 1999b). 
As a result, women workers fare better in the distribution of SSS per capita benefits 
by sex. Women get more benefits per recipient. Employees’ Compensation favors 
male workers, per recipient, but the gap is narrow. 
                             
5 This result is replicated in the case of the Ahon sa Hirap, Inc. 
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Social insurance programs need to be designed to take into account the longer life 
expectancies of women, the additional implications for women of the risk of loss of 
support due to death, abandonment, and the less stable earnings patterns commonly 
found among women workers. 
Where benefits are tied strictly to previous earnings, discrimination against women 
in the labor market is likely to translate into inadequate unemployment, disability or 
retirement benefits and women’s less regular employment patterns can mean either 
lower benefits or the loss of program eligibility (Ortiz, 2001). 
PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
Both SSS and GSIS have statutory limitations on the amount of funds that can be 
spent on administration. The limit is 10% of revenue. This limit has enabled the two 
agencies to support a salary decompression scheme. Top-ranking officers enjoy 
considerably high salaries and perks. But the Presidential Committee on Good Gov-
ernance has judged the salary levels in the two institutions to be unreasonably high, 
and is moving to put new restrictions on how the 10% is to be spent. 
GSIS is plagued by income shortfalls and poorly managed investments, although it 
has been more generous in benefit spending. Between SSS and GSIS, GSIS emerges 
as the more expensive administrator. On average, the operating expenses of GSIS 
are two to four times costlier than those of SSS. A merger of the two institutions, al-
though a tough political challenge, would achieve scale economies and improve or-
ganizational efficiency. 
PKS= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
Existing social insurance programs have a mixed record in adequately addressing 
the insurance needs of many workers, especially needy groups such as poor workers 
and older workers. Public employees also receive much more generous benefits than 
private sector workers. Overall, access to benefits is skewed in favor of less disad-
vantaged groups. 
Social solidarity requires risk sharing among income groups, age groups and persons 
of differing health status. Cross-subsidies occurring among public sector employees 
and among private sector workers suggest, however, an unintended infraction of this 
principle owing to differing incentives generated by state policies on contributions 
and benefits. Records from the SSS, GSIS, and the HDMF indicate that the direction 
of subsidization is not necessarily from rich to poor, from young to old, or from well-
protected groups to disadvantaged groups (Gonzalez, 1996). 
The general pattern of cross-subsidies exhibits unflattering features. There are a num-
ber of cases when (1) one or more of the poorer groups are subsidizing more well-
to-do groups; (2) younger, healthier groups have a higher share in benefits than in 
contributions; (3) women workers subsidize male workers; and (4) a poor region 
would be a source of subsidy for less poor regions. Overall, there is little relation-
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ship between the vision of solidarity to protect disadvantaged groups and social 
insurance institutions as they currently function. 
As seen in previous discussions, universal programs are relatively easier to adminis-
ter, but suffer from both high leakage and under-coverage. Benefits are not given to 
those who are most in need of them. As a consequence, the poor have limited access 
to social security services. Targeted programs, on the other hand, enhance cost-
effectiveness. Target groups receive more benefits for the same cost, or for fixed 
benefit levels, costs are reduced. 
Yet target group-oriented programs, where groups are granted eligibility on the basis 
of some easily identifiable shared characteristic, are not given the importance they 
deserve. Apart from massive social assistance programs (e.g. victims of natural catas-
trophes), few schemes exist that would benefit low-income groups, including poor 
workers and their families. The handful that exist include calamity loans (given by 
SSS and GSIS to members who suffer losses arising from natural disasters) and union-
based social assistance. 
Many of these have tiny constituencies. Organized labor is only a tenth of the entire 
labor force, and few unions have their own social assistance schemes such as emer-
gency loans, health clinics, and consumer cooperatives. Medicare II6, which is tar-
geted at communities with low welfare levels, is operational only in a few munici-
palities. 
Management inefficiencies may not be insignificant. Administrative costs are high 
because of the additional need to select and monitor beneficiaries. In the case of 
calamity loans, no screening device is built into the targeting mechanism, so that 
rich and poor alike in disaster areas could access the benefits. This could also give 
rise to self-selection effects: to a certain extent, those with the ability to transact with 
ease are those from the middle and upper end of the income ladder. 
Medicare II, despite being a low-cost intervention, is underfunded. Also, only small 
predictable costs are covered, a set up that is not economically efficient as collecting 
the amount needed to pay for routine checkups only to return the same amounts to 
the beneficiaries as the services are provided makes little sense. The Medicare II 
projects are unsustainable if no substantial subsidy is provided by the national gov-
ernment or if they are not integrated with the formal system. 
pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=
oáÅÉ=mêáÅÉ=pìÄëáÇó=mêçÖê~ã=
It should be emphasized that the NFA intervention is a general consumer subsidy 
and, as such, benefits even the non-poor. Figure 2 in the Appendix shows that the 
regional distribution of NFA rice was not sensitive to poverty incidence even with 
the implementation of the Rice Subsidy Program in selected provinces in 1998. 
                             
6 Medicare I is the main medical care program. 
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For instance, it shows that the share of NFA rice in total rice consumption in ARMM 
(Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao), CAR (Cordillera Autonomous Region) 
and Western Visayas was 14.6%, 16.3% and 6.7% respectively (well below the 22.2% 
average) in 1998, although the incidence of poverty in the said regions was 57.3%, 
42.5% and 39.9% respectively (higher than the national average of 31.2%). In con-
trast, NFA rice accounted for 28.3% and 27.4% of total rice consumption in Central 
Luzon and Southern Tagalog (including NCR) respectively, although poverty inci-
dence in these regions is the lowest around the country at 15.4% and 15.8% respec-
tively. 
Given this perspective, Balisacan et al. (Balisacan et al., 2000) suggests that the provi-
sion of food subsidies to the poorer segments of society can be done more effec-
tively through food stamps in urban areas and food-for-work programs in rural areas. 
He stresses that the design of these programs should be guided by certain principles 
and institutional arrangements, like the use of geographic targeting and incorpora-
tion of screening costs and penalties for leakage and under-coverage. 
mìÄäáÅ=tçêâÑ~êÉ=~åÇ=bãéäçóãÉåí=mêçÖê~ã=
Discussions with the project managers of the food-for-work program indicate that 
many laborers were willing to work for as little as PhP.60 per day compared to the 
program’s effective wage rate of PhP.104-PhP.108 per day and the market rate of 
PhP.90 per day (Subbarao et al., 1996). In like manner, the wage rate adopted by the 
Second Rural Roads Improvement Project was 25% to 30% higher than the minimum 
agricultural wage rate. As such, the higher effective wage rate offered by these pro-
grams attracted even the non-poor and eroded their effectiveness as a poverty alle-
viation measure. This suggests that there is a need to restrict employment of workers 
(either through means-testing or self-targeting mechanisms based on appropriate 
wage setting) in similar projects in the future if they are to be effective in targeting 
the poor. 
At the same time, the program was not timed to counter seasonal fluctuations and 
could have competed with the agricultural activities in the area. In this regard, Sub-
barao noted that the program has limited impact in stabilizing consumption. 
dçîÉêåãÉåí=jáÅêçÅêÉÇáí=pÅÜÉãÉë=
mÉçéäÉÛë=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=cáå~åÅÉ=`çêéçê~íáçå=
The PCFC’s conduits are spread all over the country. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows 
the distribution of PCFC’s total loan releases across regions. However, it shows that 
regions with a higher poverty incidence tend to receive a smaller portion of PCFC’s 
total loan releases. 
`fapp=
In the first instance, targeting in the CIDSS is largely done by geographical target-
ing. In 1995 to 1996, only municipalities belonging to the fifth and sixth income 
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class were eligible under the program. However, the coverage expanded in 1997 to 
include all municipalities regardless of income class. 
On the other hand, barangays were selected on the basis of the results of an MBN 
(Minimum Basic Needs) survey, the willingness of local groups to undertake the 
CIDSS, accessibility, and the stability of the peace and order situation in the area. 
However, Bautista (Bautista, 1999) reported that only 77.5% of the selected barangays 
were in fact the poorest in the municipalities. 
PKT= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
The success of social protection depends on effective administration and good im-
plementation of adequately designed programs. Common operational problems among 
government agencies include corruption, cronyism and favoritism; inadequate in-
formation processing, storage and retrieval systems; and organizational cultures that 
are hostile to customer service. Where implementing organizations already have these 
kinds of problems, the development of an organizational reform strategy will be just 
as important as the development of a program reform strategy. 
At the policy levels, the planning of social protection is affected by a wide range of 
social and economic factors and especially by the quality of governance. Good gov-
ernance is crucial for sound macro-economic management, progressive taxation and 
equitable allocations of funds for social development. At the implementing levels, 
the impact of basic social services is reduced by governance defects such as inade-
quate budgets and wasteful, inefficient and unresponsive administrations. It is the 
poor who suffer most due to poorer access, little bargaining power and influence on 
local officialdom and service providers. The effects of such deficiencies in govern-
ance are exemplified by the highly unsatisfactory coverage situation in social insur-
ance schemes. These schemes have been in force for decades in many countries but 
have failed to reach those most in need of protection (Ortiz, 2001). 
Corruption exists on a fairly significant level in the Philippines. As is well known, 
corruption biases government spending away from socially valuable goods, such as 
social protection. Based on the World Bank study, about PhP.200 billion or 30% of 
the government’s annual budget of PhP.600 billion goes to waste due to graft and 
corruption. Ill-gotten money, or money realized from corruption, is not invested nor 
spent in the Philippines, but is spirited out of the country and kept abroad to avoid 
detection and prosecution. Grand corruption may already have robbed the nation of 
trillions of pesos over the years. In a recent event, the state-controlled pension fund 
in SSS lost billions of pesos in questionable investments during the Joseph Estrada 
administration. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Given the difficulties in funding public social assistance programs in times of crisis, 
there is a need to develop a more financially sustainable social protection program 
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for that segment of the population (about 40% to 50%) outside the ambit of SSS / 
GSIS, so as to ensure that they have access to a means of smoothing their income 
and expenditures during times of crisis.7 The positive experience of private microfi-
nance institutions in the country with respect to the build-up of members’ savings 
capacity suggests that the establishment of more Grameen-type savings / credit / in-
surance programs across the country will help provide assistance to members during 
times of crisis. 
q~ÄäÉ=OW= mçíÉåíá~ä=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=^ééêç~ÅÜÉë=Äó=bÅçåçãáÅ=pÉÅíçê=
= cçêã~ä=ëÉÅíçêë= fåÑçêã~ä=ëÉÅíçêë=
^ÖêáÅìäíìêÉ= ^ÖêáÅìäíìê~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=
aáë~ëíÉê=éêÉé~êÉÇåÉëë=
`ÜáäÇ=éêçíÉÅíáçå=
^ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãë=Eëâáääë=ÇÉîÉäJ
çéãÉåíI=ä~Äçê=ÉñÅÜ~åÖÉë=L=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
ëÉêîáÅÉëI=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ÖÉåÉê~íáçåF=
m~ëëáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éçäáÅáÉë=
pçÅá~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=
cçêã~ä=ëçÅá~ä=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
`ÜáäÇ=éêçíÉÅíáçå=
jáÅêçáåëìê~åÅÉ=
pçÅá~ä=ÑìåÇë=
aáë~ëíÉê=éêÉé~êÉÇåÉëë=
pçÅá~ä=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
^ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãë=Eëâáääë=ÇÉîÉäçéJ
ãÉåíI=ä~Äçê=ÉñÅÜ~åÖÉë=L=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ëÉêîáÅÉëI=
ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ÖÉåÉê~íáçåF=
mêáÅÉ=ëìééçêíë=~åÇ=äáãáíÉÇ=~ÖêáÅìäíìê~ä=áåëìêJ
~åÅÉ=
fåÇìëíêó=~åÇ=
pÉêîáÅÉë=
^ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãë=Eëâáääë=ÇÉîÉäJ
çéãÉåíI=ä~Äçê=ÉñÅÜ~åÖÉë=L=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
ëÉêîáÅÉëI=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ÖÉåÉê~íáçåF=
`ÜáäÇ=éêçíÉÅíáçå=
pçÅá~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=
m~ëëáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=
cçêã~ä=ëçÅá~ä=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
`ÜáäÇ=éêçíÉÅíáçå=
jáÅêçáåëìê~åÅÉ=
^ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãë=Eëâáääë=ÇÉîÉäçéJ
ãÉåíI=ä~Äçê=ÉñÅÜ~åÖÉë=L=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ëÉêîáÅÉëI=
ÉãéäçóãÉåí=ÖÉåÉê~íáçåF=
pçÅá~ä=ÑìåÇë=
pçÅá~ä=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
pçìêÅÉW= lêíáòI=OMMN=
Micro-insurance offers the possibility of providing social insurance at affordable 
prices, expanding coverage by having a realistic understanding of the problems that 
communities face, and promoting community involvement. Options for the future 
include the pooling of different existing organizations, private-public partnerships, 
and an assessment of the role of reinsurance. A second approach is to devote more 
effort to the marketing of microinsurance, as a large percentage of the target popula-
tion is still not well informed of the benefits of being insured. 
However, the experience also indicates that government non-financial institutions 
like the PCFC are not efficient in managing directed credit programs for the poor. 
Moreover, the evidence to date suggests that the implementation of Grameen-type 
programs is better left to private microfinance institutions but with GFIs being the 
wholesale source of funds. In this context, the government has (1) to identify the 
factors that are key to the success of the programs discussed in this paper considering 
                             
7 Although the extension of the coverage of the Philippine national health insurance program to include 
indigents is laudable not only in broadening its coverage but also in improving its financial sustain-
ability, its impact would only be limited to the health sector. Moreover, the realization of such an ex-
pansion remains to be demonstrated. 
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that similar programs in the past have failed, and (2) to explore ways of upscaling 
microcredit and microinsurance programs. 
What is the appropriate role of government in support of microfinance institutions? 
First, government assistance is needed to provide programs to help build the capac-
ity of these organizations in the area of financial and credit management and deposit 
mobilization. As these entities (particularly the NGOs) become more engaged in 
microfinance work, their deposit mobilization has to be integrated into their basic 
operation. Thus, they have to shift their focus from fundraising to deposit taking. 
Second, the government is also needed in providing a suitable supervisory and regu-
latory framework for microfinance institutions. At present, there is no agency regu-
lating the deposit-taking function and financial intermediary function of coopera-
tives and NGOs. Consequently, poor people who put their savings in these organiza-
tions are not adequately protected. Third, the government should help establish 
performance standards for these institutions. 
In the end, it should be emphasized that these Grameen-type programs have to be 
financially self-sufficient. That is, they should be able to recover not only their ad-
ministrative cost but also the financial cost of their operations. In this regard, it is 
important that end borrowers pay market rates of interest. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
RKN= cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
A number of lessons can be learned from the major findings: 
1. As the country adapts to globalization, some of the changes are likely to induce 
losses in human welfare and setbacks in social compensation. 
Globalization alongside with its opportunities for human advancement is creating new 
threats to human welfare. Globalization introduces the Philippines to job and income 
and health insecurities. Dislocations from economic and corporate restructuring, and 
from dismantling the institutions of social protection, have meant greater insecurity 
in jobs and incomes. The pressures of global competition have led countries and em-
ployers to adopt more flexible labor policies with more precarious work arrange-
ments (United Nations Development Programme, 1999). The policy changes that are 
taking place are bringing in their wake consequences that adversely affect human 
welfare. Stalled social expenditures have a direct impact on vulnerable groups. 
At the microeconomic level, as firms try to become more competitive by downsizing 
and adopting flexibilization measures, prospects for labor have become bleaker. 
Flexibilization reduces the firm’s obligations to offer regular employment, thus elimi-
nating the need for social compensation and reducing, on a wider scale, the revenue 
basis of statutory social security programs. Salaried workers who are retained are 
forced to accept cutbacks in employee benefits in order to survive. 
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Yet it is no longer a question of whether the changes are necessary or not. Desirable 
or not, the drive for global competitiveness would make them inevitable. The response 
therefore is not whether to adapt or not, but how. 
Because their concern is on the ‘big picture’, macroeconomic policies will fail to 
reach poor workers. What is crucial is to ensure that human needs, specifically the 
welfare concerns of workers, are adequately addressed. Macroeconomic policy set-
ting must be balanced by sectoral and targeted programs directed toward protecting 
sectors particularly in need. The social protection mechanisms in place have a great 
role to play in providing a conscious and coherent attempt to offset the adverse im-
pact of current economic changes on wages and social compensation, and in crucial 
concerns such as health care, housing, education, and security for the elderly. 
2. Reforms are necessary, but many of the current initiatives may not be enough to 
secure the social protection of low-income workers. 
Reforms will be needed to make sure the social protection system withstands the 
pressures of a changing economic environment, and inability to introduce changes 
might mean further difficulties for workers. But initiatives being undertaken or con-
templated may not be sufficient. 
For example, the efforts of DOLE to forbid labor-only subcontracting – backed up 
by a number of court rulings favoring labor – have not deterred its practice. Poor 
capacity to monitor the behavior of firms has contributed to its widespread usage. 
DOLE has also intervened in a number of cases to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements. But again, its poor surveillance capacity hinders a successful attack 
against violators of workers’ rights. 
New rounds of contribution rate hikes are often the policy response to ensure both 
benefits and financial solvency of statutory social insurance. But the benefits’ real 
value is easily eroded by inflation. Much more importantly, restructuring the contri-
bution structure without addressing the issue of equitable cross-subsidies would still 
leave the poor workers shortchanged in the distribution of benefits. 
3. There are tradeoffs between giving broader coverage and maintaining long-
term program viability and intergenerational equity. 
Even if it were better allocated, social security spending would not be enough to fully 
finance a minimum package of cost-effective social insurance services for workers. 
So far, there is very limited room for maneuver because of the small revenue base of 
statutory social security, and the need to maintain a reasonable level of reserves to 
preserve viability and contain any shocks to the system. A pay-as-you-go system may 
not thrive in a situation of high unemployment and struggling economic growth. 
Given such constraints, there is a pressing need to lower expectations about what 
can be accomplished by social security systems, so that the reduced expectations of 
workers can be fulfilled. 
4. Family support will remain an important part of social networks, but it should 
not become a substitute for meeting the social security needs of workers. The 
key is to increase the choices for the workers. 
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Informal social security schemes operate well in communities and persist despite the 
existence of formal social protection systems because of the apparent willingness of 
households to pay at least some of the costs of social security. 
There is no justification, however, for relying exclusively on family support to main-
tain protection for old age and against other risks. Social protection is a public good 
for which the government has full accountability. What is important is for the gov-
ernment to provide incentives that will permit households to find the most efficient 
mix between household transfers and government measures. For example, house-
holds can be encouraged to co-finance retirement and other insurance schemes. Giv-
ing workers a number of economically viable choices, instead of narrowing their op-
tions to extremes (reducing their access to the system, on the one hand, or allowing 
them a somewhat free ride on formal social security, on the other), would result in 
better targeting of resources and greater sensitivity of public programs to their needs. 
mçäáÅó=léíáçåë=
Reforming the existing social compensation mechanisms would require a number of 
policy choices. 
1. Sustained promotion of macroeconomic policies that expand levels of output, 
investment, and security need satisfaction. 
Nothing works better than macroeconomic policies that simultaneously promote equi-
table economic growth, job creation, and social protection. Economy-wide adjust-
ment programs should go hand in hand with social investment or measures intended 
to reinforce the positive effects of economy-wide policies. These should include 
productive asset-creating programs that improve incomes and create human capital 
by enabling targeted poor groups to actively participate in the economic life of the 
nation. Increases in demand-driven social protection and assistance funds must pro-
vide enough incentives by way of benefits, relative to the cost of participation, to 
make the beneficiaries truly active partners in economic growth. 
Even in the short run, if tradeoffs in the allocation of limited resources become ob-
vious, social safety nets will have to be provided to offset the worst effects of macro-
economic policies. As the links between growth-oriented development and social 
protection are being defined, it would be necessary to couple direct economic in-
vestments to expanded social security mechanisms. 
2. Selective use of policy instruments for prioritizing and restructuring social in-
surance resources in favor of poor workers. 
Several policy instruments can be used selectively to ensure low-income workers 
have full access to social insurance resources: 
a) Changes in the contribution and benefit structure. The idea is for the better off 
to subsidize the social security needs of the poor workers. Beringuela (Beringuela, 
1993) has demonstrated that this is possible in Medicare by raising the income 
ceiling on contributions, lowering the payroll tax rate and increasing the amount 
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of benefits. Similar studies on the other social insurance components, such as 
Employees Compensation and Social Security, can be undertaken to demon-
strate the feasibility of equitable cross-subsidization. 
b) Automatic indexation of benefits. Adjusting benefits is a discretionary practice, 
requiring approval by social security boards. Yet social security schemes are ef-
fective in cushioning the workers against the impact of economic shocks or re-
structuring only to the degree that there is a regular indexation of benefits 
(Gillion, 1993). It is fully justified on equity grounds. The equity standard may 
be the consumer price index, or index of net earnings. Index-linked increases are 
also possible in provident funds. Of course, indexation may also apply to contri-
bution rates. Like wage indexation, benefit indexation requires a thorough study, 
because of its possible adverse impact on employment levels and on govern-
mental fiscal resources. 
c) Targeted social compensation schemes. To protect the most vulnerable workers, 
social security can be designed in a manner that discourages the better off from 
using it. Grosh (1998), citing medical care as an example, suggests that low-
level services for poor groups may be subsidized if similar, but high-level ser-
vices (e.g. health maintenance organizations, or HMOs) can be supplied by the 
private sector for the well-off. Housing and education can be similarly fashioned 
to achieve self-targeting outcomes. 
d) Other targeted schemes can be considered. There are, for instance, customized 
options that take into account the institutional capacities existing in the targeted 
areas. If firms are extensive in urban areas, a program targeted through factories 
will have few under-coverage problems. Targeting benefits ensure a better real-
location of resources, but means testing (which relies on reported income or on 
other verifiable correlates of poverty) will almost surely raise administrative 
costs. Still, targeting is extremely helpful in reducing leakages and making sure 
more support is available to those most in need. 
d) Shifting contributions from wages to profits. Because formal social security is 
wage-based, it taxes labor more than capital, and thus lowers the returns to la-
bor. If part of the burden of social security contributions is shifted from labor to 
profits, this distortion in the use of factors can be minimized. A profits contribu-
tion can be enforced in lieu of a payroll contribution, but this proposition will 
have to be given careful study. 
3. Where possible, expansion of existing contributory social security programs to 
cover those displaced by flexibilization practices. 
There may be justification for significant government intervention to inhibit private 
action that eliminates the social compensation of displaced workers, especially those 
who are made worse-off by flexibilization. Unless there is preemptive action by the 
government, it seems doubtful whether firms can be prevented from resorting to 
subcontracting practices that whittle down existing social protection schemes. The 
government can restructure the current social security schemes to cover those who 
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are sidelined by downsizing moves (e.g. by offering unemployment insurance), or 
those who end up in contingent employment situations (e.g. by extending coverage 
to outworkers). A broader program of mandatory coverage even for subcontractors 
would eliminate unjustified social wage differentials between regular employees and 
contingent workers. 
These changes would, as in the case of other reforms, require a reevaluation of the 
benefit and contribution structure aimed at achieving equity and adequacy. 
4. Improvements in the efficiency of social security agencies. 
SSS and GSIS can enhance their respective systems to maintain a better symmetry 
between benefits and contributions by increasing the incidence of benefits and GSIS 
by eliminating its cost burdens without skimping on important aspects of program 
management and implementation. Both institutions will have to improve the quality 
of social security services. 
The justifications for a unitary institution apply to all social insurance components: 
wider coverage (which could include non-regular employees in the private and pub-
lic sectors), and efficiency gains in collection, monitoring, fund management and 
claims processing. 
A merger between SSS and GSIS would likely invite apprehension over practicality, 
ease of implementation, political feasibility, and high consolidation costs. But in 
reality, there may be few allocative implications in the long run. 
5. Monitoring of the social security situation, especially of living standards and 
health of low-income workers, so that the effectiveness of reforms may be as-
sessed and modified. 
Keeping track of the human condition of workers – their health, living standards, 
ability to respond to risks and emergencies – is necessary to determine the impact of 
both economic changes and the reforms in social compensation. Monitoring and 
evaluation allow decision-makers to ascertain the kinds of changes necessary to 
keep the social protection system responsive to the needs of workers. Regular surveys 
that measure key social security coverage rates and outcomes in various regions may 
be critical for long-term effective operation of the system of social security. 
6. Increasing the bargaining power of workers to give them a ‘first line of defense’ 
against setbacks in social compensation. 
Fringe benefits used to be a strategic variable in collective bargaining between unions 
and employers. As labor is ‘flexibilized’, however, hard-won social security rights 
are being eroded. Unions must continue pressing for the preservation of social pro-
tection provisions in collective bargaining agreements, but legislation and govern-
ment regulation would help immensely (especially non-unionized workers). The gov-
ernment needs to improve the legal framework for social protection. 
Amendments to the Labor Code have been long overdue. As suggested by the Cen-
ter for Research Communications (CRSS / CRC) study, the repeal should focus on 
Social Protection in the Philippines 
215 
setting limits on subcontracting by delineating which forms are legally permissible. 
It should also include a penal clause on labor-only subcontracting. Additionally, in 
order to establish clear guidelines that workers can use for bargaining leverage, court 
decisions on labor-only subcontracting cases should be collated and published. A 
pro-labor Congressional initiative is crucial in making sure the rights of workers to 
social wages is not left out of any subcontracting arrangements. The strengthening 
of the regulatory powers of DOLE is just as important, so that it could effectively 
enforce CBAs and impose sanctions on erring employers. 
Labor federations can be of big help in the effort to protect outworkers. They should 
cast a wider net by giving formal recognition to a permanent pool of casual or tem-
porary workers, offering them skills training or retooling, and establishing job place-
ments systems. 
RKO= fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
mçîÉêíó=^ääÉîá~íáçå=mêçÖê~ã=îëK=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=mêçÖê~ã=
In a country like the Philippines where the poverty incidence is high even when there 
is no natural disaster or economic disruption, there is an acknowledged difficulty in 
making a clear distinction between poverty alleviation programs and social protec-
tion programs. This is the case because existing poverty programs of the government 
in almost all cases serve a dual role – as an instrument for poverty alleviation and as 
a social protection program when crisis hits. The function of responding to crisis situa-
tions is thus often built into the existing poverty programs of various agencies. Gov-
ernment agencies, especially in the economic and social sectors, have therefore each 
maintained at least one program which they regularly implement and which can be 
expanded if they are called to contribute by providing services whenever any form 
of calamity strikes. Perhaps this is the fact because the Philippines has regularly been 
subject to crises of some form or other, such as typhoons, floods, El Niño, La Niña, 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, financial and even civil and religious conflicts. This 
is not a bad practice per se if one considers that it takes time to put in place the me-
chanics, logistics and institutional structure of a poverty alleviation program and / or 
social assistance program. The more successful programs require some degree of 
social mobilization. 
mêçîáÇáåÖ=_~ëáÅ=pçÅá~ä=pÉêîáÅÉë=
Earlier experience with crisis situations suggests that the poor tend to cut back on 
their consumption of basic social services during periods of crisis primarily because 
their incomes have been reduced. This suggests the need to protect the public provision 
of basic social services during times of crisis. Furthermore, it is important that regu-
lar modes of delivering basic social services should be enhanced during such periods 
to help the poor overcome the high private costs of utilizing basic public social ser-
vices, like transport costs for the purpose of education. In addition to this, mecha-
nisms to compensate for the loss / reduction in income should not be forgotten, since 
not all goods and services consumed by the poor are provided by the public sector. 
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bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=fãé~Åí=çÑ=mêçÖê~ãë=
`ÜçáÅÉ=çÑ=mêçÖê~ãë=
Different types of emergency and crisis situations affect various groups differently. 
For instance, in 1997 / 1998 poorer households in the rural areas, particularly farmers 
and fishermen, were the hardest hit by El Niño, while the wage earners in the formal 
sector and the construction industry were more adversely affected by the Asian fi-
nancial crisis. On the one hand, the impact of El Niño was transmitted through re-
duced agricultural output, higher food prices and a rise in underemployment and on 
the other hand, the incomes of wage earners were reduced as many of them were 
either forced to take a cut in number of hours worked or were laid off. Consequently, it 
is essential to tailor-make the design of social protection programs to the nature of 
the specific social / economic disruption that the country faces at any point in time. 
In general, the experience in the Philippines suggests that some types of social pro-
tection programs work better than others. For instance, the past performance of NFA 
subsidies clearly indicates that universal food subsidies are not cost-effective. At the 
same time, the government does not appear to have the comparative advantage in 
directly implementing credit-based employment programs, but private microfinance 
institutions (particularly those that follow the Grameen Bank approach) have been 
shown to help improve the welfare of their poor clients. Moreover, most of these 
organizations are effective in reaching the poor, especially women who are found to 
be good borrowers. On the other hand, public workfare programs have been proven 
to be an effective social safety net in other countries. However, the Philippines has 
had some experience here that points to some pitfalls that have to be avoided in this 
regard. In particular, public works programs should be timed so as not to compete 
with existing employment opportunities in the area. Also, the wage rate that should 
be used for public works programs should not exceed the market wage rate so as to 
enforce self-targeting on the part of the beneficiaries. 
q~êÖÉíáåÖ=^ééêç~ÅÜ=
In general, it is important to recognize that the cost of administering the means test, 
such as beneficiary screening procedures, can be prohibitive. Thus, there is a good 
deal of value in designing programs with self-targeting elements. In the case of pub-
lic workfare, this would involve setting wages below the market wage rate. In the 
case of food subsidies, this may involve choosing food items that may be classified 
as inferior goods or those that are consumed disproportionately by the poor. On the 
other hand, simulations have shown that the most effective approach, given informa-
tion constraints, is the one which targets the poorest people in the poorest prov-
inces / city (Balisacan et al., 2000). 
cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
There is an urgent need to develop more financially sustainable social safety net 
programs for the portion of the population that is not covered by SSS / GSIS. At the 
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same time, the experience of private microfinance institutions in the country tends to 
affirm their ability to stimulate savings amongst their members. Thus, it is suggested 
that the government expand its support for Grameen-type savings / credit / insurance / 
provident funds that provide loans and assistance to members during times of crisis. 
fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=píêìÅíìêÉë=~åÇ=mêçÅÉëëÉë=
iÉ~Ç=^ÖÉåÅó=
There seems to be a great need for an agency or a body that will be tasked with the 
coordination of the design, implementation and monitoring of social assistance pro-
grams. Such an agency can be expected to bring greater focus to social safety nets. 
At present, there is a tendency for the various sectoral agencies to simply expand 
their existing poverty alleviation programs quite independently of other agencies in 
times of crisis. 
However, there is no need to create a new ‘body’. In principle, either one of the Social 
Development Committee (SDC) under the National Economic and Development Au-
thority (NEDA) and the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) may take on the 
lead role in the area of social safety net programs. The NEDA-SDC is the highest 
policy-coordinating body for all social sector programs, while the NAPC is in charge 
of the overall coordination of poverty-reduction initiatives. The NAPC has the ad-
vantage of having a better representation across sectors, since it includes representa-
tives not only from other government agencies but also from basic sectors and 
NGOs. However, the NEDA-SDC has an edge in terms of being more established 
and stable as an institution. 
oçäÉ=çÑ=idrë=
Related to the issue of the role of the NAPC is the role of the LGUs in poverty pro-
grams. RA 8425 provides that ‘the local government units through the local devel-
opment councils of the province, city municipality or barangay shall be responsible 
for the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the national Anti-
Poverty Agenda in their respective jurisdictions. On the other hand, the central gov-
ernment shall provide: 
1) a menu of high priority anti-poverty programs and projects from which the LGUs 
can select; 
2) technical assistance to LGUs in project development and capability building; 
and 
3) fund augmentation for LGUs undertaking projects with poverty alleviation ob-
jectives’. 
This strengthens the view that the NAPC’s advocacy role can be more meaningful by 
helping mediate local needs and programs and national government support through 
NGOs or the private sectors. The NAPC can do much in helping forge formal com-
mitment from local chief executives as well as in instituting capacity building for the 
LGUs to promote the specific projects identified in support of flagship programs. 
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The most effective programs appear to be those where community participation is 
high. In this regard, social preparation appears to be key to the effectiveness of pov-
erty alleviation programs. This is the lesson from CIDSS, as it illustrates the impor-
tance of localizing the approach, forging commitment and interfacing with the 
barangay leaders in contributing to the program’s achievements and success. The 
ASHI case also displays the importance of clients’ participation, not only in the pro-
gram itself, but also in decision-making, in planning, program design and improve-
ment. 
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ADB – Asian Development Bank 
APIS – Annual Poverty Indicators Survey 
ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
ASHI – Ahon sa Hirap, Inc. 
BLES – Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics 
BSP – Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
CAR – Cordillera Autonomous Region 
CBA – Collective Bargaining Agreement 
CIDSS – Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services 
CSC – Civil Service Commission 
CSO – Civil Society Organization 
CRSS / CRC – Center for Research Communications 
DBP – Development Bank of the Philippines 
DOLE – Department of Labor and Employment 
DSWD – Department of Social Welfare and Development 
DTS – Dual Training System 
EC – Employees Compensation 
ECCD – Early Childhood Care and Development 
GBA – Grameen Bank Approach 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GFI – Government Financial Institutions 
GNFA – Government Non-financial Agencies 
GOCC – Government-owned and Controlled Corporations 
GSIS – Government Service Insurance System 
HDMF – Home Development Mutual Fund 
HIRAM – Helping Individuals Reach their Aspirations 
ICOR – Inverse of Incremental-capital Output Ratio 
ICBP – Industry Capability Build-up Program 
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ILO – International Labor Organization 
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development 
ISSA – International Social Security Association 
Lakas – Lakas ng Edsa (National Union of Christian Democrats) 
LAMP – Laban ng Masang Pilipino 
LBP – Land Bank of the Philippines 
LGU – Local Government Units 
MBN – Minimum Basic Needs 
MSP – Microfinance Support Program 
NAPC – National Anti-poverty Commission 
NCR – National Capital Region 
NEDA – National Economic and Development Authority 
NFA – National Food Authority 
NGO – Non-governmental Organization 
NHIP – National Health Insurance Program 
NSO – National Statistics Office 
OFW – Overseas Filipino Workers 
OWWA – Overseas Workers Welfare Administration 
PCFC – People’s Credit and Finance Corporation 
PESO – Public Services Employment Offices 
PO – People’s Organization 
PRESEED – Promotion of Rural Employment Through Self-Employment 
and Entrepreneurship Development 
PSU – Public Sector Union 
RMFP – Rural Micro-Enterprise Financing Program 
RSBS – Retirement and Separation Benefits System 
SDC – Social Development Committee 
SEA-K – Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran 
SKA – SEA Kaunlaran Association 
SME – Small and Medium Enterprise 
SPES – Special Program for Employment of Students 
SRA – Social Reform Agenda 
SS – Social Security 
SSS – Social Security System 
STCW – Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
TESDA – Apprenticeship Program 
TFP – Total Factor Productivity 
TIMST – Third International Mathematics and Science Test 
TLDC – Technology and Livelihood Development Center 
TLRC – Technology and Livelihood Resource Center 
TVET – Technical Vocational Education and Training 
UPLB – University of the Philippines Los Banos 
WB – World Bank 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=páåÖ~éçêÉ=
jìâìä=dK=^ëÜÉê=~åÇ=oÉî~íÜá=o~à~å=
^Äëíê~Åí=
This study analyzes the social protection system of the affluent, rapidly ageing city 
of Singapore. It thus needs to shift the focus of its social sector policies away from 
housing and education to social protection in health care. The study argues that Sin-
gapore’s professed philosophy of emphasizing the individual and community (mainly 
extended family) for providing social protection, and its near exclusive reliance on a 
mandatory savings scheme, to finance old age will require substantive modifications 
if such a shift is to not only occur, but also to provide an adequate level of social 
protection and health care benefits. In particular, Singapore will need to introduce an 
adequate tax-financed redistributive first pillar in the social security system, and a 
more transparent and accountable investment regime for the CPF (Central Provident 
Fund), which also ends the large recurrent, and highly regressive tax on CPF wealth. 
The paper ends with suggestions for reform. 
* In early January 2002, the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar against the US 
dollar was US$1 = S$1.85. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
This study analyzes the social protection system in the Southeast Asian city-state of 
Singapore. The term social protection is conventionally defined to include public 
social security schemes as well as schemes with similar objectives which are not 
required by law, but are in existence both when there is a formal wage employment 
relationship, and when such a relationship is absent as in the informal sector (ILO, 
2000). During the last four decades of the 20th century, Singapore has evolved from 
a middle-income economy with a young immigrant population to an affluent and rap-
idly ageing society. As a result, the focus of social sector policies in Singapore will 
increasingly shift from housing and education to social protection and health care. 
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~ä=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
dÉåÉê~ä=a~í~=
Table 1 (see Appendix) provides selected demographic indicators, on the basis of 
which the following observations may be made. The total population of Singapore in 
2000 was 4.02 million, of which 3.26 million were citizens and permanent residents, 
the rest being foreigners who have been residing in Singapore for more than one year. 
Non-permanent residents thus constitute about one-quarter of the resident popula-
tion, one of the highest such proportions in the world. 
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Being a city-state, Singapore’s non-urban population is negligible, and therefore no 
specific policy measures for the rural population are needed. The Southeast Asian 
region serves as Singapore’s hinterland, including the supply of labor. 
Singapore’s resident population growth rate has varied between 1.3% and 2.2% during 
the 1991–2000 period. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), the average number of births 
per woman, has been below the replacement rate of 2.1 since 1975 (the TFR was 1.6 
in 2000). Singapore’s population will begin to decline absolutely in the next decade, 
unless the rate of new permanent residents is maintained or increased. But the inflow 
of permanent residents during the past two decades is already beginning to subtly 
alter the social and political dynamics in Singapore. Any substantial increase in the 
net inflow of permanent residents is therefore not sustainable much longer. Thus, 
Singapore is unlikely to be able to rely in the future on an increasing population and 
a growing labor force to generate higher output, and thereby help finance old age. 
Indeed, the rate of labor force growth is likely to be negative around 2030 (Heller, 
1997). Consistent with the experiences of affluent and ageing societies elsewhere, the 
average annual economic growth rate has already started to decelerate considerably 
from around 9.0% experienced during the last three decades of the 20th century. 
The median age of the population has also been increasing rapidly from 29.8 years 
in 1990 to 34.2 years in 2000, and is projected to be 41.2 years in 2030; while the 
proportion of the population over 65 years of age is projected to increase by 2.6 times 
from 7.3% in the year 1997 to 18.9% in 2030 (ROS, 1999, Table 1.1, p. 29). The Old 
Dependency Ratio (ODR), defined as residents above 65 years of age divided by 
residents between 15–64 years, is expected to increase from 10.4 in 1999 to 29.5 by 
2030 (ROS, 1999, Table 1.1, p. 29). 
The life expectancy at birth was 76 years for males and 80 years for females in the 
year 2000; and is expected to increase further. As the pension needs are for old age, 
life expectancy at age 60 (and at age 65) is more relevant than life expectancy at birth. 
According to the Singapore life tables based on the 1990 Census estimated by K.C. 
Tan of the Nanyang Technological University, the average female at age 60 and at 
age 65 in 1990 was expected to live for 20.9 and 17.0 years, respectively; while the 
corresponding figures for males were 17.5 and 14.2. The females are expected to 
live longer than the males, and thus require greater resources to finance old age. 
Females will also constitute a disproportionate number of the old-old, i.e. those over 
75 years, a period when health-care requirements and expenses rise sharply. 
Thus, the female population in Singapore will have on average greater needs for old-
age financing than males. Their labor force participation rate (defined as the number 
of females who are in the labor force divided by the total number of females) in 2000 
at 55.5% was lower than the rate for males (81.1%), while their average monthly 
earnings at S$2,530 were only 72% of the earnings of the males (ROS, MOM 2001, 
Tables 1.6, 2.3 and 2.4). 
Singapore’s literacy rate at 92.5% in 2000 is commensurate with its level of income. 
In 2000, the mean years of schooling in Singapore were 8.6, while 55% of the resi-
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dents aged 25 years and over had attained secondary or higher qualifications. How-
ever in 2000, 28% of the male and 21% of the female labor force had qualifications 
at primary school level or below (ROS, MOM, 2001, Table 1.2, p. 4). 
bÅçåçãáÅ=`Ü~ê~ÅíÉêáëíáÅë=
Singapore is among the most internationalized economies in the world, with its econ-
omy dominated by multinational enterprises and state-controlled firms. These firms 
have traditionally enjoyed significant control over resources and significant monop-
oly power. About 85% of Singapore’s land area is owned by the State and there is 
no constitutional or common law right to land ownership in Singapore. The State 
auctions the land use rights, and the resulting revenue is a significant proportion of 
the budgetary revenue. 
In 1998, there were 91,283 active companies (not including partnerships and sole 
proprietorships) in Singapore, of which nearly four-fifths were locally controlled 
companies (ROS, DOS, 2001, Table 7.1, p. 81). Among the locally controlled com-
panies, about 40% were in commerce, and 30% were in financial and business ser-
vices, while social and personal services accounted for only 3.4% of the total in 
1998. 
Globalization and restructuring are reducing the monopoly power of state-controlled 
firms in the domestic market to some extent. Nevertheless, the concentration of eco-
nomic (and political) power of the state-controlled firms and their management re-
mains substantial. As a result, economic restructuring in Singapore faces a dilemma. 
Any restructuring that permits competitive market forces to play a major role in the 
economy (such as in the housing mortgage market), and brings about substantive 
changes in the current methods of economic (and social) management, will have a 
far-reaching impact on the political economy of Singapore. 
Table 2 (see Appendix) provides selected economic indicators of Singapore, on the 
basis of which the following observations may be made. In 2000, Singapore had a 
per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of S$39,585, and a per capita GNP (Gross 
National Product) of S$42,212, placing it firmly in the affluent group of countries. 
The higher value for per capita GNP reflects the fact that Singapore derives substan-
tial income from abroad as a net lender. Thus, it is able to transcend limitations of 
the domestic economy by generating income from investments abroad. The share of 
wages and of private consumption in GDP at around 40% however remains low. 
The extremely high degree of dependence on international trade implied by the trade 
to GDP ratio of 3.4 suggests that Singapore is both an export and import dependent 
economy. Since most of the consumption items are also imported, the trade-weighted 
exchange rate has a significant impact on real income and consumption. Currency 
depreciation (appreciation) will thus affect the real value of accumulated pension 
wealth, and therefore welfare of the elderly as well. The exchange risk thus must be 
considered in assessing Singapore’s pension system. This risk is similar to the risk 
that tax increases (or an introduction of a new tax such as the sales tax) could reduce 
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the real value of pension wealth by raising the price level, either on a one-time basis 
only or leading to a permanent rise in the inflation rate. 
In the year 2000, Singapore had 360 manufacturing establishments which received 
fiscal incentives. They accounted for nearly half of the total domestic exports. Most 
of these establishments are MNCs (multi-national corporations), suggesting a high 
concentration in the manufacturing sector. 
In 2000, services accounted for 68% and manufacturing for 26% of GDP. The share 
of manufacturing in total employment is around 20%. Thus, it is the services sector 
that provides the bulk of GDP in Singapore. 
Singapore is a high-savings economy, with its gross domestic savings (GDS) to GDP 
ratio being 49.8% in 2000. The gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFC) to 
GDP ratio was 29.5%, the difference being potentially available for net lending abroad. 
Most of the savings are generated by the public sector through large structural 
budget surpluses (IMF, 2001, p. 54), and accounting profits of state-controlled firms. 
The government thus controls most of the flow and stocks of savings, including 
mandatory savings schemes for retirement. 
i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
Table 3 (see Appendix) provides selected indicators of the labor market structure in 
Singapore, on the basis of which the following observations may be made. In June 
2000, Singapore had a total labor force of 2.2 million, of which 60% were males and 
40% were females. The labor force participation rate in 2000 was 68.6%. The partici-
pation rate however was much lower for those above 60 years, being only 10.4% for 
persons 65 years and over. The proportion of labor force above 54 years was 6.1%. 
As in the case of non-resident population, about a quarter of the labor force is made 
up of foreign workers. These workers are divided into two categories according to 
their monthly wage. Those earning below S$2,500 per month are granted work per-
mits, and are subjected to the foreign workers’ levy. This levy varies according to 
occupation and skill levels. In the year 2000, total revenue from these levies was 
S$1.5 billion, equivalent to 6.5% of the total revenue or 1.1% percent of GDP 
(Ramesh, 2000). These levies are a type of wage income tax, and a substantial pro-
portion of their burden is likely to be on the foreign workers. 
A significant implication for social protection is that with the foreign workers Sin-
gapore has a larger labor force to generate output, and an enhanced tax base to fi-
nance the retirement needs of its residents. However, from a wider perspective, it 
raises the issue of provision of social amenities in general, and social protection in 
particular, for the foreign workers in Singapore. There may be some merit in regional 
co-operation to bring about a more comprehensive set of social amenities and pro-
tection for these migrant workers. 
About one-fifth of the labor force has either a diploma or a degree; while about a 
quarter of the labor force has an educational attainment of primary schooling and 
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below. The government has recognized the need to ensure that the mix of skills avail-
able is consistent with the requirements of the economy as it restructures. 
The manufacturing sector accounts for about one-fifth of total employment, while 
the services sector including construction accounts for the rest. The average wage in 
2000 was S$3,063, with only financial services with an average wage of S$4,931 
registering significantly higher than the average wage. 
It is in the services sector where the globalization forces and restructuring of the 
economy are making the employer-employee relationship more flexible, and increas-
ing the opportunities for self-employment. This in turn will have an impact on the 
formal pension systems, which are based on relatively stable wage employment. 
In June 2000, membership in the trade unions was 314,000, equivalent to 14.3% of 
the labor force. The manufacturing sector had a much higher degree of unionization 
accounting for about a quarter of the total membership. 
The retirement age in Singapore was 55 years until July 1993, when it was raised to 
60 years through the introduction of the Retirement Age Act (ROS, MOL, 1997, 
p. 1). The retirement age was raised to 62 from January 1, 1999; and is expected to 
gradually rise to 67 years over time. The current retirement age of 62 is however ap-
plied quite flexibly across sectors, activities, and organizations. The raising of the 
retirement age since 1993 has been accompanied by lower wages and statutory bene-
fits, including contribution rates for mandatory retirement savings. 
Over the next two decades, the skills-mix of Singapore’s labor force will need to be 
more conducive to the service sector, as the role of the manufacturing sector in gen-
erating jobs is likely to decline. As many relatively less skilled are currently em-
ployed in the manufacturing sector, such a shift represents a major challenge. The 
average worker is also likely to be older over time, and less likely to be receptive to 
continuous re-training needed to sustain high employment. Implications of these 
likely trends are discussed in Section 2.2. 
aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=fåÅçãÉ=~åÇ=^ääçÅ~íáçå=çÑ=_ìÇÖÉí=
Singapore’s growth strategy of creating an environment for the MNCs and the state 
enterprises to earn high profits has contributed to significant inequalities in the wage 
structure and income distribution. Singapore had an overall Gini coefficient of 0.43 
in 1974, and 0.48 in 1999 (Mukhopadhaya, 2002, p. 8). 
The budgetary allocation of the Singapore government for 1997–98 and for 2000–01 
is provided in Table 4 (see Appendix). The total revenue to GDP ratio of 37.2% in 
1997–98 is comparable to other high-income countries, though the ratio of 30.5% 
for 2000–01 is towards the lower end for these countries. The government expendi-
ture, including net lending to GDP ratio (27.3% in 1997–98 and 23.8% in 2000–01), 
is however much lower than in the other high-income countries. 
The social sector expenditure was 6.3% of GDP in 1997–98, 6.9% in 2000–01. The 
government has emphasized education and housing in the social sector, while health 
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care, public assistance, and other social protection schemes have received negligible 
budgetary allocation. Indeed, unlike in other high-income countries, about three-
quarters of the total national health expenditure is by individuals and employers, 
while only one-quarter is from the government budget. This is due to the deliberate 
policy design and objectives. The social security arrangements, as will be discussed 
shortly, are outside the budget, as these almost exclusively rely on mandatory savings. 
The pension payments for civil servants are also outside the budget (see section on 
civil service pension arrangements). 
The government has traditionally generated large and persistent budgetary surpluses 
(see Table 4, Appendix). These were equivalent to 10.1% of GDP in 1997–98, and 
9.2% in 2000–01. Whether surpluses of these magnitudes on a persistent basis are 
optimal from economic and social points of view is an issue that has been little de-
bated in Singapore. Nevertheless, it is an issue that must be addressed because of the 
need to substantially increase allocation of resources for health and social security. 
Indeed, if the allocation of these components were to be comparable to those in the 
other high-income countries (7% to 9% of GDP for health; 5% to 8% for social secu-
rity), then the level and the structure of Singapore’s budgetary expenditure would 
also resemble that of other high-income countries. 
mçäáíáÅ~ä=póëíÉã=
Singapore has a parliamentary system, presided by an elected president. Parliament 
is based on the Westminster model, but has limited powers to overturn government 
legislation. The ruling regime, the People’s Action Party (PAP), has been in power 
since 1959. The undisrupted tenure has created a one-party state and a monocentric 
power structure. Therefore, there is little contestability in the social, political and 
cultural spheres. Much of the key discussions are internalized and decisions reached 
are communicated through the state-controlled and guided media. 
The PAP has also created a social structure to support its economic and social poli-
cies. The People’s Association (PA), a government statutory board financed from 
the government budget, is an important supporting organization. The function of the 
PA is to foster public support and help implement social assistance schemes. To 
accomplish this role it has developed an extensive network throughout the country, 
providing it with requisite capabilities and information. 
The fact that Singapore has persistent and large budgetary surpluses (see Table 4, 
Appendix) suggests that Singapore has the resources to meet the challenges of fi-
nancing old age. With rapid ageing, those above 65 years are expected to be a quar-
ter of the electorate by the year 2030, and if the near elderly are included, a substan-
tial proportion of the electorate is likely to have an interest in allocating a larger share 
of GDP to health and social security. However, whether the political structures will 
enable them to express these preferences will depend on how the current monocen-
tric power structure evolves to accommodate greater political and social contesta-
bility. 
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NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
Singapore’s political economy and investments made in data collection have pro-
vided substantial capacity to generate socio-economic information relevant for ana-
lyzing public policies. However, the information is regarded as a strategic resource 
in Singapore, to be used by the policymakers for tactical advantages rather than as a 
public good. Therefore, very little of the available data is routinely provided to the 
general public and to the analyst. 
This makes the task of analyzing public policies and institutions in general, and of 
social protection policies in particular, much more difficult. It also severely hampers 
informed public debate on social protection issues. While this may serve short-term 
political ends, it is ultimately a self-defeating exercise. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Singapore has a monocentric power structure. As a result, the social and economic 
institutions are closely interwoven with the governing party. Thus, the National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), an umbrella organization constituting all the au-
thorized trade unions in Singapore, has a symbiotic relationship with the ruling party. 
It has representation in cabinet, and in various bodies, including those concerned 
with social protection. While there is a formal arrangement for tripartite representa-
tion, such as in the National Wages Council (NWC), in practice, there is no substan-
tive independence of those bodies from the government. 
Another institution providing an array of social services such as financial assistance, 
job-matching programs, and day care for the elderly are the Community Develop-
ment Councils (CDCs). Each CDC encompasses several parliamentary constituencies. 
In some cases, their activities duplicate those undertaken by other agencies in each 
constituency. The CDCs are headed by mayors who are political appointees. There 
are plans to expand their scope from social and welfare services to public education, 
lifelong learning and skills training, as well as culture. The operating budgets of the 
CDCs have increased from S$19 million in 1997 to S$153 million in 2001. The 
CDCs do have the institutional capacity, in terms of logistics and financial resources, 
to oversee more comprehensive and long-term social assistance schemes. 
The role of civil society groups which are independent of the political structures is 
quite small. There is also considerable uncertainty concerning the legal scope of 
operations of the civil society groups. This uncertainty acts as a major deterrent, par-
ticularly as it concerns a wide-ranging discussion of social protection issues. 
NKQ= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
The Singapore policymakers have consistently emphasized that the best form of social 
security for a worker is to pursue economic and human resource policies which 
provide continuous high employment. The government has also strongly emphasized 
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the responsibility of the individual and the community (seen as an extended family) 
to provide for old age, including long-term illnesses. 
Social assistance (or protection) schemes which undermine ‘self-reliance’ are deemed 
‘welfarist’. Financial assistance schemes, even when they are introduced, are pro-
vided on a temporary and ad hoc basis. They are mainly interim provisions designed 
to restore ‘self reliance’. The government has through its control over the media, and 
other avenues, successfully restricted public dialogue on the appropriate social pro-
tection policies. The term ‘welfarist’ has, as a result, become quite pejorative in the 
political discourse in Singapore. At the same time, top policymakers and appointed 
or elected officials are provided with pensions and other benefits more commensu-
rate with the defined-benefit pay-as-you-go schemes prevalent in the welfare states. 
It is therefore not surprising that the financial and other support for old age in Sin-
gapore has traditionally relied on the family. Thus, according to the Ministry of 
Health’s National Survey of Senior Citizens in 1995, two-thirds of the persons 60 
years and above were not part of the formal pension system, but instead relied on the 
family (ROS, MOH, 1996). In 1997, 78% aged 60 and above lived with children 
without their spouses (because some are single or widowed, and some elderly cou-
ples may have decided to live separately with different children), while 15% (about 
one in six) lived with their spouses only (ROS, 1999, Tables 1–3, p. 31). Thus, family 
support and living with children have been the primary coping mechanisms during 
old age. The future elderly however will have much fewer children to rely on due to 
the persistent below replacement rate (TFR), while higher educational and income 
levels would have shifted their and their children’s preferences towards greater in-
dependence and privacy. Thus, the role of informal arrangements is likely to con-
tinue to decline, and correspondingly the formal mechanisms will need to play a lar-
ger role. 
It should be stressed that the main constraints in bringing about a shift to a more 
formal and elaborate social protection and health care system in Singapore are not 
due to lack of technical and professional capabilities but in the realm of ideology 
and politics. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
Singapore being a city-state has an urbanized workforce, which is predominantly 
employed in the formal sector. The self-employed are a relatively small proportion 
of the total workforce, accounting for about 15% of the population. The workers in 
Singapore have traditionally exhibited a marked preference for formal wage employ-
ment. 
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OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉëW=qÜÉ=jìäíáJqáÉê=póëíÉã=
qÜÉ=jìäíáJqáÉê=póëíÉã=
An important insight from the extensive literature on pension reform is that a multi-
tier system of social security is better able to guard against various risks in old age, 
and help address issues of social adequacy, individual incentives, and financial mar-
ket development (The World Bank, 1994; Holzmann and Stiglitz, 2001). 
qÜÉ=jìäíáJíáÉê=póëíÉã=~ë=~å=^å~äóíáÅ~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
There are several ways to characterize a multi-tier system. For the purposes of this 
paper, a modified three-tier system of social security adapted from Fox and Palmer 
(2001) is used. The first tier consists of a mandatory public system financed from 
taxes (or earmarked social security contributions), which has a defined benefit (DB) 
formula, with large coverage, and incorporates social risk pooling. The primary func-
tion of this tier is to ensure a minimum income in old age, which is protected against 
inflation and longevity risks, and usually includes survivors’ benefits features. Thus, 
the first tier is for poverty alleviation. The other two tiers build on the first tier to 
help provide adequate income to maintain customary living standards in old age. 
The second tier is a defined contribution (DC) system, which in formal (or nominal) 
terms is by definition fully funded. The benefits thus are determined by the contribu-
tions (less pre-retirement withdrawals) and returns on investment of balances (less 
administrative and investment management costs, and taxes). While in a DB system 
the plan sponsor (government or employer) bears the investment risk, in a DC sys-
tem, the individual members of the plan bear the investment risk. The third tier may 
be described as a tax-advantaged but usually regulated, voluntary (or semi-voluntary) 
savings scheme which is usually (but not always) privately managed. 
It is however important to recognize that pension systems in practice are quite com-
plex as there are many variations in the design and implementation of each tier. 
Moreover, details of design, and / or implementation may fundamentally alter the nature 
of a particular tier. Thus, the three-tier classification is only a convenient first step in 
the analysis. 
páåÖ~éçêÉÛë=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=póëíÉã=~åÇ=jìäíáJíáÉê=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Using the above three-tier framework, the most striking characteristic of Singapore’s 
social protection system is the near exclusive reliance on the mandatory, publicly 
managed, portable, defined contribution (DC) tier. The main vehicle for this tier is 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF), mainly providing support for housing, retirement 
and health care. Only Singapore citizens and permanent residents are eligible for 
membership in the CPF. 
There is a virtual absence of a mandatory tax financed, defined benefit (DB), social 
risk pooling and redistributive first tier. Singapore, however, does administer a Public 
Assistance Scheme. It is stringently means-tested, provides extremely low benefits, 
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and has negligible coverage. A health-care scheme started in 1993, which is targeted 
at the poor and indigent residents, is called the Medifund Scheme. It is a health en-
dowment fund to assist those who pass stringent means tests to pay for inpatient as 
well as outpatient care. In January 2000, the government established another en-
dowment fund called the Eldercare Fund to finance the operating subsidies for the 
entire range of elderly and community care. Its aim is to enhance future affordability 
of step-down facilities, especially for elderly Singaporeans from low- and lower-
middle-income households. The government has also encouraged Singaporeans aged 
61–69 to be members of the Medishield scheme by providing two years of premium 
rebate. 
In April 2001, Singapore introduced the Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS), 
which is a tax-advantaged voluntary savings scheme open to both residents and for-
eigners. The SRS may be characterized as belonging to the third tier. 
Singapore’s pension system merits special attention because it is the only high-
income, rapidly ageing country to almost exclusively rely on a mandatory savings 
second tier to finance old age. Since the main instrument for this tier is the CPF 
scheme, it is essential to examine it in some detail. 
qÜÉ=j~áå=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=`mc=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The CPF is a national provident fund (NPF) established in 1955, before Singapore 
attained independence. It is a statutory authority under the Ministry of Manpower. 
The twelve-member CPF Board, appointed by the Minister of Manpower, has repre-
sentation from the government, employees, employers, and the professionals. The 
key challenge has been to get competent and independent representation on the 
Board. 
The CPF Board is essentially an administrative entity, with little autonomy in policy 
or in investment of the accumulated balances. It also has little research expertise. 
However, its size and scope puts at its disposal a vast amount of socio-economic 
data. It has invested heavily in information technology to utilize this data for ad-
ministration and for social engineering purposes. 
jìäíáéäÉ=oçäÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=`mc=
Since 1955, but particularly since 1968, the Singapore Government has vastly ex-
panded the scope of the CPF to achieve a wide variety of economic, social, and 
other objectives (see Table 5, Appendix). These include home-ownership, pre-retire-
ment investments, a compulsory medical savings account, life, property, retirement, 
health-care insurance, and loans for financing tertiary education. From September 
2002, another insurance scheme designed to pay modest amounts for long-term care 
not requiring hospitalization will be introduced. 
The home-ownership goal has become a dominant and unique feature of the CPF 
over the years (Asher and Phang, 1997). In effect the CPF scheme substitutes for the 
absence of a housing mortgage market. Members are permitted to make a down 
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payment on public housing constructed by the government’s Housing and Develop-
ment Board (HDB) from their CPF balances. They may obtain mortgage on the re-
maining amount from the HDB at a rate which is 0.1 percentage points higher than 
what the CPF pays its members. The HDB obtains two types of loans from the gov-
ernment budget, one as contribution to public housing, and the other for mortgage 
financing. It then constructs the housing, and repays the loans over time. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion in the remaining part of this section 
draws on the data provided in Table 5 (see Appendix) for the 1983–2000 period. 
Contribution Rate. At the time of its introduction in 1955, the CPF contribution 
rates were 5.0% for the employer and 5.0% for the employee, for a total of 10.0%, 
with a maximum monthly contribution of S$50 (Asher, 1994, Table 1, p. 336–37). 
The rate remained unchanged till September 1968, when the CPF was permitted to 
be used to purchase public housing. 
The rate structure has become fairly complex since then. Currently the contribution 
rates vary according to the sector of employment, citizenship or permanent resident-
ship, age, and whether officers are pensionable or non-pensionable.  
(www.CPF.gov.sg/CPF_info/online/ContriRa.asp, retrieved on January 5, 2002) 
Since 1968, the CPF contribution rate for the private sector and non-pensionable 
public sector employees (called the reference group) increased in a series of steps to 
reach 50% (25% each by the employer and the employee) in July 1987, with a maxi-
mum monthly contribution of S$2,500. The rate was reduced to 35% in April 1986 
to cope with the 1985 recession; but was gradually increased to 40% in July 1992, 
with a maximum monthly contribution of S$2,400. The rate was once again reduced 
to 30% in January 1999 to cope with the 1997 economic crisis, with a monthly maxi-
mization of S$1,800. 
The CPF contribution rate since January 2001 for the above-mentioned group has 
been 36% (20% by the employee and 16% from the employer), with a maximum 
monthly contribution of S$2,160. 
Since July 1988, for the reference group, there have been lower rates of contribu-
tions for those above 55 years of age. This is designed to partly de-link wages from 
seniority, and to reduce the cost of hiring elderly workers. Since January 2001, the 
contribution rates for those between 55 and 60 years of age have been 18.5% (12.5% 
by the employee and 6.0% from the employer, with a maximum monthly contribu-
tion of S$1,110). For those between 60 and 65 years, the rate is 11.0% (7.5% for the 
employee and 3.5% for the employer), with a maximum monthly contribution of 
S$660. The rate is 8.5% for those above 65 (5% for the employee and 3.5% for the 
employer), with a maximum monthly contribution of S$510. 
The CPF contributions of the reference group are channeled into three separate ac-
counts: 
Ordinary Account. For those below 55 years, between 72.2% and 61.1% of the con-
tributions is channeled into this account depending on age, with the proportion de-
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creasing with age. Balances in this account can be used for housing, pre-retirement 
investments and other purposes. 
Special Account. For those less than 55 years old, between 11.1% and 16.7% of the 
contributions are channeled into this account, with the proportion increasing with 
age. However, none of the contributions are channeled into this account for those 
aged over 55 years. Although balances in this account are for retirement purposes, 
recent reforms have permitted them to be used for certain low-risk investments. 
Medisave Account. This account can be used to pay for hospital and selected outpa-
tient services; and for health-care insurance premiums under the Medishield (and 
Medishield Plus) Scheme. The Medishield insurance covers only selected major ill-
nesses. However, those with pre-existing illnesses are not provided with this insur-
ance cover. Unlike for the other two accounts, the self-employed must contribute to 
this account. The contributions are channeled into Medisave with the proportion in-
creasing with age. For those below 55 years, between 16.7% and 22.2% are chan-
neled into this account, but for those above 55 years the proportions vary from 
43.2% to 100.0%. The amount in this account cannot be withdrawn until death, when 
it goes to the nominee(s) of the member. From September 2002, the Medisave Ac-
count may also be used to pay insurance premiums for long-term care (see Table 1, 
Appendix). 
The health insurance schemes (Medishield and Medishield Plus) have several limita-
tions. First, the coverage is inadequate. As at end September 2001, the two schemes 
covered 1.8 million persons, leaving 44% of the resident population uncovered. 
Second, its scope is narrow. Many illnesses, including pre-existing illnesses are not 
covered, and the insurance pays only a small proportion of the total hospital bill 
(typically no more than 35%). Third, rapid accumulation of Medishield balances 
suggests that the premiums are levied on the basis of over-conservative assumptions 
in relation to the benefits actually paid. Thus in 2000, the insurance premiums under 
the Medishield were S$95 million while the payments were only S$56 million; at 
the same time the accumulated balances in this fund amounted to S$466 million (8.3 
times the payments in 2000) as at end 2000 (CPF Board, 2000, p. 54). For the July-
September 2001 period, average payment per claim under the Basic Medishield was 
S$662, and under the Medishield Plus was S$1,344. These payments are quite low 
for catastrophic illnesses requiring hospitalization. On the positive side, Singapore 
has made an attempt to integrate health-care finance with retirement finance. 
While the gross contribution to the CPF has been impressive, existence of a large 
number of pre-retirement withdrawals, particularly for housing, has meant that net 
contributions have been rather low. Thus, during the 1987–2000 period, about 72% 
of contributions were withdrawn during the year. Such a high level of withdrawals 
for non-retirement purposes, particularly for housing, has adversely affected the 
accumulation of balances as discussed in the following. This also helps to explain as 
to why in spite of high contribution rates and rapid economic growth, the retirement 
balances are inadequate. Without tackling this, and the low returns credited to mem-
bers’ accounts, plans for raising the CPF contribution rate to 40%, and altering the 
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allocation of different accounts depending on age, will remain ineffective at provid-
ing adequate retirement balances. 
fåîÉëíãÉåí=mçäáÅáÉë=~åÇ=mÉêÑçêã~åÅÉ=çÑ=íÜÉ=`mc=
The Accumulation Phase. In any defined contribution (DC) scheme, investment 
policies and performance of provident and pension funds are a crucial determinant 
of the adequacy during retirement. The efficiency of the savings-investment inter-
mediation can potentially positively affect the trend rate of economic growth, which 
is the primary macroeconomic variable for economic security for both the old and 
the young under any pension arrangement. This is because economic growth deter-
mines the resources available to be divided between the old and the young. The 
efficiency with which pension savings are translated into investments is also impor-
tant because these savings, particularly if they are of a contractual nature, are long-
term savings. These can potentially enable financing of long-term growth enhancing 
investments. The shift in composition towards longer-term savings, and potential to 
raise the growth rate can subsequently lead to higher national savings. The interna-
tional experience suggests that pension reform by itself rarely increases national 
savings (Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001). 
There are three separate pools of investment funds under Singapore’s CPF system. 
The first and largest pool are the accumulated balances of the members with the CPF 
Board. These amounted to S$90.3 billion in 2000 (56.8% of GDP) (see Table 6, 
Appendix). Under the CPF Act, these must be in essence invested in floating rate 
bonds issued specifically to the CPF Board to meet the statutory requirements. They 
are therefore not traded, and have no quoted values. 
Since 1986, the floating rate is a simple average of a 12-month deposit (with a weight 
of 80%) and the month-end savings rate (with a weight of 20%) of the four major 
local banks, subject to a minimum nominal rate of 2.5% as spelled out in the CPF 
Act. The rate is revised quarterly. As a matter of administrative discretion, a small 
portion of the CPF balances in the Special Account for those less than 55 years of 
age (currently 11.1% and 16.7% of the contributions go into this account depending 
on age) receive an interest rate 1.5% above the normal rate. Since October 2001, 
balances in the Medisave Account have also received a similar differential interest 
rate. This underlines the administered nature of the interest rate on the CPF balances. 
The interest is computed monthly and compounded and credited annually. 
The compounded annual real rate of return on CPF balances (nominal rate minus 
GDP deflator) averaged only 1.83% during the 1983–2000 period; and only 0.82% per 
annum for the 1998–2000 period, the period when the floating rate was introduced. 
During the 1983–2000 period, there were four years when the real rate was negative 
(see Table 6, Appendix). The average return during the period was boosted by nega-
tive inflation rates, i.e. deflation in four years during the period (see Table 6, Ap-
pendix). The above rates are quite low, and therefore they negate the potential ad-
vantage of mandatory saving in financing retirement. 
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The requirement that the CPF Board must invest only in government bonds has 
contributed substantially to the large internal debt of S$134.4 billion (84.5% of GDP) 
in 2000 (see Table 6, Appendix). The CPF Board held three-quarters of the govern-
ment’s medium-term debt, and a little over two-thirds of the total domestic debt in 
2000 (IMF, 2001, Table 16, p. 59). The government, however, has been running per-
sistently large budget surpluses over the years (Asher and Phang, 1997; IMF, 2001, 
Table 12, p. 55). 
Given the large budget surpluses over a considerable period, the CPF funds have not 
been needed to finance infrastructure or other government expenditure. The wide-
spread belief (encouraged by the authorities) that the CPF has financed infrastruc-
ture and actual construction of public housing (as opposed to facilitating housing 
mortgage for members from the demand side) is thus not supported by macroeco-
nomic analysis. 
How are the balances with the CPF Board then ultimately deployed? Essentially, the 
Singapore Government (through the Singapore Government Investment Corpora-
tion, SGIC, and other government-investment agencies) invests these funds. There 
is, however, no transparency or public accountability concerning where these funds 
are invested, and the investment criteria and performance. The SGIC and other rele-
vant government investment agencies are protected by statutory provisions from 
making any disclosure, even to the parliament. The elected president, who is man-
dated to protect Singapore’s reserves, also has limited access to the operations of 
these investment agencies. It is widely believed that the balances are predominantly 
invested abroad in a wide variety of physical, financial, and strategic assets. 
Singapore’s method of investing the balances meant for retirement financing is con-
trary to best international practices concerning pension fund management, and has 
the potential for generating extremely high political risk. Such concentration of sav-
ings in the hands of non-transparent, non-accountable agencies also distorts the 
savings-investment process, and could lead to inefficiencies in the structure of asset 
returns. The method, however, is consistent with Singapore’s monocentric power 
structure, and strong tendency towards social engineering and control. 
It is likely the government earns a higher rate of return on the CPF funds than what 
it pays to the members, resulting in an implicit tax on the CPF wealth. This tax is 
likely to be fairly large and regressive as low-income members are likely to have 
most of their non-housing wealth in the form of CPF balances (Asher and Newman, 
2001). This vividly illustrates how political risks and non-transparency can arise in 
an individual account system. 
The de-linking of interest paid to members on their balances from the ultimate de-
ployment and performance of the funds, and 100% investment in government securi-
ties shown on the CPF balance sheet but not in actuality, have turned the CPF into 
an ersatz National Provident Fund (NPF). The CPF now contains elements of a no-
tional defined benefit (NDB) system due to administered interest rates (though quar-
terly adjustment of its interest rate is much shorter than typical of the NDB systems 
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such as in Sweden and Italy), and of the PAYG (pay-as-you-go) system as govern-
ment bonds will have to be serviced by future generations of taxpayers. As a result, 
Singapore’s nominal defined contribution (DC) system in practice has been trans-
ferred to a system more akin to the PAYG NDB system. 
This should serve as a forceful reminder that in pension economics, the formal na-
ture of the system could in practice turn out to be quite different once the details of 
the design and implementation are examined. It is therefore essential to be extremely 
careful in drawing lessons from the experiences of other countries. 
The second pool of investment funds consists of insurance funds. These amounted to 
$3.2 billion as at end 2000 (CPF Board, 2001, p. 54). These are invested in fixed de-
posits, negotiable certificates of deposit, equities, and bonds. 
A significant proportion of the insurance funds are out-sourced to investment man-
agement companies. As at end 2000, about two-thirds of the insurance funds were 
invested in this way, while nearly one-third were in bank deposits. The investments 
are listed in the Annual Report (CPF Board, 2001, p. 55) at cost, and the data provided 
on the investments in bonds and equity is quite aggregative. The real rate of return 
on insurance funds was 3.24% per annum for the 1985–2000 period, and 2.74% for 
the 1987–2000 period (see Table 6, Appendix). While this is higher than the rates of 
1.83% and 0.82%, respectively, for the CPF balances, it is still substantially lower 
than the real GDP growth rate (8.26% per annum for the 1987–2000 period) or the 
growth of average earnings (7.49%). To the extent that the return on CPF balances is 
less than wage (or GDP) increases, the replacement rate will be adversely affected. 
The third pool of funds for investment consists of pre-retirement withdrawals by 
members under the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS). A member may open a CPF 
investment account with approved agent banks, which are all locally controlled banks. 
Moreover, all investments must be in Singapore dollars. Their charges and fees are 
not regulated. Individual CPF members may invest their Ordinary Account balance 
as well as the Special Account balance in approved assets. Only less risky invest-
ments are permitted from the Special Account. From the Ordinary Account up to 
35% of the balances can be invested in shares and corporate bonds by the members 
directly. There is no limit on investments in shares through the approved unit trusts. 
Until September 30, 2001, 100% of the profits realized (less accrued interest which 
would have been payable by the CPF Board on all the amounts withdrawn under this 
scheme) were permitted to be withdrawn by individuals. This proportion was re-
duced to 50% for the period October 1, 2001 to September 30, 2002 and will be zero 
thereafter. Realized profits on pre-retirement withdrawals will thus augment the CPF 
balances instead of being used at the discretion of the members. 
As at September 2001, total amounts withdrawn from the Ordinary Account were 
S$21.6 billion (US$11.7 billion), while the average amount per member was S$34,700 
(US$18,757). Little over half the amount was used for purchasing insurance poli-
cies; about 40% for stocks and loan stocks; and only 8% or S$1.7 billion (US$0.9 
billion) was invested in unit trusts (i.e. mutual funds). Thus, CPF members have 
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shown an overwhelming preference for insurance policies and investing directly in 
stocks. The government has been fine-tuning the rules governing the CPFIS to in-
crease the amounts invested through unit trusts. As another S$50.4 billion (US$27.3 
billion) is still potentially available for investments from the Ordinary Account, 
there is considerable room for individual members to exercise investment choice. 
Only 22% of the members currently participate in this scheme. 
The amounts withdrawn from the Special Account were S$3.1 billion (US$1.7 bil-
lion) as at end September 2001, while the average amount per member withdrawn 
was S$10,500 (US$5,676). Only 10% of the members have chosen to participate in 
this scheme. Insurance policies again attracted the bulk of the investments (87%), 
while the unit trusts attracted S$404.1 million (US$218 million) or 13% of the total. 
There is still an additional S$11.2 billion (US$6.1 billion) available for investment 
under this scheme. 
The CPF Board appointed William M. Mercer Company in 1988 as a consultant for 
the CPFIS scheme for a three-year period. The mandate included tracking the per-
formance of CPF approved unit trusts. For a three-year period ending in December 
2001, 32 approved unit trusts outperformed the returns on the Ordinary Account in 
the CPF, while 24 unit trusts under-performed (Cua, 2001b). If a five-year period is 
taken, then only four unit trusts outperformed, while 25 under-performed (Cua, 
2001b). Data on the volatility of the returns of unit trusts have not been provided. 
The returns for unit trusts do not include transaction costs which are high, because 
of the 5% to 7% difference between the offer and bid (buy and sell) prices. More-
over, banks operating the CPFIS scheme also levy a variety of charges. 
It is the return after the transaction costs have been deducted which is relevant. Such 
data however are not available, as the mandate of the CPF Board does not require it. 
The authorities are conscious of this issue, and efforts are being made to address it. 
However, the small size of the unit trusts market and low level of investments per 
member are considered as major constraints in addressing it. To reduce the transac-
tion costs and enable those with low balances to participate in investment diversifi-
cation, the CPF Board may consider contracting out to different fund managers in a 
transparent and accountable manner. 
The Decumulation Phase of the CPF. The decumulation phase is important because 
during retirement, it is essential to provide protection against inflation, longevity 
risks, and to ensure benefits to the survivors. Since women have a lower exposure to 
the labor force than men, and they earn on average less than men, but have longer 
life expectancy, protection against the above risks is particularly important for them. 
At the time of retirement, the following options exist in a DC scheme to convert ac-
cumulated balances into a flow of income during retirement. These include lump sum 
payments, periodic withdrawals and annuities, or a combination of the three. It should 
be recognized that as the annuities are like any other financial product, the cost of 
purchasing annuities and therefore the rate of return from an annuity purchase varies 
with the market structure and the features (individual vs. joint annuity, inflation 
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indexing etc.) of the annuity product. The CPF permits its members to withdraw all 
accumulated balances over and above the required minimum sum at age 55. Although 
a significant proportion of CPF members have accumulated balances which fall be-
low the minimum sum, if a member’s balance is below the required minimum sum, 
he does not have to make it up from other sources. Children are, however, allowed 
to top-up parents’ CPF accounts. 
As of July 2001, the required minimum sum is S$70,000 of which S$30,000 must be 
in cash and S$40,000 can be pledged in property. The minimum sum will become 
S$80,000 in July 2003 with the amount equally divided between cash and property. 
Currently, there are no further plans to increase the minimum sum. 
The CPF Board permits three options for the cash component of the minimum sum: 
buy a life annuity from an approved insurance company, keep it with an approved 
bank, or leave it with the CPF Board. In 2000, about one-sixth of the 22,829 indi-
viduals who were covered under the minimum sum scheme purchased annuities (ROS, 
CPFB, 2001, p. 18). Thus, the annuities option is not popular. Under all three op-
tions, the first payment is not available until age 62, seven years after the withdrawal 
age. 
The above arrangements effectively increased the politically sensitive withdrawal age 
for this component. However, the main weaknesses of the mandatory savings scheme 
centering on inadequate balances for many individuals, the need for protection 
against inflation and longevity, and the provision of survivors’ benefits are not ad-
dressed by the minimum sum scheme. 
`áîáä=pÉêîáÅÉ=mÉåëáçå=^êê~åÖÉãÉåíë=
Singapore has succeeded in shifting most of its civil servants to the CPF scheme, 
and thereby reducing the number of those eligible to receive pensions. This result 
has been achieved over a fairly long period. Thus, until 1973, all government em-
ployees were eligible to be on the pension scheme. However, in 1973 lower division 
government employees, and in 1987 employees at all levels were given a choice to 
shift to the CPF scheme. The response was mixed, with some employees electing to 
stay with the pension scheme, while some shifted to the CPF scheme. The main in-
centives for a shift to the CPF for the individual civil servant was the availability of 
public housing finance under the CPF scheme, and the portability feature of the 
CPF. Lack of inflation protection in the pension scheme acted as a push factor. 
At present, only officers in the designated pensionable services (administrative ser-
vice, senior police and intelligence service), and political appointees are legally per-
mitted to be on the pension scheme. Those on the pension scheme make reduced 
contributions to the CPF scheme. The pension benefits, however, do not require any 
contributions. This arrangement therefore is even more generous than the PAYG 
method employed in the Western welfare states. It would be useful for the policy-
makers to explain why such an arrangement, in stark contrast to Singapore’s pension 
philosophy, is essential. 
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To ensure payment of pensions, the government set up a separate Pension Fund in 
1995. Table 7, see Appendix, provides the available data on the operations of the 
pension fund on the basis of which the following may be noted: The initial contribu-
tion to the fund (SS$11.7 billion) has been made from the accumulated budgetary 
surpluses; and since then annual contributions are made to the fund from budgetary 
resources. In March 2000, the accumulated balances in the pension fund were 
S$10.5 billion, equivalent to 7.3% of GDP, more than sufficient to meet future pen-
sion liabilities. 
The investment policies and performance of the pension fund is not made publicly 
available. Thus, pension fund operations are non-transparent. The implicit nominal 
rate of return based on reported data (which may be incomplete) has varied between 
2.9% and 4.3% during FY 1995 to FY 1999. This implies a very low real rate of re-
turn. The expenditure on pensions is around 0.5% of GDP or about 5% of total oper-
ating expenditure. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉëW=tçêâãÉå=`çãéÉåë~íáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ=
~åÇ=oÉíêÉåÅÜãÉåí=_ÉåÉÑáí=
Singapore does not have unemployment insurance or other schemes for social risk 
pooling. There are, however, arrangements to compensate workers for injuries or 
death incurred during employment and for retrenchment benefits. 
tçêâãÉå=`çãéÉåë~íáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The Workmen Compensation Act, passed in 1975, regulates financial compensation 
for injuries incurred during employment. The Act principally covers unskilled work-
ers and non-manual labor with an income ceiling of S$1,600 per month. The Act out-
lines a detailed schedule for compensation for temporary and permanent injuries in-
curred during work. Guidelines for medical benefits and provisions for dependants 
of the deceased are also stipulated. The financial benefits for deceased workers de-
cline with age. All employers, unless exempted by law, are compelled to insure their 
workmen. 
The Workmen Compensation Scheme is administered by the Work Injury Compen-
sation Department of the Ministry of Manpower. This is to ensure effective imple-
mentation of various provisions under the Act, including financial liability for inju-
ries sustained during employment. 
oÉíêÉåÅÜãÉåí=_ÉåÉÑáí=
Retrenchment benefits under the Employment Act are as follows: 
No employee who has been in continuous service with an employer for less than 
three years shall be entitled to any retrenchment benefit on the termination of his 
service by the employer on the grounds of redundancy or by reason of any reor-
ganization of the employer’s profession, business, trade or work.  
 (Section 45, Employment Act 1968) 
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However, companies are not compelled by law to give retrenchment benefits to 
workers. All unionized companies, however, do generally pay such benefits, about a 
month’s pay for each year of service. But in practice there is considerable flexibility 
in the manner in which the benefits are usually implemented in a specific situation. 
OKNKQ= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉëW=sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Singapore citizens and permanent residents are permitted to save 15% percent of 
their ordinary wages, bonuses and income from self-employment, each subject to a 
ceiling, in a voluntary tax-advantaged account under the Supplementary Retirement 
Scheme (SRS) introduced in April 2001. Until the SRS, there was no specific tax-
advantaged voluntary savings scheme for retirement. 
Thus, the SRS forms the tax-advantaged but regulated voluntary savings third tier of 
the social security system in Singapore. The SRS accounts can only be opened at 
one of four locally owned and controlled banks. Expatriate employees are also eligi-
ble and they can contribute at a rate of 35% in recognition of the fact that they are 
not part of the CPF scheme. Employers are not permitted to contribute to the SRS, 
but the self-employed may join. 
The contributions and investment income (except dividend income) can be accumu-
lated in a tax-advantaged manner until the statutory retirement age at the time of the 
first contribution (currently age 62). At the time of statutory withdrawals, 50% of 
the amount is taxed at the then prevailing marginal income tax rate – introducing 
additional uncertainty. The tax benefit thus varies positively with the marginal in-
come tax rate. Pre-mature withdrawals not only attract full tax, but also a 5% pen-
alty. As only about a third of the labor force currently is liable for individual income 
tax, the SRS scheme is of relevance only to the top one-third of the labor force. 
Foreigners must maintain any SRS account for at least ten years even if they leave 
Singapore earlier. 
With the exception of property, real estate, and some forms of insurance, SRS con-
tributions may be invested in a variety of assets. Withdrawals, however, must be 
made in cash but can be staggered over time to minimize tax or avoid adverse mar-
ket conditions. 
In addition to the small proportion of the labor force that is likely to find SRS of 
relevance, there are also other reasons for its limited impact. First, for many Singa-
poreans, the high CPF rates mean that the remainder of their income is committed to 
basic necessities. Second, since Singapore employs a source-based income taxation 
system, income earned abroad but not remitted to Singapore is not subject to income 
tax. Hence, the benefits derived from the SRS, particularly for foreigners, are limited. 
Third, the transaction costs of the scheme are likely to be high given limited compe-
tition, absence of regulation on fees and charges, and the small size of the unit trust 
industry. In addition, taxation at the withdrawal stage will reduce returns. 
Fourth, the income tax payable at the time of withdrawal is on both original invest-
ment and on capital gains. Since Singapore has no tax on capital gains, under some 
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circumstances, such as when a person joins the SRS at a young age and has a low 
marginal rate of tax, and when net returns on SRS investments are high, an individual 
may actually get a lower rate of after-tax return under the SRS as compared to not en-
joying the tax benefit. Usually, it is the taxation of capital gains that make the SRS 
type schemes tax-advantaged. In Singapore, capital gains, with the exception of some 
property transactions, are exempt from the income tax. The investment income from 
the investment of SRS funds is taxable at the life insurance company level, thus 
discriminating against the use of life insurance products by SRS participants. The 
SRS balances are subject to estate duty. This may adversely impact some potential 
members. 
Fifth, the ten-year minimum period for which an expatriate must maintain balances 
in the SRS account could act as a hindrance for short-term expatriates. Sixth, expa-
triates must take into account the exchange rate risks, as their liabilities are likely to 
be in non-Singapore currency as well as the risk that income tax rates (and relevant 
transaction costs) are not known. The exchange rate risk is non-trivial given the 
volatility in exchange rates, external openness of Singapore’s economy, and the 
vulnerability of the Southeast Asian region to globalization forces and to external 
shocks. 
The impact of the SRS on overall social security arrangements in Singapore will be 
marginal. This is because it is not designed to address the fundamental limitations of 
the current social security arrangements such as the lack of protection against infla-
tion and longevity, and the absence of a tax-financed redistributive tier. Moreover, 
the SRS is only likely to be of potential advantage when the annual household income 
is at least S$100,000 (Cua, 2001b). Thus, for the vast proportion of resident house-
holds, the SRS is essentially irrelevant. It is therefore not surprising that only about 
11,000 individuals have joined the SRS scheme. By December 2001 only 12,000 
SRS accounts were opened while the gross contributions amounted to S$157 mil-
lion. 
OKNKR= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
The Ministry of Community Development and Sports (MCDS) forwards a list of eli-
gible recipients for social assistance to the People’s Association. The PA dissemi-
nates this information to its Constituency Secretariats in the respective electoral 
wards. Staff at the constituency level liaise with the grassroots leaders in the indi-
vidual neighborhoods to investigate the cases. Once an accurate profile of the indi-
vidual(s) seeking assistance has been determined, the information is forwarded to 
the Citizen’s Consultative Committee (CCC). 
The CCC, the key decision-making body in the constituency, will determine the type 
of assistance required. Usually the measures are geared towards short-term relief. 
The schemes range from financial assistance, bursaries and scholarships to waivers 
on rent, utilities and conservancy charges under the following schemes: the Public 
Assistance Scheme (the number of recipients were 2,409, with about 7% of per capita 
income in 2000); the Rent and Utilities Assistance Scheme; the Short-term (Interim) 
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Financial Assistance Scheme; and the Small Families Improvement Scheme. In 
2000, 1,041 households received conditional housing and bursary grants of S$1.3 
million, or S$1,260 per household. 
Since the inception of the Medifund, designed to assist the poor and indigent resi-
dents of all ages, the total amount distributed has been S$75.2 million, or S$224 per 
case. Thus, the total amount of subsidies is quite small. This is supplemented by a 
variety of ad-hoc schemes, again not necessarily targeted at the elderly. 
The above set of financial assistance schemes is enlarged by secondary measures 
(the Economic Downturn Relief Scheme) to assist families affected by the economic 
recession. Voluntary welfare organizations (VWOs), self-help groups and the Na-
tional Trades Union Congress (NTUC) also provide similar short- to medium-term 
financial assistance to families in financial distress. These provisions are largely 
funded by the government. 
The government-sponsored self-help groups, based on ethnic lines, and the NTUC 
(with whom the ruling party has a symbiotic relationship) serve the needs of a spe-
cific target group. The self-help groups provide financial and social assistance (coun-
seling for juveniles, remedial and enrichment classes for students and retraining 
programs for blue-collar workers) to their own ethnic group, while the NTUC serves 
its union members. However, these social assistance programs are not conducted in 
isolation. There appears to be considerable synergy and coordination in the imple-
mentation of the programs. The grassroots organizations under the PA, the NTUC, 
the self-help groups, the VWOs and the Ministry of Manpower recently pooled 
resources to form a comprehensive network to retrain and place retrenched workers 
into suitable jobs. Access to financial and social assistance schemes, retraining pro-
grams and job placement schemes have enabled the ruling party to cultivate and 
solidify political support. 
OKO= i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
Singapore has made extensive use of manpower planning since becoming a republic 
in 1965. There has been close coordination between the Economic Development 
Board (EDB), which is the primary agency for pro-actively promoting inward in-
vestment, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM), and educational and training institu-
tions at all levels. Thus, there is an attempt at coordination between the anticipated 
demand for various types of skills and supply of these skills both from domestic 
manpower and foreign sources. Such coordination is usually more successful at lower 
levels (with foreign unskilled workers providing a buffer for resident workers), than 
in the professions such as doctors, architects, engineers, and lawyers. 
The Employment Act of 1968 (as amended) has been the main Act governing labor 
relations in Singapore. This Act has set very restrictive conditions and scope for 
trade union activities in Singapore. All authorized trade unions are a part of the 
NTUC with whom the ruling party has a symbiotic relationship. There is no provi-
sion for minimum wage in the Act. It is designed to ensure low-wage share and 
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high-income profit share in national income. The Act has succeeded in its objectives 
(see Table 2, Appendix). 
Since the early 1970s, there has been a tripartite body comprising the NTUC, the 
government, and employers, called the National Wages Council (NWC), which annu-
ally has set guidelines for wage adjustments. These guidelines are routinely imple-
mented by the public sector, but adherence to them has varied among the private 
sector. The NWC guidelines in some years, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, also 
included changes in the CPF contribution rates. Their mandatory nature helped to 
adjust the wages in the directions desired by the government. 
There has been a gradual shift in the wage setting, with basic (or fixed) wage account-
ing for a smaller proportion of the total compensation. This is designed to make the 
total compensation more flexible, and to prevent a significant decline in the rate of 
profits. Thus, in the 2001 recession, flexible elements of the compensation such as 
bonuses have been reduced significantly. In some cases, salary cuts have also been 
introduced. 
The link between profitability and employment preservation and creation has been 
strongly emphasized. There has also been considerable emphasis on training and re-
training of the workforce at all levels. Singapore has a Skills Development Fund 
(SDF) levy on the wage bill of those below a certain wage level to help finance train-
ing. In addition, there are other programs and tax concessions to encourage reskilling. 
But the allocation from the SDF has been open to criticism that the capital grants 
and significant proportions of the training programs supported by it have not bene-
fited those in the lower wage group. 
Singapore’s policies to increasingly rely on foreign workers have tended to increase 
wage inequalities. This is because of the abundant supply of low-skilled workers and 
the foreign workers’ levy, which have depressed wages at the low end. But to attract 
professionals, most of whom are from high-income countries, a premium above com-
parable wages has usually been paid. This has had an upward impact on the wages 
of resident professional workers as well. 
The presence of foreign workers however acts a buffer for the resident workers. This 
permits the government to concentrate on reskilling the resident workers. But with 
the increasing median age of the population, such continuous reskilling may not be 
as effective as earlier. 
The structure of the labor market is expected to undergo significant changes in the 
next few decades. Singapore is currently searching for a new growth strategy to com-
pensate for its declining competitiveness in manufacturing (particularly in semicon-
ductors), the anticipated slower growth in Southeast Asia (particularly Malaysia and 
Indonesia), increasing competition, including in international trade logistics from 
Malaysia, and its inability to widen its economic linkages with the United States and 
Japan. For differing reasons, its current ability to benefit from China and India, two 
growing mega-economies, is also fairly limited. 
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As Singapore searches for new growth-inducing activities, it will need to restructure 
the mix of skills of its labor force. But the rising median age of the population, the 
rigid educational and socio-political system, and the relatively low-level education 
of a significant proportion of the current labor force are likely to make the transition 
to a new skills-mix difficult. In addition, globalization forces are likely to significantly 
increase volatility of aggregate output and employment. There is therefore high prob-
ability that structural unemployment will emerge. This type of unemployment is less 
amenable to continuous retraining and matching of vacancies with available man-
power, which are the focus of labor market policy currently. In particular, more formal 
safety nets to cope with the unemployed may be needed. 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
Between 1983 and 2000, the membership in the CPF increased from 1.8 million to 
2.9 million, while the number of contributors increased at a much slower rate from 
0.92 million to 1.3 million (see Table 6, Appendix). Any individual who contributes 
to the CPF even once becomes a member. The contributors in a given year refer to 
those who have contributed at least once during a given year. The ratio of contribu-
tors to members has declined from 51.6% in 1983 to 44.2% in 2000. The contribu-
tors to labor force ratio has also declined from 70.9% in 1983 to 58.1% in 2000. 
This has not been a serious cause for concern till now as the foreign workers, who 
are not covered by the CPF scheme, account for nearly a quarter of the workforce; 
and most of the remainder that are non-covered are self-employed. 
The self-employed can voluntarily contribute to the CPF up to the combined em-
ployer and employee contributions. They, however, must contribute to the Medisave 
component as discussed in the following. Since the coverage depends on the formal 
employer-employee relationship, high formal employment is essential for a satisfac-
tory coverage rate. As flexibility of employment patterns, and open unemployment 
increases due to globalization and restructuring, the declining trend in CPF coverage 
may be more of a concern in the future. 
PKO= dçîÉêå~åÅÉ=
The CPF Board is currently primarily an implementing agency, with the relevant 
policy decisions taken elsewhere in the government, particularly by the Ministry of 
Finance, and MOM. The monocentric power structure has meant that it has been 
difficult to get persons who are both independent and knowledgeable to serve on the 
CPF Board. The Board’s priorities are determined by the government’s socio-eco-
nomic engineering goals at a given point in time. The strategic use of relevant in-
formation, and discouragement of independent research on social security issues 
have also been a part of the overall environment in Singapore. 
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The CPF Board also has no responsibility for the ultimate deployment of CPF bal-
ances entrusted to it. In pension fund governance, fiduciary responsibility to mem-
bers constitutes a vital principle. Fiduciary responsibility in the CPF context would 
require its Board members to administer solely in the interest of the CPF members in 
maximizing net returns on the balances, net of all expenses. 
The governance reform of the CPF Board, the Pension Fund for civil servants, and 
the occupational pension funds would need to concentrate on greater transparency of 
all operations, particularly of the investment portfolio. The end result would be an 
independent professional Board, which is mandated to give high priority to fiduciary 
responsibility towards the fund members and accountability. In addition, informa-
tion disclosure requirements (such as valuing investments on mark-to-market basis) 
should also be consistent with international practices. 
The CPF Board however has been quite effective in ensuring a low default rate by 
employers. The default rate has consistently been below 1%. The process for ensur-
ing that the contributions forwarded by the employers are actually credited into the 
members’ accounts is also well structured and effective. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
The criteria of adequacy primarily concerns adequate finances in retirement for pov-
erty alleviation and for maintaining accustomed standards of living. It is conventional 
to assess adequacy with reference to the replacement rate, i.e. the proportion of pre-
retirement income available as an annuity during retirement. The relevant replace-
ment rate is not just at the time of retirement, but throughout the period of retirement. 
For the replacement rate to remain constant during retirement, protection against 
inflation and longevity risks is essential. Provisions for survivors’ benefits are also 
needed. 
The CPF Board estimated in 1987 (no updates since then) that the replacement rate 
would vary between 20% and 40% for the members, without protection for inflation 
and a very limited protection against longevity. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that 
the average balance per CPF member doubled between 1987–99, while the average 
monthly earnings in 1999 were 2.4 times the earnings in 1987. Thus, monthly earn-
ings have risen faster than average balances per member. This implies a low replace-
ment rate. 
There are several reasons why the average balance in the CPF is low. First, the wage 
structure in Singapore is highly unequal, and this is reflected in the contributions 
made by the CPF members. Thus, in 1999, 51.4% of the contributors had monthly 
wages less than S$2,000, while only 6.3% had wages higher than S$6,000. Second, 
a high rate of pre-retirement withdrawals tied to the centrality of the real-estate sec-
tor reduces the amount available for retirement. Third, average balances are low as 
the real rate of return is low due to implicit tax on CPF wealth. Finally, high transac-
tion costs due to restricted competition and the limited size of the unit trusts market 
have also contributed to low balances. 
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PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
The previous discussion of the CPF scheme suggests that it is regressive in nature. 
This is because only about a third of the labor force is subject to income tax; and the 
tax saving increases with wage income. Moreover, contributions withdrawn sooner 
for pre-retirement investments can potentially enjoy higher effective returns than 
those that are left with the CPF Board. Since the higher income groups have a greater 
ability to undertake early withdrawals (at least until recently when a minimum sum 
had to be accumulated before such withdrawals), this feature is also regressive. 
The specific gender equity issues arise in Singapore’s social protection system be-
cause the CPF system has no protection against inflation, and very limited protection 
against longevity. Since women earn less than men, but have longer life expectancy, 
they are more likely to find themselves with inadequate resources in old age. Thus, 
the absence of a social risk pooling first tier is particularly inequitable for women. 
PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
Administrative costs of the CPF system as a whole may be divided into various com-
ponents. The first concerns the administrative costs reflected in the Annual Reports 
of the CPF Board. These costs were S$125.2 million in 2000, equivalent to 0.95% of 
contributions; or 0.13% of total assets (ROS, CPF, 2000). These costs are borne by 
the CPF members. 
The second component concerns various insurance funds. It is the members who pay 
the premiums and receive the coverage, both of which are formulated by the CPF 
Board. In 2000, the insurance premiums paid by the members amounted to S$504.7 
million, while claims were S$116.9 million (ROS, CPF, 2000, p. 48). It is not clear as 
to who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the accumulated surplus of the insurance 
funds of S$3.2 billion as at the end of 2000. 
The third component concerns the administrative and management costs associated 
with the CPFIS scheme. These costs are both of a fixed and variable nature. While 
there has been little research concerning the magnitude of these costs, they are likely 
to be significant. The share of these costs as a percentage of total investment is 
likely to vary inversely with the size of the investment. The fourth component con-
cerns the cost of converting accumulated balances into an income stream during the 
decumulation phase. 
The total administration costs comprise all four components. These costs need to be 
analyzed for a given year as well as over a time period to assess the efficiency with 
which the CPF scheme is administered in Singapore. 
From the point of view of economic resource use, costs of compliance with the CPF 
system are also relevant. These costs arise both for individuals and companies. For 
the individuals, the costs of complying with the Medisave, CPFIS, housing and 
education schemes are likely to be particularly important. 
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The compliance costs for 88,576 active employers as at 30 September 2001 
(http://www.CPF.gov.sg) arise due to the charges needed in their accounting sys-
tems to conform to the requirements of the CPF Board. 
There has been remarkably little systematic research done in Singapore on the ad-
ministration and compliance costs of the CPF system. Further elaboration of these 
aspects is therefore not feasible. 
PKS= bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=
There are several important ways in which the current pension arrangements affect 
efficiency. The first concerns the efficiency of the savings / investment process. Un-
der current arrangements, the government controls the bulk of the nation’s flow and 
stock of savings. The investment of CPF savings in non-marketable government 
bonds does not permit these savings to be allocated according to market forces, and 
hampers the development of financial and capital markets. The subsequent use of 
these savings by government investment companies in a non-transparent and non-
accountable manner is contrary to good governance practices of pension funds; and 
they have the potential to undermine investment discipline. 
The second important way in which the efficiency is affected concerns the use of the 
CPF scheme as a substitute for the housing finance market. The government’s con-
trol over the supply and demand for the housing market has the potential to lead to 
inflexibility and lead to over-consumption in housing (Asher and Phang, 1997). 
Given the centrality of the real-estate sector in the economy, inflexibility and over-
consumption have become serious constraints in restructuring the economy. The 
transition to a genuine market in the housing and real-estate sector, however, will 
need to be undertaken carefully. This is because housing wealth is a major element 
of total wealth of most households in Singapore, and property values have been used 
as collateral in bank loans by individuals and businesses. 
The need for greater efficiency in resource allocation has increased as demographic 
trends and more moderate growth are likely to reduce Singapore’s overall savings 
rate considerably. Not only will rapid ageing increase the consumption share, but it 
will also reduce public sector saving through increased expenditure, particularly for 
health care (Heller, 1997). As a result, the need for greater efficiency in translating 
savings into growth-enhancing productive investments has become more urgent. 
QK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
The CPF scheme has come to occupy a pre-dominant position in the pension ar-
rangements in Singapore. The recent parametric reforms in the CPF scheme, such as 
paying a higher administered rate of interest on Medisave and Special Accounts and 
altering the share of contributions allotted to each account, and the introduction of 
the SRS, do not however address the main limitations of the current arrangements. 
These limitations include inadequate balances at retirement, lack of inflation and 
longevity protection, lack of survivors’ benefits, lack of transparency and account-
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ability, particularly in the area of investment management, inadequate emphasis on 
fiduciary responsibility compared with socio-economic engineering objectives, and 
virtual absence of a tax-financed redistributive tier. The limited nature of health insur-
ance, and the issue of long-term care for the aged also pose major challenges to 
policymakers. 
It is clear from the discussion in this paper that more fundamental reforms are needed 
to provide economic security to the elderly in Singapore. Such reforms will require a 
change in the mindset, and a paradigm shift in the philosophy of social security. It 
will also require substantive participation of all stakeholders in the society. 
To achieve the above objectives, pension reforms incorporating a redistributive first 
tier are needed. Other requirements include substantive reforms in the health financ-
ing and health insurance systems to systematically introduce social risk pooling and 
to increase the share of financing through the government budget (currently esti-
mated to be around a quarter of the total) (Lim, 2001), and making the CPF system a 
genuine DC fully funded scheme. 
An illustrative set of measures for reforming the CPF scheme may include the fol-
lowing. An initial step would be to eliminate the implicit tax on CPF balances. In the 
short term, this can be accomplished by crediting the weighted average of returns of 
government investment companies, which are actually making decisions on the de-
ployment of the CPF funds. 
In the medium term (two to three years), more secure arrangements will be needed. 
These include the following. First, an establishment of a Provident Funds and Pen-
sions Authority (PFPA) with an independent Board of Directors, whose fiduciary 
responsibilities will be in line with best international practices in pension govern-
ance. 
If de-linking the CPF scheme from housing finance is considered too risky, then the 
CPF scheme could be formally divided into three components: housing, health care, 
and retirement. The independent PFPA can be given the responsibility for retirement 
funds, with a similar authority set up for health care financing. The existing CPF 
Board may continue to be in charge of housing finance. 
Second, the investment policies and performance of the PFPA should be completely 
transparent, and de-linked from government investment companies. The investments 
should be mark-to-market and publicly available. 
Third, all investment returns must be made known and fully credited to the account 
of the members. 
Fourth, individuals may be given limited options (including default options when no 
choices have been indicated) by the proposed PFPA’s investment management com-
mittee. A member may divide the balances among the options on a periodic basis. 
This will minimize transaction costs and permit individuals to adapt the investment 
portfolio for differing risk / return profiles. 
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Fifth, the PFPA should encourage the development of the annuity markets; if neces-
sary, through making such purchases mandatory. There is also a strong case for en-
suring that tax treatment of benefits does not distort choices among pension products 
and pension providers. 
It should be stressed that even if the reforms suggested are undertaken, the manda-
tory savings second tier by itself will not provide adequate retirement. The other two 
tiers will still need to be developed. 
It does appear, however, that the prospects for pension reforms designed to bring 
about a multi-tier system in Singapore along the lines sketched above are not promis-
ing, primarily because the CPF scheme has become an integral part of the social-
economic-political management in Singapore. There is therefore considerable resis-
tance to any substantive changes in the CPF scheme. Given the above, and due to its 
size, the transition to any new arrangements which are substantively different will 
not be smooth or without generating winners and losers. 
The policymakers, however, recognize that their legitimacy and authority depends to 
an important extent on fulfilling the material needs of the population, and that it is 
by now apparent that the current pension arrangements are inadequate for providing 
financial security in old age. Consequently, accelerated parametric reforms may well 
occur, such as refining allocation of CPF contributions to different accounts, raising 
administered interest rates credited to members accounts, liberalizing various invest-
ment and other schemes, and expanding the practice of transferring general budgetary 
resources to the individual members’ CPF accounts. Fundamental reforms, which 
address the main weaknesses of the current arrangements, will however have to wait 
for substantive reforms in the political economy of Singapore. 
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AIS – Approved Investment Scheme 
ANRPS – Approved Non-Residential Property Scheme 
CCC – Citizen’s Consultative Committee 
CDC – Community Development Council 
COWEC – Company Welfarism through Employers’ Contribution 
CPF – Central Provident Fund 
CPFIS – Central Provident Fund Insurance Scheme 
DB – Defined Benefit 
DC – Defined Contribution 
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EDB – Economic Development Board 
GDFC – Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GDS – Gross Domestic Savings 
GNP – Gross National Product 
HDB – Housing and Development Board 
MCDS – Ministry of Community Development and Sports 
MNC – Multi-National Corporation 
MOM – Ministry of Manpower 
NDB – Notional Defined Benefit 
NPF – National Provident Fund 
NTUC – National Trades Union Congress 
NWC – National Wages Council 
ODR – Old Dependency Ratio 
PA – People’ s Association 
PAP – People’s Action Party 
PAYG – Pay-As-You-Go 
PFPA – Provident Funds and Pensions Authority 
SDF – Skills Development Fund 
SGIC – Singapore Government Investment Corporation 
SOTUS – Share Ownership Top-Up Scheme 
SRS – Supplementary Retirement Scheme 
TFR – Total Fertility Rate 
VWO – Voluntary Welfare Organization 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=pçìíÜ=hçêÉ~=
gìåÖI=vçìåÖJq~É=~åÇ=pÜáåI=açåÖJjóÉçå=
^Äëíê~Åí=
Korea has grown rapidly since the early 1960s, and its GNI (Gross National Income) 
per capita was at US$8,910 in 2000, thereby classifying it as one of the upper middle-
income countries. Other standards of living have also improved greatly as seen by 
positive changes in the literacy rate, school enrollment, the infant mortality rate, life 
expectancy, and other human development indicators. Political conditions are better 
and the Korean people enjoy most democratic rights. 
Despite these improvements in socio-economic and political conditions, benefits are 
not equally distributed among the different social groups and the population. In 
particular, women, the elderly, and the youth are vulnerable to various risks. Al-
though the traditional social protection system has been expanded and strengthened 
in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, the current system still has many prob-
lems. To cite a few: exclusion of many socially weak from social security and / or so-
cial assistance benefits, insufficient levels of support and lack of an effective con-
nection of social security and social assistance programs. 
These problems arise partly due to strict eligibility, lack of coordination between gov-
ernment departments themselves and with NGOs, and insufficient financial resources 
– or government budgets, which, in turn, are caused by administrative inefficiency, 
inability to secure honest tax reports, and over-commercialization of health care. Un-
derlying these problems, though, is the government’s philosophy of social protection 
and social policy. The current social protection system in Korea is based on the dual 
principles of residualism and work-linked welfare, emphasizing the precedence of in-
dividuals’ and / or their families’ responsibility over the government’s responsibility 
for social assistance and the obligation of the persons concerned (i.e. unemployed) 
to seek a job. This dual system is compelled partly by financial difficulties and partly 
by prevailing perceptions held by government decision makers and by the majority 
of the populace. 
Reforming the fundamentals of the current system presents a formidable challenge: 
those undertaking the task must implement a new system, which will take much time. 
In the meantime, therefore, efforts have to be made to improve the current system by 
persuading key decision makers as well as the public to accept new principles and / 
or philosophies of the social protection system and by making up for its deficiencies. 
Since most of the decision makers and the populace are preoccupied with traditional 
ideas of social protection, NGOs must play a leading role, and cooperate towards 
this common goal. 
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* The exchange rate of the won to the US dollar at the time of writing was US$1 = 
1400 won. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~äI=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
The Republic of Korea was one of the least developed countries in the 1960s. How-
ever, after three decades of industrialization, it has grown so rapidly that its GNI per 
capita had risen to US$10,823 in 1995, making it the thirteenth largest trading nation 
in the world and classifying it as an upper middle-income, fast industrializing coun-
try. The financial crisis in 1997 pulled down its GNI below US$7,000 in 1998, but 
as the economy recovered from the recession, GNI per capita began to rise again, 
reaching US$8,910 in 2000 (see Table 3, Appendix).1 
In fact, economic output grew 9.4% annually during the 1980–90 period and despite 
the financial crunch in 1997, 5.7% annually during the 1990s (see Table 3, Appen-
dix). In 1996, Korea was granted membership in the OECD in recognition of its eco-
nomic achievement. 
Rapid economic growth has made the Korean populace an affluent society. An abso-
lute majority of the populace reside in urban areas (see Table 1, Appendix), and ser-
vice industry sectors have expanded rapidly alongside manufacturing sectors (see 
Tables 3 and 5, Appendix). 
As of 1999, the population of Korea amounted to 46.4 million, increasing by 1.1% 
each year during the period 1975–99. Although the infant mortality rate has steadily 
decreased and life expectancy at birth has progressively risen, the projected rate of 
population growth is expected to increase very slowly due to the low fertility rate. 
This trend is reflected in the age structure: While the age group of 15 years old and 
below is expected to decrease to 17.2% of the total population in 2015, dropping 
from 21.2% in 1999; the age group of 65 years old and above will increase to 11.6% 
in 2015, from 6.8% of the total population in 1999. As a consequence, the total de-
pendency ratio (people aged 0–14 and 65+, as a percentage of those aged 15–64) 
will skyrocket to 53.3% by 2030, from 39.3% in 2000. In particular, the old depend-
ency ratio, estimated to reach 27.7% in 2030, will pose a serious challenge to the 
current old-age pension scheme (ILO 2000, see also Table 1, Appendix). 
A rising proportion of students have enrolled in higher educational institutions, and 
more women have a higher educational attainment (see Table 2, Appendix) and par-
ticipate in economic activities (see Tables 6 and 7, Appendix). 
A spectacular economic growth is usually attributed to several concomitant factors: 
an export-oriented industrialization within the state-directed government-big con-
glomerate-bank nexus, an expanding world economy along with a relatively well 
protected domestic market, a cheap and docile workforce with a relatively high level 
                             
1 The Korea National Statistics Office gives different figures for GNI per capita; see Table 3 in the 
Appendix. 
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of education, and so on. After the financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent IMF 
intervention, Korea has become a more open and market-dominated economy. For-
eign direct investment, then amounting to a meager 0.5% of PPP GDP in 1989, rose 
to 2.1% in 1999 (see Table 3, Appendix) and in 2001, total foreign investments 
reached 10% of GDP. As a consequence, foreign companies, numbering some 4,700 
in 1998, climbed to 8,100 in 2000. The Korean government has removed a variety of 
regulations relating to business activities. 
These post-crisis economic changes, together with political change as a result of de-
mocratization in 1987, transformed Korean society. First, the Korean economy has 
continued to grow although growth halted for a short period immediately after the 
crisis. Second, the state-civil society relationship has changed favorably. Civil society 
organizations, including private and public interest NGOs, have proliferated and 
become increasingly influential. Third, small and medium companies, together with 
foreign companies, have produced a larger portion of commodities although some 
30 big conglomerates are still dominant in the economy (see Table 4, Appendix). In 
addition, public interest NGOs have been playing an increasingly important role in 
forming public opinion and in influencing government policies and, frequently, busi-
ness decisions. 
Thus, the Korean economy continues to grow even after the financial crisis and is 
becoming healthier than before. Moreover, state power has been weakened and civil 
society’s role and influence have increased. Alongside these positive changes, how-
ever, negative effects have also been felt. A relatively high unemployment rate (see 
Tables 6, 7, Appendix), higher job insecurity, and an increasing socio-economic in-
equality (see Table 8, 9, Appendix) are some of the consequences. That is, a larger 
portion of the population has become vulnerable to social risks such as unemploy-
ment, old age, poverty, and accidents. 
As required to do so by international financial institutions like the IMF and the World 
Bank, the government improved the traditional social protection system in order to 
cope with the negative effects of neoliberal reform immediately after the financial 
crisis. It increased budgets for that purpose and expanded the coverage and benefits 
of social security and social assistance programs (see Table 10, Appendix). As we 
will see later, however, the current social protection system, though much improved, 
does not yet provide an adequate level of social welfare for the socially weak (see 
Table 13, Appendix). 
Both electoral and parliamentary politics have been dominated by the two major par-
ties and one minor party, which compete in electoral politics on the basis of provin-
cial loyalty and not of policy stance. The Democratic Party for the New Millennium, 
currently in government and very similar to the British Labour Party or the American 
Democratic Party in its ideological and policy stance, includes some pro-labor and / 
or pro-welfare state politicians, but they do not have much influence in policy making 
due to their minority position within the party. Moreover, the party occupies roughly 
a third of the seats in parliament, thereby making it necessary to compromise on 
governmental policy with other parties. The other major party is the Grand National 
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Party, which is currently in the opposition, but is the largest party in parliament, 
taking a majority of seats. It is an anti-communist or anti-socialist party, resembling 
the British Conservative Party or the American Republican Party and opposes any 
legislation favoring labor and / or the socially weak. The last party, Alliance for Free 
Democracy, holds a much stronger stance in anti-communism or anti-socialism and 
is as antagonistic towards developing a welfare state as the Grand National Party. 
For this reason it is difficult to expect that deficiencies of the current system will be 
repaired in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the ruling party, a pro-welfare state 
party, shares a neoliberal belief system with other parties – that economic recovery 
and growth will automatically do away with these negative effects and that creating 
more jobs to have the poor work is the best policy. Although there are non-parlia-
mentary parties – such as the Democratic Labor Party and Socialist Party – and NGOs 
(which are either labor or socialist, thus pro-welfare state, and have some influence 
among the public), they cannot directly affect governmental policies because they do 
not have a single seat in parliament. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
Most of the data used here can be obtained from the government and also from in-
ternational organizations. Some data, for example relating to income distribution and 
the poverty level, are not available from the World Bank or other international or-
ganizations but they can be found from Korean government sources. Most of the 
data are reliable and / or comparable, but some data are not. This is largely due to the 
fact that the Korean government uses different criteria than western democracies. 
One example is data about the employment / unemployment rate and the ratio of atypi-
cal employment. In official statistics, unemployed persons are those who, among 
people aged 15 and above, have both the ability and willingness to work but have 
not worked at all. In this case, the most important difference from western countries 
is the fact that those who have the ability to work but give up searching for jobs due 
to difficulties in doing so are not considered as unemployed. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Political democratization in 1987 gave birth to numerous NGOs including trade 
unions, which are free from government control. As of 2000, there were 5,698 unions 
and 6,000 non-union NGOs active in civil society. Trade unions have a membership 
of 1,526,000 and NGOs have a membership of some 200,000. There are some NGOs 
which are heavily dependent on financial and moral support from the government 
and collaborate with it, but most NGOs formed after 1987 try to keep away from the 
government and are critical of it. There are two types of NGOs: public interest NGOs 
and private interest NGOs. The former pursues the public’s common interests such 
as a clean environment, clean politics and participative democracy, and women’s 
rights. The latter usually includes trade unions, employers’ associations, medical 
doctors’ associations, pharmacists’ associations and so on to pursue their members’ 
common (occupational) interests. Foreign companies, which numbered around 8,100 
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as of 2001, have their own organization in order to defend and expand their interests 
in Korea. 
NGOs in Korea enjoy most civic and political rights in the same way as their coun-
terparts in western democracies. Trade unions were once prohibited from engaging 
themselves in politics, especially in electoral campaigns and in political fund-raising, 
but since 1998 they have been allowed to campaign in elections and to raise political 
funds. However, non-union NGOs are prohibited from getting involved in electoral 
campaigning and political fundraising. 
NGOs play an important role, especially in forming public opinion, and thereby pres-
sure the government and / or political parties to adopt or not to adopt certain policies. 
One of the pre-eminent examples which show NGOs’ influence on governmental 
policy is the introduction of the Real Name Account Act in 1993, which was made 
possible due to the Citizens’ Alliance for Economic Justice’s (CAEJ: Kyungshilyon) 
long-time campaign.2 A recent example is the Campaign for Minority Shareholders’ 
Rights initiated by the Solidarity for Participative Democracy (SPD: Chamyeoyondae) 
in 1998. Most recently, trade unions and other NGOs, including SPD and CAEJ, 
launched an alliance for solving the problem of atypical employment in 2000. In 2001, 
some NGOs also formed an alliance to pressure the government to provide an ade-
quate level of social assistance for the poor, leading to the enactment of a new Basic 
Livelihood Protection Law. In general, NGOs, including trade unions, are (although 
informally) consulted by the government, thereby being able to exert some influence 
in the policy-making process. 
However, employers’ associations, in particular foreign companies’ associations such 
as the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM), have a stronger in-
fluence on the government in making economic policy than any other NGOs. Ac-
cording to a survey conducted by a weekly journal in April 1999, elite groups in 
Korea find the IMF, foreign companies and big conglomerates most influential. But 
at least in the area of social protection-related policy, medical professionals’ associa-
tions such as medical doctors’ and pharmacists’ associations exert a strong influence. 
Social policy issues such as employment security, industrial restructuring and social 
protection are to be discussed and agreed on in the Tripartite Commission, composed 
of the same number of representatives from trade unions and employers’ associations, 
and some government-appointed commissioners. However, because of their conflict-
ing interests it is rare to reach consensus, thereby leaving room for intervention by 
the government.3 However, the government has almost always succumbed to medi-
                             
2 A Real Name Account is referred to as ‘a bank account in which the account holder is identical with 
its real owner.’ It was widespread practice until 1993 in Korea for the real owner of a bank account to 
borrow his / her relative’s or friend’s name for the purpose of evading tax or concealing illegal transac-
tions like bribery. 
3 The current form of the Tripartite Commission was established by Kim Dae Jung’s government in 
January 1998, in order to consult and to reach a consensus on a whole variety of issues relating to IMF 
conditions. In the beginning, it was merely a consultative organ which was not supported by laws and 
could consult the President, but later it was reestablished as a formal organ after a law concerning the 
Labor–Management Government Commission was passed in parliament in May 1999. With a two-
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cal professionals’ groups – i.e. medical doctors’ associations and / or pharmacists’ 
associations. 
Cooperation between the different NGOs (i.e. trade unions, employers’ associations, 
and public-interest NGOs) is rare, although each of them sometimes cooperates with 
the government. Public interest NGOs are usually hesitant to work together with the 
government because they are afraid of becoming dependent on it. 
Most government bureaucrats tend to be anti-labor (but pro-business) and anti-wel-
fare. As a result, trade unions have to rely on collective action in order to put pres-
sure on these bureaucrats and parliamentary delegates. Even mass strikes do not make 
any significant difference. This is largely due to political circumstances unfavorable 
to labor as well as to its organizational weakness. As discussed above, parliament is 
overwhelmed by conservative parties, which are anti-labor and anti-welfare. Trade 
unions organize merely 10% of the workforce and, worse, are divided into two na-
tional umbrella organizations – the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and 
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
The current Korean government has made a commitment to create a fully equipped 
social protection system. It has overhauled and / or expanded the traditional system 
including unemployment insurance, industrial accident compensation, national pen-
sion, and national health insurance. However, it has at the same time firmly commit-
ted itself to making Korean society free market- dominated. In order to implement 
the IMF agreements and also to respond to employers’ demands, the government has 
launched a neoliberal reform, which, if successfully implemented, will make Korea 
fully open to foreign products and capital and dominated by markets free from gov-
ernment regulation. Such a dual commitment – to a full social protection system and 
to a free market – has led the government to adopt an Anglo-Saxon model of social 
welfare, namely a work-linked welfare system. A work-linked welfare system stresses 
self-support rather than full employment. Furthermore, it links the provision of so-
cial assistance and / or social security to the beneficiaries’ willingness to work. As a 
result, the Korean government prefers pushing the unemployed back into the labor 
market through developing human capital to guarantee them a minimum income. 
The current government has a limited capacity to make and implement policies, par-
ticularly those related to social protection. First of all, it is a divided government 
where the government party is a minority in parliament. Second, it has a narrow con-
stituency, partly due to the fact that its electoral support is based on a minority re-
gion, and partly due to the fact that its neoliberal labor market policies have made 
traditional allies such as trade unions turn their backs. Third, it has limited control 
                                                                                                                                        
thirds majority vote, it can deal with and make a decision on employment security and working condi-
tions, principles and directions of corporate restructuring, institutions and practices of industrial rela-
tions, and other related industrial, economic and social policies. It can ask related government organs 
to implement its decisions (Law Concerning the Establishment and Operation of the Labor–
Management Government Commission 3 May 1999). 
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over bureaucrats who are responsible for implementing government decisions but 
have mostly conservative mindsets. 
The only support for its reform efforts comes from international society, i.e. the 
IMF, World Bank, Western countries, and so on. External actors support the Korean 
government in overhauling the traditional social protection system as well as in re-
forming the economy. However, the kind of social protection system that external 
actors have in mind is the Anglo-Saxon type, and not, for example, the Swedish pro-
ductivist welfare system. Moreover, the Korean government is vulnerable to pres-
sure and lobbying by private-interest NGOs such as medical doctors’ associations. 
Furthermore, a number of politicians and bureaucrats are corrupt and look only after 
their own private interests. Overall, the Korean government is firmly committed to 
preparing for a full-scaled social protection system, but it prefers to link social wel-
fare benefits to beneficiaries’ willingness to work or to find jobs, and is limited in its 
capacity to implement the policies due to its weak constituency and rampant corrup-
tion. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
The traditional social protection system in Korea has been characterized as being 
residual. Residualism in Korea’s social assistance system means that it was strictly 
means-tested and highly targeted. Some of the programs were simply underdeveloped 
so that they could not provide any meaningful protection against risks and insecuri-
ties brought about by the market. As a consequence, Korean people tended to rely 
heavily on private welfare, which could be purchased in the market or provided by 
private sector employers. 
The social protection system under the Kim Dae Jung government has been greatly 
improved, compared to the traditional one. Nevertheless, not a few socially weak 
persons are left out without any adequate protection. This is partly due to the under-
lying dual principles of work-linked welfare and residualism the government adopts. 
It can also be attributed to cultural values and the mentality most Korean people 
have toward the social protection system. 
According to a survey conducted by the government in July 1996, 45.5% of 1,500 
respondents believe that individuals and families are responsible for caring for the 
elderly. On the other hand, 73.3% of the respondents think the government is re-
sponsible for assisting the poor and 61.8% feel it is responsible for helping the 
handicapped. Opinion about who must solve women’s problems is evenly divided 
into individuals and / or families, NGOs, and government, at 25.6%, 37.1%, and 
34.7% respectively. Thus, public perception of who is the most responsible for the 
socially weak varies according to the problem area and is much divided. Korean 
people have very strong loyalty to their family, and their loyalty diffuses to other 
social groupings – such as alumna, a group of persons from the same village or pro-
vince – which are mostly formed on the basis of personal ties. Within these groups, 
personal relationships are paternalistic and patriarchal. At the same time, they are 
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very individualistic and do not trust (groups of) persons who do not belong to the 
same group. According to a survey conducted by Sejong Institute in 1995, a majority 
of respondents believe that anyone who works hard can live an affluent life; that it 
depends on him / herself whether one is poor or rich; and income inequality is legiti-
mate. Around 80% believe that personal ties to decision makers are the most impor-
tant factor contributing to one’s success. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The formal sector in Korea can be defined as a group composed of largely well-quali-
fied workers, remunerated in the form of regular wage payments, and protected by 
labor related laws. Thus, this group can be referred to as regular employees. Table 1 
shows how the ratio of workers in the formal sector in Korea has changed. It illus-
trates that after the economic crisis, the structure of employment has deteriorated along 
with the structural adjustment carried out by most firms. One of the most evident 
findings is the increase of temporary and daily workers. The ratio of this group to 
total paid employees increased to 51% in 2001 from 46% in 1997. Thus, it can be 
said that the size of the informal sector is growing in Korea. 
q~ÄäÉ=NW= bãéäçóãÉåí=pí~íìë=çÑ=m~áÇ=tçêâÉêë=EìåáíW=íÜçìë~åÇëF=
= m~áÇ=ïçêâÉêë=
= qçí~ä= oÉÖìä~ê=ÉãéäçóÉÉë= qÉãéçê~êó=ÉãéäçóÉÉë a~áäó=ÉãéäçóÉÉë=
NVVM= NMIVRM= RIVPU= PINTN= NIUQM=
NVVO= NNISNU= SISNT= PIOPP= NITTU=
NVVR= NOITUQ= TIQOV= PIRQR= NIUMV=
NVVT= NPIOOS= TINRN=ERQKNF= QINUO=EPNKSF= NIUVO=ENQKPF=
NVVU= NOINVN= SIQRT=ERPKMF= PIVVU=EPOKUF= NITPR=ENQKOF=
NVVV= NOIROO= SIMRM=EQUKPF= QINUM=EPPKQF= OIOUV=ENUKPF=
OMMM= NPINQN= RIORO=EQTKSF= QIRNN=EPQKPF= OIPTU=ENUKNF=
OMMN= NPIQNM= SIRNV=EQUKSF= QIRVV=EPQKPF= OIOVO=ENTKNF=
pçìêÅÉW= hçêÉ~=k~íáçå~ä=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êë=ÅK=
There is a big difference in the level of wages according to the size of enterprises in 
the formal sector. Table 2 shows that in October 2001, workers in firms with 500 or 
more employees could earn about 70% more compared to workers in firms with 5 to 
9 employees. In particular, it is worth noting that this gap tends to widen. In fact, the 
Gini coefficient in Korea has gone up since the economic crisis of 1997. According 
to the Korea National Statistical Office, the Gini coefficient of an industrial worker’s 
household living in an urban area had been 0.283 in 1997. Yet, it was 0.320 in 1999 
and 0.319 in 2001 (see Table 9, Appendix). 
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q~ÄäÉ=OW= iÉîÉä=çÑ=t~ÖÉ=^ÅÅçêÇáåÖ=íç=íÜÉ=páòÉ=çÑ=båíÉêéêáëÉë=EéÉê=ÅÉåíF=
= lÅíçÄÉê=NVVV= lÅíçÄÉê=OMMM= lÅíçÄÉê=OMMN=
R=Ó=V=ïçêâÉêë= NMMKM= NMMKM= NMMKM=
NM=Ó=OV== NNRKM= NNTKO= NNVKO=
PM=Ó=VV= NNUKV= NONKU= NOPKV=
NMM=Ó=OVV= NOVKQ= NPPKO= NPNKS=
PMM=Ó=QVV== NQUKM= NRNKR= NRSKV=
RMM=ïçêâÉêë=çê=ãçêÉ== NSQKT= NSVKS= NTMKN=
pçìêÅÉW= hçêÉ~=k~íáçå~ä=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êë=ÅK=
Korea has experienced dual labor market problems in the formal sector. Most Korean 
workers are very reluctant to work in ‘3D’ (dirty, dangerous, difficult) workplaces. 
Employers in 3D industries suffer from a shortage of labor. As a result, foreign work-
ers, who are paid far less than domestic workers, have substituted Korean workers in 
most of the 3D jobs. However, there has been an oversupply of labor in the big cor-
porate sector. 
Korea experienced a dramatic increase in real wages during the period 1989–94. In-
terestingly, Taiwan, possibly one of Korea’s main competitors in trade markets, also 
experienced a significant growth in real wages at that time. However, since 1991 the 
hourly labor cost in manufacturing industries in Korea had started to exceed that of 
Taiwan. As a consequence, Korean firms, which had enjoyed a comparative advan-
tage mainly due to considerably lower costs, began finding it increasingly difficult 
to maintain their competitiveness. 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The Korean social security system consists of the four main social insurance pro-
grams present in Western welfare states using the social insurance model. They have 
been gradually built up since the mid-1960s: Industrial Accident Compensation In-
surance (1964), Medical Insurance (1977), National Pension Insurance (1988) and 
Employment Insurance (1995). Korea has gradually extended the compulsory cover-
age of the four main social insurance programs, considering the administrative diffi-
culties in collecting the insurance premium in very small enterprises. 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, introduced in 1964, was the first sig-
nificant social security program in Korea. Initially, the program covered only those 
working in mining and manufacturing industries with more than 500 employees. 
Thereafter, the program was gradually extended and finally covered all workplaces 
from July 2000 onwards. The program is funded entirely out of contributions from 
employers, with the government paying for a portion of the administration costs. On 
this point, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance is rather a state-adminis-
trated insurance for employers who are liable for the compensation of industrial 
accidents. 
The Medical Insurance Program took effect as a compulsory social security program 
in 1977, covering just the employees working in large firms with 500 workers or 
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more. After several reforms for expanding its coverage, the Medical Insurance Pro-
gram finally became a universal system by covering the self-employed in urban areas 
in July 1989. Three types of medical insurance systems (for industrial workers, the 
self-employed, and public and school employees) were integrated into this unified 
national system, National Health Insurance (NHI), in 2000.4 Though there is no dif-
ference in the benefit package among the insured, the insured have to pay contribu-
tions determined on the basis of different methods. For the employed (including in-
dustrial workers and public and school employees), the level of wages is the only 
basis for deciding on contributions. The contribution rate, which should be less than 
8% of the monthly wage, is equally paid by employers and employees. However, the 
contribution of the self-employed is decided on the basis of income, property and the 
number of dependents. In particular, the government gives subsidies amounting to 
50% of total expenditure for the insurance scheme for the self-employed. 
The National Health Insurance in Korea has a co-payment system. The patient has to 
pay a very high proportion of the medical service fees. As for outpatient care, the co-
payment rate is decided from 45% to 60%, varying according to medical institutions. 
Inpatient care is 20% of the medical service fees. Consequently, despite there being 
a universal national health system, Korean citizens have to pay nearly one half of the 
total for medical expenses directly out of their own pocket. 
As for National Pension, there are four kinds of pension schemes in Korea: National 
Pension Program (NPP), Pension for Government Officials, Pension for Military 
Personnel and Pension for Private Teachers. The pension scheme in Korea was ini-
tially introduced for public officials and military personnel in the early 1960s. The 
National Pension Program, as a compulsory scheme for private firms with ten or 
more employees, was introduced in 1988. In 1992, the compulsory coverage was ex-
panded to cover workplaces with five or more. In July 1995, the compulsory cover-
age was extended further to cover the self-employed living in rural areas, including 
farmers and fishermen. Finally, the pension program has been extended to cover the 
self-employed living in urban areas from April 1999. Thus, the NPP covers most of 
the population by now. 
The NPP has different contribution methods as well as different benefits for specific 
groups. In the case of the employed, contributions are charged equally to employers 
and employees on the basis of fixed rates. Currently, the contribution rate for the em-
ployed is 9% of the monthly wage of the insured: 4.5% from the employer and 4.5% 
from the employee. The contribution rate paid by farmers and fishermen as well as 
the self-employed in urban areas is 5% of standard monthly earnings at present. It is 
worth noting that the government has provided financial support only for farmers 
and fishermen, which amounts to one-third of the contributions paid by the insured 
of the first lower earnings class. The government will provide these subsidies for 
farmers and fishermen until 2004. 
                             
4 Since the integration of medical insurance systems, the NHI consists of two categories: 40% of the 
employed are called ‘enterprise insured person’ and 60% of the self-employed are called ‘regional in-
sured person’. 
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The level of income replacement for a pensioner who has contributed for 40 years is 
60%. On the other hand, as with the NPP, it is important to note that there is a group 
that gets more benefits than another. The amount of pension received consists of two 
parts: the basic and the additional amount. The basic amount is decided according to 
the average monthly wages of all insured persons, which is aimed at income redis-
tribution, while the additional amount is based on the average amount of the monthly 
standard wages of the insured individual, which is aimed at income proportional dis-
tribution. Thus, the NPP can be said to combine the earnings-related system with the 
redistributive benefits schedule. In the NPP, the insured who are less well-off re-
ceive more benefits in relation to the contributions they paid. 
The employment insurance system (EIS) is mandatory for all enterprises. The EIS 
was initially implemented in enterprises with 30 employees or more for unemploy-
ment benefits, and enterprises with 70 employees or more for the ESP (Employment 
Stabilization Program) and the JSDP (Job Skill Development). However, faced with 
a rapidly increasing unemployment rate, the coverage of EIS has been extended. On 
October 1, 1998, all enterprises were covered by EIS regardless of their size. There-
fore, all employees in any enterprise are covered by EIS with some exceptions (see 
2.3). 
The insurance costs for unemployment benefits are financed by equal contributions 
from both covered employees and employers. However, employers are responsible 
for financing the costs of both the ESP and JSDP because employers get direct bene-
fits from them. The contribution rates of each program in EIS are determined con-
sidering the financial situation of the Employment Insurance Fund and the prospects 
of economic and labor market situations. Since the economic crisis resulted in a high 
unemployment rate and a sharp increase in expenditures for unemployment benefits 
and active labor market programs, the government increased the contribution rate of 
each program. As of 1999, the contribution rate for unemployment benefits is 1.0% 
of the total payroll, the rate for the ESP is 0.3%, and that for the JSDP ranges from 
0.1% to 0.7%, depending on the size of the firm. 
The programs and benefits under the Employment Insurance System will be dis-
cussed in detail in Section 2.3. In this section, we will only mention that unemploy-
ment benefits in Korea are hardly generous. The level of unemployment benefits is 
50% of previous earnings. The duration of the benefits ranges from three months to 
seven months, depending on working periods and the age of the unemployed. More-
over, unemployment benefits in Korea were designed without consideration of family 
circumstances, such as number of dependents. Thus, not only the level but also the 
duration of unemployment benefits in Korea are insufficient to alleviate hardship for 
unemployed persons. 
On the other hand, the government has encouraged individuals to have tax-favored 
individual savings. In particular, in a situation where social security benefits are hardly 
sufficient to provide a reasonable protection for workers, tax-favored individual sav-
ings accounts are expected to play an important role in maintaining income in case 
of economic threats. 
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OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
There were two main social assistance programs for the poor before the economic 
crisis of 1997: the Livelihood Protection Scheme and Medical Assistance. They are 
all means-tested benefits. The Livelihood Protection Scheme was launched in 1969. 
It aimed at providing a minimum level of relief to the poor. However, it had very 
strict entitlement conditions and provided living allowance only for those unable to 
work.5 To be eligible for benefits, claimants had to prove a loss of income-earning 
ability and an absence of private support from relatives. 
On the other hand, the Medical Aid Scheme was put in operation in 1977 and had 
two different categories. The first category covered indigent people who did not have 
the means to pay for health care. They were entitled to government full-financed 
medical treatment including both out-patient and in-patient care. The second category 
was low-income groups who became entitled to receive out-patient medical care, 
which was paid for completely by the government, and in-patient care for which 
30% was defrayed by the government and the remaining 70% was provided by no-
interest, long-term government loans. Their entitlement conditions and benefit sys-
tems have been reformed but their basic form remains unchanged. In 1996, the Live-
lihood Protection Scheme covered 3.3% of the population, and Medical Assistance 
reached 3.8%. 
In the wake of the 1997 crisis, in order to make the Livelihood Protection Scheme 
play a key role in the creation of a social safety net, the Kim Dae Jung government 
reformed the entitlement condition as well as the benefit systems. First, the Tempo-
rary Protection Scheme was introduced to provide benefits for those who could not 
afford to maintain a decent standard of living due to unemployment or a drop in in-
come. The number of temporary recipients was extended to around 750,000 people 
by early 1999. Thus, the ratio of the total recipients of Livelihood Protection in the 
population increased to 4.2% in 1999 from 2.6% in 1997. Second, the means-tested 
conditions were relaxed by revising the requirement of the maximum assets from 29 
million won to 44 million won. Finally, there was a change in the benefit structure. 
The living allowance, which had been paid only to those unable to work for general 
living costs was provided for all others covered by Livelihood Protection, including 
temporary recipients for the winter term of six months. 
In addition, since October 2000, the Basic Living Protection Scheme has replaced 
the Livelihood Protection Scheme. Under the new scheme, the government has pro-
vided living allowances for all of the people whose monthly income is less than the 
minimum living costs decided by the government. This means that all recipients of 
the Basic Living Protection Scheme are entitled to a living allowance, which increas-
ingly makes the Korean government play a key role in welfare provision. In other 
words, this new scheme has strengthened the nature of social rights embodied in the 
                             
5 Both personal incomes and assets had to be lower than amounts annually specified by the government. 
In 1995, the necessary level of monthly income for entitlement to public assistance remained less than 
16% of the average monthly cash wage of an industrial worker. 
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social assistance program. In August 2001, the Basic Livelihood Protection Scheme 
covered 151,000 people, amounting to 3.2% of the population. 
In addition, the Korean government moved to increase the level of social assistance 
to the lower-income elderly funded through earmarked budgetary resources. In 1998, 
the amount of this benefit, known as old-age allowance, was 40,000 won for persons 
between ages 65–79 and 50,000 won for those over age 80. However, Korea does 
not have any other social assistance benefits that can be seen in other welfare states, 
such as family allowance. 
Recently, on the other hand, as of 2002, the government expanded the period of mater-
nity leave from 60 days to 90 days. The benefit of an additional 30 days will be pro-
vided from the Employment Insurance Fund and governmental general expenditure. 
In addition, women can take a year off after delivery to care for their child. In this 
case, they will receive a grant amounting to 200,000 won provided from the Em-
ployment Insurance Fund equivalent to US$150. There are also special measures in 
the Employment Insurance System to promote women’s employment. A grant is insti-
tuted to promote re-employment of female workers who have left the workforce be-
cause of pregnancy, childbirth or childcare. In addition, the grant is instituted to 
foster employment of mothers who support their own household. 
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
If we accept a catalogue of criteria by which ILO defines the informal sector, then 
laborers in the self-employed category and family workers or those persons employed 
in establishments with less than ten people may be counted as part of the informal 
sector. In Korea, there are such business organizations or persons employed by them 
that share some of the characteristics described by the ILO. For example, family 
members work in a business, less than ten people are employed, there are no regular 
working times, and so on, but most of them are under lawful regulations and their 
work is not seasonal. Most importantly, the government and scholars do not provide 
data or analysis about the informal sector. Moreover, most of non-wage laborers are 
supposed to be covered by a formal social protection system – for example by a na-
tional health insurance program administered by about 200 regional insurance socie-
ties. Furthermore, expanding atypical employment is assumed to be a more serious 
and important problem than informal sector employment. Here, therefore, the term 
atypical employment will be utilized, instead of the informal sector. Thus, after having 
examined the conditions – i.e. wages, working conditions, and social benefits under 
which regular or standard employees work, the problem of atypical employment will 
be described. 
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=^íóéáÅ~ä=bãéäçóãÉåí=
Conceptually, atypical work is commonly characterized by its contingency, transitori-
ness, different working conditions (compared to regular workers in the same job), 
and precariousness of employment. There are several types of atypical employment, 
such as part-time employees, dispatched workers, temporary or contractual workers, 
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and workers in special employment arrangements. In all cases, their numbers are 
increasing sharply. 
The Labor Standards Act (hereinafter LSA) states that the term part-time worker 
means ‘an employee whose contractual working hours per week are shorter than 
those of full-time workers engaged in the same kind of job at the pertinent work-
place’ (LSA Article 21). A second type of atypical employment is contractual work. 
Coupled with meritocratic labor practices or the performance pay system, which 
came into being with the introduction of the annual pay system, it has now become 
common in every industry. A third type of atypical employment is worker dispatch, 
a form of subcontracted employment. Worker dispatch refers to ‘a system in which 
an employment agency, while maintaining the employment relations after hiring a 
worker, has the worker engage in work for an employer in compliance with the em-
ployer’s direction and orders in accordance with a contract on worker dispatch’. 
Lastly, workers in special employment relations in Korea are ‘those who provide 
labor under subcontracts or on commission’. Such workers include golf caddies, 
private tutors, insurance salespersons and express couriers. 
These four groups of laborers are only similar in that they are hard to define by the 
traditional definition of worker. They provide a different kind of labor compared to that 
of conventional workers, who provide labor under the direct and specific directions 
and orders of an employer at the employer’s workplace during fixed working hours. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=^íóéáÅ~ä=bãéäçóãÉåí=
Since the late 1980s, atypical or irregular employment has become much more com-
monplace, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis in Korea at the end of 
1997. In the 1980s wage labor increased rapidly – from 47.2% in 1980 to 60.5% in 
1990 – with the main portion of the increase incurring in regular jobs. Since then, 
though, the portion of wage labor has stabilized and atypical work, including both 
daily and temporary work, has steadily expanded. This tendency has accelerated, 
especially after 1993. The percentage weight of atypical work, 41.2% in 1993, rose 
up to 45.7% in 1997. Moreover, the expansion of atypical employment proceeded 
largely in the form of temporary work rather than of daily work. Both replacing re-
gular employment and filling new positions with temporary employees have already 
been widespread phenomena since the early 1990s.6 
However, it was the financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent IMF economic stew-
ardship that facilitated this process. In order to cope with the financial crisis and 
pressure from the IMF, the Kim Dae Jung government passed legislation for legaliz-
ing non-standard employment. 
Right after the economic crisis, a large number of firms went bankrupt and most of 
the surviving firms laid off their employees en masse and stopped new recruitment. 
Such downsizing was targeted at regular employment. At the end of 1998, the num-
                             
6 Joyup Ahn 2001, ‘What have we learned about alternative employment arrangement in Korea: Defini-
tion, trends, and their characteristics’, Paper presented at the Korea-China Joint Workshop on ‘Trends 
of Atypical Employment and Policy Tasks’ in Seoul, 19 October 2001. 
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ber of regular workers was reduced by 1.1%, while that of atypical employees in-
creased by the same amount. More important is the fact that workers in atypical 
employment outnumbered regular workers at the very time when the government 
implemented a comprehensive employment policy in 1999. The total number of em-
ployees rose by 1.4%, and wage laborers increased by 2.7% compared to the previ-
ous year. Among wage laborers, the number of regular employees declined by 6.3% 
and temporary workers rose by 4.6%, while daily workers climbed by 31.9% in 1999. 
In other words, non-standardization of the labor market proceeded largely in the 
replacement of regular employees with daily workers as their share increased rapidly. 
As a consequence, the proportion of atypical employees among wage laborers climbed 
to 51.7% in 1999, from 47.0% in 1998. 
Irregularization of employment continued and the portion of atypical workers reached 
52.4% in 2000. The number of temporary workers increased, while daily workers de-
creased. That is, in the year 2000, non-standardization of the labor market went on 
mainly in the form of rising temporary employment. Compared to the previous year, the 
total number of employed people increased by 3.8% (778,000), and 79.4% (618,000) 
of this occurred in wage employment. Among the increase in wage employment, 
temporary workers amounted to 53.1% (328,000) and daily workers were only 14.2% 
(88,000). At the same time, the number of regular workers increased by 3.3% (202,000) 
and employers also increased by 7.2% (100,000). 
Non-standardization of employment has been prevailing in almost every industry 
sector and in almost every occupational group. It has expanded most rapidly in 
wholesale and retail trades and in the occupational categories of service workers and 
unskilled job workers (see Table 11, Appendix). More importantly, atypical employ-
ment has expanded more rapidly and is most prominent among the socially weak 
groups like women, youth and the elderly, and among those with lower educational 
attainment (see Table 12, Appendix). 
Concerning the wage differentials, an average hourly pay for regular employees is 
estimated to be 8,200 KR won, whereas temporary employees receive 4,300 KR won 
(a bit more than half of the regular workers’ hourly pay) and 3,800 KR won (46% of 
the regular workers’ hourly pay) are paid to daily workers. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
The Korean social protection systems has gradually expanded its coverage, begin-
ning first with old-age pension for government employees and for military service-
men and their dependents in 1960, and finally covering all the populace by the end 
of the 20th century (see Figure 1). In the process, the financial crisis of 1997 and the 
following IMF economic stewardship accelerated the expansion of the social insur-
ance system. The economic crisis, accompanying the depletion of foreign exchange, 
and the rise of the financial crisis in 1997 radically increased the working poor as 
well as the number of unemployed persons, leaving them vulnerable to various kinds 
of social risks. In these circumstances, not just international financial institutes (i.e. 
IMF, World Bank) but also Korean government policymakers came to be aware that 
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Korea should establish social safety nets in order to proceed smoothly with economic 
restructuring and also in order to avoid a serious social disruption or disintegration. 
At any rate, Korea succeeded to establish all the necessary institutional frameworks 
of social insurance by July 2000, thereby having virtually all the occupational groups 
covered by four social insurance programs. There are some groups of people ex-
cluded, but the government plans to include both the self-employed (including those 
involved in truck or taxi driving) and atypical workers (such as insurance salesper-
sons or private tutors) in the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Scheme 
from January 2003.7 The government also plans to include daily laborers, working 
less than a month and currently excluded, into the employment insurance program 
from January 2003 (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the majority of atypical employees are not yet covered by the current 
social protection system (see Figure 2).8 Although all employees, regardless of their 
employment status, are supposed to be covered, atypical employees are excluded from 
it, partly due to administrative rules, which stipulate their non-eligibility, and partly 
due to employers’ non-cooperation. 
The following employees are not eligible for the employment insurance program: 
workers employed in enterprises with four or less employees in agriculture, forestry, 
and housing industries; daily workers employed for less than a month; workers em-
ployed in household services; workers age 65 and over; part-time employees work-
ing less than 18 hours a week; public servants; and private school teachers. In the 
case of national pension, workers, even if they are employed by firms with five or 
more employees and eligible for national pension, working less than three months; 
fixed-terms workers with less than a three months contract; and temporary workers 
employed less than three months are not eligible. 
In the case of national health insurance, both workers employed less than two months, 
even if they are employed by firms with five or more employees, and fixed-terms 
workers with a less than three months contract, as well as temporary workers are not 
eligible. In addition, as of March 1998, those who are unemployed one year or more 
lose eligibility for regional health insurance (before that time, the eligible unemploy-
ment period was six months). In the case of industrial accident compensation insur-
ance, temporary workers, even if they are employed by firms with five or more em-
ployees, are not eligible. 
Thus, due to these government regulations, a majority of atypical workers are not 
covered by one or more of the four social insurance programs. 
Looking at the details, as of end 1999, industrial accident compensation insurance 
applied to 59.4% of total wage workers while employment insurance covered 48.3% 
                             
7 Chosun, daily newspaper, 13 December 2001. 
8 It is difficult to accurately find out the proportion of atypical workers that are excluded from social 
insurance programs, largely due to their conditions of employment such as frequent closing down of 
establishments, frequent job changes, irregular employment, and difficulty in verifying their earnings. 
For this reason, it can only be estimated in an indirect manner. Figure 2 shows the proportion of the 
population excluded from social insurance benefits. 
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of them; national pension covered 52.4% of the total employed age 15 and above, 
and health insurance covered 95.0% of the whole population. If we include the poor 
covered by Medical Aid programs, it can be said that the whole population is pro-
tected by some sort of health insurance program. However, many persons are ex-
cluded from other social protection programs. In particular, this is preeminent among 
atypical workers. 
If we look at employer-provided social security programs, about 50% of all the em-
ployees, irrespective of employment status, are covered. To be specific, for national 
pension 49.5%, for health insurance 52.1%, and for unemployment insurance 44.1% 
of employees respectively are covered. 
However, there are great differentials depending upon an individual’s employment 
type. While 70% to 90% of regular employees are covered by some sort of social in-
surance, the proportion for atypical workers amounts to only 22% to 25% (see Table 
13.1, Appendix). Within the category of atypical employment, there is also a huge 
discrepancy. While the coverage of employer-provided social insurance programs for 
temporary workers amounts to 20% or higher, it is only 5% for daily paid workers 
(see Table 13.2, Appendix). Thus, a majority of atypical workers, in particular daily 
paid workers, do not benefit from any employer-provided social insurance program. 
Thus, due to these government regulations a majority of atypical workers are not cov-
ered by one or more of the four social insurance programs. They are also excluded 
from the current social protection system for other reasons. For example, since July 
2000, regardless of employment size, all firms have to pay premiums for both em-
ployment insurance and industrial accident compensation insurance,9 but only about 
70% have paid premiums for the two insurances.10 
Of course, atypical workers, who are excluded from employer-provided social insur-
ance programs, are eligible for regional insurance programs such as medical insur-
ance and national pension. However, they cannot benefit from other social insurance 
programs such as employment insurance or industrial accident compensation insur-
ance. Moreover, it frequently appears that atypical employees who are eligible for 
regional (or residential) insurance programs cannot afford to pay monthly premiums. 
This is implied by a very low coverage of national pension or health insurance.11 
                             
9 For industrial accident compensation insurance, workers of all employment types are eligible for the 
benefit from July 2000, whether their employers pay premiums or not. http://www.hani.co.kr. 
10 Hankyoreh, daily newspaper, 9 May 2001. 
11 According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 66.1% of eligible insured residents have not paid 
premiums for national pension insurance for a month or more, and more than 200,000 out of 6 million 
residents in the health insurance program did not pay premiums. The same source informs us that 
among 5,795,000 insured by the regional pension scheme, excluding those (4,385) who are unem-
ployed or cannot pay premiums for other unavoidable reasons, 33.9% pay premiums at a scheduled 
date and the remaining 66.1% pay later. Among the latter, 26.1% have not paid even once. High-
income, self-employed earners like doctors and real-estate dealers are included among those who do 
not pay premiums. Chosun, 20 & 24 February 2002. It is noteworthy that many workers employed in 
firms with four or less employees are also excluded from the current social protection system. The 
government has urged the employers of these small firms to join both employment and industrial ac-
cident compensation insurance schemes since October 1998 and, as a consequence around 730,000 to 
740,000 additional employees have joined the programs. But the coverage is still about 42%. 
(Yonmyong Kim, 2000). 
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t~ÖÉ=
ä~ÄçêÉê=
j~åì~ä=
ïçêâÉêë=
cáêãë=ïáíÜ=
Q=çê=äÉëë=
ïçêâÉêë= = = =
=c~êãÉêë=C=
cáëÜÉêãÉå= =
=
pÉäÑJ
ÉãéäçóÉÇ=
rêÄ~å=ëÉäÑJ=
bãéäçóÉÇ= =
oÉÖáçå~ä=
eÉ~äíÜ=
fåëìê~åÅÉ=
mêçÖê~ãë=
=
kçíÉW= a~êâ=~êÉ~ë=áåÇáÅ~íÉ=Öêçìéë=çÑ=éÉçéäÉ=ÉñÅäìÇÉÇ=Ñêçã=ëçÅá~ä=áåëìê~åÅÉ=ÄÉåÉÑáíëK=pçäáÇ=äáåÉë=ëÉé~ê~íÉ=çÅÅìé~J
íáçå~ä=Öêçìéë=Äó=ä~ïK=
N= dçîÉêåãÉåí=ÉãéäçóÉÉ=éÉåëáçåK=
O= mêáî~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=íÉ~ÅÜÉêë=éÉåëáçåK=
P= jáäáí~êó=éÉåëáçåK=
Q= db=C=qW=dçîÉêåãÉåí=ÉãéäçóÉÉë=C=íÉ~ÅÜÉêë=ÜÉ~äíÜ=áåëìê~åÅÉK=
R= oW=oÉÖìä~ê=ïçêâÉêëI=^W=^íóéáÅ~ä=ïçêâÉêëK=
Looking at social benefits other than the above social insurance programs, which are 
also provided by employers, the following observations can be made. A majority of 
atypical workers are excluded from fringe benefits such as severance allowances and 
bonuses. Article 34 of the Labor Standard Act (LSA) states that employers must pay 
severance allowances worth one month of wages to those employees who have worked 
longer than one year for his or her company. The same law also stipulates that there 
should not be any discrimination. Article 10 of the LSA says that this law is applicable 
to all workplaces employing five or more workers and partially to workplaces with 
four or less employees. About half of all wage laborers benefit from the system of 
severance allowance. Moreover, there is a great differential between workers, depend-
ing on his or her employment status. Almost 90% of regular employees, but only 20% 
of temporary workers and a meager 5 % of daily workers benefit from the system. 
The proportion of bonus recipients is generally higher than the proportion of those 
who receive severance allowance. However, there is a huge differential between em-
ployees, according to his or her employment status (see Tables 13.1 and 13.2, Ap-
pendix). 
Thus, a majority of atypical employees have been discriminated against in a variety 
of social insurance schemes, wages and other fringe benefits, even though they do 
the same jobs and perform in the same manner as regular workers. Worse, they are 
also excluded from varying social assistance programs only because they hold jobs 
and / or own their homes. As a consequence, they have become the working poor and 
occupy a marginal position in between those that are employed and unemployed. 
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Recognizing this, several NGOs have pursued some strategies to help the working 
poor. There are two kinds of roles NGOs purport to play in order to help them. One 
is the role of NGOs as a pressure group, which aims to put pressure on the govern-
ment to reform the current social protection system so that it can provide an adequate 
level of social security and / or social assistance for the poor. Most public-interest 
NGOs belong to this category. The other role which NGOs assume is that of a service 
provider and / or a fund-raiser, which collects funds and distributes them to (civil) 
social welfare organizations. Since the NGOs’ role as a pressure group has been dis-
cussed above, we will examine those NGOs functioning as a service-provider and / 
or a fund-raiser. 
As of 2002, there are now several NGOs which collect funds from the public and 
allocate them to welfare facilities or the needy. For example, in order to provide 
social assistance for the poor and the disabled, the Community Chest of Korea 
(Sahoibokji-kongdong-mokeumhoi) was launched in November 1998. It was estab-
lished by law, but is an NGO, which originated from the ‘Central Association for the 
Promotion of Helping the Poor’, formed in 1992 by economic and social NGOs in 
order to raise and allocate funds collected from the public for social welfare works. 
There are many other NGOs and campaigns of a similar nature supporting welfare 
facilities or specific groups such as the poor, the disabled, or the elderly. These 
NGOs merely play a complementary role in providing social assistance to the socially 
weak.12 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
In Korea, most of the population are involved in the formal sector either through 
wage relations or through exchange relations in the market and are covered by for-
mal social protection schemes. Therefore, voluntary schemes do not play any sig-
nificant role in providing social protection. In fact, no community-based social in-
surance or savings schemes have been identified. 
OKOKR= fåíÉÖê~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=E^íóéáÅ~ä=bãéäçóãÉåíF=
In 2000, trade unions and other NGOs formed an alliance for the purpose of pressur-
ing the government and employers to standardize atypical employment and integrate 
it into a formal social protection system. The government and employers face two 
difficulties if they are to integrate atypical workers into the current system. First is the 
problem of international competitiveness of domestic products. Second is the prob-
lem of honest reporting of income. The former may have to be tackled in coopera-
tion with foreign actors, especially with international organizations. The latter has to 
do with the problem of cultivating popular loyalty to the law, which, in turn, neces-
sitates both ‘clean politics’ and the ‘rule of law’. 
                             
12 Before 1997, the Ministry of Health and Welfare took a leading role in raising and allocating funds by 
taking control of charitable contributions. Such a system revealed some problems, for example: firstly, 
funds were used in areas which should have been financed from the government budget; secondly, the 
government frequently used the funds for a political purpose. This is why the task of fundraising and 
its allocation has been transferred to NGOs. 
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OKP= i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
During economic growth periods, employment expansion was of central importance 
in protecting individual welfare. It is notable that since the early 1960s when the 
Korean economy made a flying start, Korea achieved not only dramatic economic 
growth, but also a rapid expansion of employment as shown in Table 3. It is true that 
the remarkable economic growth together with near full employment enabled Kore-
ans to avoid a number of possible social risks and reduced the demand for social 
welfare. 
q~ÄäÉ=PW=råÉãéäçóãÉåí=~åÇ=råÇÉêÉãéäçóãÉåíW=NVSPÓOMMM=EråáíW=éÉêÅÉåí~ÖÉF=
= NVSP= NVSU= NVTP= NVTU= NVUP= NVUU= NVVP= NVVS= NVVU= OMMM=
råÉãéäçóÉÇ= UKO= RKN= QKM= PKO= QKN= OKR= OKU= OKM= SKU= QKN=
råÇÉêÉãéäçóÉÇG== UKT= RKQ= PKU= NKM= MKR= NKM= NKP= NKQ= OKQ= OKU=
pìã= NSKV= NMKR= TKU= QKO= QKS= PKR= QKN= PKQ= VKN= SKV=
G= råÇÉêÉãéäçóãÉåí=êÉÑÉêë=íç=íÜçëÉ=ïÜç=ïçêâÉÇ=äÉëë=íÜ~å=NU=Üçìêë=éÉê=ïÉÉâK=
pçìêÅÉW= hçêÉ~=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=OMMMK=
However, a dramatic increase in real wages in Korea since the end of the 1980s was 
one of the main constraints in maintaining the competitiveness of domestic firms in 
world markets. In addition, Korean firms started to experience a worker shortage from 
around that time. In this situation, the Korean government did not only introduce the 
Employment Insurance System in 1995, but also tried to increase labor market flexi-
bility. 
The Employment Insurance System is designed not only to help unemployed workers 
by giving them unemployment benefits, but also to enhance employment stabilization 
and employability of workers. The EIS has three major programs: i) Employment Sta-
bilization Program (ESP), ii) Job Skill Development Program (JSDP) and iii) Unem-
ployment Benefits. The first two programs are active labor market measures, whereas 
the last one is a passive measure. Thus, Korea’s EIS is a combination of traditional 
unemployment benefits and active labor market programs. This is why Korea refers 
to its system as an employment insurance system rather than an unemployment in-
surance system. 
Korea has experienced, in particular after the economic crisis, an increase in tempo-
rary and daily workers, which leads to the deterioration of the employment structure. 
The ratio of temporary and daily workers in total wage workers was 47% in 1997, 
but it went up to 51% in 2001. There is structural unemployment among low-skilled 
workers including long-term unemployed, disabled, and middle-aged persons. An ac-
tive labor market policy for them is supposed to improve their opportunities to find jobs. 
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
The Korean Employment Insurance System has adopted various measures for an 
active labor market program in the ESP and the JSDP. 
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The ESP seeks to prevent massive layoffs, stimulate reemployment and expand job 
opportunities by providing economic incentives to employers who avoid massive un-
employment and employ displaced workers. To improve job matching, it also seeks 
to promote job placement by providing accurate information on the labor market and 
administering vocational counseling and guidance. In order to pursue these aims, the 
ESP is composed of four sub-programs: Employment Adjustment Assistance, Re-
gional Employment Stimulation Grants, Employment Facilitation Assistance, and 
Labor Market Information and Job Placement Services. 
First, Employment Adjustment Assistance supports employers who stabilize employ-
ment i) by taking proper measures for employment maintenance such as a temporary 
shutdown, reducing working hours, employment maintenance training, dispatching 
employees, leave of absence, and employee relocation, or ii) by hiring displaced 
workers. Second, Regional Employment Stimulation Grants were created to expand 
employment opportunities in designated regions with serious employment conditions 
by subsidizing employers who created employment in those regions. Third, Employ-
ment Facilitation Assistance helps employers who promote employment of marginal 
workers, such as the elderly and women breadwinners who are the head of the family. 
Finally, Labor Market Information and Job Placement Services aim at i) improving 
job placement and shortening the spell of unemployment by providing job seekers 
with quick, active and tailored services for new jobs; and ii) improving efficiency in 
the labor market by supplying appropriate, prompt and accurate information to all 
participants of the labor market. 
Before the financial crisis, the expenditure for ESP was meager, only 8.5 billion won 
in 1996, mainly due to the stable economy and labor market conditions. However, 
ESP began to be widely utilized from 1998 onwards by employers as a measure for 
reducing massive unemployment during the process of structural adjustment and for 
promoting employment of marginal workers. The expenditure for ESP dramatically 
increased, reaching 184 billion won in 1999. It is also notable that most of the ex-
penditure for ESP was allocated to employers who undertook measures for main-
taining current employment. 
On the other hand, in order to enhance the quality of the labor force, Korea’s EIS 
has a series of programs for supporting vocational education and training in JSDP. 
JSDP is an incentive system set up to encourage employers and employees to partici-
pate in lifelong vocational training and education through providing financial sup-
port. It seeks to foster and stimulate vocational training for new entrants to the labor 
market and to develop the job skills of employees and displaced workers. When the 
EIS was introduced in 1995, JSDP was applied only to firms with less than 1,000 em-
ployees.13 Enterprises with more than 1,000 employees were allowed to pay a train-
ing levy to the government instead of training. However, the experience from 1995 
                             
13 From 1976 to 1998, Korea maintained the training levy system based on the Basic Law on Vocational 
Training. Under the levy system, enterprises with 150 employees or more had two choices: either to 
invest a certain percentage of total wages in training their employees and / or new entrants to the labor 
market, or to pay a training levy to the government instead of training. 
Social Protection in South Korea 
291 
to 1998 illustrated that the incentive system through JSDP was more effective in in-
ducing employers to participate in vocational training than the compulsory training 
levy system. Consequently, the government changed its vocational training system 
from a compulsory levy system to an incentive system of voluntary training by 
switching the Basic Law on Vocational Training to the Vocational Training Promo-
tion Law on 1 January 1999. 
JSDP is composed of three major sub-programs: Assistance to Employers, Assistance 
to Employees, and Assistance for Training the Unemployed. First, Assistance to Em-
ployers is composed of the subsidies for training costs and loans for training facili-
ties. Second, Assistance to Employees is composed of vocational training subsidies 
for insured employees and loans for tuition. Third, Assistance for Training the Un-
employed provides free training opportunities and training allowances for displaced 
workers and new entrants to the labor market. It is composed of Aid for Retraining 
Displaced Workers and Aid for Youth Training. 
The performance of the JSDP is astonishing. In 1997, 200,000 insured employees de-
veloped their job skills in 9,000 firms through the JSDP. After the crisis, the number 
of firms and employees that participated in JSDP increased significantly. Those who 
developed their job skills with the support of JSDP amounted to 977,000 in 1999. 
Firms that benefited from JSDP totaled 43,000 in 1999. 
In addition, there have been supplementary measures to establish the social safety 
net, such as job creation by the government. In particular, the public work program 
has become a crucial income source for daily workers (accounting for about 350,000), 
as they are not entitled to unemployment benefits. Thus, a monthly average of 300,000 
unemployed people participated in the public work program from May 1998 until 
the end of 2000. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
The passive labor market policy consists mainly of unemployment benefits in the 
EIS. Unemployment benefits are composed of the job-seeking allowance (JSA) and 
employment promotion benefits (EPB). The former is the core of the unemployment 
safety net, designed to stabilize the living conditions of the unemployed and their 
families, thereby facilitating active and unobstructed job seeking activities. The latter 
aims at fostering and stimulating reemployment of the insured individuals by pro-
viding job search assistance. Hence, EPB is complementary to JSA, and eligibility is 
restricted to those who qualify for JSA. EPB consists of an early reemployment al-
lowance, vocational training promotion allowance, nationwide job-seeking allowance 
and moving allowance. 
The duration of JSA varies depending on the insured employment period and the age 
of the claimant, ranging between a minimum of 90 days and a maximum of 240 
days. Since Korea’s EIS was implemented on 1 July 1995, the insured employment 
period of each covered employee cannot exceed seven years. Thus the actual dura-
tion of JSA is 90 to 210 days, as Table 4 illustrates. 
Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia 
292 
q~ÄäÉ=QW=aìê~íáçå=çÑ=gp^=EOMMNI=ìåáíW=Ç~óëF=
fåëìêÉÇ=ÉãéäçóãÉåí=éÉêáçÇ==
iÉëë=íÜ~å
N=óÉ~ê= NÓP=óÉ~êë= PÓR=óÉ~êë= RÓNM=óÉ~êë=
NM=óÉ~êë=çê=
ãçêÉ=
iÉëë=íÜ~å=PM= VM= VM= VM= NRM= NUM=
PMÓRM= VM= NOM= NRM= NUM= ONM=^ÖÉ=
RM=çê=çäÇÉê=~åÇ=Çáë~ÄäÉÇ= NOM= NRM= NUM= ONM= OQM=
pçìêÅÉW= jáåáëíêó=çÑ=i~ÄçêI=î~êáçìë=áëëìÉëK=
The expenditure for unemployment benefits was negligible before 1998, since Korea 
enjoyed near full employment at that time. However, the economic decline, corporate 
crisis and a credit squeeze resulted in lay-offs, real wage declines, and weak demand 
for new labor market entrants. Unemployment in Korea reached 7.6% in July 1998. 
As a consequence, the expenditure for unemployment benefits increased dramatically, 
reaching a peak of 0.53% as a portion of GDP in 1999 as shown in Table 5. Never-
theless, the unemployment benefit recipients account for only 13.1% of unemployed 
persons on average in 1999. 
q~ÄäÉ=RW= mìÄäáÅ=bñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=çå=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mêçÖê~ãë=
= NVVS= NVVT= NVVU= NVVV= OMMM=
^ijmNLdam=EBF= MKMP= MKMQ= MKRN= MKUU= MKQT=
mijmOLdam=EBF= MKMM= MKMP= MKOS= MKRP= MKPM=
qçí~ä= MKMP= MKMT= MKTT= NKQN= NKMT=
N= ^ijm=áë=íÜÉ=ÉñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=Ñçê=~ÅíáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãëK=
O= mijm=áë=íÜÉ=ÉñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=Ñçê=é~ëëáîÉ=ä~Äçê=ã~êâÉí=éêçÖê~ãëK=
pçìêÅÉW= jáåáëíêó=çÑ=i~ÄçêI=î~êáçìë=áëëìÉëK=
On the other hand, the minimum wage system, which took effect for firms with ten 
or more employees in 1988, was finally extended to all workplaces in November 
2000.14 The level of minimum wage is determined annually by the Committee for 
Minimum Wage, composed of governmental representatives, business representa-
tives and labor representatives. The amount of minimum wage was 1,865 won per 
hour between September 2000 and August 2001. 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
In this section, we are going to assess the existing social security system in terms of 
the effectiveness and efficiency in running the systems. We set the criteria for com-
parison as follows: 
                             
14 Disabled persons, internship workers and workers in training are not eligible for the minimum wage 
system, given that the employer had sought permission for the exemption of minimum wage issued by 
the Ministry of Labor. 
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PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
In response to the economic crisis in Korea, the social security reforms have not been 
limited to the establishment of social safety nets. Rather, they have been developing 
towards a more comprehensive welfare system. The current Korean government, the 
Kim Dae Jung government, has tried not only to redesign but also to expand them 
with the following measures: the extension of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme 
to all workplaces in October 1998; the extension of the National Pension Scheme to 
cover the self-employed living in urban areas in April 1999; and the integration of the 
medical insurance societies into a unified national health system as well as the ex-
tension of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Scheme to all workplaces 
in July 2000. 
As we can see in Table 6, all regular workers in Korea are in principle covered by 
the four main social insurance programs. However, it is noteworthy that temporary 
and daily workers, who are not covered by the EIS, are the most vulnerable to eco-
nomic threats. In fact, since the economic crisis, temporary or daily workers have 
been the worst affected. Given that they are not eligible for unemployment benefits, 
the pain of unemployment has been further aggravated. 
q~ÄäÉ=SW= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=^ÅÅçêÇáåÖ=íç=bãéäçóãÉåí=pí~íìë=
bãéäçóãÉåí=
ëí~íìë==
k~íáçå~ä=mÉåëáçå= eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ= bãéäçóãÉåí=
fåëìê~åÅÉ==
fåÇìëíêá~ä=^ÅÅáÇÉåí=
`çãéÉåë~íáçå=
oÉÖìä~ê=ïçêâÉêë= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ=
qÉãéçê~êó=ïçêâÉêë= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= m~êíá~ääó=ÅçîÉêÉÇ= m~êíá~ääó=ÅçîÉêÉÇ=
a~áäó=ïçêâÉêë= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= m~êíá~ääó=ÅçîÉêÉÇ= m~êíá~ääó=ÅçîÉêÉÇ=
pÉäÑJÉãéäçóÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= `çîÉêÉÇ= kçí=ÅçîÉêÉÇ= kçí=ÅçîÉêÉÇ=
 
Furthermore, the real coverage rates in the four main social insurance programs show 
a very different picture from the principle shown above in Table 6. For example, the 
National Pension Program (NPP) was expanded to cover the self-employed in urban 
areas in April 1999. This means that the NPP in Korea began to cover all of the eco-
nomically active population over 18 years old; however, more than 50% of the people 
who should affiliate themselves to the NPP deny making contributions for it. In addi-
tion, though the government has extended the coverage of the EIS and IACIS (In-
dustrial Accident Compensation Insurance System) to all workers, there are many 
workers who are not covered by both programs. Most of them are working in firms 
with less than five workers because their employers are usually reluctant to pay for 
the insurance premiums of both programs, owing to great concern about increasing 
labor costs. Yet, the NHI covers all Korean people except for the poor who are cov-
ered by Medical Assistance. Consequently, with respect to coverage, the reality is 
different from the law though there is the exception of the NHI. Korea still has to 
make more effort to expand the coverage of social insurance programs. 
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PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=
It is true that after the economic crisis the social security system in Korea has evolved 
into a more comprehensive system. However, owing to the insufficient preparation 
for such rapid expansion of social security programs, there are some problems in 
implementing the social security reforms. In particular, the integration of three types 
of medical insurance systems into a unified national system has resulted in a new 
social conflict between the employed and the self-employed concerning the amount 
of contributions paid. The National Pension Program, which also covers employees 
as well as the self-employed, has the same kind of problem as the National Health 
Insurance. This conflict has occurred mainly due to the fact that the income of the 
self-employed in Korea is not sufficiently assessed in taxation. 
As a consequence, though the three types of health insurance systems are integrated, 
their financing is still separate. Financial integration was scheduled for implementa-
tion from 1 January 2002, but it was deferred for 18 months because of strong politi-
cal objection from the main opposition party. Thus, at this moment, financial integra-
tion has achieved horizontal equity only among the self-employed and among em-
ployees, not across the entire population. 
With respect to the policy-making process of social security, it is worth noting that 
since the economic crisis, the workforce’s demand for social security has been in-
creasing. In fact, in order to obtain popular agreement on ways of overcoming the 
economic crisis, the Kim government urged both management and labor to participate 
in the tripartite committee, known as the Labor-Management-Government Committee. 
All social security reforms after the economic crisis in Korea were indeed approved 
for implementation by the tripartite committee. The committee made an accord to 
integrate the four social insurance programs in Korea into a unified social security 
system. However, the financial integration of Medical Insurance is uncertain, as is 
the feasibility of integrating four social insurance programs, since the present govern-
ment is nearing the end of its term. Furthermore, the growing conflict between em-
ployees and the self-employed over the contributions for the social insurance pro-
grams will be another factor that hampers the government from implementing its 
social security reforms. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
There has been a great deal of doubt about the financial sustainability of some social 
insurance programs. First of all, the NHI has been suffering from financial collapse 
since 1997. Not only the unification of three health insurance systems, but also the 
new health service division between doctor and pharmacist, introduced in 2000, have 
been particularly blamed for this financial bankruptcy. Currently, overcoming this 
liquidation is the most urgent task with respect to running NHI. To tackle this prob-
lem, the government has announced several measures, including the establishment 
of the earmarked tax on tobacco, the increase of governmental subsidies, and the 
increase of the contribution rate. The latter two measures will not be easy to imple-
ment. 
Social Protection in South Korea 
295 
Another big concern about financial sustainability has been raised with NPP. The 
possibility of a financial crisis in the pension scheme is essentially ascribed to the 
improper institutional design of the program, the promise of too generous pensions 
with a relatively low level of contributions and the emergence of an ageing society. 
In 1998, the level of income replacement for a pensioner who contributed for 40 
years was reduced from 70% to 60%. The pension age of 60 years will be increased 
as of 2013 by one year every five years to reach 65 years. Contribution rates of em-
ployers and employees rose to 4.5% of the monthly wage. In the case of the self-
employed, the contribution rate is to be annually increased by 1% from 2000 to 
2005, that is, from 3% to 9%. 
In addition, as the three separate occupational pension schemes for civil servants, 
teachers and the military are more mature when compared to NPP, these schemes 
are rapidly approaching fiscal imbalances and are projected to run deficits some time 
during the next decade despite their already high contributions. 
PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
It is acknowledged that the welfare state in Western countries was generally built up 
on the basis of the male breadwinner model. That is, women were expected to stay at 
home and do housework whereas men were expected to work outside of the home. 
Given the tradition of Confucianism in Korea, the idea of the male breadwinner 
might influence the labor market as well as the social security system. It is true that 
female workers are not equally treated in the labor market when compared to male 
workers. In the case of the new entrants to the labor market, female youth have more 
difficulties in finding jobs compared with male youth. Furthermore, female workers 
are more likely to be employed in the informal sector. As for female workers work-
ing in the formal sector, their wages are far lower than those of male workers, as we 
have seen earlier. 
However, it is rare in Korean social security laws that gender inequality is encouraged 
with respect to benefit or eligibility. The Employment Law for Gender Equality, 
legislated in 1987, guarantees a leave of absence for child rearing in firms that em-
ploy more than five workers. Therefore, the employer must allow a leave of absence 
for childrearing when requested by employees whose child is under one year old. 
The total period of the leave of absence for childbearing and rearing may not exceed 
one year, as specified in the Labor Standard Law, Article 72. This period includes 
paid maternity leave and leave of absence for childrearing. 
PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
The government established quasi-governmental organizations to run the social in-
surance programs; the National Health Insurance Corporation for National Health 
Insurance; the National Pension Corporation for National Pension; the Korea Labor 
Welfare Corporation for Employment Insurance; and Industrial Accident Compensa-
tion Insurance. The first two are under the control of the Ministry of Health and 
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Welfare and the latter is under the Ministry of Labor. The chief executive of each 
quasi-governmental organization is appointed by the state. 
The Korean government has mainly provided subsidies for the administration costs 
of each social insurance program, though it also provides subsidies for the Regional 
Health Insurance Fund for the self-employed and for pension contributions paid by 
farmers and fishermen. However, the government has tried to cut administration costs. 
For example, administration costs for the Medical Insurance Programs are 6.5% of 
total expenditures in 2000. They were recorded at 8.5% in 1997. This decrease may 
be ascribed to the integration of medical insurance societies. Though the integration 
of the four social insurance programs into a unified social security system will greatly 
contribute to the reduction of administrative costs, its feasibility is very uncertain. 
PKS= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
With respect to the issue of targeting, we shall first look at the social assistance 
program, particularly the Employment Insurance System (EIS), before examining the 
social insurance programs. 
Social assistance programs in Korea can be defined as formal safety nets targeted at 
the poor with the objective of raising living standards to an acceptable social mini-
mum. Under the Basic Living Protection Scheme, the government has provided living 
allowances for all people whose monthly income is less than the minimum living 
costs decided by the government. In August 2001, the Basic Livelihood Protection 
Scheme covers 151,000 or 3.2% of the population. However, due to the strict eligi-
bility conditions of the scheme, there are still many households who should be cov-
ered but are not. 
With the expansion of EIS coverage, the number of employees and enterprises actu-
ally covered is increasing. The actual number of covered employees was 4.2 million 
on 31 December 1995 and 6.2 million on 28 February 2000. However, the number 
of insured employees was only 70.9% of employees that should be entitled to the 
EIS by law as Table 7 shows. The EIS does not reach 30% of the target group. From 
this figure, it can be said that the EIS is not effective. 
q~ÄäÉ=TW= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=áå=kìãÄÉê=çÑ=tçêâÉêë=EíÜçìë~åÇF=
= gìäó=NVVR= g~åì~êó=NVVU= gìäó=NVVU= cÉÄêì~êó=OMMM=
m~áÇ=ïçêâÉêë= NOIUOQ= NOIRMM= NOISMP= NOIUNV=
bäáÖáÄäÉ=ïçêâÉêë= QIOUM= RINVM= UIPQO= UITMM=
fåëìêÉÇ=ïçêâÉêë= QIOMQ= QIPMV= RIUTS= SINTO=
^ë=~=éçêíáçå=çÑ=ÉäáÖáÄäÉ=ïçêâÉêë= VUKO= UPKM= TMKQ= TMKV=
pçìêÅÉW= jáåáëíêó=çÑ=i~ÄçêI=OMMNK=
There are several reasons for this gap. First, although employers have a duty to regis-
ter at the public employment office and pay EIS premiums for their employees, many 
employers of very small enterprises neglect to do this. Second, it is extremely diffi-
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cult for the public employment offices to identify very small enterprises and their 
employees and collect insurance premiums from them because small businesses open 
and close down constantly. Third, most daily and temporary workers are not effec-
tively covered by the EIS even though they should be covered by the system if their 
employment periods are one month or longer. Therefore, how the government can 
effectively identify very small enterprises and their employees and collect insurance 
premiums is a big issue in improving targeting of the EIS. 
PKT= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
The Korean government has to be responsible for the sound management of four 
social programs. This means that the government should not only control the pro-
grams, but also be in charge of maintaining the fiscal stability of each program. Thus, 
the government has monitored and supervised the management of the insurance 
funds on a regular basis and made the process of allocating money and benefits open 
and transparent to the public. 
For instance, in order to manage a sound Employment Insurance System, all of the 
contributions for EIS are deposited into the Employment Insurance Fund (EIF), 
which is a special account in the Bank of Korea. EIF has a separate account for each 
program of EIS and should have a sufficient reserve fund in order to pay unem-
ployment benefits and implement active labor market programs in the event of a 
serious economic downturn and high unemployment rate. 
As for the Pension Fund, the mismanagement of the reserve fund, in particular with 
respect to government borrowing from the fund, was increasingly criticized. From 
1988, when the NPP was introduced, to 1996, the government borrowed more than 
50% of the total reserve fund, and by the end of 1998 this amount had reached 75%. 
The interest rates of all these governmental borrowings remained lower than those of 
financial institutions, which substantially accounted for differentials from 1.5% to 
4%. Therefore, the reforms by the new government in 1998 were initiated not only 
to redesign the pension program, but also to increase the transparency and efficiency 
of the pension fund management. In order to ensure transparency and to increase 
returns with respect to managing the funds, reforms were implemented so that the 
details of the fund management have to be announced to the public and the govern-
ment has to pay higher rates of interest than other financial institutions. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Besides political and administrative barriers, the current social protection system in 
Korea has a fundamental problem. The assumption that growth promulgated in the 
functioning of free markets and considerations of economic efficiency are unques-
tionably essential prerequisites for achieving improvements in the well-being of all 
people is underlying the principle of work-linked welfare, which the government 
espouses as a rationale for the current social protection system. The government and 
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employers insist that without the recovery and / or growth of the economy, an ade-
quate level of social protection, say, for the poor, will not be achievable. 
The principle of residualism also has to do with this growth-oriented strategy. Any 
support given above the level of minimum subsistence, it is argued, will produce wel-
fare dependency. The Korean government is not alone in holding such an assump-
tion. The discussion on social protection and / or social safety nets, widely recom-
mended by international organizations, is by no means advocating anything near to 
an even modest welfare state. Rather, it is intended to be nothing more than a mini-
mum base-line for cushioning adverse social and potentially political side effects of 
economic depression or neoliberal restructuring. 
However, if we are to stick to the principle of putting economic growth first and 
advocating trickle-down effects and the work-linked welfare principle, then many 
groups of socially weak, i.e. the elderly, the disabled, the unskilled, and many others 
who may not be perceived as necessary for overall economic development cannot 
but be excluded from adequate social protection. Moreover, historical experiences 
show that the allocative efficiency of free markets has never been realized in the real 
world due to imperfect market conditions, market failures, and imperfect informa-
tion. 
Therefore, we cannot wait and see if the free market produces sufficient resources for 
social protection and the fruits of economic growth trickle down. Rather, we should 
put the current social protection system on a completely different principle: namely, 
that it is everyone’s inviolable right to be protected by an adequate level of social 
welfare. Since rights must be protected and fulfilled, governments and employers 
have an obligation to give them first priority and guarantee them by all means. Eco-
nomic development, market mechanisms and economic efficiency are not intrinsically 
good or desirable, but they must primarily and foremost help improve the well-being 
of all people and, therefore, be oriented towards that goal. 
Once the principle of social protection as a socio-economic right is established, we 
have to redesign the current social protection system completely. First of all, those 
legally and de facto excluded from social security benefits, i.e. atypical workers, have 
to be incorporated into the system. Second, benefits have to be raised up to a level 
which enables welfare recipients to live a decent life. Third, policy makers’ and the 
public’s traditional perception of social protection has to change so that they can 
support the principles of social protection as an inviolable human right and the prece-
dence of social rights over growth. 
Related to this, some thoughts must be given to the question of whether the Anglo-
Saxon model of an economic system, which the IMF has recommended to the Korean 
government and which underlies most government policies, will go hand in hand 
with these principles. It is questionable whether it will help to change policymakers’ 
and the public’s traditional perception of social protection. It has yet to be proved 
that the Anglo-Saxon model of a business system performs better than any other 
model, such as the Rhine model, not only in terms of social protection but also even 
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in terms of economic growth. Moreover, socio-economic institutions cannot be easily 
transformed because they are intertwined with other political institutions, to the extent 
that without simultaneous changes in these institutions, they alone cannot be changed. 
The Anglo-Saxon model of an economic system has close affinity with a system of 
work-linked welfare and residualism, which leaves many socially weak with inade-
quate social protection. It is also dubious whether this model will help Korea to 
enjoy sustainable development. It seems Korea’s traditional values and orientations 
have more commonalities with continental European countries than with Anglo-
Saxon countries. In addition, continental European countries tend to provide better 
social welfare for their people. Therefore, Korea may have to reroute social and 
economic policies in a different direction, away from the current one. 
This will give rise to the problem of feasibility because, most of all, the Korean gov-
ernment and major political forces may not be persuaded. Therefore, redesigning the 
current social protection system on new principles may have to be reserved as a long-
term goal. For the present, both preliminary work for the future and a complemen-
tary job for the current system have to be done concurrently. 
As far as preliminary work for the future is concerned, it is most important that a new 
concept of social protection be diffused among policy makers as well as the public. 
As stated previously, a majority of Korean people believe that the first responsibility 
for assisting the socially weak or those facing social risks should be laid on indi-
viduals themselves and / or their families. With this perception, there will be no room 
for the concept of social protection as an inviolable right. Therefore, the prevailing 
perception of social rights must be changed more than anything else. Since the gov-
ernment and political parties are swayed by the prevailing idea of social protection, 
NGOs may have to take on this responsibility. 
Tasks for complementing the current system are varying and not easy to achieve. The 
current social protection system implemented in its present form has many problems 
and difficulties. It has improved greatly, compared to the traditional system, but it 
still shows many deficiencies. To cite a few: exclusion of many socially weak from 
social security and / or social assistance benefits, insufficient level of support, and lack 
of an effective connection between social security and social assistance programs. 
These problems have arisen partly due to strict eligibility, lack of coordination be-
tween government departments themselves and with NGOs, and insufficient finan-
cial resources or government budgets, which, in turn, are caused by administrative 
inefficiency, inability to secure honest tax reports, and over-commercialization of 
health care. Therefore, in order to reform the current social protection system for the 
purpose of providing many socially disadvantaged people with an adequate level of 
support, these underlying factors must be effectively tackled. 
Keeping this in mind, we will discuss in the final section some of the policy recom-
mendations which would help improve the current system of social protection. 
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RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
In theory, the current social protection system will provide an adequate level of social 
security or social assistance to the employed and the needy. However, more than a 
few workers and needy are excluded from social welfare benefits due to several 
inherent problems. Here are some policy recommendations to help in solving these 
inadequacies: 
First, in order to improve the effectiveness of the National Basic Livelihood Security 
Act (1999) – one of the most important programs with which the government aims 
to extend public assistance to a larger segment of the poor – it is necessary to substi-
tute a new set of criteria for the current one by which beneficiaries are determined. 
In implementing the Act, the government has made eligibility stricter than in the 
previous program by using criteria such as work capability (or willingness) and 
amount of income and assets, thereby leaving many of the needy unprotected. For 
example, the lower echelons of middle-income earners, most of whom are temporary 
or part-time workers, workers in tiny businesses, or self-employed, are left unprotected 
by the current social protection system. This is because they are not eligible for the 
NBLSA (National Basic Livelihood Security Act) due to their employment and be-
cause their employers do not provide social security benefits due to their employment 
status. This makes the Act’s original purpose debatable. It is therefore necessary to 
substitute a new set of criteria (i.e. an optimum level of welfare) for the current one. 
Second, in the case of health insurance, the major problem is high user fees stem-
ming from high coinsurance arrangements within the plans and also from full direct 
payment for non-insured services. This is caused largely by the fact that health care 
has become a business. Affordability and access are affected greatly by the growth 
of profit-driven corporations in the health care field. Providers refuse to serve those 
who cannot pay, will only promote services with a reasonable monetary return, raise 
prices to the extent the market will bear, increase utilization to maximize income, and 
aggressively promote excessive and irrelevant services that may not address pa-
tients’ basic health needs. Commercialization is threatening the ethos of health care. 
As a result, the commercialized health-care system leaves out destitute people who 
are in need of it, and raises health-care costs, which, in turn, will eventually push up 
insurance premiums. 
To tackle these problems, the government must provide a financial means that helps 
poor people who cannot afford costly health care; manage technology diffusion and 
its utilization; regulate pharmaceutical pricing and marketing; and take measures to 
reduce fraudulent medical claims and tax evasion. However, since the government 
has been captured by medical professionals’ associations, NGOs may have to play 
an important role. 
One of the most important tasks to be addressed is a perception gap between the 
public and health-care leaders in issues as fundamental as the following: 
• What is social health insurance about and what can be expected from it? 
• How is health care different from other goods and services? 
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• What is the health care system aiming for? 
• How is the excluded population group handled by the system? 
In addition, the current medical insurance program comprising three types of insur-
ance schemes – for employees in private firms; for the self-employed; and for gov-
ernment employees and private school teachers – were merged to form one organi-
zation, the National Health Insurance Corporation, in July 2000. The financing and 
methods of calculating contributions of the three schemes are still separate and dif-
ferent, thereby causing serious problems in terms of finance and fairness. Each medi-
cal insurance society has imposed different amounts of contributions on the insured. 
This occurs because premiums are calculated on the basis of different criteria; for 
example, for wage workers premiums are calculated on wages alone, whereas for the 
self-employed, premiums are calculated on both total income and property and the 
number of dependents. Different kinds of benefits depending upon each society’s 
financial situation are provided. 
This situation has given rise to unfairness for the beneficiaries and financial difficul-
ties for workplace insurance societies which are disadvantaged. Although employees 
in private sectors contribute less than in other sectors (i.e. self-employed), they re-
ceive more benefits, thereby causing a problem of unfairness. This has also contrib-
uted to the deterioration of the financial situation. Private-sector employees receive 
insurance benefits of more than 31% of their contributions, while self-employed re-
ceive benefits just 3% higher than their contribution. Moreover, the former pay lower 
premiums than the latter. Thus, the current system of separated insurance societies 
was a major cause of a huge deficit of 1,835,300,000,000 KR won for the fiscal year 
of 2001.15 The government party and opposition parties previously agreed on the 
integration of distinctive health insurance societies, but the latter changed their stance 
and pushed for a new legislation, which has left the system just as financially sepa-
rated as before.16 
Third, in the case of both the health insurance and national pension schemes, the 
equity problem has to be solved. It may not be easy to maintain an equitable system 
if the total incomes of the self-employed are not accurately documented. To evade 
tax, it is not uncommon that the self-employed, including doctors, lawyers, and res-
taurant owners do not report their incomes honestly. Reported incomes sometimes 
amount to a meager one-tenth of total incomes. Since insurance premiums are calcu-
lated on the basis of reported incomes, this gives rise to an equity problem, and also 
causes financial deficiency. This poses a more serious problem in the case of the 
national pension program. Therefore, the government must give priority to tackling 
                             
15 Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, 28 January 2002. Deficits in national health insurance are caused by 
several factors. Some examples are an aging population, the increasing role of general and tertiary-
care hospitals, lack of incentives for the provider of medical resources, and the abrupt increase in the 
costs of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. 
16 Opposition parties’ positions comprise a majority in parliament. The labor side is divided into two 
opposing blocs. KFTU, a long-standing and more conservative trade union confederation, supports the 
separate system, while KCTU, a recently formed and more radical national center, supports an organ-
izational and financial unity of separate societies. Hankoyreh Daily Newspaper, 24 December 2001. 
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this problem. Fourth, the absence of private pension coverage may pose a problem 
because public pensions provide protection with the expectation that other sources 
of income and supportive mechanisms will provide an adequate level of support. 
The problem becomes more serious because the replacement ratio is expected to be 
lowered as financial difficulties increase due to the aging of society. An alternative 
would be to convert the current severance allowance scheme offered by corporations 
into an occupational private pension scheme, which would supplement public 
schemes. 
Lastly, in order to solve the problems of inefficiency and / or accountability, at least 
three things have to be done. One is coordination and / or integration of varying so-
cial welfare programs and / or projects scattered among government departments, 
which in some cases overlap. Here, it is important to integrate and unify the programs 
into one system, which will facilitate the establishment of the ‘equal contribution (or 
premium) equal benefit’ principle. It is also necessary to set up a unitary system of 
premiums or benefits in which premiums and benefits (i.e. social assistance) are cal-
culated on the basis of total and honest earnings. For that purpose, the integration of 
two different health insurance societies and a merger of the four social insurance 
programs may be needed. In addition, the job of imposing and collecting contribu-
tions has to be switched over to the National Tax Office.17 Some emphasis should 
also be put on the cooperation between the government and NGOs or between NGOs, 
without which it is difficult to provide the one-stop service for potential beneficiar-
ies. The last field for reform is an increase in professional manpower, i.e. qualified 
public social welfare officials, which is a prerequisite for the effective implementa-
tion of a social protection system. 
                             
17 Yonmyong Kim 2000, ‘Social protection of atypical workers and policy implications’, Paper pre-
sented at the seminar jointly organized by KFTU and KCTU (17 October 2000). 
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a~áäó= PP= PITSR= QKS= RKR= MKT= OKS=
qçí~ä= PMU= PIRVT= RNKO= QQKO= QMKO= PUKU=
oÉÖìä~ê= US= QINMU= URKT= TUKO= TQKV= TNKS=
qÉãéçê~êó= NQN= OIVTR= RRKM= QPKV= PVKV= POKR=
fåÇáêÉÅí=
ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
`çåíê~ÅíJ
çìí=ïçêâ=
a~áäó= UN= QINQO= UKO= UKV= QKO= QKT=
qçí~ä= VRQ= QIMPP= SKO= RKP= QKT= UKU=
oÉÖìä~ê= QS= TIOQQ= TUKM= SPKN= TPKR= TRKU=
qÉãéçê~êó= NNR= PISVU= NPKT= NOKM= TKN= NMKN=
låJÅ~ää=
ïçêâ=
a~áäó= TVP= PIVMN= NKM= NKM= MKP= MKS=
qçí~ä= RRP= RISUT= OQKU= OPKQ= OMKV= OPKQ=
oÉÖìä~ê= NOT= SIRQR= TOKN= TMKV= SVKO= STKV=
qÉãéçê~êó= PPR= RISPP= NNKU= VKV= SKU= NNKV=
lïåJ
~ÅÅçìåí=
ëÉäÑJ
ÉãéäçóJ
ãÉåí= a~áäó= VN= QISSO= SKQ= SKT= QKU= NKV=
qçí~ä= NQU= OIQQT= OKP= PKM= OKQ= NKR=
oÉÖìä~ê= O= TINSV= RNKV= TPKT= NMMKM= PTKU=
qÉãéçê~êó= SP= PIMQT= PKT= QKS= OKO= NKV=
péÉÅá~ä=
ÉãéäçóãÉåí=
eçãÉ=
ïçêâ=
a~áäó= UP= NIUQU= MKM= MKM= MKM= MKM=
pçìêÅÉW= hçêÉ~=k~íáçå~ä=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=î~êáçìë=óÉ~êë=Ä=L=OMMMK=lêáÖáå~ä=Ç~í~I=ã~åáéìä~íÉÇ=Äó=gçóìé=^ÜåI=OMMNK=
^Åêçåóãë=
AMCHAM – American Chamber of Commerce in Korea 
CAEJ – Citizens’ Alliance for Economic Justice (Kyungshilyon) 
EIF – Employment Insurance Fund 
EIS – Employment Insurance System 
EPB – Employment Promotion Benefits 
ESP – Employment Stabilization Program 
FKTU – Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GNI – Gross National Income 
IACIS – Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance System 
ILO – International Labor Organization 
IMF – International Monetary Fond 
JSA – Job Seeking Allowance 
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JSDP – Job Skill Development Program 
KCTU – Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
LSA – Labor Standards Act 
NBLSA – National Basic Livelihood Security Act 
NGO – Non-governmental Organization 
NHI – National Health Insurance 
NPP – National Pension Program 
NSO – National Statistical Office 
PPP – Purchasing Power Parity 
SPD – Solidarity for Participative Democracy (Chamyeoyondae) 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
oÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë=
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=qÜ~áä~åÇ=
^ã~ê~=mçåÖë~éáÅÜI=o~â~ïáå=iÉÉÅÜ~å~ï~åáÅÜéÜ~å=
~åÇ=k~êìÉãçä=_ìåàçåÖàáí=
^Äëíê~Åí=
Before the crisis of 1997, Thailand experienced substantial increases in gross domestic 
product (GDP) and per capita income. Between 1987 and 1997, the average annual 
growth rate of the GDP was 8.7 percent, while for gross national product (GNP) the 
growth was 7.2 percent. When the crisis hit in mid 1997, real GDP growth rate of Thai-
land recorded –1.4 percent in 1997 and –10.8 percent in 1998. The real GDP growth 
rate in the year 1999 expanded by 4.2 percent. In 2000, the Thai economy was still re-
covering with the growth rate of 4.4 percent. The economic crisis has brought about 
negative effects on domestic financial, employment and general economic conditions. 
The incidence of poverty and unemployment increased significantly during the crisis. 
In Thailand, social protection can be classified into social security (social insurance), 
social assistance, social services, and labour protection. According to the Social 
Security Act, benefits are provided for insured persons, covering seven types of 
benefits: illness or injury, maternity, disability, death, child allowance, old age pen-
sion and unemployment. However, unemployment insurance has not been imple-
mented yet. Employees in the private formal sector (i.e. workers in private enterprises) 
and employees in the public sector (i.e. state enterprise workers, civil servants) are 
covered by social security measures. Apart from the social security system, the gov-
ernment also offers additional social assistance and services (non-contributory). So-
cial assistance and services are classified into three categories: in-cash transfer pro-
grammes, in-kind transfer programmes and income generation programmes. The con-
cept of social assistance and services is to provide assistance to specific groups with 
specific problems. 
Informal sector employees (i.e. subcontracted workers, self-employed, workers in 
agriculture sector) are not employed under the protection of the Social Security Act 
and regulation. Presently, informal workers’ access to the social security system is 
mainly through the “self-employment” scheme in Thailand. In reality, to obtain death, 
disability, maternity and accident benefits through this scheme, informal workers 
have to pay double premiums (one for themselves, and another for “employers”), 
which place the programme out of the reach of most informal workers who often 
earn less than the minimum wage. 
However, a number of new ideas regarding social protection are currently being ex-
plored and, in some cases, put into practice in the form of both government sponsored 
and locally-based initiatives. A few of these new programmes, focusing in particular 
on the 30 baht universal coverage health plan and government initiatives regarding 
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occupational safety and health. Regarding health policies, the Thai government 
should continue moving toward adequate universal coverage, and should monitor 
and improve over time upon the 30 baht health policy. Moreover, the Social Security 
Act needs to be implemented in full and the coverage for subcontracted workers and 
homeworkers need to be clarified. At the same time, monitoring of the implementa-
tion and operation of the existing laws need to be carried out more diligently. 
* The exchange rate of the bath against the US dollar at the time of writing (May 
2002) was US$1 = 42.91 baht. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~äI=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
dÉåÉê~ä=a~í~=
According to the Population and Housing Census (2000), the actual population of 
Thailand in the year 2000 was 60,617,230 persons (National Statistical Office). It 
has been estimated that by the year 2016, the population will exceed 69.9 million 
(see Table 1, Appendix). Because of a declining fertility rate, population growth de-
creased to about 1.1% during the period 1999–2000. It has been projected that the 
annual rate of population growth will continue to decline during the period 2000–16. 
By the year 2016, it is expected to decrease to only 0.2%. 
With regard to age demographics, it has been projected that there will be a declining 
proportion of the population aged 15 years old and below, and an increasing proportion 
of the elderly (60 years and above). At present, elderly persons make up nearly 10% of 
the total population. The proportion of elderly persons is expected to increase in the 
foreseeable future (see Figure 1). By 2016, elderly persons will comprise 15% of the 
total population (see Table 2, Appendix). This projection suggests that the need to pre-
pare for providing support services to that segment of the population is evident. Nec-
essary support includes income security, health care, housing and other social services. 
cáÖìêÉ=NW= mçéìä~íáçå=mêçàÉÅíáçå=Äó=^ÖÉ=~åÇ=pÉñ=EíÜçìë~åÇ=éÉêëçåëF=
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j~äÉ= cÉã~äÉ= j~äÉ= cÉã~äÉ=
OMMM= OMNS=
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The total fertility rate (TFR) in Thailand declined during the period 1965–95 from 
6.3 children per woman to 2.02 children per woman. It has been projected that the 
fertility trend will continue to decline in the coming decades. By 2025, it is expected 
to decrease to only 1.7 children per woman (see Figure 2). The reason for this trend 
lies partly in the fact that Thailand has been highly successful in promoting family 
planning practices since the 1960s. 
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pçìêÅÉW= k~íáçå~ä=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=NVVT=~åÇ=lÑÑáÅÉ=çÑ=íÜÉ=k~íáçå~ä=bÇìÅ~íáçå=`çããáëëáçåI=NVVVK=
In 1995, the life expectancy at birth for Thai males was 69.9 years and 74.9 years for 
Thai females. It has been projected that by 2025, the life expectancy for males and 
females will exceed 75 and 80 years respectively (see Figure 3). 
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Urbanization is proceeding at a rapid pace throughout Thailand. According to the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (1997), about 21.9% of the total 
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population in 1995 consisted of urban residents. At present, urban residents account 
for 25.8% of the total population (in 2000). It has been projected that by 2010 ap-
proximately 35.3% of the people in Thailand will be living in urban areas (see Table 
3, Appendix). Due to the fact that people want to have a better life, or at least better 
jobs, they tend to move to regional growth centres (e.g. Bangkok, Khon Kaen, Nakhon 
Ratchasima, Songkha, and Chiang Mai) that can offer more employment opportuni-
ties. Therefore, urban population ratios tend to be highest in the centre metropolitan 
and large city factories. 
During the period 1995–2010, it has been projected that the urbanization process 
will continue to proceed at a rapid pace. Most of the country’s fast-growing urban 
regions are expected to be areas on the Eastern Seaboard. 
bÇìÅ~íáçå=
The female illiteracy rate was 9.0% in 2000 (see Table 4, Appendix). The female 
illiteracy ratios are two to three times higher than those for males. Illiteracy can be a 
crucial obstacle to gaining employment, especially when the process requires written 
application forms or other written material. 
At present, the average education standard of the population in Thailand is at the 
first level. A very high level of enrolment ratio for the first level of education for 
both men and women is observed. The gross enrolment rate does not reveal signifi-
cant differences across gender at all levels of education. For higher levels of educa-
tion, 34% of females advance to the third level of education, compared to 30% of 
males (see Table 5, Appendix). 
Moreover, 42.8% of the labour force have finished level 4 of primary school. Only 
11.5% advance to the highest level of education. The average educational level of 
the labour force in Thailand is at the primary level of education (see Table 6, Ap-
pendix). 
j~ÅêçJÉÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Before the crisis of 1997, Thailand experienced a substantial increase in Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and per capita income. Between 1987 and 1997, the average 
annual growth rate of the GDP was 8.7%, while the Gross National Product (GNP) 
grew by 7.2%. This period produced impressive improvement in life expectancy, in-
fant mortality, child nutrition, adult literacy and primary enrolments. 
After the crisis outbreak in mid-1997, the real GDP growth rate of Thailand was –
1.4% in 1997 and –10.8% in 1998. It expanded by 4.2% in 1999. In 2000 the Thai 
economy was still recovering, with a growth rate of 4.4%. According to the Bank of 
Thailand (2000), the growth rate in the years ahead is expected to be relatively the 
same as that in the year 2000. 
Inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) jumped to 8.1% in 1998 from 
5.6% in 1997. In 1999, the inflation rate was 0.3% and rose to 1.6% in 2000. Ac-
cording to the NESDB, the inflation rate is expected to be 2.6% in 2001. 
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The economic crisis has brought about massive capital outflows with ensuing nega-
tive effects on domestic financial, employment and general economic conditions. Un-
employment increased significantly during the crisis from 2.2% to 4.6% between 
1997 and 1998. The Labour Force Survey in February 1999 reported that the unem-
ployment rate reached 5.2% in 1999. In that year, Miyazawa loans helped generate 
employment and activate economic recovery in 2000. 
Between 1996 and 2000, the incidence of poverty increased from 11.5% in 1996 to 
13.0% in 1998, to 15.9% in 1999, and finally to 15.0% in 2000. This meant that Thai-
land effectively lost five years of its economic development (Medhi Krongkaw, 2001). 
An important concern, therefore, is the government’s expenditure on programmes 
primarily directed at the poor. Between 1996 and 1999, public spending on anti-pov-
erty programmes per person increased from 1,462 baht in 1996 to 2,248 baht in 1997, 
and to 2,546 baht (1 US dollar = 43.92 baht) in 1998. Due to a large increase in the 
number of poor persons, the expenditure per person then declined to 2,138 baht in 
1999 (see Figure 3). 
cáÖìêÉ=QW= oÉ~ä=dçîÉêåãÉåí=bñéÉåÇáíìêÉ=çå=^åíáJéçîÉêíó=mêçÖê~ããÉë=éÉê=mççê=
mÉêëçåI=NVVSÓVV=
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pçìêÅÉW= tçêäÇ=_~åâI=OMMNI=éK=TPK=
i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
Although the total workforce (see Table 7, Appendix) increased from 31.7 million in 
1996 to 33.2 million in 2001, the labour force participation rate declined from 73.1% 
to 70.9% during that period. This decline was more evident among women than men. 
However, the change in labour force participation rates was strongly influenced by 
the higher rates of school attendance. The aftermath of the 1997 crisis resulted in 
higher open unemployment. Within four years, the unemployment rate increased 
twofold, from 2.0% in 1996 to 5.2% in 1999 (see Table 8, Appendix). On average, 
unemployment was high during that period although it began declining in 2000. 
After the 1997 crisis, it was believed that many of those retrenched sought work in 
the informal sector as small traders in urban areas or as farm workers in rural areas. 
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In Thailand, workers in the informal sector constituted a large number of the work-
force. However, statistics are not available due to the difficulty in tracking down 
workers who are usually mobile. 
According to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the 
crisis contributed to a greater reduction in employment among males than females. 
The crisis indices for unemployment rates by age group indicate that workers in the 
age range of 30–50 years were most affected. 
Between 1997 and 1999, the number of private employees declined by 12.3%, while 
the number of government employees increased by 9.1% (see Table 10, Appendix). 
The table also shows a shift from paid employment to self-employment with consid-
erable increases for employers (22.1%) and own-account workers (8.5%). The rise 
in the number of employers means that the number of enterprises is rapidly growing. 
Nevertheless, for the whole period 1996–2001, the findings are more measured, with 
the number of private employees remaining almost exactly the same. 
aáëíêáÄìíáçå=çÑ=fåÅçãÉ=~åÇ=^ääçÅ~íáçå=çÑ=_ìÇÖÉí=
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kbpa_K=
It is noted that the income distribution in Thailand became more unequal in the early 
phase of its economic development, but improved once a certain development level 
was reached. According to the NESDB’s newsletter, distributed in September 1999, 
the Gini index of inequality of per capita income increased from 48.5% in 1988 to 
52.4% in 1990, and 53.6% in 1992. After 1992, income inequality began to decrease 
and continued this trend up to 1998. It increased sharply between 1998 and 1999 (see 
Figure 5). This is due to a larger negative impact of the 1997 crisis on the income of 
the poor relative to the rich. As seen in Figure 6, the poorest group of people in the 
bottom 20% experienced falling income at a ratio of 4.2 to 3.8, while that of the 
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richest in the top 20% portion went up from 56.5 to 58.5. Therefore, income dispari-
ties between the top and bottom 20% of people increased from 4.7 times in 1998 to 
5.1 times in 1999. 
cáÖìêÉ=SW= ^îÉê~ÖÉ=mÉê=`~éáí~=fåÅçãÉ=Äó=nìáåíáäÉ=
72
6 1
31
5 2
04
7 
34
10
 
97
41
 
67
9 1
25
8 2
01
2 
33
94
 
10
19
0 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
The bottom 20 % The second 20 % The th ir d 20 % The fourth  20  % The top  20 %
Ba
ht
/p
er
so
n/
m
on
th 1998
1999
 
pçìêÅÉW= k~íáçå~ä=pí~íáëíáÅ~ä=lÑÑáÅÉI=pçÅáçJÉÅçåçãáÅ=pìêîÉóI=éêçÅÉëëÉÇ=Äó=abaI=kbpa_K=
When the crisis hit, there was no social policy in existence to effectively deal with 
the problems of the poor. The government was forced to resort to external resources 
to support the financial and social sectors. Many projects and programmes have been 
introduced and implemented to bring the country firmly into economic recovery. 
With respect to social development programmes, the government specifically includes 
three sectors: education, health and social welfare. 
Public expenditure on community and social services (1998–2001) can be seen in 
Table 11 in the Appendix. In 2001, the expenses for community and social services 
were 381,758 million baht, equivalent to 42% of total expenditure. The amount of 
221,603 million baht was allotted to education affairs and services. It accounted for 
58% of the expenditure on community and social services. However, total education 
expenditure was consistently growing during 1998–2001. In 2001, health affairs and 
services expenditure accounted for 17% of the community and social services ex-
penditure, equivalent to 64,791 million baht. 
mçäáíáÅ~ä=póëíÉã=
The political system in Thailand has long been dominated by short-lived coalition 
politics. Elections have faced problems of vote rigging and been subject to manipu-
lation by business interest groups. The influence of the military, which dominated 
Thai politics for many decades, however, has declined with the emergence of civil 
society. The failure of a military coup in 1992 marked the beginning of a new civilian 
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influence in politics, institutionalized with the passage of constitutional reform in 
1997. 
In the year 2000, Senate elections were introduced for the first time in Thai history. 
In 2001, the new general election took place and the Thai Rak Thai Party won the 
majority of seats in parliament. Currently, the newly elected government is proving 
to be effective in implementing the new Constitution in its full form. Social and politi-
cal reforms have slowly taken place. Socially, recognition of the integration of dis-
advantaged and vulnerable groups into mainstream society is underway. Concepts of 
social services, social welfare, social protection, and social development are all en-
compassing issues to sort out in the social reform process. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
Labour market information is essential data for assessing existing and planned pro-
grammes for social protection, and promoting job creation, enterprise development, 
employment services, skills development and social dialogue. This information in-
cludes both qualitative information and quantitative data. The main sources of la-
bour market information are the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the National 
Statistical Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Office of the National Economic and 
Social Development Board and the Bank of Thailand. Moreover, various agencies 
produce statistical data on education and training. Among these are the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of University Affairs. 
The National Statistical Office (NSO) is responsible for conducting the Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS), which are the principal sources of regular comprehensive labour 
statistics. Since the 1997 financial crisis, the LFS has been published quarterly. The 
NSO also conducts the socio-economic survey every two years. It is a key source of 
information on household income, expenditure, assets, liabilities and so on. The over-
all coverage and broad methodology are similar to the Labour Force Surveys. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Interior also obtains information on employment as part 
of its village census. Due to the large volume of obtained data and inexperience of 
data collectors, questions have been raised as to whether the resulting statistical data 
are reliable and accurate. Issues of overlapping and duplication with the Labour 
Force Survey are also in question. 
In the formal sector, enterprise surveys are generally sources of statistical data on 
employment. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the National Statistical 
Office conduct these surveys. Some deficiencies of surveys in terms of sampling 
frame, questionnaire design and response rate have been noted. Suggestions from the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) have been made to improve the survey 
system. 
In addition, information from the Social Security Fund records is compiled as sup-
plementary estimates in terms of employment trends. These records are reported on 
a monthly basis and can be compared with those from the Labour Force Survey. In 
doing this, one could see the fact that a large portion of daily paid employees are not 
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covered by the social security system even if working in enterprises with ten or more 
employees. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
The existing institutional framework discussed in this section is associated with 
organized interest groups, ranging from ad hoc and informal to formal and permanent 
institutions. In this regard, labour unions are an institution that can protect worker 
interests. However, the labour union movement in Thailand is weak in terms of its 
capacity to protect the interests and rights of workers, especially after unions in state 
enterprises were disbanded after the 1991 military coup. According to the Labour 
Force Survey (1998), about 4.6% of all private sector wage employees in the coun-
try had a labour union in their workplace. Only 2.9% reported being members of a 
union. At present, there is the State Enterprise Labour Relation Act, which was en-
forced on 8 April 2000. The Act allows workers in state enterprise to form trade 
unions, but it still does not give the right to strike. 
The low level of unionization is mainly due to the weakness of the legal protection 
system available to labour organizers. Frequently, their efforts are discouraged be-
fore the union is able to hold its first meeting. According to the World Bank (July 
2000), labour unions are mostly present in large establishments (over 100 workers). 
Small (less than ten workers) and medium (between 10–99 workers) establishments 
hardly have a union because it is much easier for these establishments to discourage 
union organizing efforts among their workers without adverse external publicity. 
In addition, the economic crisis has also affected union memberships, leading to an 
increasing number of workers losing their jobs. At the same time, economic restruc-
turing and privatization policies have resulted in massive layoffs. Some prominent 
union officials have also lost their jobs. Under Thai labour legislation, once unem-
ployed, union officials cannot continue to hold union positions. This has obviously 
affected the capacity of leadership. It has had a demoralising effect on other union 
leaders as well (ILO, 2000). 
The role of civil society in Thai politics and society has made remarkable progress. 
Civil society organizations have developed and expanded in number since 1980 when 
the government relaxed its control. Civil society groups played a vital role when the 
new Constitution was being drafted. Since the onset of the crisis in 1997, the voice 
of civil society and its participation in vigorous development debates have been sig-
nificant and recognized. The new role of the civil society organization is seen in the 
management of the Social Investment Fund (SIF), which was launched in late 1998 
with World Bank financing. Its objective is to both address the impact of the crisis 
and to accelerate the empowerment of communities. The Social Investment Fund re-
presented the first occasion when the Thai government channelled funds directly to 
civil society organizations in large sums. Civil society organizations are currently 
playing an important role in providing social protection at the community level. The 
Thai government and donors have allocated budgets to civil society organizations to 
implement several programmes such as HIV / AIDS prevention and treatment, care of 
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the elderly, small and medium enterprise development, and environmental protec-
tion. 
Currently, approximately 18,500 non-governmental organizations are registered, and 
many more are operating without legal status. These NGOs have formed themselves 
into networks and participated in a variety of community organizations (World Bank, 
2001). The most striking aspect of these NGOs is their effort to coordinate initiatives 
among community organizations in order to improve the economic situation of group 
members. 
More recently, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare established 19 provincial 
NGO Coordinating Centres in order to coordinate the activities of NGOs working on 
social welfare and safety nets in each province. In addition, the Ministry has sup-
ported legislation that would strengthen the ability of civil society organizations to 
provide support in the areas of social welfare. 
With respect to tripartism, there are 16 national tripartite consultative bodies in Thai-
land. Their roles cover a broad range of mandates in labour market management. They 
include workplace safety, minimum wage determination, and dispute settlement. In 
practice, tripartism in Thailand is very weak, due to the fact that government repre-
sentatives dominate the tripartite bodies. As a result, tripartism cannot act as an effec-
tive voice for the workforce’s concerns. During the crisis, the Prime Minister formed 
a Committee on the Alleviation of Unemployment in December 1997. In practice, 
worker and employer representation on the Committee was minimal. Moreover, the 
initiatives were placed under the responsibility of individual ministries. Programme 
implementation did not specify a role for the social actors nor has the process of 
implementation apparently been a tripartite one (ILO, 2000, p. 80). 
In addition, Thai trade unions have expressed their concern over the matter of decen-
tralizing wage fixing to the provincial level. The concern, however, is that trade union 
organizations outside the Bangkok metropolitan area and the neighbouring five 
provinces are relatively weak. Therefore, it would be difficult to ensure legitimate 
and competent worker participation in provincial dialogues on wages (ILO, 2000, p. 
83). 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
Thailand has made progress in the area of governance and human rights in the past 
decade. This has helped the nation to deal effectively with the many ramifications of 
the economic crisis. During the 1990s, the country launched a concerted process of 
change, most notably the 1997 People’s Constitution and the Eighth National Eco-
nomic and Social Development Plan (1997–2001). The new Constitution embodies a 
crucially important institutional framework that empowers people to realize their 
rights and liberties as well as to participate more effectively in political and public 
decision-making. In addition, the new Constitution launches a more open and ac-
countable political environment, while enhancing the system of checks and balances. 
It also meets the expectations of the Thai people regarding their keen awareness and 
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interest in vital issues such as transparency, accountability, representation, participa-
tion, decentralization, self-governance, and the rule of law and human rights. 
Along with the promotion of political accountability and transparency, new institu-
tions such as the National Counter-Corruption Commission, the Electoral Commis-
sion, and the Administrative Courts have been established. The new Constitution not 
only creates the framework for the restructuring of national representative institutions 
and reform of the electoral process, it also emphasizes gender equality, community 
empowerment, and basic rights in education and health. 
Politically, concepts of transparency, accountability, equity, and participation are the 
basic criteria for good governance. The challenge now is to incorporate good gov-
ernance at all levels of society. Moreover, the current Thaksin government has also 
promised to fight political corruption and electoral fraud. Therefore, time is a crucial 
factor in proving the government’s intentions. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
Initially, social protection was introduced in Thailand and was known as ‘social secu-
rity’ in early 1932, when the country changed from an absolute monarchy to a con-
stitutional monarchy. At that time, the idea of establishing a social security system 
in Thai society was not possible due to general political instability during World 
War II. Until 1947, when Field Marshall Phibul-Songkram became Prime Minister, 
the Social Security Act, B.E. 2497 (1954) was promulgated. However, the Act could 
not be implemented because a Royal Decree was not issued and announced. This 
situation was related to the fact that the government at that time did not make enough 
efforts to materialize the idea of establishing a social security system. Meanwhile, 
many people did not understand the benefits since they placed high value on family 
responsibility and therefore disapproved of the idea. Moreover, they felt that such a 
system would put an unnecessary burden on public expenditure and government ad-
ministration. Faced with strong opposition, the government eventually revoked the 
first draft legislature on social security. 
In 1972, Revolutionary Decree No.103 was issued and announced, paving the way 
for the establishment of the first Workmen’s Compensation Fund in 1974. The Fund 
provided basic guarantees and protection for workers in the formal private and public 
sector who suffered from occupational accidents, work-related injuries and diseases. 
However, the Social Security Act of 1990 was passed by Parliament and enforced on 
2 September, 1990. Workers in formal contractual employment were essentially tar-
gets under this Act. 
Although the Social Security Act of 1990 has been in force for more than ten years, 
the system is still far from comprehensive. Large numbers of workers outside of for-
mal employment, working mainly in the agriculture sector, are not yet covered by 
this system. Therefore, they have to rely on traditional or informal measures of so-
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cial security, such as financial support from the family, village-based savings groups 
or cooperative savings. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
In Thailand, formal sector employees are classified into two categories: employees 
in the private formal sector (i.e. workers in private enterprises) and employees in the 
public sector (i.e. state enterprise workers and civil servants). Employees in the formal 
sector are identified as those who are employed with social protection coverage by 
law and regulations. They are not only protected by social security measures, but 
they also have a higher and regular income. 
Recently, workers in small-scale enterprises (with less than 50 workers) have played 
an increasingly important role in Thai economy. In the enterprise sector, the promi-
nence of small-scale enterprises can be observed. According to the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Welfare Survey (2000), 49.8% employ one to four workers; 83.8% 
employ one to 19 workers and 93.6% employ one to 49 workers (see Table 14, Ap-
pendix). At present, almost 50% (enterprises with one to four workers) of the sur-
veyed enterprises have been identified as the ‘informal sector’. At the moment, em-
ployees in this sector are not protected by law and regulations. 
Government support appears to emphasize formal and large enterprises. For exam-
ple, the Board of Investment under the Office of the Prime Minister is the principal 
government agency providing incentives to stimulate investment in Thailand. Many 
of the Board’s activities have been oriented towards foreign investors and the devel-
opment of medium and large-scale commercial and industrial operations. Little atten-
tion has been paid to small and less formal enterprises. This can also apply in par-
ticular to the area of social security. Formal and large enterprises are clearly privi-
leged by the state. As we can see, employees in the formal sector do not only have a 
higher and regular income, but are also protected by social security measures. This 
is mainly due to the different characteristics of formal and informal sector employ-
ment. The implementation of social security schemes is rather straightforward in the 
formal sector, due to long-term employment, regular income, income records and so on. 
However, workers employed in enterprises with one or more workers will be pro-
tected by the Social Security Act in accordance with the Cabinet’s decision on 20 
November 2001. The scheme will be implemented on 1 April 2002. Formal sector 
workers in Thailand face some significant problems, in particular with the health in-
surance system. The problem lies in the differences in the scope of coverage of the 
various insurance schemes. For example, employees in the private sector are entitled 
to claim medical benefits from the Social Security Fund only for themselves, whereas 
civil servants and employees of state enterprises are all entitled to claim medical 
expenses for their parents, spouse and children. However, an insured male worker is 
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entitled to receive maternity benefits of 4,000 baht for his spouse or for an unregis-
tered wife. Moreover, the insured person is also entitled to claim for child allow-
ances, which amount to 150 baht per month per child. 
According to the 1994 Workmen’s Compensation Act, all employees in enterprises 
with ten or more employees are covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Fund. The 
Fund provides benefits in cases of work-related incidents such as injuries or diseases, 
loss of organ(s), disability, death or disappearance. The problems faced by employees 
in private enterprises are as follows: 
• Accident and injury rates among workers are still high. 
• Employers fail to take responsibility for providing adequate protection against 
accidents and injuries in the workplace. In many cases, workplaces are still equipped 
with outdated machines, and workers are not given a warning about possible haz-
ards in operating machines. Moreover, emergency measures and escape routes 
may be substandard or lacking. 
• A worker injured in a work-related accident is in many cases forced to seek medi-
cal care and service at hospitals registered with the Social Security Fund, instead 
of claiming benefits from the Workmen’s Compensation Fund. This is commonly 
due to the fact that most employers do not want to have cases (injuries, or work-
related accidents) reported to the authorities. Enterprises with frequent accident 
and injury reports would be subject to inspection or monitoring. 
• A great number of workers have had work-related illnesses, but they are misdiag-
nosed by physicians. The results are chronic illness without proper treatment. This 
situation is due to the lack of specialized training on the part of physicians and 
medical personnel. 
• In case of disability or partial disability, or the loss of a limb, most of these in-
jured are not able to fully claim benefits and compensation. This is due to the fact 
that the degree of disability is not clearly defined, according to the Act, for subse-
quent compensation. 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
The Social Security Act was initially enforced to cover enterprises with 20 or more 
employees and extended to enterprises with ten or more employees on 2 September 
1993. On 20 November 2001, the Thai Cabinet agreed to extend coverage to all enter-
prises with one or more employees. This agreement will be implemented on 1 April 
2002. It is expected that a total of 9,490,000 workers will then be covered under the 
protection of the Social Security Act. It should be noted that workers in the informal 
sector and self-employed individuals are not included. This is because the implemen-
tation of the Social Security Act has not been extended to informal sector workers 
and the self-employed. At the same time, any person who becomes unemployed or 
resigns from his job can apply to become a voluntary insured person according to 
Article 39 of the Social Security Act. 
However, the Social Security Act and Workmen’s Compensation Act do not cover 
civil servants, other government employees such as soldiers, police officers, teachers, 
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and university staff, as well as workers in state enterprises. Instead, civil servants 
and workers in state enterprises are eligible for quite generous benefits in terms of 
pension and compensation by providing health care and services for self and family 
members (e.g. parents, spouse and / or children). 
Regarding the Social Security Act, benefits are provided for insured persons, cover-
ing six types of benefits: illness or injury, maternity, disability, death, child allowance, 
old-age pension and unemployment. The provision to establish unemployment in-
surance has not been implemented. In case of emergencies and accidents, outpatients 
can be reimbursed for a maximum of two visits per year. Inpatients can get reim-
bursement for a maximum of two hospital stays per year. With regard to pension, an 
insured person will be paid an old-age pension benefit. The amount of pension bene-
fits is calculated at the rate of 15% of the average wage of the last 60 months or 15% 
plus 1% per additional 12 months of contributions above 180 months. 
Contribution to the Social Security Fund comes from employees, employers, and the 
government. According to the law, employers and employees each make contribu-
tions at the rate of 3% of wages to cover the six types of benefits. The government 
contributes at a rate of 2% of wages. Under such conditions, the employer has to 
deduct 3% from the wages of an insured employee as well as add his contribution 
(3% of wage) and pay the contributions of both within 15 days of the following month 
to the Social Security Office. Any employer who intentionally fails to comply with 
the Social Security Act (No. 2), 1994 is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing six months or to a fine not exceeding 20,000 baht (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002, 
pp. 53–54). However, since the Act was enacted in 1994, it was agreed that the desig-
nated 3%, 3%, and 2% contributions of the three parties are set as the goal. In 1994, 
when the programme was started, the contribution was only 1.5% for each of the 
three contributors. When the economic crisis hit, the contribution rate was dropped 
temporarily. Today the contribution rates stand at 3%, 3% and 2% for employees, 
employers and the government respectively. Workers not belonging formally to an 
enterprise such as the ‘self-employed’ and workers in the informal sector can become 
members and benefit from the Social Security Fund by making contributions for 
both employers and employees. 
Employment is the most important form of social protection for workers. Prior to the 
crisis, Thailand did not have an unemployment insurance programme. In the after-
math of the crisis, the government began to consider introducing an unemployment 
insurance scheme for providing social protection to retrenched workers. However, it 
deliberately decided not to launch such a scheme due to some belief that it would 
run counter to traditional self-reliance and self-help. Moreover, many felt that a better 
government policy would be to set up initiatives to build up the capacity of commu-
nities and families so that they could help each other. After the crisis, the main fea-
tures of the labour protection policy were as follows: First, the severance pay require-
ment was extended from six to ten months; second, a major job-creation or employ-
ment-generation programme was launched in the rural areas to absorb returning 
migrants; third, social security benefits were extended for laid-off subscribers from 
Social Protection in Thailand 
327 
six to twelve months and the tripartite contribution rate for such benefits was reduced 
by one-third. Moreover, pension and child allowance schemes were established 
under the social security scheme for private sector employees; finally, the govern-
ment launched training programmes for upgrading the skills of workers laid off 
during the crisis (World Bank, 2000, p. 39). 
For non-government enterprise employees, the Labour Protection Act of 1998 pro-
vides protection for unemployment in three cases: 
(1) Severance pay. Severance pay is the money which the employer pays to the em-
ployee upon termination of employment, in addition to other categories of money 
which the employer agrees to pay the employee according to Section 5 of the Labour 
Protection Act 1998. 
(2) Provident Fund. This fund is set up by both the employers and employees as 
protection for the employee in case of retirement, death, termination of employment, 
or termination of membership. The Provident Fund Act of 1987 states that the Provi-
dent Fund is voluntary and not required of all firms. Therefore, many firms do not 
establish a Provident Fund. 
(3) Employee Welfare Fund. This fund was established to provide welfare for work-
ers whose employment is terminated because of death or other reasons. The Labour 
Protection Act required that the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare according to 
Section 126 establish an Employee Welfare Fund. The employee must be a member 
of the Employee Welfare Fund unless the employer has established a Provident Fund 
for the firm. Both employer and employee are required to make contributions to the 
Fund. In other words, workers should be protected by either the Provident Fund or 
the Employee Welfare Fund in case of termination of employment. 
In the Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002–06), poverty 
reduction is recognized by the Thai government as a high priority area. A poverty 
eradication plan was drawn up in 2001. The Plan’s goals are to provide equitable 
access to education and social services for the poor and disadvantaged. Key features 
towards these goals are (National Economic and Social Development Board, NESDB): 
‘Improving the capability of the poor and ensuring social security for the poor by 
urging formation of occupational and / or saving groups among the poor. Through 
these forums, the poor will be able to learn from each other’s experiences, to make 
collective decisions, and to establish networks of community welfare. Non-govern-
ment organizations, local education institutions, and religious institutions will be en-
couraged to play an active role in the poverty-reduction process. The very poor will 
be guaranteed basic necessities such as food, health insurance, and a living allow-
ance. The state will also help improve productivity of the rural poor. In addition, the 
local economy will be enhanced, so that the poor can be self-reliant and have more 
job opportunities within their own localities. For the urban poor, emphasis will be 
placed upon access to education and health services, securing a livelihood by linking 
community businesses with industrial businesses at various levels, and ensuring a 
healthy living environment.’ 
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OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
Apart from the social security or social insurance system as described in 2.1.2, the 
government also offers additional social assistance and services (non-contributory). 
Social assistance and services may be classified into three categories: in-cash trans-
fer programmes, in-kind transfer programmes, and income generation programmes. 
The concept of social assistance and services is to provide assistance to specific 
groups with specific problems. 
(1) In-Cash Transfer Programmes. The Department of Public Welfare in the Minis-
try of Labour and Social Welfare operates several cash assistance programmes, such 
as direct cash assistance to needy families, monthly cash assistance to the elderly 
without any means of support, and village community funds. Significantly, two cash 
transfer programmes are described as follows: 
(1.1) Student Loan and Government Scholarship Programmes. An Education Loan 
Fund for the student loan scheme was established in 1996. The eligible beneficiaries 
include students studying at upper secondary and tertiary private and public educa-
tional institutions with an income below 12,500 baht per month (World Bank, 1999). 
These programmes existed prior to the crisis. But with the crisis, the government put 
in additional effort to strengthen these projects both financially and administratively. 
The loan from the Asian Development Bank to support scholarships for children in 
need proved to be less effective than expected. During the first year of implementa-
tion, the identification of poor students was not properly carried out and needed 
improvement. However, evaluation reports are not available at the moment. 
With respect to primary health care service, the services have been provided to peo-
ple in both urban and rural areas. Very poor people can receive health care services 
from government hospitals and health care centres. But services may be slow and 
not fully adequate. Programmes for health care include the following: 
(1.2) Monthly Cash Assistance to the Elderly. The programme pays 300 baht per 
month, as a pension, to each elderly poor. This income is considerably less than the 
minimum subsistence requirements implied by the NESDB poverty line for the eld-
erly, which averaged around 700 baht per person in the rural areas in 1997. 
(2) In-kind Transfer Programmes. The in-kind transfer programmes include the School 
Feeding Programme, which is administered by the Ministry of Education, and the 
Medical Services operated by the Ministry of Public Health. The following pro-
grammes are described as in-kind transfer programmes: 
(2.1) School Feeding Programme. There are two main programmes – a free school 
lunch programme and a supplementary food programme (school milk). The school 
lunch programme applies to children in primary school, while the supplementary food 
programme is provided to pre-primary students and primary students through to the 
third grade. 
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(2.2) Health Programmes. Before 2001, most Thai families participated in one of the 
many public health coverage schemes, ranging from free health services to benefici-
ary co-payment or premium payment. These schemes include the public assistance 
scheme, the civil servants medical benefit scheme, the compulsory health insurance 
scheme for formal sector employees, and the voluntary health insurance programme 
for the needy. After 2001, the low-income health card and voluntary health card 
schemes are replacing the 30 baht Universal Health Scheme. 
• Low-Income Health Card. The low-income health card is the public assistance 
scheme. This scheme covers low-income adults, children under 12 years of age, 
the elderly (60 years and above), the disabled, monks and war veterans. The low-
income card programme and is targeted at poor adults within the 13–59 year age 
group, with a budget of 273 baht per capita for a period of three years. These in-
dividuals are entitled to free health care at hospitals and public health centres. The 
low-income card is provided to poor adults with the income ceiling of 2,000 baht 
per month for a single person and 2,800 baht per month for a family. 
• Voluntary Health Card. This programme aims to serve the near poor and those 
who do not have mandatory insurance, such as civil servants and formal sector 
employees. Health cards can be purchased at 500 baht with a 1,000 baht govern-
ment subsidy. Not more than five persons in the family can benefit from the card. 
• 30 Baht Universal Health Programme. This health care programme gives every-
one (except people who have mandatory insurance such as civil servants and for-
mal sector employees) access to medical services, requiring each person to pay 
only a fee of 30 baht per visit. Very poor individuals can apply for a special card 
that grants them free medical treatment. The 30 Baht Universal Health Programme 
began as a pilot programme in April 2001 in only six provinces. Recently, it has 
been expanded to all 75 provinces and 13 districts in Bangkok. The remaining 
districts in Bangkok are to be included on 1 April, 2002. 
(3) Income Generation Programmes. There are wage-employment creation pro-
grammes that are open to the population at large within a given area, such as the 
Rural Job Creation Programme, the Green Earn Programme, and the Tambon De-
velopment Programme. 
OKNKQ= líÜÉêë=
Moreover, family and community networks are traditionally seen as a safety net 
mechanism to provide necessary support if and when necessary. His Majesty the 
King adopted a strategy to promote the concept of ‘self-sufficiency’ at the family 
and community level. This concept has encouraged the government to focus more 
on rebuilding and consolidating social capital eroded by economic growth. Thus, the 
approach is aimed at strengthening the unofficial, community-based ‘safety nets’ 
(World Bank, 2001). Much support now goes directly to community-based organiza-
tions such as savings and credit groups, and women’s and children’s groups. 
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OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
In Thailand, as in many other countries, there are no clear and standardized defini-
tions of the informal sector in use currently. Informal sector workers are assumed to 
be individuals who work outside of ‘conventional’ office and factory forms of em-
ployment, and work without a regular contract.1 The National Statistical Office 
(NSO) of Thailand uses criteria based on qualitative characteristics of the sector, and 
the number of employees (less than ten) to categorize workers and establishments as 
part of the ‘informal sector.’ By NSO definitions, more than 75% of Thailand’s em-
ployed labour force is in the informal economy. The majority (52%) of enterprises in 
Thailand are informal enterprises and according to statistics issued by the NSO in 1997, 
‘employment generated by the informal sector in the manufacturing, trade and service 
sectors is approximately 3.5 times greater than that generated by the formal sector.’2 
Moreover, as is apparent in the literature, the informal sector has been growing rather 
than shrinking in developing countries throughout the world, and there is a much 
higher proportion of women in the informal than in the formal sector, particularly in 
certain branches of the informal sector. In Thailand, for example, women constitute 
the great majority of workers involved in home-based production, particularly in the 
production of garments, textiles, food and beverages, and other goods that are made 
either in small neighbourhood home-based factories or in individual homes. 
The following discussion will draw primarily from recent studies on home-based 
workers in order to illustrate certain points regarding the need for social protection. 
However, the general discussion will deal with concerns and programmes that apply 
to workers throughout the informal sector. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The problems faced by informal sector workers have generally been invisible to poli-
cymakers in Thailand, as in other countries, until very recently. During the Asian 
                             
1 According to the criteria for informal sector activities developed by Sethuraman and the ILO in 1976, 
economic activities that can be classified under the informal sector under the following circumstances: 
family members work in a business; less than ten people are employed in a business; there are no legal 
regulations, or existing regulations are not observed; there are no regular working times; the workers 
have less than six years of schooling; the work is seasonal; no electricity is available in the workplace; 
and there is no dependency on regular loans. Although some of these criteria are not relevant to the 
Thai case (e.g. electricity is generally available in places of work in Thailand), the other features are 
not uncommon in the informal sector in Thailand. Some of these features are used by the NSO (in par-
ticular, the number of employees being less than ten, as discussed above). It should be noted that cur-
rently ILO publications refer to the 1993 (15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians) defi-
nition of an informal sector enterprise as ‘a private non-agricultural business which is household-
operated and has a total of, at most, five paid employees’. See for example, International Labour Or-
ganization (Bangkok), ‘Decent work for all: Targeting full employment in Thailand’, August 2000, p. 
27. However, the ILO acknowledges that the ‘less than ten employees’ definition is also commonly 
used in many countries throughout the world. 
2 M. Allal, ‘Micro- and small enterprises in Thailand: Definitions and contributions’, Working paper 6 
for the ILO / UNDP Project on Micro- and Small Enterprise Development and Poverty Alleviation in 
Thailand, THA / 99 / 003 (Bangkok, ILO / EASMAT). Quoted in ILO (Bangkok), ibid, p. 30. 
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financial crisis, for example, the impact of the informal sector was virtually ignored 
by most government offices in Thailand and by most of the large-scale develop-
ment-oriented international organizations, as the focus was almost exclusively on 
the impact of the crisis on the formal sector. 
This focus on the formal sector was true even of studies dealing with the ‘social 
impact’ of the crisis, particularly in late 1997 and 1998 when reports began to be 
written. A few analysts noted the impact of the crisis on the informal sector (and 
speculated about the impact without doing any actual empirical research); however, 
their general assumption was that the sector was doing reasonably well and could 
expand and absorb unemployed workers who had been in formal sector occupations. 
Moreover, some writers thought that the financial crisis might even be a ‘golden op-
portunity’ for women in the informal sector in Thailand, since they could now work 
more and ‘take greater charge of the household finances.’ Needless to say, this view 
did not go down well with women in Thailand, who were already working long hours 
for very little pay, and now faced difficulties keeping their family’s real income 
from falling too sharply in the face of rising costs and falling earnings. 
Besides being invisible to policymakers, informal workers in Thailand face other sig-
nificant problems.3 Their primary problems are tied to their lack of legal rights and 
their lack of access to resources (capital, education, training, and others) that would 
give them more options. In addition, social and family constraints often limit women 
in particular to informal sector work. 
Both work- and non work-related health concerns are also very important to infor-
mal workers in Thailand. For many, occupational safety and health and other risks 
are a big concern due to their unregulated and unprotected work. In addition to health 
hazards directly related to their jobs, low-income informal workers are also often 
exposed indirectly to environmental hazards associated with the physical locations 
in which they live and work (hazards associated with poverty, unsafe buildings, over-
crowding, pollution, etc.). Among the most vulnerable informal workers are those 
who deal with garbage and waste processes or manufacturing processes involving 
the use of chemicals and other substances in an unregulated environment without any 
kind of protective measures or equipment. The poverty of so many informal workers 
forces them to ignore the risks and work in this way for as long as they can. They do 
not feel that they have the luxury of considering the hazards involved, at least until 
                             
3 Other problems often noted include the ideas that informal workers are non-legal and therefore outside 
the scope of official statistics and government regulation as well as labour and social protection legis-
lation; have irregular workplaces and working hours; work long hours with low productivity; often 
have little training so that the chances of finding a job in the formal sector are low; face a lack of as-
sets and capital and no access to the formal financial markets; face low entry barriers and growing 
competition when the informal sector expands, which in turn reduces the chances of making a living; 
often are in poor working conditions; and, as a rule, have no work safety and have no access to social 
security systems, among other concerns. (From FES-Singapore, Background Information for Country 
Studies on Social Protection, p. 14.) These features and problems are generally applicable to informal 
workers in Thailand at the present time, albeit with a great deal of variation across different occupa-
tions and industrial sub-sectors. 
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something dramatic happens – and then the work just goes to others, who do it in the 
same unprotected way. 
Informal workers’ risks also tend to be very high because their employment is often 
irregular and without enforceable contracts. They have no recourse if what they have 
produced is not accepted (in the case of subcontracting) or not sold at an acceptable 
price (in the case of self-employment). They have no job security or workers’ bene-
fits, and they are not covered by most labour legislation. In some cases, they may be 
subject to harassment, and they often face delayed payments of wages – and here 
again, they have no effective legal recourse, and so are forced to turn to relatives or 
moneylenders to meet immediate needs. Moreover, without access to new markets 
or resources, they may be left without options when conditions change, either due to 
declines in demand or supply, increases in costs, or other unpredictable events that 
endanger their assets and livelihoods. 
In Thailand, the financial crisis exposed the vulnerability of this sector because it 
brought about sudden and dramatic reversals for large numbers of informal workers. 
Not only were they faced with rising costs of living and production and declining 
demand, but their invisibility also meant that they were largely left out of the ‘social 
response packages’ to the crisis. Homenet, a NGO network working closely with 
homeworkers in the informal sector in Thailand, carried out a study on the impact of 
the financial crisis on homeworkers. The study showed that very few knew about the 
response package initiatives implemented by government and non-government 
agencies. Those who knew about them generally were not able to gain access to these 
programmes. For example, almost none of those surveyed were able to take advan-
tage of the key Social Investment Fund initiatives that were devised in reaction to 
the crisis, at least in the initial years.4 
In the years following the crisis, however, informal workers were able to benefit from 
some ongoing government programmes, particularly those sponsored by the De-
partment of Public Welfare and other governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions.5 They also benefited from a few other short-term programmes that eventually 
were formulated in response to the crisis (e.g. the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s 
public works programmes for poor communities). Nonetheless, the crisis made it very 
clear that informal workers could not be expected to just fend for themselves. They 
could not easily find new job opportunities, and the sector could not expand to meet 
                             
4 HomeNet Thailand, ‘Impact of the economic crisis on homeworkers in Thailand’, International La-
bour Organization (Bangkok), January 2002. The Social Investment Fund (SIF), a World Bank loan in 
response to the financial crisis, aimed at providing financial support for community organizations with 
projects promoting income-generation, emergency and social support for the poor, environment and 
cultural preservation and community strengthening. Access to SIF appears to have increased in the pe-
riod after the surveys were conducted. The main controversies remain (1) how much has actually 
reached informal workers, and (2) what the timing has been (i.e. the long delays in gaining access to 
these funds). 
5 As an example of this, homeworkers (subcontracted home-based workers) in the artificial flower and 
garment industries in Thailand reported receiving a multitude of services from governmental and non-
governmental organizations during this period, for details see Table 17, Appendix. 
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the needs of displaced workers. Moreover, as noted earlier, women in the sector did 
not generally find this a ‘golden opportunity’ for their own personal growth. 
Instead, rising costs and declining demand throughout the country and the region 
had a very serious effect on informal workers. This included not only those in ser-
vice but also in manufacturing sub-sectors, since their position at the low wage / low 
productivity end of their respective industries and occupations meant that they could 
not respond to export opportunities to countries not affected by the crisis, but rather 
had to face deteriorating conditions in local and regional markets. Many had to give 
up their regular informal sector employment to become casual workers under ad-
verse circumstances. Moreover, those who were able to maintain orders or customers 
were often forced to work under even more hazardous conditions and for much longer 
hours to compensate for the significant fall in their real incomes. 
In the wake of the financial crisis and subsequent economic downturns, it became 
clear that formal and informal workers also cannot simply fall back on family and 
community members for help, as the latter themselves have difficulty trying to cope 
with the dislocations of a troubled economy. For this reason, it has become apparent 
that social protection programmes need to be expanded, and extended to the infor-
mal sector. This idea had been discussed during Thailand’s high growth period, and 
at that time there seemed to be the political will to move in that direction. However, 
the financial crisis brought this momentum to a halt as government spending was cut 
back. 
In the past year or two the issue of extending social protection to the informal sector 
has again come up, and new initiatives are being pursued in promising ways; how 
the current global economic slowdown will affect these new initiatives is as yet un-
clear. The following sections will discuss existing government and voluntary schemes 
that deal with the different aspects of social protection for informal workers. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
In principle, there are many things government agencies at different levels (national, 
provincial, and local) can do to promote social protection for the informal sector. 
This could include such things as social insurance programmes to deal with unem-
ployment, health, disability, old age, death, and other life reversals; social assistance 
and welfare programmes to cover particular groups; child protection (including child 
care) aimed at the welfare of children whose parent or parents work in the informal 
economy; and labour regulations and employment / income generating policies to pro-
tect against the uncertainties and hazards of work in the sector. 
In Thailand, during the high growth years, there were serious discussions regarding 
the extension of labour and social protection programmes that are in place for formal 
sector workers (through the Labour Protection Law and the Social Security Act) to 
informal workers as well – i.e. to those working in establishments of less than ten 
employees, and who register with the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. In fact, 
the Eighth National Plan (1997–2001) originally projected that social security provi-
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sions would be extended to the informal sector. However, with budget cuts in the 
wake of the financial crisis, these measures were put on hold. In principle, social secu-
rity benefits were extended to all establishments with one or more workers as of April 
2002. Despite great efforts to influence the government to extend social security 
provisions to the informal sector, this provision still does not cover workers in in-
formal units (particularly unregistered ones). 
In recent years, informal workers’ access to the social security system has been, in 
principle, mainly through the ‘self-employment’ scheme in Thailand, as discussed 
above. This holds true even for subcontracted workers who are not self-employed. In 
reality, however, to obtain death, disability, maternity and accident benefits through 
this scheme, informal workers have to pay double premiums (one for themselves, and 
another for ‘employers’), which places the programme out of the reach of most in-
formal workers, who often earn less than the minimum wage. Moreover, this pro-
gramme does not cover illness, which is the main need and concern of informal 
workers, particularly the large numbers who work in hazardous and unhealthy envi-
ronments. Interestingly, in the case of subcontracted workers, employers / contractors 
deduct a withholding tax of 3% from the amount earned by workers, but the latter do 
not benefit from insurance plans sponsored by either the government or by employ-
ers. 
For these reasons, most informal workers feel that the formal inclusion (beginning in 
September 1994) of the ‘self-employed’ in the social security scheme on a voluntary 
basis is something that is largely irrelevant to them. This is because even though the 
Social Security Office states that workers in the informal sector can be covered by 
the Social Security scheme by registering themselves as self-employed, they have to 
make two contributions on behalf of both the employer and employee. This option is 
not attractive to informal workers. In fact, the only really affordable government-
sponsored social protection plans that low-income informal workers have had access 
to until recently are (1) the health card programme from the Ministry of Public Health, 
and (2) in a limited number of cases, the welfare programmes of the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Welfare and other ministries. However, these programmes are de-
signed to aid impoverished families and individuals, rather than low-income workers 
in general. 
With regard to the health system, which is a critical concern for informal workers, a 
30 baht health scheme has been enacted that is promising but still largely untested, 
as it is being extended slowly throughout the country (see also Section 4 regarding 
innovative programmes). For most informal workers, the health plan in place until 
recently has involved participation in a voluntary health scheme (with 500 baht health 
cards that cover a family of up to five members); having a low-income health card 
(‘low-income’ here refers to an individual making less than 2,000 baht per year, or a 
family with an income of less than 2,800 baht per year); or having no coverage at 
all. Even in the case of health card holders, 80% claim that they would be in serious 
trouble if they became seriously ill. This is due in part to the referral system used in 
the programme that, it is said, may not give patients the care they need. It is also due 
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in part to the spending limits imposed for each patient.6 It is the hope of the govern-
ment of Thailand, as well as the informal workers and their families, that the new uni-
versal health coverage plan – along with the one million baht revolving fund for vil-
lages (also discussed in Section 4), and new initiatives regarding occupational health 
and safety and other measures that are still in the pre-programme stage – will im-
prove the government-sponsored provision of social protection to the informal sec-
tor. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Attempts involving organizations outside of the government to provide certain types 
of social protection to informal workers are extremely diverse, and they depend upon 
the type of informal worker and the geographic region. There are legal barriers to 
some types of voluntary social insurance and social welfare programmes such as the 
handling of community-based insurance schemes through cooperatives, and these 
barriers have inhibited their growth to some extent. Nonetheless, the financial crisis 
created a great deal of insecurity and turmoil throughout the country, and one of the 
reactions was the creation of many new voluntary programmes, particularly through 
community-based organizations (CBOs) and credit unions, among other organiza-
tions. 
In fact, for decades villages in every part of the country have been setting up inde-
pendent schemes to provide local people with social benefits. Depending on the 
village or CBO, the benefits may be in the form of medical, life / funeral, old age, dis-
aster, education, or other benefits (usually a combination of these). In Thailand, the 
costs of funerals are high and are culturally and socially important; moreover, the 
costs associated with transportation to and from hospitals, particularly in rural areas, 
may be far greater than the costs in public hospitals. Funeral / life and medical (in-
cluding transportation) costs are thus among the most important costs to be covered, 
along with survivor benefits, disability, and other concerns. 
Because of the diversity of these local, voluntary programmes, we will note here only 
a few that have been discussed in some detail. Among credit union cooperatives, for 
example, the Soon Klang Thewa Credit Union has provided loans for middle- and 
low-income members, including informal workers, for decades.7 Similarly, the Sri 
Haruetai Klung Credit Union Cooperative offers savings and loan programmes, a 
children’s education fund, and medical, maternity, death, disaster, and old age bene-
fits as part of its welfare fund. The Klongprea Saving Group, the Praephan Group, the 
Maeprik Village Bank, the Noensai Saving Group, and the Urban Community Wel-
fare Fund are also examples of self-help CBO-initiated groups that deal with saving 
and lending (micro-finance) services, small enterprise support, and welfare fund ser-
vices (mostly related to medical, death, and old age benefits).8 Employment-based 
                             
6 This point was made in the Workshop Report of the ILO-STEP Technical Workshop on the Extension 
of Social Insurance and Assistance to Homebased Workers in Thailand, June 7–9. 2000. 
7 Cf. HomeNet Thailand (op. cit.), Chapter Three. 
8 Regarding these organizations, cf. Daonoi Srikajon, ‘An approach to social protection schemes for 
home-based workers in Thailand.’ HomeNet Thailand, March 2001. The author points out that there 
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groups have also experimented with mutual assistance and social insurance card 
schemes, among other approaches, in specific small-scale social protection cover-
age. 
In each case, a certain amount is paid by members in order to maintain the group fund, 
and a group leader is appointed to manage the fund. Savings schemes operate in a 
similar way, with a specified amount (e.g. 20 baht per month) paid by all members 
each month. In some cases, e.g., for funeral expenses, all members contribute a speci-
fied amount upon the death of a group member. The contributions tend to increase 
as costs increase over the years. 
Many of these programmes have been in place for up to 25 years, and although their 
coverage is limited, they have provided members with financial assistance when 
government programmes were completely out of the informal workers’ reach. How-
ever, poorly managed local programmes, or programmes that suddenly face large 
amounts of unexpected costs or a serious drop in membership (e.g. due to an eco-
nomic downturn or crisis) can suddenly collapse as the programmes simply run out 
of funds altogether. Other problems regularly facing local CBO-sponsored social in-
surance and assistance schemes include: 
– the fact that low-income members may not be able to contribute much to the 
fund; 
– the programmes may not at any point gain enough members to sustain the fund 
for long; and 
– the local community may not have adequate information regarding the micro-
finance- and micro-insurance-related experiences of groups in other parts of the 
country, which includes the practices that can either make schemes viable or lead 
them to ruin. 
It is important to keep in mind that these schemes are almost never government-sup-
ported in Thailand. Moreover, it must be recognized that although the local, volun-
tary programmes can provide adequate coverage for some limited needs, they will 
not be able to meet the wide-ranging needs of informal workers for social protection. 
Given the uncertainties and lack of resources available to the majority of informal 
workers, it is clear that some combination of voluntary and government-provided 
programmes is needed. 
OKOKR= líÜÉêë=
As in most developing countries, informal workers will turn first to family members 
and community groups for help in case of need, particularly in times of unexpected 
life upheavals (unemployment, death, illness). However, as the financial crisis made 
clear, family members and community groups are not likely to be able to help when 
                                                                                                                                        
are over 40,000 CBOs in Thailand, with a capital flow of approximately 30,000 million baht. Not all 
of these currently have welfare fund programmes, but CBO-sponsored programmes are seen by many 
as a potential means of providing certain types of social protection that can complement (rather than 
substitute for) government-sponsored social protection initiatives. 
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they themselves are adversely affected by an economic downturn. Even in times of 
economic growth, low-income informal workers may not have sufficient family or 
community resources on which to draw, particularly when costs are high and needs 
are great. 
There have been some accounts of informal workers, e.g. subcontracted workers, 
turning to employers for loans or help with illness or other difficulties.9 There may 
certainly be some employers that try to maintain family-like ties with their informal 
workers. However, it is unlikely that most employers will go very far for individual 
workers. In the case of homeworker groups in Thailand (groups of subcontracted 
home-based workers), it was found that some group leaders tried to protect group 
members from economic downturns or delayed payments as much as possible (e.g. 
by going to moneylenders themselves). However, once again, there is not much that 
group leaders can do for large numbers of individuals or individuals with sizeable 
needs. The situation is all the more difficult for migrant workers, given that they often 
lack family members nearby, and they are less likely to be members of community-
based organizations. For all informal workers, it is clear that what is required is a 
combination of public, private, and personal means for dealing with times of need. 
Fortunately, the informal economy has become somewhat less ‘invisible’ to policy-
makers, and new initiatives have been proposed. A few of these will be discussed in 
Section 4. 
OKP= i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
The labour market policy in Thailand has been affected by the 1997 economic crisis 
and the economic recession of the past few years. The admission of China into the 
WTO has also impacted the labour market in Thailand. It was realized earlier that 
Thailand could no longer rely on unskilled labour. Programmes to provide technical 
training for semi-skilled and skilled workers have to be implemented. But this can 
be done only when the market and production trend is identified. Even the present 
compulsory education requirement is not sufficient to prepare Thailand for the fu-
ture. The economic crisis has also created college graduate unemployment. 
College graduate unemployment has been another labour market problem. There are 
many projects with the objective of creating employment, both short term and long 
term for fresh graduates. A new graduate employment programme hires new gradu-
ates to work on assigned community development projects for more than six months 
                             
9 Vagneron asserts, for example, that ‘Many entrepreneurs help their workers financially (by paying 
them in advance) or when they are ill; this remains true no matter the size of the enterprise. Such fam-
ily-like relations are more widespread among the small subcontractors making low quality products, 
but also because informal relations are necessary in order to soften the working conditions, which bear 
the mark of harsh competition, and are thus quite difficult.’ In I. Vagneron, ‘How can the situation on 
the domestic labour market shape subcontracting arrangements? Evidence from the garment sector in 
Thailand.’ Workshop on Subcontracting Labour in Asia: Historical and Global Perspectives, Bangkok, 
22–24 November 1999 (CLARA-IISH-IIAS), p. 11. 
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to support their families. However, with incomes below government wages, it is not 
clear what percentage of the hiring was truly ‘productive’ employment. Assessment 
needs to be made on a project by project basis. Since there are many different pro-
jects, project evaluation will have to be made separately. 
Rural employment projects provide only 3,000 baht per person, too small an amount 
to have any impact on individuals or households. It is a short-term / one-time relief 
only. It was reported that for the fiscal year 1999, 7,856 persons were employed. 
Still, the amount is not substantial enough to have a significant impact. 
With regard to skills development, there are many training projects in the Unem-
ployment Mitigation Package. For the fiscal year 1999 / 2000, the following targets 
were identified: Children and women vocational training projects were aimed at 8,000 
persons, homeworker leader projects targeted 7,500 persons, and vocational training 
as a prostitution prevention measure had a target of 2,500 persons. Most training pro-
grammes identified a number of trainees as the target. There is no output / outcome 
identified. Similar to the employment creation projects, ‘productive training’ should 
be the objective of all training programmes / projects, not the mere number of those 
who attended the sessions. This is especially important for the computer training pro-
jects implemented. Preliminary assessment indicated that computer-training projects 
need a special design and should include post-project activities to ensure a success-
ful outcome. Post-training evaluation in the form of beneficiary satisfaction is needed 
to evaluate the training projects. One indicator is the ability to use the skills learned 
in the training projects to earn income. 
Regarding the minimum wage, it is largely set up by two tripartite mechanisms, namely 
the National Wage Committee and the National Labour Department Advisory Coun-
cil (NLDAC). With this process, workers have relied on national wage decisions 
rather than seeking enterprise-based social dialogue through trade unions and collec-
tive bargaining. This could be a factor determining efforts towards labour organiza-
tion because some of the incentives for trade union membership are diminished. 
The government is promoting international labour migration to provide employment 
opportunities for those who are willing to travel abroad to earn a living. Training 
programmes to prepare workers are being considered. At the same time, labour atta-
chés stationed in other countries are actively seeking employment opportunities for 
Thai workers. 
Foreign workers are allowed to work in Thailand only when permits are granted. Offi-
cial channels are created to reduce the number of illegal foreign workers and expand 
the labour market for Thai workers. This programme is not very popular among em-
ployers because they prefer foreign workers. This sector involves low unskilled 
workers, which the Thai people are not willing to allow into the country. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçìê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
The 1997 Constitution provides the foundation for reforming the education system 
by giving all Thai citizens the right to 12 years of publicly financed education as 
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evident in the 1998 National Education Act. Currently, the average educational level 
of the labour force in Thailand is at the primary level of education. The primary and 
secondary education systems will need to change to support the development of a 
flexible workforce. A ‘learning-to-learn’ approach has become more widespread, with 
students researching their own information and learning to work in teams. At the 
secondary school level there should be greater efforts to expose students to the 
world of work, using systems such as the school-to-work programme. 
In the context of a passive labour market policy, the implementation and operation 
of the Labour Protection Law is generally low. According to the Labour Force Sur-
vey in August 1999, 15% of Thai workers reported being protected by the Labour 
Protection Act. Large enterprises (with more than 100 workers) follow the law fully. 
Workers in large establishments have near-universal coverage (91%), while only 43% 
of employees in medium-sized establishments (10–99 employees) are covered (World 
Bank, 2000, p. 42). Small enterprises are not covered under the Labour Protection 
Act at the moment. 
With respect to the implementation of a minimum wage policy, there are a large 
number of workers earning less than the minimum wage in Thailand. For instance, 
Labour Force Survey data indicate that, in the third quarter of 1999, 3.6 million 
workers (about 30% of all wage employees) earned a wage that was less than the 
minimum wage (World Bank, 2000, p. 34). However, there are wide regional varia-
tions in the proportion of workers earning less than the minimum wage. As would be 
expected, Bangkok has the smallest proportion of workers earning less than the 
minimum wage (15–20%), followed by the Southern and Central regions (23–25%). 
In addition, private employees are also paid less than the minimum wage. Among 
private employees, it is mostly those who work in small and medium enterprises that 
are at risk of being paid less than the minimum wage. Data on labour inspections 
published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (1999) confirm that 14% of 
small and medium enterprises were found to be in violation of the minimum wage 
laws in 1998. 
PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉNM=
råÉãéäçóãÉåí=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
The question is whether the existing laws are adequate to provide unemployment pro-
tection for workers, but since the existing laws are not fully operational, the answer 
cannot be given at this stage. One difficulty in answering the question lies in the fact 
that only six of the seven unemployment benefits provided in the existing Social Secu-
rity Act have been implemented. It is therefore clear that the existing Social Security 
Act has not adequately provided for unemployment coverage. Coverage for other 
                             
10 Pongsapich, 2001, pp. 18–20. 
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benefits is usually satisfactory. The expansion of the number of people in the pro-
gramme is therefore necessary. The question then is whether the Labour Protection 
Act provides unemployment protection for retrenched workers, i.e. whether severance 
pay and a provident fund (or Employee Welfare Fund) sufficiently cover unemploy-
ment benefits. Here, the difficulty lies in the implementation and operation of the 
laws. At present, especially because of the financial crisis, severance pay and a pro-
vident fund (or employee welfare benefits) are not provided for employees in all 
cases. Many firms are still not following the law in providing severance pay to re-
trenched employees. Many firms have neither the provident fund nor registration 
with the Employee Welfare Fund. 
`çîÉê~ÖÉ=áå=`~ëÉ=çÑ=pìÄÅçåíê~ÅíáåÖ=
The implementation of Section 12 of the Labour Protection Act, 1998 is also prob-
lematic. In the case of subcontracting, employers must make subcontractors at all 
levels responsible for providing benefits to their employees. In reality however, both 
the employers and the subcontractors ignore the law and therefore employees of sub-
contractors are not protected. Section 12 states: In cases where the employer is the 
subcontractor, all subcontractors of all levels along the line, if any, to the primary 
contractor shall be jointly liable with the subcontractor who is the employer for the 
payment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday overtime pay, severance pay, 
special severance pay, accumulated funds, contributions, or additional payments. 
The primary contractor or the subcontractors under paragraph one shall have a right 
of recourse against the subcontractor who is the employer for refund of payments 
already made pursuant to paragraph one. 
In reality, one finds that protection in case of subcontracting has not been recognized 
in Thai society, regardless of what the law states. No employer takes responsibility 
for the protection or welfare of workers who are not directly employed by the com-
pany. Almost all companies treat subcontractors as service providers, exchanging 
services for fees. This arrangement does not recognize that services involve workers 
at all. Therefore, regardless of the law, there is no social protection in the case of 
subcontracting in Thailand. 
bñÉãéíáçåë=Ñêçã=íÜÉ=mêçîáëáçå=
In addition, the Labour Protection Act 1998 also allows certain works to be pre-
scribed differently from the provision of this Act. Section 22 states: Agricultural 
work, sea fishery, loading or unloading of goods on sea vessels, work to be per-
formed at home, transport work and other work, as prescribed in the royal decrees, 
may be prescribed differently from the provisions of this Act, in the ministerial regu-
lations for the labour protection in these various cases. 
Additional prescriptions for the different kinds of work identified in Section 22 have 
been announced under ministerial regulations except for agricultural work and work 
to be performed at home. ‘Work to be performed at home’ is a form of subcontract-
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ing. Therefore, it is clear that homeworkers and subcontractors are not sufficiently 
protected under the present Labour Protection Act. 
Protection coverage under the present schemes is therefore insufficient. The Social 
Security Act needs to be implemented in full and coverage for subcontractors and 
homeworkers needs to be clarified. In addition, monitoring of the implementation 
and operation of the existing laws need to be carried out more seriously. 
oÉ~ëçåë=Ñçê=qÉêãáå~íáçå=çÑ=bãéäçóãÉåí=
The Labour Protection Act, Section 75 allows for the temporary termination of the 
operation of a firm if acceptable reasons other than for force majuere are given. 
Sometimes, employers claim lack of new orders for temporary termination of pro-
duction to lay off workers. This means that employers have the leeway to get out of 
paying for compensation. Section 75 states: In the case that it is necessary for the 
employer to temporarily halt its operations wholly or partially for any cause other 
than for force majuere, the employer shall pay the employee at least 50% of the normal 
working day’s wages that the employee received before the cessation of operations 
for the entire duration of the period during which the employer does not allow the 
employee to work. The employer shall give notice to the employee and the labour 
inspection official in advance prior to the halting of operations under paragraph one. 
On this issue Chalit Meesit makes three observations (Chalit Meesit, 1999, pp. 15–16): 
• Many employers use Section 75 to argue for temporarily halting production, re-
ducing employees’ pay by 50% and reducing other operating expenses by curtail-
ing benefits for employees. 
• If employees do not agree to the 50% pay cut and decide to terminate employ-
ment, employers need not provide severance pay. 
• If temporary halting of operations is due to a financial crisis, not because of tech-
nical and complex problems; and if the problem cannot be solved after temporarily 
ceasing operations, termination of employment may be necessary. But some em-
ployers prefer to use Section 75 of the Labour Protection Act to avoid severance 
pay. 
In effect, employers have been able to reduce the wages of workers and create un-
deremployment conditions in order to solve their financial crisis. The question of 
reasons for termination of employment by employers is an issue that was heavily 
debated during the economic crisis. Many employees feel that they have been treated 
unfairly. But because the crisis created an unusual environment, employees have 
been agreeing to unemployment benefits at a value lower than normal or agreeing to 
be underemployed instead of unemployed. 
PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=
With respect to the social security system, some deficiencies in management are 
noted, in particular to medical care and services. Insured persons who are under the 
system are generally not entitled to select their own preferred hospitals for treat-
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ment. In most cases, employers often choose hospitals for their employees. Apart 
from this, it is found that many hospitals continue to make excuses to deny treatment 
or delay medical attention in cases of emergency or serious injury. 
With regard to unemployment, the government has been reluctant to launch an Un-
employment Insurance System. Therefore, regarding the benefits identified in the 
Social Security Act, unemployment coverage should also be considered. The pro-
posed scheme for unemployment insurance is to ask for an additional 5% contribu-
tion from the three parties (employees, employers, and government). Implementa-
tion of this scheme awaits legislative and political procedures before finalization. 
Currently, much debate is focused on how the existing social protection systems in 
Thailand should be improved. The following considerations should be made to im-
prove management. First, the Social Security System should be extended to those 
employed in the agriculture sector. Second, the government must not draw money 
from the Social Security Fund for the 30 baht Universal Medical Care Fund because 
it would not be fair to both the insured workers and employers who have made con-
tributions to the Social Security Fund. Third, insured workers must be given adequate 
information so that they are able to make informed choices about hospitals. Fourth, 
stringent measures must be imposed on hospitals in case of their refusal to provide 
proper medical care and treatment to insured workers, or their demand for medical 
fees from insured workers. Fifth, workers should have a participatory role in the 
Medical Board, the Appeals Board, the Workmen’s Compensation Fund Board, and 
the Social Security Board. Finally, civil society organizations (CSO) should play an 
active role in monitoring and in the evaluation process, in particular in the 30 Baht 
Universal Health Programme, as this project is implemented in a top-down manner. 
At present social protection schemes need to be carried out by government agencies. 
Civil society groups can only monitor the implementation process and efficiency of 
the programmes. In the future, if the decentralization processes achieve their goals, 
local governments may have the capacity to manage some of the social services and 
social assistance programmes. At the moment, this situation is far from being a reality. 
Since unions are weak in Thailand, their achievements are few. Their immediate 
goals are to push for unemployment coverage. Progress will be made when the pre-
sent government is receptive to the proposal to consider unemployment coverage. 
But it is not near finalization. Other social protection schemes are not being initiated 
by the unions since workers in the unions are covered under the same social scheme 
and enjoy the same benefits as workers in the formal sector generally do. Some 
schemes are fragmented and provide very small benefits to workers in the informal 
sector (together with the general population of Thailand). Support for the elderly is 
being advocated and the government is considering the second long-term plan for 
the elderly. These plans are advocated by civil society groups. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
With respect to financial sustainability, some programmes are not economically feasi-
ble or sustainable, even though they may be socially appropriate and necessary. An 
Social Protection in Thailand 
343 
example is the voluntary health card programme. The cost of health care per card is 
2,138 baht, but the card is sold to the public at 500 baht per card and a government 
subsidy is continually required. The Ministry of Public Health, therefore, is in the 
process of designing different health service and assistance programmes. The 30 
Baht Universal Health Programme is being implemented and scrutinized by the 
people, the media and academics. Financial sustainability of the 30 baht scheme is 
being questioned. Preliminary analysis suggests that financial sustainability will not 
be possible. 
On the other hand, many of the unfeasible and unsustainable programmes have been 
abandoned. For example, the fishing enterprise promotion for returned migrants 
proved to be unsuccessful when returned migrants had no intention of adopting 
fishery as an occupation. Another example was the programme of promoting short-
term employment in the form of daily wages. These programmes only provided jobs 
for a few days; hence the problem of unemployment was not solved. Therefore, these 
types of programmes need to be redesigned with the aim of providing ‘productive’ 
employment. 
At the moment, financial sustainability of the social security scheme by itself is re-
ported to be achievable. But if part of the social security fund is transferred to sup-
port the universal health coverage scheme, sustainability will not be achieved. 
Other social services and assistance programmes are supported by the annual gov-
ernment budget and are not self-supporting. Therefore, the issue of financial sustain-
ability is not applicable. In general, social protection programme financing is being 
studied and there is much debate among those involved. 
PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
According to the Social Security Act, there is a slight difference in coverage between 
men and women. This difference is observed in terms of maternity benefits, which 
are specifically provided for female employees in the formal sector. However, dif-
ferent standard benefits between female employees in the formal sector and those 
who work in the informal sector and homeworkers are recognized. For example, the 
law gives women in the formal sector the opportunity to request for social security, 
whereas those in the informal sector are mostly left without protection. 
In terms of access to training, it is difficult to assess women’s access to workplace-
based training because of unavailable data. However, discrimination against women 
is reported. According to ILO data (ILO, 2000), employers are often reluctant to pro-
vide training for women. The employers simply cite that a woman is unreliable since 
she will resign after getting married and having children. 
The Labour Protection Act of 1998 stipulates equality in wages for males and fe-
males for the same kind of work. Practically, wages for men are 15–20% higher than 
those for women in Thailand. According to the Social Monitor IV, the wage gap be-
tween men and women narrowed to about 14% during the 1997 crisis. However, by 
the third quarter of 1999, with recovery underway, the male-female gap had increased 
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to 19%. This illustrates that the structural problems in the labour market continued 
to prevent women from earning more. The law also offers protection to female em-
ployees against sexual harassment. However, there are some problems with the en-
forcement of the law. For instance, protection does not cover women outside the 
industrial sector and also the definition of sexual harassment defined in the 1998 
Labour Protection Act needs to be strictly enforced. Several provisions by the La-
bour Protection Act to protect women are not effectively implemented. Therefore, 
discrimination against women is still seen at work and in society as a whole. 
The glass ceiling is still very much evident in Thailand. Only 20% of high-ranking 
personnel in government offices, state-enterprises, and the private sector are women. 
PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
Costs for staff and administration related to the amount of money allocated and spent 
by the government for social protection are considerably high. According to the 
Bureau of Budget, 15.2% of the budget in fiscal year 2001 allocated for the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Welfare went into employees’ salaries and wages. For the Min-
istry of Public Health, 49% of the budget was spent on salaries and wages. More-
over, 66.2% of the budget allocated for the Ministry of Education went to salaries 
and wages (see Table 13–15, Appendix). Many comment that the costs for staff and 
administration of the three above-mentioned ministries are not reasonable consider-
ing the availability, coverage and the duties performed by the administration. These 
people support the argument that public bureaucracy in Thailand has grown too big 
and costly to maintain. Overall, about 42% of the budget now goes towards the sala-
ries of public sector employees. Besides being too large to be affordable, the public 
bureaucracy has proven to be inefficient. Therefore, bureaucracy reform should be 
implemented so that it becomes smaller in size and more performance-oriented. At 
present, Thailand is facing a number of problems; especially after the crisis, people 
demand more services from the government. The challenge is how these services are 
to be efficiently expanded. 
PKS= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
Generally, social security or welfare for civil servants and state enterprise workers is 
not based on the principles of the Social Security Act. The civil servant or employee 
does not pay any contribution to the fund. Instead, the state covers all expenses. 
These funds come directly from the government’s budget, which is allocated by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of the Budget. In the private sector, firms with 
ten or more employees contribute as follows: Employees, employers, and govern-
ment each contribute to the Social Security Fund at a rate of 3%, 3% and 2% respec-
tively. The goal is to increase the contribution of employees, employers and govern-
ment to 4.5%, 4.5% and 2.5% respectively. The revised rates will start on 1 January 
2003. 
Before the crisis, it was felt that the social protection system in Thailand was ade-
quate. In the formal sector, the Social Security Act and the Labour Protection Act 
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were in place to provide coverage. The protection system was established according 
to scope, size, and desired objectives. Limited protection was identified to minimize 
cost for employees, employers, and government. As a result, coverage and compen-
sation were also limited. 
During the crisis, great efforts were made towards economic recovery and a compre-
hensive plan for social protection programmes. The poor, unemployed and vulner-
able groups were to be included into the social protection programmes. 
However, a major problem in the social protection system, in particular in health care 
and educational assistance services programmes, has been the target problem. For 
example, there is no agreeable target criterion for identifying the poor. Many have 
criticized identification of the poor in quantitative terms by using the poverty line 
concept. Due to the lack of database information on the poor, identification of pro-
jects and desired beneficiaries has proven to be difficult. Scholarship projects are an 
example. These projects were criticized for not reaching those who really needed the 
scholarships. However, when students whose parents earn incomes of less than 
120,000 baht per year were considered, it was found that 90% of students who were 
granted scholarships came from families with incomes of less than 50,000 baht per 
year. 
Similarly, in training programmes, identification of trainees also requires careful plan-
ning. Computer training programmes proved to be inappropriate and did not respond 
to the needs of those targeted, i.e. the poor and unemployed graduates. Instead of 
providing training service for retrenched and unemployed persons, regular students 
became trainees instead. Voluntary health cards also ended up with the general pub-
lic and not the needy. Graduate volunteer projects did not focus on poor graduates 
and recruited regular graduates instead. 
PKT= ^ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=C=qê~åëé~êÉåÅó=
In Thailand, the Constitution requires the State to decentralize service delivery and 
financing to local authorities. It is argued that decentralization can result in increasing 
efficiency because local level governments have better information regarding local 
needs and preferences. Furthermore, decentralization strategies and mechanisms can 
bring about poverty reduction. Currently, the progress of decentralization in the 
country has been slow. Participation of civil society at the local level in the decision-
making and monitoring processes still needs strengthening. In terms of allocating 
money to social protection, in particular to social assistance and services programmes, 
the role of civil society organizations has actively increased since the crisis. Corrup-
tion and personal or political gain are discouraged, while transparency and account-
ability are being highlighted. The media has also played a very important monitoring 
role in the implementation of social assistance and services programmes (i.e. village 
funds, the 30 Baht Universal Health Programme). Through many channels, the pub-
lic has been told of the mismanagement or misuse of certain funds, resulting in an 
ever-growing demand for transparency. 
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QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ããÉë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
In Thailand, a number of new ideas regarding social protection are currently being 
explored and, in some cases, put into practice in the form of both government-spon-
sored and locally-based initiatives. We will note a few of these new programmes, 
focusing in particular on the 30 Baht Universal Coverage Health Plan and government 
initiatives regarding occupational safety and health; the one million baht assistance 
to villages (to the extent that this may tie in with social protection concerns); and new 
micro-insurance ideas coming from CBOs and other organizations and networks. 
As noted previously, there have been long-term discussions in Thailand regarding 
the need to extend legal and social protection to the informal sector. In fact, expecta-
tions that this would be done were raised, up until the time of the financial crisis. In 
the past year, these ideas have been pursued again, along with such proposals as the 
provision of universal health coverage by the end of 2001. However, the economic 
slowdown beginning in late 2001 has again raised questions regarding when these 
changes will be made, including whether there would be adequate financing and, of 
equal importance, enforcement of these measures. 
Even though these changes have not yet fully materialized, the new government in 
Thailand did initiate a number of programmes that have a potentially significant 
impact on social protection for informal workers. The first is the 30 Baht Universal 
Coverage Health Plan. The idea behind the plan is to provide health care services for 
all, with a charge of 30 baht per patient per visit. Although there was early criticism 
that the programme does not focus enough attention on preventive health and has 
other serious funding and referral-related drawbacks, the programme is evolving over 
time and is attempting to place more emphasis on prevention and adequate care for 
all patients. At the moment, expectations are high for the new universal health cov-
erage plan, but there are worries as to whether the system can maintain a high stan-
dard of medical care. Again, it will be interesting and important to see how this 
innovative government programme evolves in the future. 
Another aspect of the health issue is the growing focus on problems associated with 
environmental and occupational safety and health. One such new government initia-
tive, the WISE (Work Improvement for Small Enterprises) project involving the Thai 
government and the International Labour Organization, along with local NGOs, has, 
at the moment, limited scope as an experimental programme. But it is expected that 
the project will be extended to different parts of the country in the future. 
Another well-known initiative on the part of the present Thai government is the One 
Million Baht Village Fund Policy to assist community-based activities. It is an inno-
vative programme, and the plan centres on a one-time revolving fund given out to 
each of the 70,865 villages and approximately 2,000 urban communities. Its primary 
use is to extend credit at low interest rates, with a priority placed on education, debt 
repayment, and investments. It will be overseen by the Government Savings Bank, 
and is expected to promote small and medium enterprises, among having other uses. 
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Besides potentially helping the employment generation and stabilization aspect of 
social protection, part of the village fund could potentially also serve as a means of 
government support for, or else complement, the welfare fund programmes run by 
CBOs. As noted above, at present the CBO-initiated programmes are not financially 
supported by the government (e.g. through co-financing). If part of the One Million 
Baht programme funds were used in a way that would help provide this support, it 
would satisfy the desire of many to see good locally-sensitive community-based 
welfare programmes gain the strength that only government participation can pro-
vide. 
In addition to government-sponsored programmes, a number of provincial and local 
CBOs, as well as employment-based groups (e.g. networks or organizations repre-
senting informal sector workers) are also pursuing new strategies to ensure social 
protection to community members. For example, the Urban Community Welfare 
Fund’s micro-insurance scheme is seen as a promising programme, in large part be-
cause it is supported by the Urban Community Development Office, which is now 
called Community Organization Development Institute (CODI), and thus may repre-
sent a blending of government and local CBO strengths. Another interesting initia-
tive involves local organizations working with private insurance companies to set up 
micro-insurance schemes. As an example, HomeNet North, a network of homebased 
workers in the Northern region of Thailand, has been negotiating with several com-
panies. These companies offer members fixed life, accident, disability and hospital in-
surance packages at a premium of 2,000 baht per person annually. Although HomeNet 
North would ideally like a programme that costs only 50 baht per person per month, 
this approach to micro-insurance is very promising and needs to be studied further. 
The Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) has also established 
programmes in rural areas that are worth studying in more detail. In addition to offer-
ing loans and other financial support, the BAAC has developed a micro-insurance 
scheme to help provide for funeral costs. Members of the bank, those who have a 
savings account or have taken out a loan, pay a fixed rate. Because these programmes 
have a large number of members, the payment to the family of the deceased can be 
substantial, and they can thus be very helpful to a family in need. These and other 
innovative ideas should be studied to see whether similar programmes could or 
should be duplicated in other parts of the country. 
Regarding employment generation and stabilization programmes to help informal 
workers as a form of social protection, the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority initiated 
an innovative public works programme that was specifically designed to help poorer 
communities. Low-income informal workers did benefit after the economic crisis from 
this and similar public works programmes. However, it is not clear if there is a po-
litical will to keep these programmes going beyond the immediate post-crisis years. 
More general skills-training programmes have continued, but these are not always 
designed in a way that will benefit specific groups of informal workers. Moreover, 
the country has not yet been able to plan for the continuing decline of labour-inten-
sive industries in the face of new international competition, and it is the labour-inten-
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sive industries that employ many informal workers. More comprehensive approaches 
to education, access to resources (financial, marketing, and others), training, and re-
lated concerns will be needed. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
The following recommendations are not original, nor is the list exhaustive. However, 
these recommendations represent commonly held ideas (from the viewpoint of or-
ganizations of and representing informal workers) about social protection in Thai-
land. 
• It is important to extend both labour and social protection to the informal econ-
omy. If necessary, this can be done in stages (e.g. starting with subcontracted work-
ers who have an employer / contractor, and then progressing to the self-employed 
and other categories of informal workers), but preferably this would be done all at 
one time. 
• For subcontracted workers, a clear legal relationship between employers (con-
tractors) and subcontracted workers needs to be established, identifying their mu-
tual obligations. Part of this will involve having employers (e.g. company or fac-
tory managers) register the informal subcontracted workers they employ either on 
or off the premises. The employers should then make social security contributions 
for these workers, either in a form similar to that for formal workers, or as a fixed 
amount per informal worker employed, payable into a general fund administered 
by the government for informal employees and their families. 
• Certain laws regarding social protection in Thailand need to be amended, e.g. to 
easily allow community-based insurance schemes administered through coopera-
tives. 
• Regarding health policies, the Thai government should continue moving toward 
adequate universal coverage, and should monitor and improve over time upon the 
30 baht health policy. An immediate need is to inform particularly the low-in-
come individuals and families that could most benefit from the plan. Other con-
cerns centre on the referral system (where smaller health centres transfer patients 
to larger centres with better health services, relying exclusively on the judgment 
of local health practitioners to determine whether specialists can be seen) and the 
quality of care and benefits available through the plan. However, since this is a 
new programme, these aspects need to be evaluated carefully. 
• The government, along with non-governmental, private sector, and other national 
and international organizations, should continue working toward the implementa-
tion of better policies and institutions that deal with occupational safety and 
health. Among other efforts, these institutions should help monitor current condi-
tions, using readily accessible information about safety and health problems and 
their causes, and help create and enforce new legislation and programmes that try 
to find effective ways to deal with hazardous conditions in the informal economy. 
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• Governmental, non-governmental, private sector, and other national and interna-
tional organizations will need to coordinate their activities and focus very clearly 
on education, training, and employment generation and stabilization activities for 
informal workers, particularly those in declining industries and services. With re-
spect to employment generation as a means of ensuring social protection: there is 
a serious need to consider long-term trends regarding informal sector employment, 
and to ensure that the educational and training systems meet the needs of these 
workers in a rapidly changing national and global economy. As a minimum, there 
is a need to recognize that the low wage / low productivity work in which very large 
numbers of informal workers are currently engaged in is not likely to continue in 
Thailand in the future. 
• Connected to education, training, and employment initiatives is the need for ade-
quate childcare and child protection, as well as access to information, transpor-
tation, and other resources (e.g. loans, insurance, and other financial services) for 
informal workers and their families in order to allow them to move into new pro-
ductive areas of employment. Government financing or co-financing of some of 
these programmes and activities will be important, at least in the initial stages un-
til the programme or fund is strong enough to operate without any government 
backing or support. In addition, a stronger database regarding who is in informal 
employment, where these workers are, what their skills are, and what their pri-
mary needs are, is always important information to have in order to facilitate re-
training and a shift in employment. 
• In a more general sense, the government, along with the non-governmental, 
private sector, and other national and international organizations will need to 
work together to develop a multifaceted system of social protection that meets 
the varied and diverse needs of different subgroups within the informal sec-
tor. Government programmes, private sector offerings, CBO-sponsored initiatives, 
and other measures (e.g. sponsored by NGOs or international organizations) are 
not in any way mutually exclusive, and each has its strengths and limitations. The 
exact combination of programmes that is most appropriate for a particular group, 
family, or individual will vary according to very specific needs and circumstances. 
Such initiatives as government and / or NGO co-financing of CBO-sponsored forms 
of social protection (and assistance with the design and administration of such 
programmes) are also desirable, at least in the initial stages. 
• Finally, it should be emphasized that the promotion of informal workers’ or-
ganizations will help substantially in carrying through these policies in an ef-
fective way. It is clear that informal workers who are not organized generally do 
not have effective access to the programmes that are already in place. Informal 
workers’ organizations and networks can help disseminate information, reduce the 
sector’s overall invisibility, and act as a voice for informal workers who would 
not otherwise be heard. Informal workers’ organizations can also help administer 
some aspects of social protection plans for their members. The size of the organi-
zation, and the strength and commitment of its members and its leadership are 
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very important considerations in determining how successful the organization 
will be; for instance, whether it is a ‘group’ in name only, or whether the members 
and leaders have long-term commitments to the organization and to each other. 
These are a few of the recommendations that come up regularly in discussions about 
social protection and the informal economy. The details of proposed plans and ap-
proaches to social protection vary widely, but it is clear that something needs to be 
done. Informal workers are currently legally unprotected against reversals and even 
the more predictable changes in the life cycle (e.g. old age and death). These prob-
lems become very severe as industries, and the economy as a whole, suffer declines. 
Particularly because the financial crisis exposed the vulnerability of informal workers 
along with the critical need for this sector, it has become clear that a great deal must 
be done for this growing and very important segment of the workforce in Thailand. 
This will involve helping to promote membership-based informal workers’ or-
ganizations and networks, and it will involve public, private, and ‘third sector’ 
(local and international NGO / civil society) organizations and institutions working 
together to implement programmes that reach informal workers and meet their 
needs for social protection as effectively as possible. 
For formal sector employees, the policy recommendations are as follows: 
• The role and impact of the Social Security Act and the Labour Protection Act need 
to be assessed to identify effective and ineffective measures and make recom-
mendations on the necessary improvement strategies required. 
• Since not all aspects of the two Acts are in operation, and because of the economic 
crisis, a revised implementation plan to bring about the full implementation of the 
two Acts is necessary. Three items which have been identified are: 
– Extension of protection coverage to firms with less than ten employees. The 
cabinet has now adopted this policy and the extension will be effective on 1 
April 2002. 
– Extension of protection coverage to employees in the agriculture and subcon-
tracting / homeworking sectors. 
– Implementation of the unemployment protection scheme of the Labour Protec-
tion Act. 
• Consider the social safety net programmes introduced by the government during 
the crisis and identify alternatives to incorporate them into the regular social pro-
tection schemes already in existence. The additional budget allocation for the so-
cial safety net programmes should be considered as a possibility to increase the 
budget for regular social protection programmes. 
• A study on expenditures on all social protection programmes of the government 
should be carried out. This should include expenditures of all sectors on social 
security, social welfare, social services, skills development programmes and other 
employment-related activities. The findings from this study will complement the 
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above recommendation and provide the basis for a comprehensive programme for 
employment promotion for the whole country. 
• Consider projects of programmes that can absorb unemployment from large en-
terprises through subcontracting. The possibility of linking large enterprises to 
small enterprises with adequate unemployment protection will help relieve hard-
ship of the retrenched workers. Coordinating mechanisms to link together differ-
ent size firms which allow for flows of workers from one level to another may 
provide flexibility, which may reduce the impact of the crisis to a certain degree. 
Special efforts should be made to find alternatives to protect workers in agricul-
ture and subcontracting work. 
• Carry out a feasibility study for the establishment of a loan fund to support in-
vestment of small enterprises in connection with the above recommendation. Al-
ternatively, establish a loan fund to be operated similarly to the Bank of Agricul-
ture and Agricultural Cooperatives for small enterprises. Commercial banks are 
not willing to grant loans to small and medium enterprises in the current eco-
nomic environment. Special programmes need to be initiated. 
 The existing loan programme for vocational training for retrenched workers may 
be reviewed and considered together with the policy to promote investment in 
small and medium enterprises. 
• Improve the social protection management system through the establishment of 
mechanisms for: 
– Database on unemployment, employment, and labour projection schemes to 
provide the government and the public with a good warning system against 
unemployment. 
– Establish a Management Information System that can monitor the employers’ 
labour practices as well as actual benefits received by employees. Job-seeking 
behaviour of those receiving unemployment benefits should be monitored. 
This is to prevent misuse or abuse of the laws on either side. 
– Establish a coordinating mechanism which allows for flexibility for flows of 
workers between large enterprises and subcontracting units as well as small en-
terprises. 
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^Åêçåóãë=
BAAC – Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
CBO – Community-Based Organization 
CODI – Community Organization Development Institute 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
CSO – Civil Society Organization 
DED – Development Evaluation Division 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GNP – Gross National Product 
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pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=sáÉíå~ã=
kÖìóÉå=eìì=aòìåÖ=~åÇ=a~ç=nì~åÖ=sáåÜ=
^Äëíê~Åí=
Vietnam started its renovation process in 1986. During the last 15 years of imple-
menting its renovation policy, the country’s socio-economic situation has experienced 
comprehensive and significant changes. 
Economic growth remains consistently high. Average annual GDP growth in 1986–
90 was 3.9% per year, 8.2% between 1991 and 1995 and 7% between 1996–2000. At 
the end of 2000, GDP per capita rose to US$400, twice the level of 1990. Although 
difficult conditions were seen, Vietnam attempted to reach a growth rate of 6.8% in 
2001. 
However, the poverty rate was still as high as 32% in 2000 (by the UN poverty line). 
Unemployment and underemployment remain some of the biggest challenges for 
Vietnam in the 21st century. 
A fundamental criterion for the state to invest in social development is a reasonable 
increase in GDP. The state expenditure for all social fields for the period 1995–2000 
saw an increasing trend. 14% of state expenditure was disbursed for social protec-
tion, 15% for education, and 6% for health care. 
Furthermore, a relatively well-developed contributory social insurance system now 
exists, and projects are underway to ‘round out’ this system with unemployment 
benefits and longer-term invalidity benefits. 
However, the majority of the population is not covered by social insurance or health 
insurance and gains little benefit from social transfers financed by the state budget. 
Those in the majority are located in the rural and informal sectors of the economy 
and are mostly poor. The only formal social protection for them consists of possible 
access to very limited and tightly targeted social assistance from the Contingency 
Fund for Pre-Harvest Starvation and Disaster Relief, plus assistance with health and 
education costs from the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) and 
other development programs. A very small minority of the population receives regu-
lar monthly benefits from the Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief (SGFRR). 
This pattern reflects in part Vietnam’s situation as a transition economy, which is 
also a developing economy. It has a minority formal sector with well-developed social 
protection, and a majority rural and informal sector with little formal social protec-
tion. The present condition to an extent portrays the impact of history, including the 
large number of Vietnamese individuals and families severely affected by war and 
revolution. 
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There have been a number of measures undertaken by the Vietnam government to 
increase funding for social protection. The reforms target improvements to the ade-
quacy and effectiveness of public social assistance schemes in providing a social 
safety net for the majority who lack formal social insurance coverage. 
* The rate of exchange of the dong against the US dollar at the end of 2000 was 
US$1 = 14.500 VND. 
NK= fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
NKN= dÉåÉê~ä=mçäáíáÅ~äI=pçÅá~ä=~åÇ=bÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
dÉåÉê~ä=fåÑçêã~íáçå=
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia and covers an area of 
more than 331 thousand sq km. In 2001, it had a population of 78.7 million people, 
of which 50.8% were female. The average growth rate of the population over the 
period 1989–99 was 1.7%. By the year 2000, the net fertility rate was 19.9% while 
the net mortality rate was 5.6%, so the natural rate of population growth soared to 
14.3%. 
During the last few decades, the life expectancy of the Vietnamese has been increas-
ing. From 50.3 years in 1975, it climbed to 67.2 years in 1995 and 67.8 years by 2001. 
The rapidly decreasing fertility rate in accordance with the increasing life expectancy 
has resulted in an ageing Vietnamese population. The proportion of elderly people 
(aged 65 and over) increased from 4.7% to 5.8% for the period 1989–99. Urban 
dwellers constituted 23.5% and 24.55% in 1999 and 2001, respectively. 
The migration rate for the period 1994–99 (i.e. five years ago during the General 
Census on 1 April 1999) was 74‰, higher than the level of the previous period 
(1989–93), especially with the massive rush into big cities and industrial zones such 
as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Danang (between 1994–99, about 1.2 million rural 
people migrated into urban areas to earn a living). 
The literacy rate of the population aged 10 and over increased from 88% to 91% for 
the period 1989–99 and to 93.9% in 2001, with a remarkably high rate of literacy for 
laborers, up to as high as 97%. However, as far as gender is concerned, the female-
male differentials remain high: in 1999, the literacy rate of female laborers was 88%, 
6% lower than that of male laborers (94%); the difference in the literacy rate of 
workers between the rural and urban areas was less visible (93% in urban areas and 
90% in rural areas). Current figures suggest 92% of the population aged 10 and over 
have been exposed to some form of language study (96% in urban areas and 91% in 
rural areas). The general rate of school enrollment for all levels was 49% in 1995 and 
rose to 67% in 2001. By the year 2000, the national goal of anti-illiteracy and uni-
versalized primary education was completed nationwide. The average number of 
schooling years per person was 7.3 years; since 2001, Vietnam has been shifting to 
compulsory education in lower secondary level (nine years) and this is expected to 
be realized by the year 2010. 
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j~ÅêçJÉÅçåçãáÅ=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
Vietnam’s economy averaged 7% growth per year between 1996 and 2000. Although 
conditions are currently difficult due to low quality and low efficiency development, 
limited and unstable macro-economic balances, lack of perfect legislative systems, 
and so on, Vietnam attempted to reach a fair growth rate of 6.8% in 2001. The struc-
ture of the economy (by GDP) is being transformed positively into more value-added 
industries: in 2001 the industry and construction share was 38%, the share of ser-
vices was 39% and agriculture-forestry-fishery was 23% (against 23.79%; 35.72% 
and 40.49% in 1991). Inflation was curbed effectively at the beginning of the 1990s 
and has remained stable and commensurate with economic development. The infla-
tion rate was 3% per year over the period 1997–2000. 
In the period 1996–2000, total export revenue increased by 21.5% per annum, total 
import revenue increased by 13.3% per annum; the economy attracted and invested 
approximately US$10 billion of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and US$6.2 billion 
of ODA (Official Development Assistance). GDP per capita doubled to US$400 
compared to 1990. 
A reasonable increase in GDP is considered fundamental in order for the state to in-
vest in social development. The domestic collecting rate for the state budget over 
GDP in the period of 1995–2000 was more than 21% per annum. The expenditure of 
state budget for all social fields over 1995–2000 saw an increasing trend in compari-
son with 1991–94. In 2000, 14% of total state spending was disbursed for social pro-
tection, 15% for education, and 6% for health. 
Vietnam is developing a multi-sectoral economy. At present, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are playing a major role in the national economy. Since the introduction of 
the new Law on Enterprises (1 January 2000), the number of newly established pri-
vate enterprises has been growing at a very high rate (18.3% in 2000, 19.5% in 2001) 
in comparison to the year before. 
At the moment, approximately 200,000 SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) and 
60,000 farming households are contributing significantly to the generation of em-
ployment; the foreign investment sector (joint ventures and enterprises with 100% 
capital of foreign origin) continues with strong growth – with the petroleum, gas and 
other sectors increasing by 13.8%, 11% and15% respectively (in 2001). The infor-
mal sector plays a major part in job creation and poverty alleviation. 
i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=píêìÅíìêÉ=
In 2000, the total labor force amounted to 38.6 million people. The composition of 
employed workers has been moving positively: 62.6% are working in agriculture, 
forestry and fishery; this number decreased by 1.1% in comparison to 1999. At the 
same time the labor proportion increased by 0.6% in construction and industry over 
1999–2000 (from 12.5% to 13.1%) and by 0.4% in service (from 23.9% to 24.3%). 
Since the absolute number of workers in agriculture-forestry-fishery is still large and 
only slowly decreasing, the main pressure concerning future employment trends re-
mains in rural areas. 
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In 2000, 91% of the labor force was working in the non-state sector. Specifically, 
the private and non-farming household economy attracted about 32% of the labor 
force (i.e. around 12 million workers), while the farming economy1 attracted about 
700,000 workers (about 12 workers / farm). One year after the implementation of the 
Law on Enterprises, 300,000 workers were employed in these new enterprises. By 
June 2000, the foreign investment sector had created around 330,000 jobs; in other 
words it absorbed about 1% of the labor force if indirect labor is included. 
The unemployment rate in urban areas saw a downward tendency from 6.7% in 1999 
to 6.5% in 2000 and 6.28% in 2001. The rate of the annual actual working time as a 
percentage of total annual potential working time in rural areas improved (74% in 
2000). However, the generation of employment is still one of Vietnam’s biggest chal-
lenges in the 21st century. 
fåÅçãÉ=~åÇ=_ìÇÖÉí=aáëíêáÄìíáçå=
The savings rate increased from 27.14% in 1995 to 29.46% in 2000. The rate of final 
consumption decreased correspondingly, yet in absolute terms was on the rise, at 
1.75 times that of the final consumption in 2000 compared to 1995 (in current prices). 
However, it is noteworthy that the gap in uneven income distribution among the 
poorest quintile and the richest quintile, among regions, urban and rural areas seemed 
to be growing. 
According to the Vietnam Living Standard Survey, the Gini coefficient based on 
average expenditure per capita in 1993 was 0.33 and increased to 0.35 in 1998. Dur-
ing the period 1993–98, the real expenditure per capita of the poorest quintile in-
creased only by 29%, while it rose to 54% in the richest quintile. This certainly 
shows the increasing income distribution gap in Vietnam, although it is still not too 
wide. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take notice of the fact that the rural / urban 
income difference is considerable. Ninety-six percent of the poor are living in rural 
areas, nearly one-third (32%) of which are concentrated in the mountainous and 
upland areas in the North. About two-thirds (63%) of the more well-off live in urban 
areas; one-third resides in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Taking the average income 
per capita into consideration, urban dwellers have twice as many possessions as their 
rural counterparts. 
mçäáíáÅ~ä=póëíÉã=
Pursuant to the Constitution in 1992 and some amendments of and additions to this 
Constitution in 2001, it confirms that: 
• The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a legislation-based state by the people, of 
the people and for the people. All state power was founded on the alliance of 
workers, farmers and the intellectual class and belongs to the people. 
                             
1 This includes agricultural enterprises which have at least 2 hectares of land and produce at least an 
amount of goods equal to VND 40 million per year. 
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• The Vietnam Communist Party is a pioneer force of the Vietnam worker class and a 
loyal representative of their interests. The whole nation is based on the Marxism-
Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology and also the leadership of state and society. 
• The state power is executed via the National Assembly; People’s Committees, 
which are elected and bear responsibility for the people, exist at all levels and re-
present their will and aspirations. 
• The government is an executive body. It is the highest administrative state body 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Vietnam is a unified state of all races pre-
siding in the Vietnamese territory; the state administers the society via legislation 
and keeps enhancing its socialist legal system. 
• Vietnam has a socialist market-oriented economy. 
As such, the political system in Vietnam is very stable. No significant changes oc-
curred in the last two decades. The government is set up and led by a powerful and 
sole party with no opposition party and / or wing. Confidence in the party’s absolute 
leadership is the decisive factor to the success of the process of doimoi (renovation), 
development and integration into the international economy. 
NKO= ^î~áä~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=nì~äáíó=çÑ=a~í~=
The most important issue in conducting a study on social protection is gaining ac-
cess to a source that provides quality data. At the national level, these data can be 
extracted from basic channels such as state statistical reports; census, living standard 
surveys (multi-targets), annual surveys on employment and labor and poverty allevia-
tion, administrative reports by specific state-management agencies at all levels and 
other studies. 
With the financial and technical assistance of the United Nations (UN), Vietnam has 
built up an information network and updated data. However, due to the ongoing tran-
sition, data sources are still deficient, particularly information related to social insur-
ance, the labor force, employment and unemployment. On the one hand, since these 
data are formed based on local definitions and standards, it is hard to be internation-
ally comparable; on the other hand, as a poor country Vietnam is facing the problem 
of rudimentary and insufficient facilities for collecting, processing and analyzing 
information and data. 
In addition, the limited capacity of skilled staff in computer technology and foreign 
languages obstructs current and future studies on social protection in Vietnam. It is 
therefore necessary to set up a managerial information network on social protection, 
not only to reflect the specific characteristics of Vietnam, but also to be internationally 
comparable. First, it needs to make the best use of international assistance and support 
(such as from the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank etc.) in technical terms for surveys and gathering information. 
NKP= bñáëíáåÖ=fåëíáíìíáçå~ä=cê~ãÉïçêâ=
The institutional framework of Vietnam is based on a strong public movement. The 
active participation of social actors such as socio-political organizations, occupational 
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organizations and NGOs in realizing social policies is the norm. These activities pro-
duce a framework of publicly controlled power, and at the same time serve as a plat-
form to broaden the regulation of democracy and promote other public initiatives. 
The trade union (TU) is a socio-political organization representing Vietnamese work-
ers. It protects the lawful and legitimate rights and benefits of workers, and shares 
responsibility with the state to develop production, job settlement, vocational train-
ing, and the improvement of the material and spiritual life of workers. Furthermore, 
it formulates laws, social policy, labor and wage policies, social insurance, and labor 
protection. It also controls and monitors the implementation of labor legislation and 
takes the responsibility of organizing, educating and encouraging workers to promote 
the role and obligation of citizens. It is designated as member of the Executive Council 
of the Social Insurance Fund at all levels. One representative each from the Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, the TU and VSI (Vietnam Social Insurance) stands on this council, which 
decides the strategy of the development of SI, approves the 5-year and yearly plans, 
and supervises activities of VSI at all levels. At the enterprise level, the TU is repre-
sented to enable workers to sign collective labor agreements. 
NGOs and civil society organizations, especially Fatherland’s Front, Women’s Un-
ion, Youth’s Union, and Farmer’s Union are political foundations of the state. They 
are close to workers and act as a bridge and transmitting channel to deliver policies 
to workers, making sure the targets and objectives are met and sound results are 
achieved. They are successful in aggregating forces and displaying unity and inno-
vation in the implementation of social protection policies. 
Today, employers have a greater influential role in social protection schemes. In 
Vietnam, there are organizations such as the Vietnam Cooperative Alliance, Viet-
nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Association of Industrial Trade, and Club 
of Directors, among others. They act as representatives of the employers. These or-
ganizations coordinate and assist each other to develop enterprises and contribute to 
policies related to enterprise development. At the same time they participate actively 
in social protection, especially social insurance and the realization of social policies. 
The government and social actors are related closely on the basis of a common-pur-
pose partnership, a harmonious benefit-based solution on a tripartite scheme: State, 
employer, worker and dispute-settlement all conform to Vietnamese law (i.e. the La-
bor Code). Tripartism among state, trade union (workers), and employers has been 
gradually forming, although this mechanism is still in the process of becoming a 
complete and institutionalized legislation. 
NKQ= dçîÉêåãÉåí=pìééçêí=
Social protection is one of the crucial social policies of the nation and is the focus of 
much government attention. The basic viewpoint of the Vietnamese government is 
to coherently link economic growth with social advancement and equality during the 
lifespan of each development plan. The Vietnamese government pledged to realize 
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the Copenhagen Declaration and Action Plan on Social Development in 1995, the 
Hanoi Declaration on 20 / 20 Initiatives and other relevant international commitments. 
In particular, priority is given to the renovation of social protection policies appro-
priate for the transition to a market economy, specifically: 
• The government has issued many policies on economic development and put 
forth solutions aimed at macroeconomic stabilization with a vision of setting up 
an economic foundation and favorable conditions to achieve social protection tar-
gets; 
• The legal system is being formulated and completed (Labor Code, Law on Protec-
tion and Care for Children, ordinances on disabled and elderly people); reforms 
of the social insurance system are introduced to ensure the implementation of so-
cial protection policies with equality and clearer guiding principles; 
• National target programs have been established such as the Employment Program, 
poverty alleviation, and the program on supporting extremely poor communities; 
• Public expenditure is adjusted by increasing social protection from the state budget. 
At the same time, the policy for mobilizing all resources for social protection is 
implemented. 
During the implementation process of social protection policies, the government util-
izes a decentralized mechanism. As a result, policies are targeted to the intended bene-
ficiaries and implemented successfully. 
NKR= qê~Çáíáçå~ä=~åÇ=`çåíÉãéçê~êó=mÉêÅÉéíáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=
póëíÉã=
In the past, under the central planning and subsidized system, the social protection 
scheme in Vietnam was under the authority of the state, and the beneficiaries of the 
scheme were categorized as part of the state sector or cooperatives (amounting to 
10% of the population). The rest of the population was not included in this scheme. 
Thus, the family and community, particularly in villages, hamlets and communes, 
played very important roles for those in need of social protection. 
Cultural and traditional values and practices such as ‘elderly parents relying on their 
children in case of sickness’ or ‘assistance among people in the community’ prevail 
till today and constitute an informal social protection system in Vietnam. Alongside 
the prevailing cultural values, it is hoped that the widening of the formal social pro-
tection scheme will create a positive environment for a comprehensive social protec-
tion scheme. This combines modern factors with traditional cultural values to develop 
a social protection scheme that is sustainable and effective as well as compliant with 
the principles of solidarity, risk sharing and equality that are considered important 
values in a modern society. 
In the market economy, the development of a social protection scheme with the con-
tribution of all partners (workers, employers and assistance from the state) has been 
widely accepted in place of the previous subsidized social protection scheme. How-
ever, in the poor conditions of Vietnam where labor productivity and workers’ in-
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comes are low, the state cannot run a security scheme that requires a large contribu-
tion from workers. In the long-term future, Vietnam still needs a security scheme with 
low contributions but comprehensive benefits. 
A developed society is one where everybody has a safe social life; everyone is in-
volved in a social security scheme, particularly in the case of sickness, maternity, 
work-related injuries, unemployment, old age and death. The Vietnamese govern-
ment is pursuing a policy that ensures social security for everybody. However, 
whereas workers expect to benefit only from pension and death schemes, it needs to 
develop a comprehensive system. With the aim of responding to the interest of the 
people, a formal social protection system (both compulsory and voluntary) has been 
developed and enlarged. In addition, an informal social protection system relying on 
family and community plays a very important role in the Vietnamese society. 
OK= oÉîáÉï=çÑ=íÜÉ=bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
OKN= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=ElêÖ~åáòÉÇF=pÉÅíçê=
OKNKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
The formal sector in Vietnam comprises the enterprise sector and the public sector. 
a) Enterprise sector: It consists of registered enterprises with ten or more workers 
operating under certain laws: 
– Enterprises operating under the Law on State Enterprises: State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) play a key role in the economy, making up 39% of GDP. SOEs make up two-
thirds of GDP in industry and construction, and one-half of GDP in services. In 2001, 
Vietnam had more than 5,000 SOEs with 1.8 million employees. At present, SOEs are 
in the process of restructuring (i.e. equitized, sold off, paid in-part or outsourced). It 
is foreseen that by 2005, the total number of SOEs will be reduced to around 2,000 
and as a consequence the number of employees will decrease by 350,000. Many 
of them will become workers in joint-stock, private enterprises or in other sectors of 
the economy. 
– Enterprises operating under the Law on Enterprises (private): They are domestic 
non-state enterprises (NSEs) with ten or more workers. The non-state economy has 
been surging forward since Vietnam started its economic reform in 1986; on Janu-
ary 1, 2000, when the new Law on Enterprises took effect, the number of private en-
terprises boomed rapidly. For instance, in the year 2000, more than 14,000 private 
enterprises were established and registered with a capital of around 24,000 billion 
dong (US$1.6 billion), three times more in terms of the number of enterprises and 
five times more in terms of capital in comparison to figures in 1999. During the first 
eight months of 2001, there were about 12,000 private enterprises established and 
registered with a capital of around 14,400 billion dong, 1.4 times more in terms of 
the number of enterprises and 1.7 times more in terms of capital in comparison to 
figures in 2000. By June 2001, the total number of workers in private enterprises 
was 1.4 million. 
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– Enterprises operating under the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam: By the 
end of 2000, there were 3,170 foreign investment projects with a registered capital 
of approximately US$39 billion and operating capital of US$20 billion in Vietnam. 
The foreign investment sector had contributed 35.6% in industrial production reve-
nue, about 23% in export turnover (excluding oil and gas), and 13% of GDP in 2000. 
This sector had a positive effect on the overall balances of the economy, and absorbed 
a modest number of employees. In 2001, about 354,000 employees were working 
for this sector, making up nearly 1% of employed people. 
– Enterprises operating under the Cooperative Law: In reality, the collective econ-
omy has been re-organizing. At the moment, cooperatives are being re-formed pur-
suant to the new Cooperative Law. In 2000, 8.5% of GDP was attributed to the co-
operative economy and attracted about 350,000 employees. 
b) Public sector: This sector contains state administration, party and mass organi-
zations and public services (education, health care, scientific research, culture and so 
on). Its employees make up 3.8% of the total number of employees. Predictably, in 
2001 the total number of employees in the formal sector accounted for around 15% 
of the workforce – a fair increase in comparison to 9.5% in 1994.2 
The formal sector is the main source of income for the state budget; it is the backbone 
of the economy and a decisive factor to national development. Therefore, although it 
absorbs a very modest number of employees, it is given much consideration in terms 
of legal framework formation, financial and credit provision, training and supplying 
human resources, R&D and so on. 
mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=cçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
• Being a pioneer and high-yield producer. The capital per worker is much higher 
than that in the informal sector. It is estimated to be 42–50 million dong in the 
state industry, 27–30 million dong in the service sector and around 400 million 
dong in the foreign investment sector. On the other hand, in small-scale indus-
tries, capital per worker amounts to about 10 million dong and the lowest level is 
recorded for the self-employed and in the agriculture sector. 
• Attracting mostly trained workers, especially in the state sector (i.e. SOEs and 
public services). Central agencies and enterprises employ more than 93% of highly 
skilled workers. 
• Being highly protected by the state through subsidies for SOEs, protection for 
import-substituting industries, and priority in credit provision. 
• Providing workers with a stabilized and guaranteed income (minimum level), pro-
tected working conditions and occupational safety and health based on labor leg-
islation and other laws. 
• Applying labor contracts with workers (regular staff in the state sector), partici-
pating in compulsory social and health insurance schemes (under various laws); 
providing training and retrenchment benefits; forming trade unions. 
                             
2 Vu Quang Viet, “Economic development situation in Vietnam 1989–1995”, Economic Study, No. 220, 
September 1996. 
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Despite playing an important role in the economy as a whole, the formal sector re-
mains with the following problems: 
– Quality and efficiency of enterprises: Although SOEs are considered as the back-
bone of the economy, they are often characterized by small scale, insufficient capi-
tal, outdated technology, poor capacity to search for new markets, and heavy reliance 
on state support. Over 50% of SOEs are unprofitable. The newly-established private 
enterprises lack capital, especially manpower, business experience, and mid-term and 
long-term strategies, and are characterized by low quality products, little attention to 
R&D, marketing and human resource training. 
– Competitiveness: The concentration of investment in strongly protected and im-
port-substituting industries (including foreign investment enterprises) diminished the 
competitiveness of Vietnamese commodities. According to the World Economic Fo-
rum, in terms of competitiveness, Vietnam ranked 49th, 39th and 49th out of 53 
countries in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively. 
– Labor market: There are an insufficient number of labor market institutions. 
Many of them have just been set up recently; they are still limited in capacity and 
experience, and lack a consistent and effective policy system. They have also wit-
nessed strong administrative interference, a scattered labor market and low labor 
mobility. 
– Labor contracts and collective agreements: A great number of workers in SOEs 
and foreign investment enterprises sign labor contracts. However, the percentage of 
workers possessing signed labor contracts, which are mostly for one-year or less-
than-one-year periods, is 40% of the total number of workers in private enterprises. 
In the year 2000, only 42% of enterprises with ten or more workers had signed a 
collective agreement. In the private sector for the same year, it was as low as 20%. 
– Social insurance: The rate of enterprises actually contributing to social insurance as 
a percentage of the total number of enterprises compelled to do so remains at a low 
level (63.2%). There has been a lower rate of workers for whom it is compulsory to 
contribute. In addition, some enterprises leave out a great number of workers from 
the compulsory contributions list for social insurance to avoid their responsibility of 
contributing social insurance (SI) for these workers. In the private sector, only 18.4% 
of workers contributed to social insurance in 2000. 
– Occupational safety and health: the implementation of labor legislation on work-
place protection has many shortcomings. The application of working standards relies 
heavily on the specific conditions of each enterprise, particularly in mining enterprises 
where labor protection, safety standards and technical norms are regularly violated. 
– Trade Unions: A survey in 2000 found that only 58.76% of enterprises with ten 
or more workers had established a trade union, whereas 70% of private enterprises 
were not yet unionized. 
Social Protection in Vietnam 
373 
OKNKO= pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=p~îáåÖë=pÅÜÉãÉë=
One of the key concepts of SI is the pooling of contributions of workers and their 
employers in order to protect the insured persons and their dependants against the 
effects of social security contingencies. 
Vietnam established a new self-financing social insurance system in 1995 by decree 
12 / CP of 1995. This is administered by the Vietnam Social Insurance (VSI) in order 
to adjust to the new policies for the introduction of a market-oriented economy. 
The scheme applies to employees with labour contracts of three months or more in 
SOEs, state institutions (including the civil service), Vietnamese staff in joint ven-
tures, the armed forces, and employees in non-state enterprises with ten or more 
workers. The number of contributors, excluding the armed forces, was over 5 mil-
lion, about 16% of the labour force. 
The Social Insurance Fund is derived from the following resources: a) employers pay 
15% of basic salaries to VSI. Out of this amount, 10% is for pension insurance and 
survivorship and the remaining 5% is for sickness, maternity and employment injury 
benefits; b) employees pay 5% of their basic salaries, which is allocated to pensions 
and life insurance; c) contribution and subsidies from the state budget; and d) other 
resources, such as profits from investment activities of the insurance fund. 
The contingencies included in the SI scheme cover sickness, maternity, employment 
injury, retirement and survivorship. 
1) Sickness benefit. In the case of sickness, 75% of insurable earnings (the earnings 
on which contributions were paid) is payable, without any contribution condition 
(duration of contribution, extra fees), for a maximum number of days per year rang-
ing from 30 to 50 according to the duration of insurance, or 40 to 60 days for workers 
in heavy or hazardous occupations. Extended benefits entitlement is prescribed for 
serious diseases normally up to 180 days per year. Sick leave can also be granted to 
a parent when required for caring for sick children under age 7. 
2) Maternity benefit. The maternity allowance of 100% of insurable earnings and 
the maternity grant of one month’s insurable earnings are usually payable without 
any contribution condition for four months, or five to six months for workers in heavy 
or hazardous jobs or living in difficult economic areas. Maternity benefits are re-
stricted to two children. 
3) Benefits for employment injury. This benefit, which includes occupational dis-
eases, is due on the occurrence of personal injuries sustained in the course of em-
ployment or whilst travelling to and from work. There are no contribution conditions 
for this contingency. Employers are liable to provide medical treatment and continue 
payment of salaries to injured workers. Where permanent disablement occurs, VSI is 
liable for disability benefits, which consist of lump sum payments where the degrees 
of disability are 30% or less, and pensions for higher ratings. On death from employ-
ment injuries, survivors are entitled to 24 months minimum wages and to pension 
benefits. Benefits are for up to four dependants (children under the ages 15 or 18 if 
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students and, subject to having reached retirement age, parents, parents-in-law, foster 
parents and spouse) and each is entitled to pensions of 40% of the minimum wage, 
or 75% if entirely dependent on the pension. A funeral allowance of eight months 
minimum wage is also payable. 
4) Retirement pension. It is payable if the claimants have attained retirement age, 
retired and paid pension contributions for at least 20 years. Under the decree, as 
amended, ‘retirement age’ means either: 
a) For an insured person who has worked either for 15 years in jobs classified as 
heavy or hazardous, or 15 years in jobs which are complemented with a regional 
allowance coefficient of 0.7 or over, or for ten years in South Vietnam or Laos 
before April 30, 1975 or in Cambodia before August 31, 1989, age 50 (women) 
and age 55 (men); or 
b) For an insured person who has paid social insurance contributions for at least 30 
years, age 50 (women) and age 55 (men) respectively; or 
c) For all other insured persons, age 55 (women) and age 60 (men). 
The pension rate is 45% of average earnings for 15 years insurance rising at the rate 
of 2% for additional years to a maximum of 75%. Contributors for more than 30 
years receive a lump sum of 50% of average salary per year in excess of 30 years up 
to a maximum of five months average salary. The minimum pension is equal to the 
minimum wage. However, reduced pensions are payable when: a) men and women 
aged 60 and 55, respectively, have paid contributions for at least 15 years; b) men 
aged 50 and women aged 45 have a degree of disability of 61% or more; and c) 
persons who have worked for a minimum of 15 years in heavy and hazardous jobs 
and paid pension contributions for a minimum of 20 years and are disabled to the 
extent of 61% loss of earnings capacity or more. 
5) Survivorship pension benefits and funeral allowances are prescribed for survi-
vors on the same basis as for survivors in the employment injury branch as ex-
plained earlier. 
At present, the government is designing a detailed plan aimed at expanding the ob-
jectives of social insurance that will include farmers and laborers in rural areas as 
well as self-employed laborers, while facilitating the participation of all people in 
the social insurance system. This also aims at correcting some shortcomings of the 
present insurance system, and securing a more comprehensive insurance policy. In 
2000, relevant government agencies (Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice, TU, and VSI) were assigned the task of developing the Law on 
Social Insurance. The ILO also gives advice on SI. 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI) was officially set up in 1993 by a decree issued in 
1992 on designing two health insurance schemes: (a) A compulsory scheme for state 
officials and employees, pensioners and employees in the non-state sector (with ten 
employees or more), and (b) A voluntary health insurance scheme for rural popula-
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tions, self-employed persons, family members and school children. The objectives 
were to facilitate access to health care to the population as a whole and to progres-
sively raise the standards of health care services. 
The compulsorily insured are entitled to a full range of medical care including con-
sultations, medicines, and outpatient and inpatient treatment. Exclusions are related 
to diseases treated by public health care (for example, HIV / AIDS, mental diseases), 
except employment injury cases, which are the responsibility of employers. Drugs 
are particularly important due to their generally high costs. 
Overall, the same range of care is provided to voluntarily insured persons, but varia-
tions occur from province to province according to the charges levied for voluntary 
health insurance cards and the facilities available. The decree specifies that if volun-
tary health contributions are equivalent to the average compulsory contribution, card-
holders have identical benefit rights. There are two types of health insurance (HI) 
cards: low fee (for inpatient services) and high fee (for all kinds of services and in 
some cases drugs). Almost all insured persons in the voluntary scheme chose low 
fee cards. 
The compulsory scheme charges 3% of basic salaries; from this 2% is due from em-
ployers and 1% is contributed by employees. The voluntary health cards cost about 
22,000 dong per year for school children, between 30,000 and 38,000 dong per year 
for farmers and between 50,000 to 60,000 dong per year for the general population, 
according to location and the decisions of the People’s Committees. 
HI played an important role in mobilizing additional resources for the health sector 
in 1998. HI contributes up to 15% of the total revenue of hospitals. However, be-
cause expenditure exceeds revenue, HI faces the challenges of sustainable financing. 
OKNKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
In the event that an employee becomes redundant due to restructuring of the com-
pany, such employees will then receive benefits according to the policies stipulated 
in article 17 of the Labor Code and the government decree 72 / CP of October 31, 
1995. Article 17 states that ‘where, as result of structural or technological changes, 
workers who have been regularly employed in the enterprise for one year or more be-
come redundant, the employers have the responsibility to retrain them for continued 
employment in new jobs; if no new jobs are available and employment has to be 
terminated, the employers must pay a retrenchment benefit at the rate of one month’s 
salary for each year of employment, but no less than two months’ wage.’ Redundant 
workers can thus get either training or some retrenchment benefits. 
Social Guarantee Fund for veterans and war invalids. This fund draws allocations 
from the state budget to pay pensions and other benefits to war-affected persons or 
their surviving kin. 
The policy on preferential treatment to those who are credited with services to the 
country’s liberation is one of the first priorities of the party and the Vietnamese 
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government. Therefore, the government has issued two important ordinances: the 
ordinance on Special Treatment to the War-Affected People and the ordinance on 
rewarding the name Hero Mother. These ordinances are aimed at ensuring happy 
lives for this special group of people in both material and spiritual terms, and im-
proving their living standards to an equal or higher level in comparison with that of 
their neighbors. 
This fund draws allocations from the state budget to pay pensions and other benefits 
to approximately 1.4 million war-afflicted persons or their surviving kin. They also 
have exemptions from health insurance contributions and cost-sharing provisions of 
20%, which came into force in January 1999. 
OKO= pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=áå=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
OKOKN= `~íÉÖçêáò~íáçå=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=ëÉÅíçê=
The development of a multisectoral economy has provided a framework and an impe-
tus to a non-state economy. As a result, the economy is more dynamic, especially 
with the revival of many traditional craft industries and new types of activities. 
Therefore, the informal sector has developed in both urban and rural areas. 
In urban areas, the informal sector has been diversified. Along with traditional craft 
activities, there are many newly formed activities such as commercial agencies, con-
sultation and tutoring services, home-based medical treatment and so forth. These 
businesses and service units are characteristically small-scale (less than ten workers), 
inconsistent, changeable and unregistered. This sector also includes formal sector 
workers who want some extra income. 
In rural areas, the ‘by-piece’ scheme based on households (for all kinds of products) 
builds a favorable foundation for the development of the informal sector. Besides 
farming activities, workers can get involved in other secondary occupations like 
small-scale farming, product processing, trade, mechanics, transportation, construc-
tion, hired work and so on. In traditional crafts villages, small-scale production, proc-
essing and service units are home-based with some hired workers. 
The shortage of farmland and underdeveloped off-farm activities has led to severe 
underemployment in rural areas. According to the survey on employment and labor 
in July 2001, the underemployment rate of the economically active population in 
rural areas was 26%. The pressure to find employment drives a fraction of workers 
to big cities. Every year, there are 55,000 – 80,000 immigrants from rural areas ventur-
ing to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Study on immigration in Vietnam, 1998). They 
normally end up working in informal activities in urban areas. 
While the underemployment rate is viewed as a pressing matter in rural areas, it is a 
big problem in urban areas. Underemployment reached 6.28% in July 2001. In sev-
eral big cities, such as Hanoi, an even higher rate was seen: 7.4%; in Ho Chi Minh 
City: 6.04%; Haiphong: 7.11%; Cantho: 6.82%. For one, the unemployed have low 
income due to poor individual savings with limited support from family and friends; 
Social Protection in Vietnam 
377 
furthermore, unemployment insurance has never existed in Vietnam. In response, 
the unemployed have to seek jobs. Even those who obtain retrenchment benefits still 
seem to find it hard to make a living. Finding employment in the formal sector is 
very difficult; hence many out-of-work employees have to seek jobs in the informal 
sector. 
As a consequence, there are a large number of employees working in the informal 
sector. It is estimated that about 32 million workers were in this sector in 2001: 21 
million were working in private agriculture, 2 million in home-based work, and nearly 
11 million workers in non-farming activities. 
According to a calculation done by the Department for SNA (the General Statistical 
Office), the informal sector contributed 35% of GDP in 1995 – an impressively high 
rate. More importantly, it has a great influence on job creation and has sustained a 
livelihood for the majority of workers. 
OKOKO= mêçÄäÉãë=~åÇ=cÉ~íìêÉë=çÑ=íÜÉ=fåÑçêã~ä=pÉÅíçê=
a) The main objective of this sector is employment and income generation. A study 
by the Institute of Labor Science and Social Affairs in 1996 showed that the average 
monthly income per worker was 414,000 dong, as high as 86% of that in non-state 
small enterprises. However, the working hours are generally longer than usual (10 to 
12 hours per day); 
b) They comprise mostly micro-enterprises, self-employment or subcontracting with 
irregular workplaces and working hours, often with poor working conditions; 
c) They are illegal and therefore outside of official statistics and government regula-
tion as well as labor and social protection. There is no work safety and no access to 
compulsory social insurance and health insurance; 
d) They lack assets and capital and have little access to the formal financial mar-
ket; 
e) Workers in this sector are often untrained so the chances of finding jobs in the 
formal sector are very low. 
OKOKP= pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=~åÇ=pÉêîáÅÉëW=_ÉåÉÑáíë=~åÇ=qê~åëÑÉêë=
There are three nationwide funds for social assistance: 
~F= pçÅá~ä=dì~ê~åíÉÉ=cìåÇ=Ñçê=oÉÖìä~ê=oÉäáÉÑ=EpdcooF=
This fund operates a categorical benefit system for a defined group of people who 
are assessed as being unable to provide for themselves or to be supported by family 
members. The Fund also finances some institutional placement and social rehabilita-
tion programs. 
The following types of social assistance are included: 
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• Regular monthly benefits for the elderly alone, orphans, and disabled civilians. 
These groups are regarded by the authorities as being genuinely unable to assist 
themselves, namely: a) The ‘elderly alone’ (frail elderly people who are in extreme 
poverty and have no other family members to assist them). People receiving so-
cial assistance benefits are a small proportion of the total elderly population. The 
numbers represent about 0.8% of those aged 60 and above. In 1999, about 51% of 
those deemed eligible for assistance actually received it. b) Orphans. Orphans and 
unsupported children are a growing problem in Vietnam. Street children exist in 
large numbers in all the major cities. The number of orphans in 1999 was about 
156,000; from this number 40,500 receive social assistance (26%). c) The seriously 
disabled. In 1999, Vietnam was estimated to have about 5 million disabled people, 
1.3 million of which were severely disabled. Due to the large number of disabled, 
those capable of suitable employment or those supported by their families as well 
as those receiving disability or invalids pensions from the government as former 
civil or military employees are excluded from receiving Social Guarantee Fund for 
Regular Relief assistance. In 1999, the total number of those potentially eligible 
was 415,444 persons, of which only 63,125 were receiving SGFRR assistance 
(15.2%). 
• Temporary benefits for a small group of homeless people, also described as home-
less vagrants or vagrant beggars, and for the support of a small group of children 
in extreme circumstances. In 1999, there were 2,010 people described as homeless 
or vagrant beggars receiving SGFRR assistance out of a total of 32,800. Of these, 
1,665 were being cared for in social protection centres, and 27,000 provided with 
subsidies to live in the community. 
• Institutional placements in social protection residential centers for a minority 
of people within these groups. Included in each of the SGFRR beneficiary groups 
are those placed in social protection institutions. These involve higher unit costs 
than community placements, typically 4,934,000 dong per year in social protection 
institutions compared with 540,000 dong per year for those staying in the com-
munity. 
• Rehabilitation Programs designed to deal with ‘social evils’, i.e. the medical-
social problems group (HIV / Aids cases, prostitution, and drug addicts). In 1998, 
the SGFRR funded 60 centers dealing with drug addiction, HIV / Aids and prosti-
tution. The total cost was about 59 billion dong. 
• Supplementary Assistance from the SGFRR sometimes takes the form of funding 
exemptions from, or concessions on educational fees for children, grants for text-
books and notebooks, and health assistance. In practice, some costs appear to be 
charged to HEPR and other development programs as well. In 1998, 682,999 stu-
dents received assistance in paying school fees; 352,043 students received text-
books and / or notebooks; and 1,065,880 people received Health Insurance Cards. 
Financing of the SGFRR comes mainly from the budget of the central government. 
However, some funding is raised locally, and the more prosperous provinces tend to 
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pay higher benefit rates than the minimum laid down by the government. Some pro-
vinces appear to provide benefits to certain low-income people not included on the 
official lists. 
ÄF=`çåíáåÖÉåÅó=cìåÇ=Ñçê=mêÉJe~êîÉëí=pí~êî~íáçå=~åÇ=aáë~ëíÉê=oÉäáÉÑ=EÉãÉêÖÉåÅóF=
The Contingency Fund for Pre-Harvest Starvation and Disaster Relief covers two 
areas of social relief: a) It acts as a focus for providing aid when natural disasters 
strike an area; b) It provides supplementary assistance to very poor people, much of 
it in the form of food aid (or cash to buy food) in the pre-harvest starvation period. 
Some forms of supplementary assistance (e.g. waiver of school fees) are also some-
times charged to this fund. 
Ó= aáë~ëíÉê=oÉäáÉÑ=
Vietnam is situated in a part of the world highly prone to natural disasters. It is in the 
North equatorial typhoon belt, and is subject to floods, droughts, landslides, tidal 
invasion, forest fires, and frequent harvest failures in local areas. Disasters occur 
quite often every year. The disaster relief component of the fund is designed to deal 
with at least some of the consequences of natural disasters. Other components in-
clude medical assistance and the rebuilding or clearing of roads and infrastructure, 
and seed or other assistance to farmers to replant devastated croplands. 
Major outlays for disaster relief from the Contingency Fund in recent years have 
varied according to the severity of damage. In 1997 for example, disasters destroyed 
114,408 dwellings, seriously damaged 167,560 and killed 3,062 people. 
Assistance provided under the Contingency Fund covers only part of the losses 
households suffer. The priority is to save lives and prevent disaster-linked deaths 
such as death from subsequent starvation. Actual deaths from the disasters are com-
pensated at a standard payment of 1 million dong per death, but most compensation 
for property damage is a partial grant-in-aid. Local authorities make assessments of 
damage and claims put forward for verification. Out of whatever Contingency Fund 
money they have on hand or extra funds received from the government and interna-
tional agencies or other donors, the local authorities decide what if any compensa-
tion is to be given to those who have suffered property damage or other losses. 
While there is no formal schedule of assistance for destroyed or damaged houses, 
calculation of average payments suggest that grants may normally be around 1 mil-
lion dong for a destroyed house, and half a million dong for a damaged house. 
Ó= mêÉJe~êîÉëí=pí~êî~íáçå=oÉäáÉÑ=
In 1999, a total of 1.3 million people were given grants for purposes classified as 
pre-harvest starvation (50% of total eligible persons). These are people suffering 
from pre-harvest problems, from poverty, unemployment and other problems. Nor-
mally, these people have real incomes below the poverty level throughout the year. 
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Some food starvation situations may arise from other incidents, for example the 
need to pay medical costs because of serious illness. Also, some food aid is given to 
allow poor people to celebrate the Tet New Year festival. 
The average grant amounts to about 50,000 dong per person assisted. In purchasing 
power terms this might enable a person to buy 20 to 30 kgs of rice at rural prices, 
depending on the location and seasonal factors. 
Allowance for the Contingency Fund is built into the approved budgets of local au-
thorities. In addition to the centrally provided funding, local authorities are expected 
to raise some of their own resources to deal with problems. When major disasters 
strike, resource levels are inadequate and additional resources have to be sought from 
national organizations, NGOs and foreign donors. 
OKOKQ= sçäìåí~êó=pÅÜÉãÉëW=p~îáåÖëI=`êÉÇáí=~åÇ=jáÅêçJáåëìê~åÅÉ=pÅÜÉãÉë=
Savings schemes and small credit schemes have been newly introduced in Vietnam. 
There is a growing body of evidence from microfinance schemes working within 
Vietnam that rural households, even poor rural households, are able and eager to 
take loans at unsubsidized rates of interest and repay them. Microfinance activities 
are becoming extremely important to households with limited access to formal fi-
nancial services. The Vietnam standard of living survey revealed that 70% of credit 
for households comes from informal resources, including savings schemes and small 
credit schemes. 
A recent study on microfinance in Vietnam showed that by the end of 1995, there 
were 534 People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) with 150,000 members. These funds provided 
loans of up to US$35 million. Some mass organizations participated actively in micro-
credit activities such as the Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), which organized 
50,000 savings and credit groups nationwide. 
All of the PCFs provide loan and credit services with facilities for personal savings. 
There are also credit funds provided by NGOs, which are not required to combine 
offering credit with savings facilities. 
Recently, various voluntary schemes for farmers have been running at the commune 
level. Most schemes base contributions and benefits on the price of rice. Since prices 
fluctuate and crops are uncertain, this poses a problem for financing and inevitably 
some of these schemes have collapsed, though others are still functioning. It is sug-
gested to design simple and modest schemes for rural workers with adequate aver-
age incomes. The objective would be to establish a base for gradual implementation 
to ensure sustainability and extension of coverage. 
OKOKR= líÜÉêë=
A number of other forms of social assistance exist in Vietnam. NGOs and other or-
ganizations also provide assistance to some groups of people under development or 
disaster relief programs. 
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The other main forms of assistance are grants and concessions under the various 
development programs, particularly HEPR. Assistance takes the form of concessions 
or exemptions from school fees, funds to buy textbooks or notebooks, health cost 
coverage or provision of health insurance cards, and remissions of local taxes due. 
In some remote areas, subsidies are provided for items such as iodine salt. In prac-
tice, there seems to be a blurred boundary concerning which funds are charged for a 
number of these forms of supplementary assistance. 
Apart from these social protection provisions, Vietnamese households, particularly 
poor rural people, rely heavily on informal social protection based on family, com-
munity, and other contacts. This includes support between extended family mem-
bers, informal work and food assistance between neighbors, and loans from family, 
neighbors, and moneylenders. 
OKP= i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
The evolution of the labor market must be considered in the context of broader eco-
nomic policies. The labor code and a number of other laws such as the law on SOEs, 
the enterprise law, and the law on foreign investment in Vietnam are designed to 
provide a common legal framework for labor-management relations in both the public 
and private sectors. Labor market policies, however, are still in their initial stage of 
formulation and development. 
OKPKN= ^ÅíáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=gçÄ=lééçêíìåáíáÉë=Ei~Äçê=aÉã~åÇF=
Creating jobs for workers is one of the top priorities of Vietnam’s socio-economic 
policies. To date, the climate for private sector development is improving. The pri-
vate sector has become an engine of growth and job creation. 90% of all jobs are 
generated there each year. 
At present, over 90% of all enterprises are small and medium size (SMEs). In indus-
try and services, the development of SMEs is a new and predominant model of job 
generation. Different measures have been applied to help SMEs. The government 
has provided a portion of the initial capital for setting up a credit guarantee fund. 
The function of this fund is to help SMEs borrow from banks. Other organizations 
such as VCCI (Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry), VICOOPSME (Vietnam 
Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises), the Vietnam Women’s Union, and 
the Youth Union have also helped the development of SMEs through their activities. 
In order to reduce poverty incidence and generate employment for people, the gov-
ernment has implemented a number of national target programs; among them are the 
National Program on Employment (NPE) and the National Target Program on Pov-
erty Alleviation (NPHEPR). 
The main objective of the NPE is employment creation. The NPE has a four-year 
budget for 1997 to 2000 of 4,800 billion dong. From this amount, 2,480 dong will be 
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drawn from the state budget, with the balance coming from international agencies 
and enterprises. Of the total, 4,693 billion dong is proposed to go into development 
loans. 
The government gives priority to providing loans for small projects which generate 
many jobs and absorb as many female workers, poor, and unemployed as possible. 
Through these projects, the government encourages the community and mobilizes 
people’s capital for production and business. 
The basic objective of the NPHEPR is poverty alleviation. The NPHEPR has a target 
budget of 10,000 billion dong for the period 1998–2000, with funding sources com-
prising a mix of state budget, credit institutions, international agencies, and other 
sources. 
NPE and NPEHEPR are considered target means of generating 25,000 – 300,000 jobs 
annually, providing short-term training and employment services to hundreds of 
thousands of workers and reducing poverty by 2% per year. However, there are also 
problems, such as complicated implementation procedures, low sustainable employ-
ment, and difficulties in assessing efficiency and effectiveness, to name a few. 
NPHEPR lending through the Bank for the Poor targets poverty groups and is not 
based on the availability of collateral. The Bank for the Poor was established and 
went into operation in 1996. About 70% of funds for poverty alleviation are under 
the management of this bank. By the end of 2000 it provided more than five million 
households with a loan of 1.3 to 3 million dong, with one- to two-year terms at a 
preferential interest rate of 0.8% per month. Apart from this, the credits for the poor 
are also provided by the Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development, the national 
programs on re-greening bare hills, employment promotion, resettlement and sup-
port to the ethnic minorities who were in extremely difficult situations. 
Public investment in infrastructure is another important field in creating jobs. The 
government implemented a number of programs targeting rural transportation, elec-
trification, irrigation, markets (for the sale of goods) and set up a rural service cen-
ter. Millions of working days have been absorbed into these programs every year. 
Other mass and social organizations are also engaged actively in employment crea-
tion activities, the most active being the Labor Confederation, the Vietnam Women’s 
Union, the Vietnam Youth Union, and the Peasants’ Union. The main activities of 
these organizations are providing consultation services for their members in design-
ing small projects in order to get loans and develop employment service centers, 
mobilizing capital and giving technical and marketing guidelines to help their mem-
bers, especially for such vulnerable groups as the poor, women and the young. 
eìã~å=`~éáí~ä=cçêãìä~íáçåI=pâáääë=aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=
One of the main objectives of the NPE is to increase the proportion of the workforce 
with skills training. Priority in job expansion is given to vulnerable groups including 
the disabled, war veterans, demobilized military personnel, redundant workers of 
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state enterprises, and women. The Centers for Employment Services (CESs) play a 
key role in this process. CESs provide vocational training courses in connection with 
employment for workers. From 1992 to 2000 there were 700,000 workers trained and 
about 870,000 were introduced to employment by the centers. 
Different extension programs in agriculture, forestry and fishery have provided short-
term training courses to hundreds of thousands of people. These programs help peo-
ple to better utilize their working time and generate more income. 
Bilateral and multilateral organizations also provide assistance through programs on 
human resource development, vocational training, improvement of policies related 
to the labor market, promotion of small and medium enterprises, support for hunger 
and poverty reduction campaign, and so on. 
j~íÅÜáåÖ=gçÄ=pÉÉâÉêë=
The government provides support to centers for employment services to assist in the 
implementation of vocational training functions, advice on occupational orientation 
and provision of job services for workers in the labor market. From 1992 to 2000, 
the CESs had advised on employment for 2,000,000 persons. These centers also 
provide information about vacancies as well as worker requirements. 
OKPKO= m~ëëáîÉ=i~Äçê=j~êâÉí=mçäáÅó=
bÇìÅ~íáçå=~åÇ=qê~áåáåÖ=póëíÉã=
Historically, education has been highly valued among Vietnamese people. After inde-
pendence, the government undertook a major initiative to expand the public educa-
tion system. Education is a high priority for government policymakers. In fact, dur-
ing a period of economic difficulty and state budget retrenchment in the early 1990s, 
education was one of the few sectors protected. 
Vietnam’s public education system has out-performed other public initiatives. Popu-
lation literacy stands at nearly 91% and gender differences are comparatively small. 
Primary school enrollment is almost 100%. However, major regional differences in 
educational indicators exist. For example, literacy rates in mountain provinces are as 
low as 50%. Although national primary school enrollment rates are nearly 100%, they 
are significantly lower in mountain, central, and Mekong Delta regions. In these areas, 
gender disparities in enrollment rates and literacy are greater. Institutionally, the 
education sector is becoming more diverse. Government policy encourages the es-
tablishment of private educational institutions. Vocational training programs, which 
are generally short, are open to students who complete primary or lower secondary 
education and who are not likely to proceed further in the formal education system. 
Secondary vocational education programs last three to four years and are also open 
to students who leave primary and lower secondary school. Professional secondary 
education lasts two to four years and students completing upper secondary school 
may attend these programs. 
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The quality of training, vocational education and even tertiary education, however, 
is somewhat hampered by the organization and structure of these sub-sectors. Cur-
rently, technical and vocational education and training is mainly a state-driven sys-
tem that suffers from fragmented management, has a large number of uncoordinated 
external supporters, and does not systematically respond to the needs of the labor 
market. 
jÉ~ëìêÉë=í~âÉå=íç=ÜÉäé=ïçêâÉêë=
Reform of state-owned enterprises is presently the main focus of the government. As 
part of the state enterprise reform program, equitization in Vietnam started with a 
pilot program in 1992. 
Employees of equitized SOEs benefit from the allocation of dividends from a portion 
of state shares, not exceeding 10% of the enterprise value to employees during their 
lifetime. The rest will be divided into two parts: one part (30%–50%) belongs to the 
state and the second part will be sold to external buyers. The value of dividends 
allocated to each employee for this purpose will not exceed the equivalent of a six-
month salary as stipulated in the state salary scale. The state shall remain the owner 
of these shares. 
Employees are also entitled to purchase JSC (Joint Stock Company) shares on credit 
(5-year term with an annual interest rate of 4%). The value of these shall not exceed 
15% of the enterprise value (or 20% in special cases). Detailed conditions for the 
purchase of shares on credit are stipulated. 
Finally, all employees will be guaranteed the right to continue their work at a JSC 
after equitization. If, 12 months after the registration date of a JSC, an employee be-
comes redundant due to restructuring of the company, this employee will then bene-
fit from the policies stipulated in article 17 of the Labor Code and the government 
decree 72 / CP of October 31, 1995 (see Section 2.1.3). 
The government also applies early retirement schemes and retrenchment payments. 
It is estimated that the government has to spend 6,000 billion dong in three years 
starting from 2001, in order to reduce the number of workers in the state sector by 
15% (administration and SOEs). 
jáåáãìã=t~ÖÉ=mçäáÅó=
The government sets a minimum wage rate intended for ‘the worker doing the sim-
plest work in normal working conditions’. It is also adjusted periodically to maintain 
the cost of living. The government sets different minimum wage rates for different 
sectors. The rate applied to joint ventures is higher than the rate applied to domestic 
enterprises. 
The minimum wage applied to domestic enterprises and administration is 21,000 
dong per month (US$14). The minimum wage applied to joint ventures ranges from 
US$30 to $45 per month depending on the location of the enterprises. 
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PK= ^ëëÉëëãÉåí=çÑ=íÜÉ=bÑÑÉÅíáîÉåÉëë=~åÇ=bÑÑáÅáÉåÅó=çÑ=íÜÉ=
bñáëíáåÖ=póëíÉã=
PKN= `çîÉê~ÖÉ=
pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
The coverage of compulsory social insurance has reached only 16% of the labour 
force, which implies that the total number of contributors is just over 5 million people. 
The voluntary social system that covers self-employed laborers as well as farmers 
and laborers in rural areas, and facilitates the participation by all people in social 
insurance is still in the infancy stage and coverage is very limited. 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
The coverage of HI has expanded very fast. The VHI estimates that in 1999 the num-
ber of insured people was about 10.5 million, three times higher than in 1993. Ap-
proximately 6.3 million persons (including 2.77 million pensioners and eligible per-
sons) are part of the compulsory scheme, and 3.6 million are in the voluntary schemes 
(including 3.5 million school children, i.e. 96.8%). 572,000 poor persons were pro-
vided HI cards by the government. However, HI still covers only about 14% of the 
total population. 
pçÅá~ä=~ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
Social assistance is characterized by the low probability of receiving benefits, and 
very low average payment rates. It is estimated that about 38% of those eligible 
actually received some kind of social assistance in 2000. 
PKO= cÉ~ëáÄáäáíó=
pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=~åÇ=eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
The system of benefits suffers from serious defects, which detract from its effective-
ness and its efficiency at targeting the resources available, including: 
• Actual benefit amounts are much lower proportions of actual earnings than the 
rates would suggest, as they are percentages of basic salaries without any extras, 
whilst survivors’ pensions, which are especially important to women and chil-
dren, are related to minimum wages instead of average earnings; 
• Structural and other deficiencies in sickness and maternity benefits, including the re-
striction of maternity allowance to two births and the lack of contribution conditions; 
• The different treatment accorded to essentially the same contingencies under the 
employment injury and pension branches respectively; 
• The limited provision for permanent invalidity; 
• Entitlement to retirement pension (RP), which is the most costly benefit, is nor-
mally subject to stringent conditions, but the VSI scheme has low pension ages, 
especially for women; special, easier qualifying rules for particular categories of 
workers, and it does not enforce the retirement rule effectively. 
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The ILO has recommended that health insurance should be integrated with the other 
social insurance benefits by merging VSI and VHI, whilst retaining separate funds. 
This would improve policy cohesion and the legal framework and establish a better 
basis for enforcement. Close co-operation of the two organizations is proposed, 
especially by harmonizing their legislation for the purpose of intensifying compli-
ance activities and unifying the collection of contributions. 
pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
Presently, allowance for the Contingency Fund is built into the approved budgets of 
local authorities. In addition to the centrally provided funding, local authorities are 
expected to raise some of their own resources for dealing with problems. The mixed 
funding sources and mixed purposes of the fund lead to a number of practical prob-
lems at the local level. 
In the future, funding should be allocated to provinces, districts, and communes on 
the basis of verified disasters in their areas. When disasters strike, local funds can be 
mobilized for immediate relief until the central fund transfers the necessary resources. 
The Pre-Harvest Starvation Relief could continue as a social assistance system for 
which regular funds are provided by the central government for disbursement at the 
local level (for the time being by communes). The separation would allow Pre-
Harvest Starvation Relief to be redeveloped and expanded as a social assistance 
system for the working poor and for those not covered by social insurance. 
PKP= cáå~åÅá~ä=pìëí~áå~Äáäáíó=
The fiscal cost to the central government of total social transfers aggregate to around 
14% of government spending or above 3% of GDP. 
pçÅá~ä=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
At present, the state budget is responsible for over 88% of total costs. The system 
depends heavily on state subsidies. 
The projection under the ILO / Netherlands social security project – ILO / TF / Vietnam 
revealed that the state budget expenditure on social security would rise steeply from 
5,600 billion dong in 1999 to 10,500 billion dong by 2015 and only then begin to de-
cline. 
In view of these considerations, it is suggested that the voluntary defined contribu-
tion approach should be regarded as a transitional phase and that the policy objective 
should be to establish a compulsory defined benefit scheme as soon as conditions 
allow. The objective would be to establish a basis for gradual implementation step 
by step to ensure sustainability, and also progressive extension of its scope of cover-
age of persons and contingencies in order to gradually meet the needs of the agricul-
tural sector for social security protection. 
In fact, various voluntary pension schemes for farmers have been running for several 
years, usually at the commune level, and are paying modest pensions to eligible 
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members. As mentioned above, most schemes base contributions and benefits on the 
price of rice. Since prices fluctuate, this poses problems for the financing of volun-
tary schemes and inevitably some have collapsed, though others are still functioning. 
There are risks that the proposed provincial pension schemes will come under pres-
sure to permit withdrawals from individual accounts by members who are suffering 
severe financial hardship for any of numerous reasons, such as individual or general 
crop failures and devastation caused by the regularly occurring natural disasters. 
Since the official relief schemes are quite limited, it could be difficult to refuse such 
requests for the release of part or all of the individual balances. 
eÉ~äíÜ=fåëìê~åÅÉ=
VHI suffers from the same non-compliance problems as VSI, but is more affected by 
the low rate of contributions and under-payments because the costs of medical treat-
ment of individuals are not related to the amounts paid in contributions. The recent 
ILO actuarial valuation found that 16 out of 61 provincial funds had deficits in 1997. 
pçÅá~ä=^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=
Financing of the Social Guarantee Funds comes mainly from the budget of the cen-
tral government. However, some funding is raised locally, and the more prosperous 
provinces tend to pay higher benefit rates than the minimum laid down by the gov-
ernment. It remains a problem that some provinces appear to provide benefits to 
certain low-income people not included on the official lists. 
kqmb=~åÇ=íÜÉ=kqmebmo=
Overemphasis on subsidized credit to households was a major problem as it both 
limited the overall reach of the programs and tended to direct credit at more dynamic 
and better informed households, to the detriment of those most in need. The heavy 
emphasis on farm lending is unlikely to create many additional rural jobs in the non-
farm sector where the greater potential for employment creation lies. 
Other problems, which are likely to constrain the longer-term value of the programs, 
include insufficient emphasis on vocational education and training; inadequate atten-
tion to rural industrialization and insufficient attention to the role of paid wage labor 
on infrastructure projects as a means of reducing poverty. 
Redressing the problems would require a mix of mutually supportive strategies and 
action at three levels – the macro-level to create an appropriate environment for the 
dynamic and responsive evolution of the programs; at the meso-level for capacity and 
institution building and at the micro-level to publicize the programs, improve access 
to them, and support the users with appropriate training and services. 
PKQ= dÉåÇÉê=bèìáíó=
Vietnam has had formal legal equality between women and men for many years. In 
most respects, the formal social protection programs incorporate this legal equality. 
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However, there are a number of long-standing gender issues. These include the 
lower average educational, occupational, and earnings status of women, the ‘double 
shift’ problem where women are expected to work full time in paid employment as 
well as carry out the bulk of household and family duties, and occupational health 
and safety issues which affect women more than men. More recently, unemploy-
ment has risen faster amongst women. 
Within the social insurance system, gender issues include the limitation of maternity 
leave to two pregnancies and the lower pension age for women. While the lower age 
policy enables women to retire earlier, it also means lower retirement pensions and 
re-employment on less favorable terms. 
PKR= `çëíë=çÑ=^Çãáåáëíê~íáçå=
The use of general-purpose commune administrations to pay benefits at the local 
level is possibly a pragmatic way of dealing with the lack of special purpose govern-
ment agencies at the local level. It is also a way to reduce the cost of administration. 
In March 2002, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the operation 
of the system, as well as to reduce administrative costs, the Vietnamese government 
decided to absorb the VHI into the VSI, resulting in one unified agency. 
PKS= q~êÖÉíáåÖ=
The targeting efficiency of the social protection system appears to be low. Even 
within the very restrictive definitions of those entitled to assistance, only a minority 
of those apparently eligible for benefits actually receive them, and the probability of 
receiving a benefit seems to vary according to geographic location. This may be in 
part because the criteria for assistance (insurance) are open to flexible interpretation 
at all levels, especially the local level. 
However, the very low numbers of beneficiaries granted assistance (the equivalent 
of only 0.2% of the population) suggests that the main problem is inadequate fund-
ing. This leads to low benefit grant rates and to extreme poverty amongst many of 
those in need who do not in practice receive assistance from the fund. 
QK= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=fååçî~íáîÉ=mêçÖê~ãë=~åÇ=^äíÉêå~íáîÉ=
pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉë=
QKN= pÉäÉÅíáçå=çÑ=jçÇÉäë=~åÇ=~å=^ééêçéêá~íÉ=pçÅá~ä=mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ=
The social protection scheme of a country depends on the development patterns and 
economic system of the country. The development model and economic system must 
be designed to ensure a harmonized combination of economic growth and settlement 
of social issues in conformity with principles of equality and social advancement. The 
appropriate economic system for Vietnam is an open market economy in combina-
tion with national cultural values. Vietnam is in a transformation process. The de-
velopment model and economic system selected by Vietnam is a socialism-oriented 
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open economic system with the strategic goals of ‘wealthy people, powerful country 
– equality – democracy and civilization’. The future social protection scheme should 
be designed according to the following criteria. 
qÜÉ=ëÉäÉÅíÉÇ=ãçÇÉäë=Ñçê=~=ëçÅá~ä=éêçíÉÅíáçå=ëÅÜÉãÉW=
iÉîÉä= póëíÉã= pçÅá~ä=êáëâë= q~êÖÉí=Öêçìéë=
NK= eÉ~äíÜ=Å~êÉ=áåëìê~åÅÉ== páÅâåÉëëI=áääåÉëë== ^ää=ÅáíáòÉåë==
OK= pÉÅìêáíó=çå=ä~Äçê=áåàìêó=~åÇ=
éêçÑÉëëáçå~ä=ÇáëÉ~ëÉë==
i~Äçê=áåàìêóI=éêçÑÉëJ
ëáçå~ä=ÇáëÉ~ëÉë==
tçêâÉêë==
PK= mÉåëáçå== bäÇÉêäó== ^ää=ÅáíáòÉåë==
iÉîÉä=NW=
pçÅá~ä=ëÉÅìêáíó==
QK= råÉãéäçóãÉåí=ëÉÅìêáíó== råÉãéäçóãÉåí== tçêâÉêë==
NK= sçÅ~íáçå~ä=íê~áåáåÖI=êÉíê~áåáåÖ==
OK= `êÉ~íáçå=çÑ=íÉãéçê~êó=àçÄë=áå=íÜÉ=
éìÄäáÅ=ëÉÅíçê==
PK= ^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=Ñçê=ëÉäÑJÉãéäçóãÉåí=
EÅêÉÇáíëF=
iÉîÉä=OW=
^ÑÑáêã~íáîÉ=
éçäáÅó=çå=ä~Äçê=
ã~êâÉí==
QK= ^ëëáëí~åÅÉ=çå=àçÄ=ã~íÅÜáåÖ=
råÉãéäçóãÉåí=~åÇ=
ìåÇÉêÉãéäçóãÉåí==
gçÄäÉëë=éÉçéäÉI=
ä~áÇJçÑÑ=ïçêâÉêë==
NK= pçÅá~ä=Éñíê~çêÇáå~êó=ÅçåíáåÖÉåÅó=
ÑìåÇë=iÉîÉä=PW=
pçÅá~ä=~ëëáëJ
í~åÅÉ== OK= pçÅá~ä=dì~ê~åíÉÉ=cìåÇ=Ñçê=oÉÖìä~ê=
oÉäáÉÑ==
mçîÉêíó== içïJáåÅçãÉ=É~êåÉêëI=
îìäåÉê~ÄäÉ=ëçÅá~ä=Öêçìéë==
 
With the above-mentioned social and economic system, the social protection scheme 
should be renovated in a way that ensures the use of market principles, safeguards 
social benefits for all people and facilitates their development. It must be an inte-
grated system consisting of the following: Social security with contributions by all 
partners (pay-as-you-go), widening of social services, particularly basic social ser-
vices, social assistance to vulnerable groups and designing of an encouraged policy 
on the labor market. 
A model designed as mentioned above allows developing a social protection scheme 
on the basic principles of consistency, integration, mainstreaming and interrelation. 
QKO= båä~êÖáåÖ=íÜÉ=pÅ~äÉ=~åÇ=`çîÉê~ÖÉ=çÑ=_ÉåÉÑáÅá~êáÉë=
The biggest problem of the current social protection system is the poor coverage, 
mainly limited to the formal sector. Thus, when implementing a revised strategy of 
social development, it should gradually enlarge the scale of coverage and multiply 
the beneficiaries for the following sectors: 
• Farmers, rural workers; 
• Workers in non-agricultural individual household businesses; 
• Workers in the informal sector. 
In the case of Vietnam, in addition to the above-mentioned target groups, the social 
protection scheme should pay more attention to the regions which are in greater 
danger of national disasters. This means that the setup of a policy and program on 
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national disaster prevention must be included in the national social protection 
scheme. 
The strategic direction for enlarging the scope of coverage and beneficiaries leans 
towards the informal sector. However, this cannot be determined in a short time. 
Furthermore, the scope of the informal sector is too large, with very poor economic 
conditions. It needs long-term five-, ten-, and twenty-year plans, depending on dif-
fering country conditions. Many policies on social protection should be implemented 
on a trial basis before full implementation. For Vietnam, there should be in-depth re-
search conducted and trial implementation of a social security scheme for farmers, 
workers in non-agricultural individual home-based businesses or unemployment 
schemes for laid-off workers. 
In the informal sector, where the levels of legislation implementation and labor pro-
ductivity are low, the applicable social protection scheme should be different from 
the one for the formal sector. In these schemes, the rate of contribution as well as the 
benefits and assistance rates should be lower than those in the schemes applied for 
the formal sector. 
The direction is to expand the coverage step by step and to reduce the gap between 
the schemes for the formal sector and informal sector respectively, as conditions allow. 
QKP= píêÉåÖíÜÉåáåÖ=íÜÉ=oçäÉ=çÑ=íÜÉ=pí~íÉ=~åÇ=båä~êÖáåÖ=íÜÉ=m~êíáÅáé~íáçå=
çÑ=íÜÉ=mêáî~íÉ=pÉÅíçê=
Increasing the participation of social partners, particularly in the private sector, is one 
of the most important approaches to strengthening the recourse for the social protec-
tion scheme, and decreasing subsidies from the state to better harmonize with open 
market mechanisms. This approach shall be considered in the following dimensions: 
• Applying market methods to preserve values and increase the available funds for 
social protection (participation in the program and investments); 
• Mobilizing contributions from the private sector to increase the funds for social 
protection (sharing with the state); 
• Increasing opportunities for individuals who are beneficiaries complying with the 
publicized principles of democracy and transparency. 
In addition, the social protection scheme is a basic national social policy; the state 
should thus strengthen its role and pay more attention to the scheme. The role and 
responsibility of the state can be described as follows: 
• To formulate strategies, issue policies and laws, and draw up a legal framework 
on social protection; 
• To set up and implement National Target Programs on social protection; 
• To adjust the public expenditure structure in order to increase investment from 
the state budget for social protection. 
Regarding the reform of the social protection policy, it is fundamental to build up a 
supply network of social protection and social services, especially basic social ser-
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vices to make sure that the beneficiaries will have access to high-quality services. At 
present, these services are provided mainly by the state, but in the near future the 
private sector should play a more important role, primarily in medical services, edu-
cation, clean water supply, environmental sanitation, micro-credit for the poor, em-
ployment services, and vocational training. 
Social security in the formal sector is supplied by the state. In the future, the state 
will continue to play a leading role. However, Vietnam should consider the possibility 
of the private sector implementing some social insurance schemes, beginning with 
the informal sector. 
The social protection service network is defined as non-profit, drawing the participa-
tion of state, private sector, and NGOs. It is organized as a unified planning network 
with respect to interactive and co-operative linkages and supported by the state as 
and when needed. 
It is likely that an enhanced state role and responsibility with the wider participation 
of social actors and the private sector under the auspices of the state in a civil society 
is a guarantee factor for a successful outcome of the existing social protection policy 
in the future. 
QKQ= píêìÅíìêÉ=çÑ=íÜÉ=`çåíêáÄìíáçå=o~íÉ=çÑ=m~êíáÅáé~åíë=áå=íÜÉ=pçÅá~ä=
mêçíÉÅíáçå=pÅÜÉãÉ=
– The social insurance scheme for the formal sector in Vietnam has a total contribu-
tion rate of 23% (including health insurance). It is lower than in other countries, and 
varies between the rate contributed by employees and employers with employers 
paying three times more than employees. 
At present however, raising the contribution rate will result in an additional financial 
burden on enterprises, resulting in higher bankruptcy risk and diminished possibility 
of contributing to social insurance. During the next five or ten years, it will be neces-
sary to adjust the rate to around 30–32%, as in other countries, and at the same time 
change the rate between employers and employees to 50% each. 
Concerning social insurance, the state acts as employer and contributes for employ-
ees working in public administrative agencies. Yet it supports and assists in some 
urgent cases to guarantee the safety of people, especially in cases of economic crises, 
severe natural disasters and wars by developing the Social Insurance Fund. 
In Vietnam, social assistant funds (including emergency and regular relief) are bal-
anced in the contingency funds in the budget of communes and ensured at a mini-
mum level. This is considered a big problem at the moment. The basic orientation in 
social protection policy reform is to split the social assistance funds from the contin-
gency budget to create an independent fund. This fund should be mobilized by dif-
ferent sources such as the state budget, the public and private sector and interna-
tional aid. However, the state should adjust the public expenditure structure to in-
crease investments in this fund. 
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– Under the active labor market policy, Vietnam established a National Fund for 
Employment Promotion (NPE) in 1992 to serve for loan provision under small-scale 
projects, vocational training and employment service. Besides the Fund for Poverty 
Alleviation and other charity funds, these funds are mainly formed from the state 
budget at central and local levels, personal and private sector contributions and in-
ternational cooperation. In the future, the state will continue to increase the invest-
ment level from central and local budget sources, yet it is also necessary to raise the 
personal and private sector contributions to this fund. 
– Social protection funds (social insurance, regular and emergency relief funds, the 
fund for employment promotion and poverty alleviation and other charity funds) 
operate under the principle of complementarity, mutual assistance and risk sharing. 
Hence, it is important to ensure the balance of funds (collections to expenditure) to 
assure the efficiency and sustainability of the policy. The fund for social insurance 
and the fund for employment will remain particularly important. Hence, the conser-
vation and increase of these funds’ values are firmly assured. In response, the fol-
lowing solutions are needed. 
– Create capital turnover to loan based on market interest rates and procedures (all 
economic, credit organizations and individuals should be able to access this loan). 
This is based on different studies by national and international agencies, which rec-
ommend that in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of credit funds, the 
loans given to borrowers (including the poor and disadvantaged) have to be deter-
mined on market interest rates rather than preferential rates. 
– Give priority to investment in socio-economic projects with high efficiency and 
low risk such as real estate, export and import. 
– Give assistance from the state budget based on public expenditures restructuring 
as an investment for social development. 
QKR= aÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=pçÅá~ä=p~ÑÉíó=kÉí=mêçÖê~ãë=
According to the new concept, social protection is defined as including social insur-
ance, social assistance and labor market policies. However, more provisional resolu-
tions need to be added, especially concerning risks, economic shocks, social changes 
(local war, racial war, terrorist war), institutional reforms (especially in a transitional 
economy such as Vietnam’s) and natural disasters. The above resolutions are in-
cluded in social safety net programs. 
The target groups of social safety net programs are chronically or temporarily poor 
people, people affected by crisis and / or social changes, institutional reforms, and 
natural disasters. Unless social safety net programs do not support these people, they 
will fall into poverty. 
Concrete social safety net programs are formed depending on specific circumstances 
and the status of the country. However, the most important components are as fol-
lows: 
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– Programs on unemployment reduction and income generation. These programs 
focus on supporting job creation, training and retraining, supporting small-scale loans 
to create employment and job placement for out-of-work people as well as redundant 
workers who have been laid off because of institutional reforms (especially in state-
owned enterprise restructuring in transitional countries). 
– Programs on hunger eradication and poverty reduction. These programs focus on 
creating more opportunities for poor people to develop production, raise income, 
and provide access to high quality social services at low cost. 
– Programs providing social services, especially basic social services such as health 
care, reproductive health, education, anti-malnutrition for children, and clean water 
supply, in a timely manner for poor people, and disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. 
– Programs and projects on community development to form and build up commu-
nity organizations in order to promote supportive activities to different target groups, 
especially women, children, the elderly and disabled in a community. 
– Programs supporting specific groups of people such as ethnic minorities in remote 
and upland areas, poor widows, orphans, the disabled, immigrants, as well as others, 
to help them better integrate into the community. 
Vietnam is still a poor country and engaged in an institutional reform process. It also 
suffers heavily from a longstanding war and natural disasters. Under these circum-
stances, the development of social safety net programs as ad hoc measures to sup-
port the above-mentioned social groups is becoming of greater significance. The 
Vietnam government pays particular attention to this issue and intensifies efforts to 
invest in these programs from the state budget and takes advantage of local as well 
as international cooperation. 
RK= mçäáÅó=oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=
5.1 In order to reform the social protection system, the government should design a 
research project to comprehensively analyze and assess the efficiencies and advan-
tages of the current scheme. This should be done in addition to studies on interna-
tional experiences, and to propose a new social protection scheme with respect to the 
specific situation in the country and in observance of international tendencies. This 
research should cover the following components: 
– Assessment of the role of the government and social counterparts in the social 
protection scheme; 
– Identification of a methodology for building employment policies, unemployment 
insurance, active labor market policies and social safety net programs. 
– Evaluation of financial resources of the social protection scheme; 
– Assessment of the social protection management capacity. 
5.2 A country policy on social protection (or strategy on social protection) should 
be developed, in which priorities, interaction between social insurance and social 
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assistance, labor market policy, social safety net programs and different roles of the 
state agencies and other stakeholders in the national social protection scheme are 
identified. Strategies of promoting social protection schemes would be to ensure that 
the schemes are fiscally sustainable even at the aggregate level; that they offer incen-
tives, and are well-targeted and effective in terms of delivery. 
– The benefit level of social insurance should be confined to affordability based on 
contributions. Fiscal prospects should be projected on a regular basis and benefit-
contribution schedules should be adjusted accordingly as unexpected changes such 
as ageing, economic uncertainty, and global and regional crises occur. 
– Incentives provided by social protection should be compatible with outside op-
tions. The level of benefits and the method of support need to be designed so that 
work incentives will not be undermined. 
– Those most in need should be the actual recipients of social protection schemes. 
Systematic analysis on the major demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
needs to be performed and eligibility criteria, task selection and the method of in-
forming people should be determined accordingly, based on the analysis. 
– Performance of delivering personnel should be evaluated on a regular basis and 
reflected in promotions and earnings of the staff. 
In order to achieve these objectives, a plan on social protection development needs 
to be set up with the following activities: 
– Determine the components of the social protection programs including social in-
surance, unemployment insurance, health care, the social guarantee fund for regu-
lar relief, the contingency fund for Pre-Harvest Starvation and Disaster Relief and 
social safety nets, of which the program supporting new initiatives of social in-
surance development for the informal sector should be paid particular attention; 
– Finalize the designing plans and carry out the social protection programs; 
– Consider the feasibility and stability of the program, focusing especially on fi-
nancial and fiscal resources; 
– Properly determine the target groups on the basis of formulating criteria to clas-
sify eligible persons in every social protection program; 
– Complete the management system, the supervision and assessment system of the 
programs. 
5.3 In the future, the social protection scheme should be developed with the partici-
pation of the state, then enlarged and transferred gradually to the private sector as 
well as organizations and individuals. This scheme should also be highly decentral-
ized to the local level in a unified network. However, this process should be institu-
tionalized by laws, of which the most important components are as follows: 
– Reviewing, revising and adding more articles of the Labor Code including the 
chapter on social security, employment and the labor market; 
– Formulating a law on social security, unemployment and health insurance; 
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– Delivering regulations on social security for the informal sector in the urban and 
agricultural sectors. 
– Formulating and completing functions, tasks, and duties as well as the structure 
of social security agencies at central and local levels. 
5.4 Cooperation in using ICT (Information and Communication Technology) to form 
a scheme on social protection management information. All countries should promote 
work in terms of research on indicators as well as from the social protection manage-
ment information system, including information on social insurance, health insurance, 
unemployment insurance, permanent relief, and labor market information. The Inter-
net should be used in the above systems. This information system could be available 
on-line in order to compare countries in the region. To fulfill these requirements, it is 
necessary to improve materials and technical facilities, to have countries cooperate 
and exchange experiences, and to train staff and improve the capacity of governmen-
tal bodies and counterparts in the social protection scheme. 
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VWU – Vietnam Women’s Union 
TU – Trade Union 
UN – United Nations 
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Adverse selection. Acceptance of voluntary membership of a social insurance scheme 
by a preponderance of persons with strong expectations of qualifying for benefits on 
the basis of minimal contributions. 
Capitation provider payment system. A system under which a health insurance 
scheme pays medical providers (hospitals, clinics and individual doctors accredited 
and contracted to the scheme) by fixed amounts for each person registered with a 
provider for the type and range of care specified in the contract. The agreed capita-
tion amounts are paid at intervals to providers regardless of whether the registered 
insured persons claimed medical benefits during these periods. 
Consumer price index. A consumer price index measures the period to period pro-
portional change in the prices of a fixed set of consumer goods and services of con-
stant quantity and characteristics. The purpose of a consumer price index is to meas-
ures changes over time in the general level of prices of goods and services that a re-
ference population acquire, use or pay for consumption. 
Defined benefit scheme. A scheme which defines the standards of the benefits to be 
provided by means of a formula and determines the financial system accordingly. 
This formula, which determines pensions or lump sum payments, is tied to years 
worked, earnings and social criteria. Some entity (the state, employer, insurance com-
pany) bears the financial risk of the promise or entitlement embedded in the formula. 
Defined contribution scheme. A scheme which defines its benefits in terms of the 
contributions to be paid into individual accounts, together with shares of investment 
income, from which the benefit will be paid when qualifying conditions are satisfied. 
The worker bears the financial risk. Many hybrid schemes exist that contain both 
defined contribution and defined benefit elements. 
Gini Index. Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an econ-
omy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini index measures the area 
between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical curve of absolute equality. A Gini index 
of zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
GNI. Gross National Income. Following current statistical practice, the World Bank 
has recently adopted a new terminology in line with the 1993 System of National Ac-
counts (SNA). GNP (Gross National Product) has been changed to GNI (Gross National 
Income); GNP per capita to GNI per capita; private consumption to household final 
consumption expenditure; general government consumption to general government 
final consumption expenditure; gross domestic investment to gross capital formation. 
Human development index (HDI). A composite index measuring average achieve-
ment in three basic dimensions of human development-a long and healthy life, know-
ledge and a decent standard of living. 
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Illiteracy rate. The adult illiteracy rate comprises the percentage of people age 15 
and above who cannot, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement 
about their everyday life. This definition is based on the concept of functional literacy: 
a person’s ability to use reading and writing skills effectively in the context of his or 
her society. 
Infant mortality rate. The number of infants who die before reaching one year of 
age, expressed per 1,000 life births in a given year. 
Informal economy. The informal economy is characterized by an exchange of goods 
and services which is not accurately recorded in government figures and accounting 
and which is generally untaxed. 
Informal sector. The informal sector comprises private non-agricultural businesses 
which are household-operated and have no more than 5 paid employees (interna-
tional definition established by the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisti-
cians in 1993). In some countries, self-employed without family or temporary assis-
tants are always included in the official definition of the informal sector. 
Labour force. The economically active population: all people who supply labour for 
the production of goods and services during a specific period. It includes both the 
employed and the unemployed. Although national practices vary, in general the labour 
force includes the armed forces and first time job seekers but excludes homemakers 
and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal sector. 
Labour force participation rate. The number of people who are classified as la-
bour force for every 100 working age persons. 
Labour market policy. Labour market policies and programmes are designed to 
facilitate labour adjustments and promote the efficient operation of labour markets. 
Active labour market programmes are interventions to encourage people to take posi-
tive action to improve their employment prospects. They include vocational training 
and retraining, employment services, job search assistance, organization of job fairs. 
Low / middle / high income country. Economies are classified into three categories 
according to income. The GNP per capita cutoff levels are as follows: low income $ 
755 or less; middle income $ 756–9,265; and high income $9,266 or more. A further 
division at $2,995 is made between lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income 
economies. 
Moral hazard. Tendency for changes in behaviour under insurance that increase the 
risk of the contingencies occurring. 
Net enrolment ratio. Number of enrolled pupils as percentage of the relevant age 
group. 
Old-age dependency ratio. Residents above 65 years of age divided by residents 
between 15 and 64. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG). A social security financial system under which current reve-
nues (mostly from contributions such as payroll taxes) are used to cover current bene-
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fits (e.g. mandatory old age pensions) year by year. In practice, a contingency re-
serve is needed against unforeseen changes in expenditures or falls in income. This 
may be 6 months average benefit expenditure for sickness benefit and 12 months for 
unemployment insurance that is more liable to fluctuations. These assets are sup-
posed to cover periods of cyclical unemployment or negative wage growth. 
The PAYG cost rate is the result from dividing the total expenditure by the total 
contributory earnings and indicates the contribution rate needed to balance income 
with expenditure. 
Poverty gap index. The index reflects the depth of poverty, in that it depends on the 
distances of the poor below the poverty line as well as the number of poor. This 
index indicates the potential for eliminating poverty by targeting transfers to the 
poor. A drawback of this index is that it neglects inequality among the poor, it may 
not capture differences in the severity of poverty. 
Poverty severity index. The index indicates how the level of inequality among the 
poor. 
Replacement rate. Proportion of pre-retirement income available as an annuity dur-
ing retirement. 
Reserve ratio. An indicator of the level of reserves in a social security scheme com-
pared with annual expenditures, a reserve ratio is determined by dividing the re-
serves at the beginning of the year by the expenditure in that year. The required 
reserve ratios for each social insurance branch are established at actuarial valuations 
(and may be specified in the legislation) and can be monitored at the intervening 
intervals. 
Residualism. The residual welfare model is referred to as a social welfare model 
where market and / or family is first given responsibility for satisfying social needs 
and the state or society intervenes if and / or to the extent that market and / or family 
fails to do so. 
Routine expenditures are monthly spending for salaries payment of civil servants, 
subsidies and other departments’ routine spending costs; while development expen-
ditures are used for financing government development projects and programmes. 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). There is no definitive delineation be-
tween a small and medium sized business. As a general reference, small is often from 
5 to 20 (10) employees, medium from 20 (10) up to 200. Businesses with fewer than 
5 employees are usually called micro-enterprises. Establishments with over 100 em-
ployees are considered large enterprises. 
Social assistance. A system of income support on the principle of need, as deter-
mined by a means test, which is financed from general revenue. 
Social insurance. The technique of pooling risks and finances in autonomous funds 
as the basis for statutory contributory social security schemes for health and income 
protection. 
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Social protection. The set of policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty 
and vulnerability by promoting efficient labour markets, diminishing people’s expo-
sure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and 
interruption / loss of income. The policies and procedures included in social protec-
tion involve five major kinds of activities: labour market policies and programmes, 
social insurance programmes, social assistance, micro and area based schemes and 
child protection. 
Social safety nets. Sometimes the term is used for the whole set of programmes and 
policies which are here included under social protection. Others use it to refer only 
to welfare and targeted programmes for the poor. In many cases, these programmes 
are short-term in nature. 
Social security. Social security is defined by the ILO as the protection which soci-
ety provides for its members through a series of public measures: 
– to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work resulting from 
the contingencies of sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, inva-
lidity, old age, and death, 
– to provide them with health care, and 
– to provide financial support to families with children. 
Total dependency ratio. People aged 0–14 and above 65 as a percentage of those 
aged 15–64. This ratio is the sum of the youth and old-age dependency ratios. 
Total fertility rate. The number of children who would be born to a woman if she 
were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
current age-specific fertility rates. 
Tripartite. The term used to describe equal participation and representation of gov-
ernments and employers’ and workers’ organizations in bodies at the national and 
enterprise level. 
Youth dependency ratio. The ratio of the population younger than age 15 to the 
population aged 15 to 64. 
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– Isabel Ortiz (ed) 2001. Social Protection in Asia and the Pacific. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank. 
– World Bank 2002. World Development Report. Washington, Oxford University 
Press. 
– The results of the workshop on ‘Social Protection in ASEAN’ organized by Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung in June 2001 in Singapore. 
– The country studies on ‘Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia’ published 
by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in this book. 
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